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Empathie et perception des valeurs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Barry C. Smith*
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy, University of London
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: Differences of evaluative judgments are often assumed to be a reason to prefer pluralism, relativism or subjectivism to objectivism, and this preference is even more pronounced in the case of judgements of taste. A comparison between perceptual and moral disagreements, however, enables us to understand that differences in judgments may be due to a difference in access to the situation or object, and not necessarily to a difference in value. The feeling of irresolvable differences that sometimes arises in situations of evaluation, may not hold in the absence of objective values and / or common values, but be due to a difficulty or inability to capture the perspective, or circumstances of assessment wherein the other agents are placed.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2012