A ubiquitous specimen of meme culture consists of a piece of graffiti with a short catalogue that reads as follows: ‘Things I hate: 1. Vandalism 2. Irony 3. Lists.’Footnote 1 We might be forgiven for thinking of this text as quintessentially post-modern in its ironic self-reflexivity, its looping self-referentiality. But such playful self-awareness has a much older literary pedigree. The goal of the following discussion is to approach one of the most influential literary theorists of all antiquity with an attentiveness to that playfulness. This article examines On Forms of Style by Hermogenes of Tarsus to show how his discussion of each of the titular forms is written in that stylistic form itself. In other words, Hermogenes’ account of abundance (περιβολή) is written in the abundant style; his description of γοργότης or the rapid style is characterized by a breathless rapidity; and the account of σεμνότης or solemnity features the very techniques that Hermogenes recommends for achieving it. By paying attention to this dynamic, which can be recognized as a basic compositional strategy of the work, we can account for statements of Hermogenes that otherwise seem obscure or out of place.
Hermogenes’ Περὶ ἰδεῶν λόγου was one of the most widely studied texts to emerge from the Second Sophistic.Footnote 2 By the fifth century, On Forms of Style came to be grouped with another work by Hermogenes (On Issues, on stasis theory), two treatises falsely attributed to him (On Invention and On the Method of Force), and the Progymnasmata of Aphthonius to form the ‘Corpus of Hermogenes.’Footnote 3 This became the standard sequence of textbooks in the Byzantine rhetorical curriculum, where it wielded an influence that has been described as ‘practically without parallel in the history of education.’Footnote 4 As a result, On Forms of Style became the most widely read and influential treatment—in the Byzantine tradition at least—of literary criticism from all antiquity.Footnote 5
Hermogenes’ treatise achieved such prominence largely because it offered a more elaborate and flexible system of categorizing literary style than any previous one. Instead of the familiar Hellenistic tripartite division of style into something like the plain, middle and grand styles, Hermogenes presents seven stylistic forms, several of which are further divided into sub-forms to create more than sixteen types.Footnote 6 Hermogenes proceeds methodically, discussing these forms and sub-forms in succession and showing how each can be produced by modulating a set of features including content, diction, rhetorical figures and rhythm. To illustrate his points, Hermogenes provides examples from Classical literature, especially his model rhetor, Demosthenes.Footnote 7 Then, after discussing each form, he adds a general treatment of civic discourse (comprising the traditional divisions of forensic, deliberative and panegyric discourse, II.10.1–20), then a special section on panegyrical discourse (for which he includes historiography, poetry and philosophical dialogues, II.10.21–51), and concludes with assessments of individual authors, in which he applies his system to the analysis of their styles. The focus here will be on the first part of the work, namely his discussion of the forms themselves, up to his treatment of the style of force (δεινότης), which concludes at II.9.42. As suggested above, Hermogenes’ most effective illustrations of those forms of style are not limited to the passages he quotes from Demosthenes’ On the Crown and other trusty warhorses from the Classical period. We turn now to show how Hermogenes’ descriptions of styles constitute actual demonstrations of those styles in and of themselves.
ΣΕΜNΟΤΗΣ ∼ SOLEMNITY
We begin with simpler instances and work up to more involved examples. Thus instead of starting with Hermogenes’ first form, ‘clarity’ or σαφήνεια (which he treats as an umbrella form, leaving substantive discussion to its sub-forms ‘purity’ and ‘distinctness’), let us examine first ‘solemnity’, one of the sub-forms of ‘grandeur’ (μέγεθος). Solemnity is chiefly characterized by ἔννοιαι or ‘thoughts’ (a term that Hermogenes uses for the actual topics of discourse) having to do with the divine, whether the gods themselves, divine things, or god-like human achievements and affairs (I.6.4–11). Hermogenes lists several techniques for producing this form, recommending especially the use of generalizations and universalizing statements.Footnote 8 In describing further techniques, he adds that ‘to relate something that you are going to say to your own opinion is characteristic of dignity and solemnity’ (I.6.27.2–3), and for this he quotes a passage from Thucydides: ‘Agamemnon seems to me to have been one of those who were preeminent in power then,’ (Ἀγαμέμνων τέ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν τότε δυνάμει προὔχων, I.6.27, citing Thuc. 1.9). Keeping these two techniques in mind, namely generalizations and personal opinions, consider Hermogenes’ introduction to his discussion of solemnity, where he says that especially solemn thoughts are those that deal with the gods qua gods. He then clarifies this qualification by quoting a line from Homer that depicts Zeus and Hera in an all-too-human light, saying that such lines do not speak of the gods as gods, and then offers the following comment (I.6.1):
διὸ πόρρω μοι δοκεῖ σεμνότητος εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν, πλέον δὲ μετέχειν ἡδονῆς καὶ γλυκύτητος· ἀνθρωποπαθῶς γὰρ καί, τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, ποιητικῶς λέλεκται, τὸ πλεῖστον δὲ ἡδονῆς ἡ ποίησις οἶμαι στοχάζεται.
Thus they seem to me to be far removed from solemnity in their thought, and to partake rather of pleasure and sweetness; for they have been said in a way that reflects human passions, and also, to speak more generally, in a poetic manner, and poetry for the most part, I think, aims at pleasure.
Here Hermogenes manages to combine a personal opinion (μοι δοκεῖ; cf. how Hermogenes cites Thucydides’ μοι δοκεῖ in the passage quoted above) with two generalizing statements (τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν; τὸ πλεῖστον). Finally, note the quasi-syllogistic linked statements: ποιητικῶς λέλεκται, τὸ πλεῖστον δὲ ἡδονῆς ἡ ποίησις οἶμαι στοχάζεται. This is an example of what Hermogenes will define later as the ‘aphoristic’ quality of the short kôla that contribute to solemnity (I.6.30), where he cites as a famous example the quasi-syllogistic tag from Plato’s Phaedrus (245c): ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος· τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον (‘All soul is immortal; for that which is always in motion is immortal’). Hermogenes’ own quasi-syllogistic observation that certain Homeric lines ‘have been said poetically, and poetry for the most part aims at pleasure’ is calibrated to produce the same aphoristic quality as that reflected in Plato’s proof of the soul’s immortality. Between the generalizations, the personal opinion and the aphoristic ring that concludes this first section in the σεμνότης chapter, Hermogenes has gone out of his way to introduce solemnity in a way that draws on the techniques he will recommend for producing solemnity itself.
ΓΟΡΓΟΤΗΣ ∼ RAPIDITY
We continue with γοργότης, or rapidity. Hermogenes’ listing of the figures of γοργότης is a study in rapidity itself (II.1.12–18):
σχήματα μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἴδους τάδε. τὸ ἀσύνδετον κομματικόν, οἷον· “προσῆλθε τῇ βουλῇ, προβούλευμα ἐγράφη”. τὸ κατ᾽ ὄνομα κομματικόν, οἷον· “Ἀμφίπολιν, Πύδναν, Ποτίδαιαν, Μεθώνην, Παγασάς”. καὶ αἱ πυκναὶ καὶ δι᾽ ἐλαχίστου ἐξαλλαγαί, οἷον· “τὸ πρῶτον Ἀμφίπολιν λαβών, μετὰ ταῦτα Πύδναν, πάλιν Ποτίδαιαν, Μεθώνην αὖθις, εἶτα Θετταλίας ἐπέβη” καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. οἵ τε δι᾽ ἐλαχίστου λόγου μερισμοὶ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν ἔχοντες, οἷον· “ἑσπέρα μὲν γὰρ ἦν, ἧκε δ᾽ ἀγγέλλων τις ὡς τοὺς πρυτάνεις, ὡς Ἐλάτεια κατείληπται”. τὸ κατ᾽ ἐπαναφορὰν κομματικόν, οἷον· “ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους καλεῖς, ἐπὶ σαυτὸν καλεῖς”. τὸ κατ᾽ ἀντιστροφὴν κομματικόν, οἷον· “ταξιάρχους παρ᾽ ὑμῶν, ἄρχοντας παρ᾽ ὑμῶν”.
The figures of this form are therefore as follows: kommata that are made with asyndeton, as in ‘he came to the council, a proposal was written’; kommata that are made up of names, as in ‘Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidaea, Methone, Pagasae’; slight changes that follow in close succession, as in ‘First taking Amphipolis, after that Pydna, then Potidaea, further still Methone, then he invaded Thessaly’ and so on. The divisions of a statement formed briefly and that are followed by an apodosis, as in, ‘For it was evening, and someone came to announce to the prytaneis that Elateia was taken’; kommata that are formed in epanaphora, as in ‘you call to the laws, you call to yourself’; kommata that are formed in antistrophe, as in ‘taxiarchs from you, rulers from you’.
Such a hurried tour of figures is unusual in Hermogenes. This brisk catalogue is in fact an example of γοργότης itself. He notes that kommata formed through asyndeton are characteristic of rapidity, and indeed this passage is almost entirely devoid of conjunctions or connecting particles. Noteworthy also are the last two examples cited, regarding kommata formed with epanaphora and antistrophe, referring to phrases beginning with the same word(s) and ending with the same word(s), respectively. The two phrases that Hermogenes uses to introduce his examples demonstrate both epanaphora and antistrophe: τὸ κατ᾽ ἐπαναφορὰν κομματικόν … τὸ κατ᾽ ἀντιστροφὴν κομματικόν. Or perhaps these phrases might better be characterized as featuring ‘slight changes differing only slightly and following in close succession’. Regardless of how one classifies them, Hermogenes’ account of figures that produce rapidity should be seen as exemplifying rapidity itself.
ΔΡΙΜΥΤΗΣ ∼ PUNGENCY
Hermogenes sums up this form by saying it consists ‘not in speaking subtly, but saying subtle things in a simple and relaxed way’ (τὸ μὴ περινενοημένως λέγειν, ἁπλῶς δὲ καὶ ἀνειμένως τὰ περινενοημένα, ΙΙ.5.1), adding that its thoughts are ‘deep in their superficiality’ (ἐξ ἐπιπολῆς βαθεῖαι, ibid.), often requiring explanation. The adjective δριμύς is used properly of powerful or stinging tastes or smells, and when used to describe language, we might follow the LSJ in thinking of translations like ‘keen’ or ‘shrewd’, or the formula ‘striking turns of phrase’.Footnote 9 Hermogenes tends to use δριμύτης the way one talks about a ‘pregnant’ phrase that carries more significance than it might seem to at first. A common means of ‘saying subtle things in a simple way’, as Hermogenes describes, is to repeat or echo a key word or idea in one of three ways: by similarity of sound (we get the example μέλλει … μέλει), by paronomasia—defined here as a word used properly and then in an extended sense—or by first using an unobtrusive metaphor, and then developing that metaphor in a bold way (II.5.10–13).
We get such a pregnant expression produced through verbal repetition in Hermogenes’ description of pungency’s diction. He notes, pointedly, that ‘in and of itself, the diction that produces pungency has nothing pungent about it’ (ἡ λέξις δὲ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἡ ποιοῦσα τὴν δριμύτητα οὐδὲν ἔχει τῆς δριμύτητος, II.5.2), if, that is, we separate it from the thought that is being expressed. In noting that ‘the diction that produces pungency has nothing pungent about it’, Hermogenes makes a subtle point in simple fashion, and in such a way that he must immediately unpack its meaning. Moreover, he produces this simply expressed but subtle point by taking a key word—here δριμύτητα itself—and then repeating it in a way that makes the reader pause and think again about what they have just read. Seen in this way, the form of expression used here aligns with Hermogenes’ subsequent description of how δριμύτης is often produced ‘in combination between a particular word and certain things said beforehand’ (κατ᾽ ἀκολουθίαν τινῶν προρρηθέντων ἀπό τινος λέξεως, II.5.9), which involves a repetition or twist of sound, of the exact word or of the metaphor in question. To claim that ‘in and of itself, the diction of pungency has nothing pungent about it’ is to make a subtle point in a deceptively simple way, and thus offer an encapsulation of pungency itself.
ΕΝΔΙΑΘΕΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ ∼ SPONTANEOUS DISCOURSE
Hermogenes uses the term ἐνδιάθετος λόγος not in the Stoic sense of ‘inner thought’ that is opposed to ‘pronounced’ thought (προφορικὸς λόγος), but rather for ‘spontaneous discourse’ that is used against an opponent. This is an alternative term which Hermogenes employs for the style of ἀλήθεια οr ‘sincerity’, and its distinguishing characteristic is seemingly unpremeditated emotional language. After listing figures that produce ‘spontaneous discourse’ (II.7.39), he adds a jarring aside about Demosthenes’ use of one of the figures in question (II.7.42–3):
καὶ παρέσχε μυρία τοιαῦτα πράγματα ζητοῦσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἰαλέμοις τούτοις, οἵ φασιν ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὸν ῥήτορα καὶ δὴ καὶ βιβλία καταλιπεῖν ἐτόλμησαν τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἐξηγήσεων, ἃ καὶ νῦν ἐξελίττοντες οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν διδασκάλων οἴονταί τινες εἶναι καὶ τοὺς συνόντας πείθουσιν, ὅμοιοι, φασίν, ὁμοίους. ποῦ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἰδεῖν τι τοιοῦτον, ὅτι ἔλαβεν ὡς ὁμολογούμενον ὁ ῥήτωρ βουλόμενος τοῦτο ἐνδείξασθαι …;
He has offered countless such problems to these fools who investigate him, who say that they are explaining the rhetor and have even dared to publish books of commentaries on him, which many teachers now read and think that they are somebody special, and they persuade their students that they are too, like following like, as they say. For where is it possible for them to see any such thing as the rhetor having assumed as a given what he was wanting to demonstrate … ?
It is unclear who all these foolish commentators on Demosthenes are—Patillon notes that there is a single surviving example of a scholiast making such a comment about Demosthenes’ use of the figure in question—and why Hermogenes should feel the need to express his disapproval of them so vehemently, and why here of all places.Footnote 10 But Hermogenes’ caustic censuring in fact demonstrates the style of ἐνδιάθετος λόγος itself. He had just been giving a catalogue of the features that produce ‘spontaneous discourse’. They include abusive and vehement diction (II.7.28); abrupt displays of seemingly un-premeditated emotion, as when Demosthenes says, ‘and this filthy wretch was conscious of this!’ (II.7.12–13, quoting Dem. 19.199); the pejorative use of the demonstrative adjective (τὸ δεικτικόν, II.7.34); and finally, critical judgements or epikriseis, which in Hermogenes’ examples are cast in the form of rhetorical questions (II.7.37). All of the above feature prominently in our passage: Hermogenes’ sudden outburst of scorn against these presumptuous commentators; his uncharacteristic use of an abusive word like ἰάλεμος and the seemingly gratuitous appearance of the pejorative demonstrative τούτοις; even his indignant question, ‘how could these commentators possibly believe that Demosthenes would do what they are claiming he does?’. The reason Hermogenes breaks into this spontaneous rant is because he is giving an example of ἐνδιάθετος λόγος—the spontaneous and sincere style—in action.
Other spontaneous outbursts appear in this section as well. After citing Aelius Aristides (Or. 5.40) for an example of a method of producing spontaneous discourse, Hermogenes adds the following (II.7.6):
λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὡς τούτου βελτίονος ὄντος, ὧν ὁ Δημοσθένης εἶπε—μαινοίμην γὰρ ἄν, εἰ τοῦτο λέγοιμι—ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκείνου ἀληθινώτερόν ἐστιν.
I am not saying that this is better than what Demosthenes said—for I would be raving mad if I said such a thing—but that it is more sincere.
The sudden protest, urging the reader not to believe that Hermogenes could be capable of such an act, attracts the reader’s attention. Sure enough, later in the same paragraph, Hermogenes quotes as an example of spontaneous sincere emotion Demosthenes making a similar protest to convince his audience not to believe he could be capable of the behaviour that is being imputed to him (II.7.7, quoting Dem. 19.172): ἐξώλης ἀπολοίμην καὶ προώλης, εἰ προσλαβὼν ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ μετὰ τούτων ἐπρέσβευσα (‘May I completely and utterly perish, if it was after taking a great deal of money that I went on an embassy with them’). Hermogenes’ seemingly spontaneous protest (‘I would be raving mad if I said such a thing’) anticipates the example of spontaneous emotion that he quotes from Demosthenes (‘May I perish if I <did such a thing>’).
ΠΕΡΙΒΟΛΗ ∼ ABUNDANCE
This effect is especially apparent in Hermogenes’ discussion of περιβολή, or ‘abundance’.Footnote 11 This is partially because this form can be easy to recognize in practice, as it is closely associated not with specific diction but rather with pleonasm (Ι.11.22):
λέξις δὲ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἰδία περιβολῆς, ὥσπερ ἦσαν ἄλλαι τινὲς ἴδιαι τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν … εἰ μή τις τὰς ἰσοδυναμούσας ἑτέραις λέξεσι διὰ τὸ ἐκ παραλλήλου δύνασθαι τίθεσθαι περιβολῆς ἰδίας λέγοι.
There is no kind of diction that is proper in and of itself to abundance, as there were some types of diction that were proper to the other forms … unless one should claim that phrases that are synonymous with other phrases are proper to abundance because they can be placed in parallel with one another.
Hermogenes’ explanation of how pleonasm can help achieve abundance is an extravagant specimen of pleonasm itself. He spends seven entire sections (I.11.22–8) belabouring the same point that abundance is produced not through a single type of diction but rather synonymous phrases used in parallel. Thus within the space of a few lines he has the following two sentences regarding pleonastic expression: ‘Through their arrangement next to one another I think, they create the impression of having been abundantly developed’ (τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλας οἶμαι συμπλοκῇ καὶ τὴν ἔμφασιν τοῦ περιβεβλῆσθαι ποιοῦσιν, I.11.24). Then a moment later we find the same thought, altered in form through a series of artful variations: ‘But the placement [of synonymous expressions] in parallel has created, perhaps, a certain impression of abundance’ (ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἐκ παραλλήλου θέσις αὐτῶν πεποίηκεν ἴσως τινὰ ἔμφασιν περιβολῆς, I.11.25). Hermogenes has just identified as a textbook example of abundance the repetition in quick succession of the same idea in altered form, and then he goes out and does exactly that, ringing the changes in his alterations of the lexical units that comprise the first sentence: τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλας … συμπλοκῇ becomes ἡ ἐκ παραλλήλου θέσις; the distancing effect achieved by οἶμαι is made instead through ἴσως; and the phrase τὴν ἔμφασιν περιβεβλῆσθαι becomes τινὰ ἔμφασιν περιβολῆς. Hermogenes indulges in pleonasm precisely when he explains how pleonasm produces abundance.Footnote 12
The realization that Hermogenes is tacitly but extensively drawing upon the abundant style in discussing περιβολή might offer some validation to readers of Hermogenes who come away from this section with a sneaking suspicion that it drags on a bit. A rough but revealing comparison of page ranges in Patillon’s edition suggests that Hermogenes’ treatment of ‘abundance’ is the most abundantly furnished section of the whole work, and by some margin: it clocks in at about 20 pages (89–109), with the next longest, on κάλλος, at 17 (109–25). In contrast, some forms receive much briefer treatment, such as σφοδρότης at four pages (71–4), or λαμπρότης (75–80) or βαρύτης (182–7) at six apiece. When it comes to demonstrating περιβολή in action, quantity has a quality all its own.
ΚΑΘΑΡΟΤΗΣ ∼ PURITY
A key figure for ‘purity’ is ‘direct construction’ (ὀρθότης, I.3.10–11), or simple syntax, and the avoidance of plagiasmos, or ‘oblique construction’, a term which for Hermogenes means beginning statements with participial clauses, including but not limited to genitive absolutes.Footnote 13 Virtually no sentence here begins with a participial clause, with the sole exception proving the rule through its simplicity.Footnote 14 That this is noteworthy is clear from Hermogenes’ treatment of the next form: purity’s sister-form ‘distinctness’ (εὐκρίνεια), while similar to καθαρότης in many respects, is different when it comes to its figures, in that no mention is made of the avoidance of plagiasmos (I.4.11–16), the ‘oblique construction’. Sure enough, in Hermogenes’ account of εὐκρίνεια one finds circumstantial participles beginning sentences (I.4.3.11; I.4.15.7–9), as well as a sentence that begins with an attributive participial clause (I.4.5), which never happens in the description of καθαρότης, in addition to greater syntactic complexity in general, such as articular infinitives twice serving as the subject of transitive verbs (Ι.4.3.1–3; I.4.9.1–2), which again Hermogenes avoids in describing καθαρότης. In other words, it is not an accident that Hermogenes’ description of purity is characterized by simple syntax—this is how he demonstrates purity in action.
ΕΥΚΡΙΝΕΙΑ ∼ DISTINCTNESS
As mentioned above, ‘distinctness’ is a sister-form to purity, and while there is considerable overlap between the two—they share the same diction, kôla, arrangement (συνθῆκαι), cadences (ἀναπαύσεις) and rhythms (Ι.4.10, Ι.4.17)—distinctness is distinguished by trafficking heavily in what today one would call ‘signposting’: clear transitions (συμπληρώσεις, an idiomatic usage, Ι.4.7) that mark the end of one topic and the beginning of another; recapitulations (ἐπαναλήψεις, Ι.4.14) that repeat earlier points after digressions; announcements that signal future topics (I.4.5.1–2); and the ‘defined grouping figure’ (τὸ κατ᾽ ἄθροισιν ὡρισμένον, I.4.11) that tells the audience that topics X and Y are to be immediately treated. Noteworthy is also the role distinctness plays in correcting (διορθοῦται, I.4.1) speech that has gotten off track.
It may not come as a surprise by this point that this chapter is full of such signposting language. There are plenty of well-marked transitions;Footnote 15 an obvious example of the ‘defined grouping’ figure appears immediately following Hermogenes’ description of it and the example he cites from Demosthenes;Footnote 16 and a clearly marked recapitulation early in the chapter.Footnote 17 But those represent the basic tools for discursive organization that a treatise—even a literary treatise like On Forms of Style—simply cannot do without. Unsurprisingly, similarly formulated transitions and recapitulations appear throughout the discussions of other forms. What makes the sign-posting of this section on distinctness stand out is a quirk that shows clearly how Hermogenes puts into practice his own advice for producing the distinct style, and which represents the most curious feature of this entire discussion. On no fewer than five occasions in this relatively short section, Hermogenes either dismisses a question as related to the topic of force—the ultimate form—and not connected to the subject at hand, or announces that he will devote a thorough discussion to it when he gets to force.Footnote 18 Even without considering the relative brevity of the treatment of εὐκρίνεια, this represents an outlier, as eight out of the fifteen other forms treated before force have no such instances, two have one, and only one other discussion has as many as four moments when Hermogenes says that he will return to a topic more fully when he gets to force—and as we will see, that runner-up section is another exception that proves the rule.Footnote 19 The reason that so many cross-references to the discussion on force appear in the section on distinctness is because they help demonstrate distinctness in action, as some of them function to announce in advance a subject that will be treated subsequently (a ‘thought’ characteristic of distinctness; I.4.5.1–2), while others correct the speech by dismissing a tangent and returning the discussion to its main thread. These course corrections should be considered in the light of one of the opening statements in the chapter, on how distinctness ‘corrects’ the course of the speech ‘if because of some necessity it suffers anything that is counter to its pure style, the sort of mistakes which happen frequently in speeches’ (εἴ τι πάσχοι ὑπεναντίον αὐτῇ κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην τινά, αἳ δὲ πολλαὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους εἰσὶ ἁμαρτίαι, διορθοῦται, I.4.1).
Tellingly, the runner-up section—rapidity, with four such instances—has its own reasons for announcing that a topic will be treated later on in the discussion of force.Footnote 20 One figure Hermogenes recommends for producing rapidity is what he calls the σχῆμα τὸ καθ᾽ ὑποστροφήν, which as his examples make clear refers to incidental or parenthetical remarks that are followed by a return to the main topic.Footnote 21 It is as such parenthetical remarks that this section’s course-corrections after mentioning the upcoming discussion on force are functioning. Not only that, but they twice echo closely the language of the example of a parenthetical remark that Hermogenes cites from Demosthenes (ΙΙ.1.8, citing Dem. 19.10):
ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων αἰσθόμενος Φίλιππον—εἶθ᾽ ὑπέστρεψεν ἐξ ἐπεμβολῆς—ὡς τότε δημηγορῶν ἔφη—εἶτα πάλιν ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀφήσησιν—ἐπιβουλεύσαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησι.
‘This man therefore is the first Athenian who perceived that Philip’—then he turns about through a parenthetical remark—‘as he said then when he was speaking in the assembly’—then he comes back to the narration—‘was plotting against the Greeks.’
Compare Demosthenes’ parenthetical ὡς τότε δημηγορῶν ἔφη with Hermogenes’ parenthetical remark about dealing with a topic in the section on force: περὶ δὲ ταύτης ὅπερ ἔφην ἔν τε τῷ περὶ ἀφελείας ἔν τε τῷ περὶ δεινότητος ἡμῖν λελέξεται. νυνὶ δὲ περὶ μεθόδου τῆς ποιούσης γοργὸν τὸν λόγον πρῶτον λέξομεν (II.1.3) (‘As I said, we will discuss this both in the discussion on simplicity and in the one on force, but now we will talk first about the method that produces the rapid style’). Likewise, after another parenthetical remark about a problem to be treated in his discussion of force (ἐν τῷ περὶ δεινότητος μεθόδου ἐροῦμεν), the way Hermogenes ‘returns back’ to his main thread (ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸν περὶ γοργότητος λόγον πάλιν ἐπανιτέον, ΙΙ.1.29) echoes the way he had described Demosthenes ‘coming back’ to his own main narrative after a parenthetical aside (πάλιν ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀφήγησιν, ΙΙ.1.8). Finally, Hermogenes explicitly compares the parenthetical remarks of rapidity to the course-corrections of distinctness (II.1.10). The former rescue rapidity from lapsing into flatness (ὑπτιότης), while the latter clear up any confusion that mars clarity (σαφήνεια). It is not a coincidence that the section on rapidity is the one that most closely resembles the distinctness chapter, with its striking number of cross-references to the future section on force. These insistent references to an upcoming discussion are themselves demonstrations of the methods and figures that produce distinctness and rapidity.
ΚΑΛΛΟΣ ∼ BEAUTY
Hermogenes’ treatment of κάλλος focuses on the figures that contribute to the style. A prominent example is παρίσωσις, or clauses that are carefully balanced with respect to both rhythm and rhyme. Hermogenes cites a famous example from the Symposium (Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου, Ι.12.20 on Symp. 185c), where Plato was spoofing the affected style of sophists like Isocrates. A couple sentences later, when discussing overlap between vigour, brilliance and beauty, Hermogenes treats us to a highly wrought double example of παρίσωσις of his own: τὰ γὰρ ἀκμαῖά τε καὶ ὡραῖα—καὶ σώματα καὶ ὅ τι βούλει—πάντως καὶ λαμπρὰ καὶ καλά (I.12.23) (‘For what is vigourous and in bloom—whether bodies or whatever you like—is necessarily also brilliant and beautiful’).
ΤΡΑΧΥΤΗΣ ∼ ASPERITY, ΣΦΟΔΡΟΤΗΣ ∼ VEHEMENCE
Asperity and vehemence are sister-forms characterized by expressions of criticism and abuse, and they are distinguished from one another by the nature of the target of that criticism. For Hermogenes, vehemence targets one’s ‘inferiors’, while ‘the thoughts of asperity are all those that openly feature reproof of superior persons’ (I.7.5.1–3). What Hermogenes has in mind by ‘superior persons’ becomes clear through his examples from Demosthenes. As Patillon notes, Demosthenes’ ‘superiors’ are none other than his Athenian audience.Footnote 22 Hermogenes specifies that this reproof often takes the form of an attempt to ‘correct’ the behaviour of the audience: ‘you will not lack such examples, I mean those that contain corrective advice of some sort’ (Ι.7.11.1–2). Hermogenes draws one such example from the Epistles attributed to Demosthenes, where he rebukes his audience for not being ashamed at favouring Aristogeiton over himself: ‘Do you feel shame neither before others nor before yourselves over the fact that, in the same circumstances under which you acquitted Aristogeiton, you have exiled Demosthenes?’ (I.7.10, citing Dem. Ep. 3.37). A few lines later, in discussing where other examples might be found, and noting that unsoftened asperity is rare in Demosthenes, Hermogenes chides his own audience for the possibility that they might consider favouring Aristogeiton: ‘Examples of unsoftened asperity are indeed exceedingly rare in the works of the rhetor, as I said, but Aristogeiton will offer you abundant examples, if, that is, you would be willing to draw examples even from him’ (παραδείγματα δὲ τῆς ἀπαραμυθήτου τραχύτητος παρὰ μὲν τῷ ῥήτορι καὶ πάνυ ἐστίν, ὡς ἔφην, σπάνια, ὁ δὲ Ἀριστογείτων σοι ἄφθονα παρέξεται, εἰ καὶ παρ᾽ ἐκείνου βούλοιο λαβεῖν παραδείγματα, Ι.7.12). Hermogenes suggests that his audience should feel ashamed of themselves for even considering Aristogeiton, just a few lines after citing an example of asperity from Demosthenes where the latter says his audience should feel ashamed of themselves for favouring the very same rhetor. Hermogenes’ demonstration of the form of asperity in action, here following closely in the footsteps of his hero, could not be clearer.
Vehemence is similar to asperity, with one important distinction (I.8.1.1–7):
The thoughts of vehemence are likewise those having to do with rebuke and reproof, just like asperity. But asperity is used against superior persons, as well as the members of the jury or assembly themselves … while vehemence is used against inferior persons, such as against one’s opponents or against whomever the audience would enjoy hearing it.
In other words, criticism of one’s audience, whose goodwill one nevertheless seeks to maintain, is the mark of asperity, while vehemence is characterized by criticism of a third party whose favour the speaker does not need to cultivate. Since the main difference between asperity and vehemence has to do with the target of the speaker’s criticism, let us suppose that if Hermogenes offers a snarky demonstration of vehemence in action, it will differ from his ironical demonstration of asperity (‘if, that is, you would be willing to draw examples even from him’) in its target. We saw that with asperity, Hermogenes suggested that his own audience should feel shame for even considering drawing from Aristogeiton for inspiration. Compare this to a catty aside he makes while discussing vehemence, after repeating that vehemence is different from asperity in that it cannot be used against one’s superiors, unless the audience would enjoy listening to it, which he declares ‘is clear from the above even to anyone with a little feel for rhetoric’ (δῆλον ἐκ τούτων καὶ ὅτῳ μικρὸν αἰσθήσεως τῆς περὶ λόγους μέτεστιν, Ι.8.4). Such personal asides deserve special scrutiny, and here Hermogenes’ scorn is directed not against the reader themselves—contrast this with the second-person address in asperity’s εἰ καὶ παρ᾽ ἐκείνου βούλοιο λαβεῖν παραδείγματα—but against an unnamed and intellectually inferior third party. Moreover, since the belittling attitude is directed at a third party, Hermogenes implicitly flatters the reader, as he is effectively co-opting and associating them with himself in an in-group that does have a decent feel for rhetoric. This results in the situation that Hermogenes described as characteristic of vehemence, namely the use of reproachful language directed not against one’s superiors (that is, his audience), but against a third party and in a way that pleases the audience.
ΛΑΜΠΡΟΤΗΣ ∼ BRILLIANCE
The form of λαμπρότης, a sub-form of grandeur, is treated at first as a kind of flourish or ‘lustre’ (Wooten’s translation for φαιδρότης at I.9.1) for enhancing grandeur and its other sub-forms in the way that the forms of sweetness or simplicity can be enhanced, albeit by a different form of adornment (ὡραϊσμός). This may not sound particularly enlightening, but its significance will become clearer. Hermogenes then goes on to clarify that its thoughts are characterized by the speaker’s confidence in what he has to say, whether because that includes glorious deeds, or because he accomplished them skilfully, or because the audience will enjoy hearing about them—essentially instances where the speaker has a chance to ‘shine’ (Ι.9.4). The section on the figures of brilliance is more concrete: they include, besides asyndeton, rhetorical negations (ἀναιρέσεις) and ‘resumptions’ (ἀποστάσεις) (Ι.9.12–13). The figure of ἀναίρεσις can be quickly identified in Hermogenes’ account of brilliance by noting his example from On the Crown: ‘It was not with stones that I fortified this city, nor with bricks, nor is it in these things … ’ (οὐ λίθοις ἐτείχισα τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲ πλίνθοις ἐγώ, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις …, I.9.12, quoting Dem. De cor. 299). This example consists, like a priamel, of a series of negations that serve to amplify a larger point. If we return to the beginning of the chapter where Hermogenes described how brilliance serves as a kind of lustre to adorn grandeur and its sub-forms, but not quite in the way the forms of simplicity and sweetness are adorned, we find Hermogenes employing anairesis himself (I.9.2):
φαιδρότης δὲ οὐ τῆς ἐν ὡραϊσμῷ, ἣ γλυκύτητός τε καὶ ἀφελείας ἐστίν, οὐδὲ τῆς κατ᾽ ἐπιμέλειαν συνθήκης κάλλος ἐχούσης τι … οὔκουν ταύτης δεῖ φαιδρότητος τῷ μεγέθει ὡς καθ᾽ αὑτό, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀξιωματικῆς.
Not the lustre in adornment which belongs to sweetness and simplicity, nor that which consists in the care shown to arrangement and which has a certain beauty to it … it is thus not this lustre in and of itself that grandeur needs, but that proper to dignity.
The way Hermogenes incorporates the figure of ἀπόστασις into his account of brilliance is more involved. For Hermogenes, ἀπόστασις is a break followed by the ‘resumption’ of a subject anew, a ‘return to the beginning’. But he then tweaks this by adding that if you ‘return the speech with a declaration of your purpose to the beginning by making use of direct construction, and do not immediately make use of oblique construction or add another figure that contributes to abundance and necessarily draws out the text at length, it becomes less brilliant’, noting that such an instance would be characteristic instead of ‘purity’ (I.9.14). What this is supposed to mean becomes clearer by the example he cites and analyzes: ὑμεῖς τοίνυν, Λακεδαιμονίων γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἀρχόντων … (Dem. De cor. 96). Here in Demosthenes the return to and resumption of the main thread (cf. τοίνυν and LSJ s.v. 3b) leads immediately into an oblique construction, the genitive absolute. This is what Hermogenes himself does after the opening section about brilliance serving as a type of lustre for the forms of grandeur, a section which, though framing the whole chapter, said more about what brilliance is not than what it is. After that initial digression concludes, Hermogenes resumes his main discussion with a more helpful description of what brilliance actually consists of: ‘Discourse then becomes brilliant with respect to its thought … ’ (γίνεται τοίνυν λόγος λαμπρὸς κατὰ ἔννοιαν μέν, ὅταν … Ι.9.4). We thus have the ἀπόστασις or ‘resumption’, also signalled by the particle τοίνυν just as in the example from Demosthenes, but we still have to remember Hermogenes’ warning that the ἀπόστασις must immediately be followed by an oblique construction or another figure contributing to abundance, or instead of brilliance we will end up with purity. And indeed there immediately follows a figure that plays a major role in producing abundance: not so much the subordinate clause embedded within another subordinate clause (ὅταν … ἐφ᾽ οἷς, I.9.4.2), but the μέν in κατὰ ἔννοιαν μέν (I.9.4) that has to wait for more than an entire Budé page for its answering δέ (I.9.7.1). Hermogenes in fact discusses this figure—namely the delayed δέ—in the section on περιβολή, while describing μερισμός, the ‘distribution’ of material into μέν and δέ clauses. He notes that making the audience wait longer for the δέ clause to answer its μέν clause is particularly effective for producing περιβολή (Ι.11.44, citing Dem. 2.3, 4):
διὰ μακροῦ μὲν γὰρ ὅτε ἀπολαμβάνοι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, περιβάλλει πάντως, οἷον· “τὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν Φιλίππου ῥώμην διεξιέναι καὶ διὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων προτρέπειν τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς” μέχρι τοῦ “ἃ δὲ καὶ χωρὶς τούτων ἔνι”· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις.
For whenever the answering clause arrives after a long interval, it necessarily creates abundance, as in ‘For on the one hand to discuss the strength of Philip and through such arguments to encourage you to do what is necessary’ up until ‘but on the other hand, apart from them it is possible for me’. For this is where the answering clause appears.
In other words, Hermogenes’ resumption (ἀπόστασις) of his main thread in discussing λαμπρότης at I.9.4 (γίνεται τοίνυν λόγος λαμπρὸς κατὰ ἔννοιαν μέν) is immediately followed by a figure that produces abundance (the long-delayed δέ clause that comes at μεθοδεύσεις δέ, I.9.7.1). This is precisely how Hermogenes recommends employing ἀπόστασις to produce brilliance at I.9.14, where he warns us that when making use of ἀπόστασις or a ‘fresh start’ (signalled in his example from Demosthenes with the resumptive use of τοίνυν), if we do not ‘immediately make use of oblique construction or add another figure that contributes to abundance (σχῆμα περιβλητικόν) and necessarily draws out the text at length, it becomes less brilliant.’ Thus, the ‘resumption’ or ἀπόστασις that begins the second paragraph of the section on brilliance itself demonstrates the brilliant style.
ΑΚΜH ∼ VIGOUR
Vigour is a compound form which Hermogenes defines as the mixture of brilliance and either asperity or vehemence. It combines the critical and abusive thoughts of asperity and vehemence with the confident flair and stylistic complexity of brilliance.Footnote 23 This might not seem complicated, but the chapter proves to be among the more involved of the whole treatise, and at one point Hermogenes somehow manages to get himself sidetracked in a controversy over whether it is vigour that borrows features of brilliance, or if those belong equally to vigour itself (Ι.10.17–18):
διὸ οὐδὲ ἀντακολουθοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἀκμὴ πάντως ἔχει τι καὶ λαμπρότητος, οὐ μὴν ἥ γε λαμπρότης ἔχει τι ἀκμῆς, εἰ μή τις ἐρίζων βιαίως λέγοι ταῦτα, ἃ ἦν ἴδια λαμπρότητος, τὴν μακροκωλίαν λέγω καὶ τὰ ἀποστατικὰ σχήματα καὶ εἴ τι ἕτερον, διὰ τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν εὑρίσκεσθαι ἰσάζειν καὶ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἐντεῦθεν ἐκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖθεν ἐνθάδε μετενηνέχθαι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν ἐστι σαφὴς λῆρος· φανερὰ γὰρ ταῦτά γε καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ψιλῇ, ὡς ἴδια μέν ἐστι λαμπρότητος, ἀκμὴ δὲ οὐδὲ ἔχει γενέσεως ὑπόστασιν καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μῖξις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς τραχύτητος ἢ σφοδρότητος καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς λαμπρότητος ποιεῖ τὴν ἀκμήν.
Therefore they do not reciprocate with one another, but vigour necessarily has something of brilliance, while brilliance does not necessarily have anything of vigour, unless somebody in a spirit of contentiousness should make the forced claim that since the characteristics of brilliance, I mean the use of long clauses and the figure of resumption and so on, are found in the case of each form, they belong equivalently to each, and that no characteristic is thus transferred from one to the other or vice versa. But this is clearly garbage, since it is readily apparent even to plain sense that these characteristics belong to brilliance, while vigour does not have substance to come into being on its own, but it is the mixture of characteristics of asperity or vehemence and brilliance that produces vigour.
This supposed controversy, which somehow arouses Hermogenes’ ire, exists simply for the sake of allowing Hermogenes to demonstrate vigour in action. In the passage quoted, two stylistic features jump off the page, namely the long, complex clauses and Hermogenes’ contemptuous remarks regarding his opponents, whose contentious claims he harshly criticizes as ‘clearly garbage’ (σαφὴς λῆρος), adding that this should be obvious ‘even to plain sense’ (καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ψιλῇ).Footnote 24 Those contemptuous remarks regarding his opponents are characteristic of vehemence, while the use of long clauses Hermogenes describes in this very passage (repeating what he said at I.9.18) as a feature of brilliance. That combination of vehemence or asperity with brilliance is of course what defines vigour—the very point which Hermogenes has been belabouring.
ΕΠΙΕIΚΕΙΑ ∼ MODESTY
In the first sentence of his account of ἐπιείκεια, Hermogenes defines one of its main characteristics as when the speaker deliberately undersells their own achievements or abilities (ὅταν ἑκόντα τις αὑτὸν μειονεκτοῦντα δεικνύῃ, ΙΙ.6.1, ‘when one shows oneself willingly accepting an inferior state’).Footnote 25 He then offers an example from Against Conon where Demosthenes says ‘he could also have brought charges of robbery and outrageous behaviour but instead settled to bring only a charge of assault’ (II.6.1.3–4, citing Dem. 54.1.24). We should keep this definition and example in mind when we reach a later point in the section on ἐπιείκεια, where Hermogenes cites two other passages from Demosthenes, one in which he magnifies his achievements and a second in which he diminishes them. Hermogenes notes that the second passage offers a good example of how to produce the ‘modest’ style, and then adds that examples of this method are rare in Demosthenes, and that thus, ‘I at least could not find off the top of my head another example of such a method from the rhetor or anyone else’ (II.6.11.2–4). Underscoring the point, in the next sentence he repeats his assertion that he could not find any example (II.6.12). But Hermogenes certainly could come up with another example from Demosthenes off the top of his head, since it was with just such an example from Against Conon that he began this section on ἐπιείκεια. Hermogenes is deliberately selling himself short—at just the moment where he describes how selling yourself short is the way to produce ἐπιείκεια.
In case we missed it, Hermogenes plays a similar trick a few pages later, when he describes how paraleipsis contributes to ἐπιείκεια, and how that can be done ‘either by omitting things in their entirety, or by mentioning something without adding any additional information, but simply indicating it and making a kind of addition of something undefined’ (II.6.20.5–7). Hermogenes in fact had used paraleipsis himself earlier in the same section, when emphasizing the difficulty of finding suitable examples of the form of ἐπιείκεια, but suggesting that he has given the reader some idea of what he has in mind (II.6.12):
ἐνδείξασθαι μέντοι σαφῶς τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ δεδυνῆσθαι νομίζω, ὥστε τάχα οὐ χαλεπῶς καὶ παραδείγματα ἴδια τοῦ εἴδους εὕροι τις ἂν ζητῶν, εἰ φροντίσειεν. εἴη δ᾽ ἂν οὐκ ὀλίγα παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι, ἔνθα ἂν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔχῃ τι λέγειν περὶ αὑτοῦ, καὶ οἶμαί γε εἶναί τι τοιοῦτον ἐν τῷ Χαρμίδῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ μετὰ τοὺς Ἀλκιβιάδου λόγους καὶ πολλαχοῦ μέντοι.
I believe however that it has been possible to indicate its nature, so that if you were to look you would likely find without difficulty examples that are properly characteristic of the form, if you should care to do so. In Plato there would be no few examples, wherever Socrates has something to say about himself, and I think at least that there is some example of this sort in the Charmides and in the Symposium after Alcibiades’ speech, but also in many other places.
These references to unspecified passages in the Charmides and Symposium correspond to the second kind of paraleipsis Hermogenes describes, namely the one which the speaker produces ‘by mentioning something but not adding any additional information, but simply indicating it and making a kind of addition of something undefined’. The casual nods to Platonic dialogues give the impression that Hermogenes could say more about them if he wanted to, but that he is deliberately limiting himself, and this is exactly how Hermogenes says that Demosthenes produces the style of ἐπιείκεια when, employing the figure of paraleipsis, he mentions events at ‘Olynthus and Methone and Apollonia and thirty-two cities in Thrace’ (II.6.21, citing Dem. 9.26) but declines to go into detail about them. Like his hero, Hermogenes presents himself as deliberately not including as much as he could—an example of ἐπιείκεια in action.
ΑΦΕΛΕΙΑ ∼ SIMPLICITY
Simplicity is characterized by the inclusion of unnecessary details (II.3.2 and II.3.13), and thoughts that involve homely or ordinary subjects (II.3.7). As an example of how to produce such extraneous detail, Hermogenes takes a phrase from On the Crown (18.51), ‘except the harvesters and other wage-workers’ (ΙΙ.3.13.6–7), and he says that if you got rid of the undefined part of the phrase (i.e. ‘other wage-workers’), and continued to add more specific examples, you would get a good example of ἀφέλεια: ‘except the harvesters and the diggers and sheaf-binders and shepherds and herdsmen’ (εἰ μὴ καὶ τοὺς θεριστὰς καὶ τοὺς σκαπανέας καὶ τοὺς ἀμαλλοδέτας καὶ τοὺς ποιμένας καὶ τοὺς νομέας, II.3.13). Keeping in mind how Hermogenes rewrites Demosthenes here to add more occupational types, consider a previous section in the chapter, on the thoughts characteristic of ἀφέλεια. Hermogenes discusses how these include childlike thoughts and those of simple-minded people, quoting passages from Xenophon and Theocritus, and adding that more examples can be found in the bucolic poets and Anacreon. Almost as an afterthought, he tacks on Menander, and consider how he does so (II.3.5):
παρά τε αὖ τῷ Μενάνδρῳ μυρία ἂν εὕροις τοιαῦτα καὶ γυναῖκας λεγούσας καὶ νεανίσκους ἐρῶντας καὶ μαγείρους καὶ παρθένους θρυπτομένας καί τινας ἄλλους.
Also in Menander you can find countless such examples, women speaking and young men in love and cooks and coy maidens and several others.
Hermogenes adds to the examples he has already cited an extraneous catalogue of specific character types—which is exactly the method he showed one could use to take a passage from Demosthenes and accentuate its ‘simple’ style.
ΓΛΥΚΤΥΗΣ ∼ SWEETNESS
Sweetness is characterized by the pleasure (ἡδονή) it produces in the audience (II.4.1). Hermogenes lists several elements that contribute to this effect, from the discussion of mythological material (II.4.1), to the use of sensory language (II.4.5), to the pathetic fallacy (II.4.13). However, most relevant for our purposes is his discussion, under the heading of diction suitable for sweetness, of the special pleasure that arises when prose authors quote poets, thus creating a ‘mixture of prose and poetry’ (ΙΙ.4.22.2–3). Here he cites two instances of Plato quoting Homer;Footnote 26 Plato quoting Hesiod;Footnote 27 characters in Platonic dialogues feeling inspired and breaking into verse;Footnote 28 and Demosthenes quoting tragedy.Footnote 29 These examples from Classical prose authors do not represent however the first time in his treatment of γλυκύτης that Hermogenes demonstrates the special pleasure that arises when prose authors quote poetry. Throughout the entire chapter, the author of this resolutely technical prose treatise has been illustrating his discussion with examples taken especially from poetry. He quotes poetry to a greater extent in this chapter than in any other.Footnote 30 Thus, he quotes Sappho when discussing sensory language (II.4.6); in his treatment of the pathetic fallacy (II.4.14–16) he quotes Sappho again as well as the Iliad and the Odyssey (Il. 5.749; Il.13.29; Od. 21.388); and in a digression on shameful pleasures that are pleasurable to hear about (II.4.9-10), he quotes Il. 14.346, 14.347 and Od. 11.243–4. All these come before Hermogenes starts dealing with prose authors quoting poetry. If the reader’s impression of the γλυκύτης chapter is that it focuses heavily on poetry, that is no accident. As Hermogenes says, mixing poetry with prose produces a special kind of sweetness and pleasure, so it was always going to be his chapter on γλυκύτης that found ways to engage continuously with lines of poetry.
ΒΑΡΥΤΗΣ ∼ INDIGNATION
Indignation is the style of a speaker who feels that they or their achievements have been slighted or are underappreciated (II.8.1). A method for producing it is to employ ironic self-deprecation, which underscores all the more one’s contributions. Thus Hermogenes notes that, although not all irony suggests this ‘indignation’, ‘when one makes use of irony against oneself, and especially if one is addressing the jury and not one’s opponent, it makes the indignation clear’ (II.8.7.3–6). One approach for producing such ironic self-deprecation is to question something generally acknowledged or that has been granted: ‘Furthermore, it is characteristic of indignation to call into question, as if perplexed, what is acknowledged as if it were in doubt’ (II.8.14.1–3). A related approach is to express hesitancy about what is acknowledged, which functions as a back-handed rebuke, and Hermogenes walks the reader through an example from Demosthenes (II.8.15, quoting inexactly Or. 19.238):
τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἐνδοιάζειν περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων, ὃ δὴ καὶ τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου ἔφαμέν πως εἶναι λόγου, οἷον· “εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷς ἐτιμᾶσθε ἠδίκησέ τις ὑμῶν, πόσῳ μᾶλλον μισοῖσθ᾽ ἂν ἢ σῴζοισθε δικαίως;” εἶθ᾽ ἡ ἐνδοίασις μετ᾽ ἐπικρίσεως· “ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι πολλῷ”. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ εἰρωνεία τις τὸ ἐνδοιάσαι περὶ τοῦ ὁμολογουμένου.
Such is the case also with the expression of hesitancy regarding what is acknowledged, which indeed we said was in a way characteristic of spontaneous discourse, as in: ‘If in how you were honoured one of you acted unjustly, by how much more would you be hated rather than delivered?’ Then comes the hesitation in the expression of a judgement: ‘By a great deal more, I think.’ This hesitation about something that is acknowledged is also a form of irony.
Hermogenes does not have real cause to feel indignation towards his audience. But there is an instance earlier in this chapter where he expresses the sort of ‘hesitation in the expression of a judgement’ that he characterizes, in the passage quoted, as a form of irony. After citing a passage from On the Crown where Demosthenes speaks sarcastically of Aeschines, Hermogenes adds that, ‘it however needs to be understood that not every instance of irony features a similar sort of indignation, but this has been made clear from what I already said, I believe’ (εἰδέναι μέντοι χρὴ ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα εἰρωνεία ὁμοίαν ἔχει τὴν βαρύτητα, δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο κἀκ τῶν προειρημένων γεγενῆσθαι νομίζω, II.8.7). That final, extraneous ‘I believe’ (νομίζω) may seem like filler, but consider how Hermogenes cites Demosthenes’ ‘I think’ (οἶμαι) as an example of hesitation in the expression of a judgement that functions ironically. After saying, ‘but this has been made clear from what I already said’, Hermogenes hedges his statement with ‘I believe’. If we accept the invitation to read Hermogenes through Hermogenes, we can see this as an example of hesitation in expressing judgement that functions ironically, with the irony being that Hermogenes believes quite firmly that he has made his point clear. By couching his statement in hesitation, Hermogenes ironically calls into question his ability to present material clearly. Thus, we have an example of the speaker employing ironic self-deprecation, which Hermogenes says is especially effective in producing βαρύτης (II.8.7.3–6).
Before considering the final form, force, οne point should be emphasized. The features highlighted above that can be readily quantified appear only or most frequently in their respective sections: distinctness has more course corrections directing the reader to the later discussion on force than any other section; the section on sweetness quotes more poetry than any other; no other section features an obtrusively rhyming jingle like beauty has in ἀκμαῖά τε καὶ ὡραῖα … λαμπρὰ καὶ καλά; only pungency says anything like ‘the diction of pungency has nothing pungent about it’; no other section has such a brisk catalogue of figures comparable to that of rapidity; no section is as long as that on abundance; nowhere else apart from his discussion on simplicity does Hermogenes offer unprompted a catalogue of character types, etc. If it is one of the commentator’s responsibilities to account for stylistic discrepancies, outliers and oddities, and if economy in exegesis is a virtue, then one explanation in particular recommends itself here: all these phenomena can be attributed to a single cause, namely that Hermogenes’ discussion of each form of style is written in such a way as to exemplify that form.
ΔΕΙΝΟΤΗΣ ∼ FORCE
Finally, we turn to the ultimate form, in all senses of the word: δεινότης, usually known in English as ‘force’ or ‘forcefulness’. This is the expert blending and application of the other forms at the appropriate time (II.9.1), and for Hermogenes it is the signature form of his hero, Demosthenes. Hermogenes clarifies that the form is to be considered in three different ways: discourse can seem to be forceful without being so, which is exemplified by sophists like Gorgias and Polus (II.9.34); it can actually be forceful without seeming so, like Lysias (ΙΙ.9.29); finally, and most properly, it can both seem forceful and actually be so—and this is exemplified by Demosthenes. Hermogenes declares that he will devote a full treatment to force in a separate treatise On the Method of Force that he has been constantly referring to during the previous chapters, and which, he declares, is eventually going to follow the present treatise, On Forms of Style (II.9.39). In the meantime, he describes for the reader the magnitude of the task of giving a full account of force (II.9.40–1):
καὶ ὁποῖόν γε τοῦτο καὶ ὁπόσον ἔργον, ὁ πειραθεὶς γνώσεται· σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀνθρωπίνης ἐστὶ δυνάμεως, θείας δέ τινος ἰσχύος τέχνῃ πάντα ὑποβαλεῖν ταῦτα, καιρούς, πρόσωπα, τόπους, αἰτίας, τρόπους, τἆλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ δεῖξαι περὶ πάντων μὲν προβλημάτων, πάντων δ᾽ αὖ τῶν ἐν τούτοις εἰδῶν καὶ τρόπων, πάντων δ᾽ αὖ τῶν κατὰ μέρος νοημάτων, εἴτ᾽οὖν εἴη προκαταρτικὰ εἴτε πιστωτικά τε καὶ συστατικὰ εἴτε ἀντιθέσεων λυτικὰ εἴτε ἐπιλογικά, πασῶν τε ἰδεῶν λόγου, ποῖον μέν τι προσήκει τὸ ὅλον εἶδος εἶναι τοῦ λόγου κατὰ τόδε τὸ ζήτημα, ἐπὶ τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ προσώπου λεγόντων, κατὰ τόνδε τὸν καιρόν, ποῖα δὲ αὐτῶν τὰ κατὰ μέρος νοήματα, καὶ τίνα μὲν εἰπεῖν τῶν εὑρεθέντων, τίνα δὲ ἄρρητα ἐᾶν ἐνταῦθα βέλτιον—ἑτέρωθι γάρ, ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, καὶ τοὐναντίον ἔσται—καὶ τίς τοῖς κριθεῖσι ῥηθῆναι τάξις ἀρίστη νῦν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶνδε—πάλιν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρων καὶ κατ᾽ ἄλλον καιρὸν τάχα ἴσως ἑτέρως ἔσται—καὶ πῶς μὲν τοῦτο, πῶς δὲ ἐκεῖνο εἰσακτέον, καὶ τίσι μὲν πλεονάσαι τῶν ἐννοιῶν καὶ τίνα τρόπον βέλτιον, τίνων δὲ τὴν ταχίστην ἀπαλλάττεσθαι καὶ δι᾽ ἐλαχίστου πως αὐτῶν ἐπιμνησθέντα· ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ πάντα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τέχνῃ διαλαβεῖν καὶ ταῦτα μὴ διὰ σφόδρα μακρῶν θεῖον οἶμαί τι πρᾶγμά ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνης δυνάμεως.
And as to what sort of work this is and how great it is, he who has attempted it will know. For it is almost not within human ability, but rather it belongs to some divine power to undertake all of this, and to treat times, persons, places, cause, manner and further concerns of this sort, and to treat all the problems, and further all the species and variations among them, and yet further all the particular thoughts, whether, that is, those are prefatory or for establishing proof or demonstration, or for refuting counterarguments or for the epilogue, as well as all the styles of discourse, and with respect to the whole form of the discourse in question what sort it ought to be—for this particular subject, in the case of these particular men, who are speaking about this particular person, on this particular occasion—and what sort of thoughts they have respectively, and once those thoughts have been found to know which one should say and which it is better in this case to leave unsaid—for on another occasion, if it so happens, the opposite will be the case—and for the thoughts that one has decided to say, what will be the best order to present them in, now and under these circumstances—for again this too under different circumstances and on another occasion will perhaps be equally different—and how this, how that is to be introduced, and which thoughts it is better to use frequently and in what way, and which one should finish with as quickly as possible by briefly mentioning them in some way; for to treat all these and similar topics in a systematic fashion, and not to do so at excessive length, I think is a kind of divine deed, and one not within human ability.
This passage, on the difficulty of treating the method of force satisfactorily, displays a marked degree of complexity, length and artifice. It ranks among Hermogenes’ more purple passages, and, if the pun can be excused, it should be considered a tour de force. In fact, what we are dealing with here, in this discussion of the difficulty of treating the method of force, is a demonstration of the use of force itself. Again, Hermogenes’ understanding of δεινότης is flexible and all-encompassing: it represents the expert use of all the forms deployed at the right moments. Since force draws on all the other forms, it is difficult to point to specific features here and associate them with characteristic features of force as described in Hermogenes’ system. However, it is possible to identify a number of the most prominent features of the passage as textbook characteristics of certain forms, especially solemnity and abundance, which play an outsized role compared to the other forms in Hermogenes’ account of how to produce force. In other words, force supposedly draws on all the forms, but some forms are more crucial to it than others.
We start with the beginning and end of this passage, where Hermogenes describes the task before him as requiring superhuman or divine capabilities: ‘For it is almost not within human ability, but rather it belongs to some divine power … I think is a kind of divine deed, and one not within human ability.’ In this treatise, the invocation of the divine has specific associations, as it features among the definitive ways of producing σεμνότης. Hermogenes explained in his account of solemnity that four topics are particularly suited to the form, the first being the gods themselves, the second divine things, and the third, perhaps most interesting to us, divine things that have to do with people (I.6.8–9):
The third class of thoughts that produce solemnity is when one speaks about things which are indeed divine by nature, but which for the most part are observed among mankind, for example if we should discuss the soul, namely that it is immortal, or about justice or prudence, or about all of life or what law is or nature or that sort of thing.
Thus within the Hermogenean system, discourse having to do with the divine and divine achievements is strongly associated with solemnity. In particular, Hermogenes’ characterization of the task of discussing δεινότης as divine aligns with his third class of thoughts that produce solemnity.
Moreover, by prefacing this passage with ‘he who has attempted it will know’ (ὁ πειραθεὶς γνώσεται), Hermogenes again signals his use of σεμνότης. Discussing solemnity, he notes the following (I.6.14):
καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δι᾽ ἐμφάσεων μυστικῶς τι καὶ τελεστικῶς ἐν ταῖς σεμναῖς τῶν ἐννοιῶν ὑποσημαίνειν μεθόδου σεμνῆς· ὡς γὰρ αὐτοὶ μὲν εἰδότες, οὐκ ὄντες δὲ οἷοί τε λέγειν εἰς τοὐμφανὲς αὐτά, ἐνδεικνύμεθα διὰ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης μέγεθός τι καὶ σεμνότητα ἐννοίας … “τόδε τι εὑρεῖν τε χαλεπὸν καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας λέγειν ἀδύνατον”. [Pl. Ti. 28c]
To hint at something in solemn thoughts through emphasis in a mystic and ritualistic way belongs to the solemn method, for as when we ourselves know something, but are not able to say it in the open, we display through this method a kind of magnitude and solemnity of thought … as in, ‘both to discover this is a difficult thing, and having discovered it, it is impossible to say to everyone’.
Hermogenes’ comment that the use of force is so difficult to describe as to require divine ability, and moreover that ‘he who has attempted it will know’, is a textbook use of solemnity. Moreover, note how Hermogenes had cited the famous tag from the Timaeus as a good example of σεμνότης. The quotation is not exact; in Plato’s version Timaeus says that to discover the maker of the universe is a difficult ἔργον—note that word—and to describe him impossible.Footnote 31 Hermogenes now similarly frames his own undertaking of describing force as a significant ἔργον, one that requires divine skill (ὁποῖόν γε τοῦτο καὶ ὁπόσον ἔργον). Hermogenes could not adhere more closely to his own recommendations for producing the thoughts of solemnity.
Why is it significant that Hermogenes leans so heavily on solemnity here? As it turns out, at ΙΙ.9.24 he had just singled out the thoughts of solemnity (and vigour) as particularly suitable for that kind of force that both seems to be and actually is forceful. In that same discussion, Hermogenes also recommends for producing that variety of force the use of rhetorical figures proper to four forms: solemnity, vigour, brilliance and, finally, abundance (II.9.27). Returning to our passage, next to solemnity, we find it is the form of abundance that is most prominently signposted. The most obvious organizational feature of our passage is the piling up of clause after subordinate clause, the endless string of interwoven and coordinated phrases. Note especially the fact that there are five μέν clauses, answered by even more δέ clauses. These features might as well serve as the calling cards of abundance. In discussing how to produce this form, Hermogenes devoted special attention to devices that naturally ‘draw additional’ thoughts and clauses in their wake. Key for achieving this effect is μερισμός, the ‘distribution’ of material into μέν and δέ clauses (I.11.43–4):
ἔτι ἐφέλκονται νοήματα καὶ οἱ μερισμοί, οἷον “ἃ μὲν … ἃ δ᾽ …”. μερισμὸς γὰρ πᾶς ἔμφασιν μὲν πάντως ἔχει περιβολῆς διὰ τὸ ἐφέλκεσθαί τι.
Distributions further draw additional thoughts after themselves, as in ‘on the one hand … on the other … ’. For every distribution necessarily has the impression of abundance due to the fact that it draws something additional after it in its wake.
Thus within Hermogenes’ system, the arrangement of ideas into involved μέν–δέ clauses is tightly connected with abundance. Compare this with his elaborate account of force, where he employs no less than five separate μέν–δέ clauses. In describing the difficulty of giving an account of force, Hermogenes advertises that he is tapping into abundance just as clearly as he signals his use of solemnity. His bravura performance in our passage consists of a mixture of prominent characteristics of several forms, with abundance and solemnity featuring conspicuously. Again, these happen to be among those very forms which Hermogenes recommends mixing to produce discourse that both seems to be and is forceful. It is no coincidence that this section represents perhaps the most purple passage in the entire treatise: here we see Hermogenes practising what he preaches to demonstrate the supreme form of his system, δεινότης, in action.
As he had done throughout, so in this climactic discussion Hermogenes offers his readers a demonstration in his own voice of the stylistic form in question. This strategy can be seen throughout the work, and we have seen how it sheds light on otherwise obscure moments. Το account for the immense popularity of the text as a teaching tool, we must recognize that the discussion of καθαρότης is written with the purest clarity; that poetry makes the chapter on γλυκύτης a pleasure to read; and that the exceptionally long and involved section on περιβολή imparts to the user an all-too-familiar intimacy with what Hermogenes understands by ‘abundance’. We should not be unduly influenced by Philostratus’ belittling appraisal of Hermogenes as a precocious teen who peaked too soon and never lived up to his hype, and we should think twice before dismissing his work as devoid of any literary interest in its own right.Footnote 32 Instead, we ought to devote more study to the compositional strategies Hermogenes employs in demonstrating the qualities of language and literature that he found most worthy of admiration and emulation.
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