The most important contribution of Fixing Democracy is to analyze the politics of constituent assemblies—as opposed to constitutional change—in Latin America since the start of the Third Wave of democratization. Javier Corrales contends that presidents will propose constitutional conventions if their legislative support is greater than the opposition’s. But if the balance of power is unfavorable for executives, they will avoid them. What Corrales refers to as the asymmetry of legislative power is the key relationship that swells the executive’s constitutional powers.
Corrales examines the politics of constituent assemblies since the 1980s, when neoliberal reforms called for reductions in the size of the state, presidential omnipotence was on the defensive, and indigenous rights became a central part of the international agenda. He analyzes 11 constitutional conventions (Argentina 1994, Bolivia 2006–9 and 2007, Brazil 1986–88, Colombia 1990–91, Ecuador 1996–98 and 2006–8, Nicaragua 1985–86, Paraguay 1992, Peru 1992–94, and Venezuela 1999). He also insightfully explores the politics of 13 aborted assemblies (Bolivia early 1990s and 1994–95, Chile 2016, Colombia 1995 and circa 2000, Ecuador 2005, Honduras 2009, Nicaragua early 1990s, Panama 2015, Paraguay 2007 and 2011, and Venezuela, 1992–93 and 1994–95). The inclusion of cases where there is no assembly, despite support for a constitutional convention, allows Corrales to test his argument comprehensively.
An advantage of Fixing Democracy’s research design is that we learn key facts about these 24 cases. Corrales also takes us on a guided tour of constitutional reform in Venezuela (about which he has published a great deal), Bolivia, and Ecuador. If for no other reason, the analytic narratives of constitutional reform will make Fixing Democracy required reading for students of constitutional conventions of Latin America. More informed readers will reflect on the tables and the argument, either to contest or to build on Corrales’s conclusions. Both will also profit from his discussion of aborted assemblies, which I find to be one of the book’s most important empirical contributions.
It was political or economic crises, along with progovernment majorities, that led assemblies to inflate the executive’s powers. Only 2 of the 11 cases of constituent deliberations—Nicaragua 1986 and Paraguay 1992—are inconsistent with Corrales’s argument. Only 2 saw seat asymmetries in the executive’s favor nevertheless weaken its constitutional faculties (see the table on p. 60). Why? Corrales, in synthesis, suggests that constitution making after long-lasting dictatorships skews the politics of constituent assemblies. This is an intriguing idea (62–63), one that Corrales might have explored more systematically. And each of the aborted 13 conventions is preceded by a weak or split executive (nicely summarized on pp. 49–51). But it is the increase in levels of presidential approval that leads presidents to weaken term limits. Corrales, in chapter 8, uses a logistic model to demonstrate that legislative asymmetry does not explain when presidents persuade assemblies or legislatures to allow them to stand for re-election.
Three chapters explore the politics of constitutional conventions in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. These chapters turn out to be key because the period since the 1980s includes the rise of the left. Perhaps the expansion of executive powers is a product of ideological commitments. Left-wing antiestablishment movements take power in elections that swiftly lead to constituent assemblies in each of these countries. But Corrales shows that these parties are hamstrung when they do not hold a favorable balance of power. The Venezuelan presidency became stronger as a result of the 1999 constituent assembly because President ChÆvez’s movement deployed electoral laws to manufacture a large progovernment majority in the assembly. President Evo Morales settled for a weaker set of powers in the 2009 Constitution because his party had won a bare majority of seats in the 2008 assembly and faced an opposition anchored in lowland Bolivia. President Rafael Correa increased the executive’s powers with respect to the 1998 Constitution because his supporters formed a coalition with indigenous groups and feminists to enact the 2008 Constitution.
Fixing Democracy’s conclusions are consistent with more political interpretations of constitutional change. They echo Adam Przeworski’s point (in Democracy and the Market, 1991) that the outcome of transitions is a product of bargaining between incumbents and opposition movements. They build on Gabriel Negretto’s analysis (in Making Constitutions, 2013) of constitutional reform in Latin America between 1900 and 2008 by scrutinizing the Third Wave of constitutional reform. As does Negretto, Corrales argues that a symmetrical balance of power leads to power-diffusing constitutions, although Negretto notes that constitutional reforms have increased the legislative powers of presidents even as they have created more inclusive rules (e.g., the proliferation of runoff formulas) for electing presidents in recent decades. (Why Corrales opted to modify Shugart and Carey’s index of presidential powers and not use Negretto’s is a topic I wish Corrales had discussed.)
I have a few quibbles about case selection and the research design. Corrales ignores a pair of constituent assemblies. His book is silent on the constitutional conventions that produced the 1983 Constitution in El Salvador and the 1985 charter in Guatemala, even though the outcomes of these two cases are consistent with his interpretation. In neither case does a political party control a majority of seats. Both constitutions also produce a distribution of powers that creates some of the weaker executives of the region.
Another issue is whether constitutional rulings and reforms should have received more attention in this book. It is theoretically possible that a constituent assembly is less far-reaching than a key set of constitutional reforms. So, for example, it is true that President Morales had to settle for a less ambitious constitution than he wanted. But he overcame the limits of the 2009 Constitution (no more than two consecutive presidential terms) by getting a MAS-dominated Supreme Court in April 2013 to allow him to run for a second consecutive re-election in 2014. That the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) holds an overwhelming legislative majority also empowers a president with an expansionary conception of executive power.
None of these omissions, I should add, undermine Corrales’s central argument. The symmetry or asymmetry of power shapes the ebb and flow of the executive’s power. But discussions of key court rulings and constitutional amendments would have dispelled doubts about the validity of his thesis. And they would have supplied a comprehensive portrait of executive power in Latin America. Nonetheless, in a relatively short (238 pages of text, tables, and figures) and well-organized book, readers will learn that a favorable balance of power explains why most constitutional assemblies have strengthened executive power in Latin America since the mid-1980s.
