This book deals with the history of the reduction of working hours in Germany during the late nineteenth century and in the 1950s and 1960s by example of two major companies, Bayer and Siemens. The author's main argument is that what very often appears as a genuine success story of organized labor was in reality much less contested: In the late nineteenth century as well as after World War II, images of cooperation played a decisive role in the reduction of working hours.

The most important cooperative image before World War I was “patriarchalism”: It implicated that entrepreneur/managers remained in full control of the business, but had an obligation to take care of the workers and try to improve their social situation as long as they were members of the Belegschaft (staff). This led to the erection of company housing and social benefits, but it remained absolutely clear that workers’ organizations were not accepted as negotiants in wage bargaining. While the idea of patriarchalism was that of a harmonious relationship between management and workforce, the reality looked different; the reduction in working hours remained contested and finding a resolution that satisfied the different “status groups” inside the firms proved to be very difficult.

While patriarchalism obviously did not lead to consensus on the reduction of working hours, the image of Sozialpartnerschaft, or “social partnership,” fared better, shaping negotiations in the 1950s and 1960s decisively. The idea of social partnership created a paradigm that enabled managers and organized labor to agree on a reduction in working hours without grave conflicts. In this context, it is very important for Albrecht Franz to demonstrate that the ideas of patriarchalism and social partnership were not mere semantics, but actually had a deep impact on the way the reduction was negotiated.

Franz's book has many merits. The general story line appears convincing and the author argues on a remarkably sophisticated level, especially when dealing with organizational theory. However, there are two important critical points to be made.

First, it may be questioned to what degree it is possible to derive general conclusions from the examples of Bayer and Siemens. Both companies had a strong tradition of Betriebliche Sozialpolitik, or company social policy, and relied to a large extent on a skilled workforce. Werner Plumpe has shown, for instance, in his comparison of Bayer and Gelsenkirchener Bergbau AG in the 1920s, that labor relations were much more contested in the mining business than in the chemical industry. So Bayer and Siemens are probably too similar for a fruitful historical comparison. It is only at the very end of the book that the author admits it is difficult to draw general conclusions, as both firms were champions of social policy. But is this not a fact a historical comparison should explain in detail?

A second point of criticism (which is probably a matter of taste): I consider this book to be significantly overtheorized. First of all, the author begins with fifty pages on the theory of neo-institutionalism. Compared with his theoretical examinations, his actual work with historical sources plays a comparatively minor role. On some occasions, Franz gives a theoretical explanation when—at least from my point of view—a historical one is required: to explain in detail how the shortening of labor hours was negotiated, for example, or to provide the background of the historical actors. The author, for instance, gives no real answer to the very often studied question of the degree to which the attitudes toward social policy held by managers who had made their careers during the Nazi period differed from those of the managers of an older generation. So it seems that the high theoretical level of Franz's book sometimes stands in the way of an actual solid historical explanation—and this is not the way it should be.