“History,” Voltaire famously observed, “is a pack of tricks we play on the dead.” Attempting to correct this well-observed perversion of the past, Otto von Ranke instructed his students in the 19th century's first “scientific” history seminar to recount the past “as it actually occurred,” basing all accounts strictly on primary source materials. The only problem with this rule of thumb, of course, is that although each event is unique, no two observers see the same thing. What one sees depends on who, what, when, and where one is. So history, necessarily, is a construct, a recounting of the past that owes as much to its writer—and how he or she reconciles conflicting sources—as it does to the actual events described.
Since the 1920s, conventional wisdom about Iran has held that the Qajar dynasty (1796–1925) presided over a weak state unable to cope with modernity, consequently exposing the country to pillage by Western powers, especially Russia and Britain. Following the failure of the Constitutional Revolution and the chaos of World War I, order was restored and a strong state built up by Reza Pahlavi, a Cossack officer who seized power in a 1921 coup d'état and subsequently made himself minister of war, prime minister, and—after a failed effort to create a republic as Mustafa Kemal had done in Turkey—king. Reza Shah modernized Iran; he established a strongly centralized secular state based on a military and civil bureaucracy that he personally controlled. After his 1941 abdication, the state was further developed by his son, Muhammad Reza Shah, and then by the Islamic Republic of Iran, heir to the Pahlavi dictatorship, after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
Although there is much truth in this conventional view, it may not be “the whole truth and nothing but the truth.” Indeed, it may well violate “Einstein's razor,” the dictum that urges us to explain things “as simply as possible, but not more simply.”
In her well-conceived, brilliantly researched, and meticulously detailed new book, Stephanie Cronin seeks to deconstruct what she calls “the discourse of state-building and ‘the man of order’ [Reza Shah]” (p. 3). Instead, she proposes that we look at the decades of Reza Shah's rule in terms of “history from below,” giving attention to events that other historians have neglected or dismissed as insignificant. Rather than viewing the period from 1921 to 1941 as characterized by a progressive dictator's inevitable modernization of an “ossified and moribund ‘traditional’ environment . . . historically redundant and doomed to social extinction” she sees emerging state power being “constantly contested by a wide range of social groups with diverse forms of political representation, modes of action, and ideological vision” (p. 3). Her work seems entirely consistent with Homa Katouzian's view that Iranian history has been a continuing cycle, “yo-yoing” between extremes of arbitrary government and chaos, as well as with Ervand Abrahamian's seminal work on the crowd in Iranian history.
Cronin has organized her book into two parts. The first part, which she titles “From Constitutionalism to Dictatorship,” focuses on the period between 1921 and 1926, when Reza Khan consolidated the power that he seized in February 1921, enabling him to depose the Qajars in 1925 and crown himself the first king of a new Pahlavi dynasty in early 1926. The second part of the book, “The New Order and its Opponents,” looks at Reza Pahlavi's years as shah between 1926 and 1941. With the exception of the initial, introductory chapter in each part, all of the chapters are case studies of important episodes during which Reza's opponents contested his control. These episodes, which are described here in considerably more detail than is otherwise available in Western languages, include the 1921 Pasyan “rebellion” in Mashhad, the 1922 Tabriz Lahuti “insurrection,” disturbances involving the Tehran crowd during Reza's rise to the throne between 1921 and 1925, the 1929 Abadan refinery strike, and the 1939 Jahansuz “conspiracy.”
In her introduction, Cronin argues that the Constitutional Period (1905–11) segued seamlessly into the Pahlavi era and that Reza Khan's rule emerged out of “the embryonic multi-party pluralism nurtured in the space provided by the collapsing Qajar monarchy” (p. 6). She asserts that the “real rupture” between periods, which resulted in the “strong” Pahlavi state—that is to say, an absolute, arbitrary dictatorship—was “not in 1921 but in 1925” (p. 6). Implicit in her presentation is the idea that the “strength” of the government—extolled by its supporters and regretted by its opponents—was illusory, because in crushing resistance—real or imagined—the government made itself deaf to criticism and consequently brittle and subject to being relatively easily swept away.
In her conclusion, Cronin summarizes the details that she presents in previous chapters. She also ties the events of 1921 to 1941 to the much later Iranian Revolution and the 2009 révolution manqué. Her narrative of 1921 to 1941, which might as well describe the present, depicts
the persistence of deep social conflicts, the contested character of political power, and the only very partial reach of the monarchy's ideological hegemony . . . social movements indicative of the contentious political engagement of broad layers of the Iranian people, social groups and categories often either entirely invisible in the literature or present only as passive recipients of the state's agenda, fodder for its fiscal and military policies (p. 261).
She continues by saying that “the mass protests which took place on the streets of Tehran and other cities during the revolutionary period of 1977–1979 . . . owed their character to a deep indigenous tradition of urban protest” (p. 265), a point she has clearly made in terms of the Reza Shah years as well. And,
in 2009 these traditions of urban protest were again to burst onto the political scene, in the form of the massive demonstrations which accompanied the presidential election, both the incumbent, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, and his opponents mobilizing their supporters to vie for control of the streets. In this campaign, and in the political struggles which have followed, the template of popular politics handed down from the Tobacco Protest, through the Constitutional Revolution, the oil nationalization crisis and the 1979 revolution, has once again powerfully reasserted itself (p. 268).
This book is an essential contribution to our knowledge of the interwar period in Iran. Enormous changes took place in Iranian society during these years. Yet historians’ previous focus on change from above and the supposedly all-pervasive importance of the Pahlavi regime has to a great extent blinded the world both to the strength of Iranian culture—a culture that has shaped Iran's history for millennia—and to the important role played by ordinary women and men. Stephanie Cronin's Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran is a long overdue corrective to the simplistic conventional wisdom about Iran's development during the interwar years.
