I am grateful for two respondents as perceptive as Ian Greener and Nick Timmins. Greener’s response allows me in turn to extend my argument. Timmins’ response challenges my case, allowing me to defend it – while his sharp political ‘nose’ sniffs out trends in policy with which I agree.
On a key feature of the ‘new market’, they say opposite things. Greener says I am too modest in claiming that it may be a zero-sum game: that it is a ‘reducing-sum game’, as excess capacity will be unaffordable and (public) providers will close. Timmins claims that excess capacity will be generated internally through increases in productivity. How do we square the circle?
A zero-sum game can mean two things. I used it to refer to local choice (or contracts) changing providers. Greener uses it to refer to capacity overall. The political reality is that, behind closed doors, the invisible fist is bashing out good old-fashioned national planning (led by the NHS Chief Executive), to ‘reconfigure’ (mostly hospital) services. This will leave choice as ‘much ado about nothing.’ In the 1990s we had the absurdity that the government was commissioning ‘economic theory’ about how to develop excess capacity for a market from the Economic Adviser to the-then NHS Chief Executive (Department of Health, 1995) at the same time as reducing capacity on economic/planning grounds. While the new market is different, health policy is as Janus-faced as ever. And as regards Timmins’ increased capacity, the market will soon be ‘managed’ politically so that weaker Trusts (in terms of productivity) are downsized or closed. Market forces will help the planners, as in Sweden in the mid-1990s when the market was a transitory tool for reshaping the system.
Competitive markets abolish themselves, which is perhaps why the government stuffs the private sector’s mouth with gold – to keep it nibbling around the edges and providing ‘competition’ for electives. This ‘pump-priming’ will have to continue, however: with regard to Timmins’ ‘real test … in the second wave contracts’ with private-sector Independent Sector Treatment Centres, the latter will have to be kept sweet enough. If they are treated like NHS Trusts, they will melt away like May snow.
Timmins attributes to me an ‘unspoken assumption’ that the NHS was doing fine. Far from it. What improvements – either in cancer or in waiting-times – that have appeared in recent years, however, have been in the era of national targets (Alvarez-Rosete et al., Reference Alvarez-Rosete2005), after the internal market and before the new market. What we need are coherent plans (the visible fist, if you like, even if it's new UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s ‘big clunking fist’, as ex-Prime Minister Blair described it): free referral/choice, which informs planning rather than subverts it. Performance management should combine fewer, more robust targets with regional discretion.
Since I wrote the original article, central control has deepened, against all rhetoric. We now have a ‘new model contract’ issued from the Department of Health in February 2007. This says to hospitals, including Foundation Trusts –‘if your primary care trusts (PCTs) cannot keep patients out of hospital by providing alternative services of adequate quality, then we will not pay you properly for “over-performance”’. Whatever the merits of this, it is political fist rather than economic hand.
There is a conflict between internal performance (and market) management, and external regulation of a market constructed according to economic theory. Timmins and I agree that ‘the market will indeed end up being a very managed market…’. Timmins’ follow-up question – how will this new entity will be regulated? – is misleading. There is not a coherent system of external regulation for the new market because there cannot be: politicians cannot allow it. In any case, if we look at the short-lived candidates for the post over the last couple of years: Monitor – the quasi-external body created to ‘regulate’ (and mould) Foundation Trusts – is a strange beast which is half-‘Foundation Trust advocate’ and half-‘Foundation Trust scourge’; the Healthcare Commission is about quality standards and retrospective financial report cards; and the Audit Commission is struggling to explain why it could not predict in 2005/6 the deficit crisis about which some of us warned the government much earlier. Timmins is right: the government has put overall system regulation in the ‘too difficult’ basket, suggesting the whole approach may be flawed. But it is worse than that – Ministers did not realise until about 2005 that the new market outlined in 2002 would need such a generic regulator.
One reason for this is that each policy fragment (of what is now presented in 2007 as a coherent reform strategy) has emerged from short-term reaction to a perceived problem – some reaction ‘rational’ and some ‘political’. At the rational end, as Greener says, we had private providers to boost choice; and a fixed tariff in reaction to the complaint that the internal market had stressed quantity over quality. As Greener says, (even rational) piecemeal fixes have created local anarchies. And it is not just the policy fragments which have emerged piecemeal and reactive, it is the institutions which they have breathlessly created. For example, will the new, post-2006 primary care trusts (PCTs) provide services or not? How will Practice-Based Commissioning (GP practices doing their own local commissioning) relate to the PCTs?
My article draws on Hirschman. I might have applied another of his maxims, regarding ‘lazy monopolists’ who do not extract super-profits but instead ignore both quality and productivity. Greener agrees with my picture of NHS hospitals being forced into ghettos of specialised and emergency services, pointing to their asset and geographic specificity. While no NHS provider can be ‘lazy’ these days, the economic incentive intended by the new market – competition yet fixed pricing, forcing quality as the basis of competition – will simply be absent for the ‘core NHS’, and performance management will be the real driver for improvement. So why do not we make a virtue of it rather than apologise for it (as a ‘non-market’ device)?
Timmins is right: payment-by-results is gradually metamorphosing into price competition (as the tariff becomes a maximum benchmark) – and, already, the NHS is demanding ‘local tariffs’ (Health Service Journal, 2007). Greener hears economists ‘gnashing their teeth already’ at fixed prices. The fact that price competition was harmful in the internal market and that Ministers overtly chose a reimbursement tariff in reaction to this will soon be forgotten (policy amnesia is almost total now in the Department of Health, and he who forgets the past is condemned to relive it.)
I agree with Greener in that the PFI is worse than I record in my text: the government has now realised it is both a bad deal and inflexible, hence the ‘reining in’ and cancellation of Private Finance Initiative schemes to build new hospitals between January 2006 and March 2007. Indeed the policy which starts from the premise that primary care is good and hospitals are bad – Our Health, Our Care, Our Say (Department of Health, 2006) – is not an evidence-based appraisal of the possibilities of extra-hospital care, but a faint howl of pain. That is the phrase Timmins uses about my paper. And I accept it – as a believer in a public NHS.
