To examine the political thought of Martin Luther requires an assessment of his so-called Two Kingdoms doctrine. This doctrine asserts that the social order entails the division and intersection of two forms of government: that of the world or secular rule and that of heaven or divine rule. This doctrine is grounded in a famous scene in the Gospels (Matt. 22:15–22). The enemies of Jesus seek to entrap him by means of a Roman coin which has the image of the emperor (Tiberius) and the inscription “god and high priest” (divus et pontifex maximus). If the rabbi Jesus declares allegiance to the emperor he breaks the First Commandment which proclaims no other gods than God alone. If he affirms the First Commandment, then his enemies can accuse him of sedition and put him in legal jeopardy with the Roman authorities. Jesus escapes the trap by pronouncing this dictum: “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's.”
Jesus's dictum has about it a legislative quality, an air of making policy, the consequences of which go far beyond confusing a gaggle of Pharisees and Herodians. It is not simply that Jesus escapes a trap. He challenges. He questions the fundamental way that religion and politics had done business since the dawn of civilized time. In the ancient world, politics was sacred. The foundation of the state had to do with divinity, however that divinity was conceived. The claims of the state on citizens and subjects were total claims. In the state, one met the ultimate coercive social order. To be sure, there was a modicum of religious freedom in the empire. But this freedom was allowed only by treaty or government largesse. The priestly classes, of whatever nation or tribe, might object to Caesar's assertion on the coin but they did not object to his assumption. They too understood politics as sacred totality and used coercion to gain power; often, as the Hebrew Bible demonstrates, against the will of God.
Jesus rejects this sacred totality and instead places the believer in a sovereign space between religion and the state. The believer is called to live in two kingdoms—one sacred, one secular—and must come to grips with both. This responsibility placed on the believer makes for a complicated political ethic, especially for post-Constantinian Christians when the church itself becomes a political institution in the kingdom of the world, privileged by the state, and allowed to exercise its own coercive power for good or for ill.
The predicament of Christians living in two kingdoms is that they are tempted to exercise coercive power for worldly purposes under the guise of religion. This is the fundamental problem of Christian political theology in the Western church which finds an intense focus in the thought of Martin Luther. How does Jarrett A. Carty, associate professor at Concordia University in Montreal, deal with this problem?
The answer is that he assesses the problem fairly and candidly.
This is not easy. Luther's writings are voluminous. Occasional essays, some written in the heat of the moment; biblical expositions, university lectures, the records of which are based on student notes; even dinner conversations (i.e., Table Talk), also recorded by students; all produced by a volcanic personality. It would appear that Luther never had an unpublished thought. This makes evaluation of Luther's political theology difficult in the extreme. The temptation for the scholar is to cherry pick the sources; to gravitate towards what is pleasing to the standards of tolerance and pluralism in contemporary academia and ignore or underplay the rest.
Carty resists this temptation, although he makes his preferences clear. When he focuses on the early essays The Freedom of the Christian (1520) and Temporal Authority (1523), he finds much to approve. The former essay asserts the primacy of subjective freedom in personal faith; a faith that cannot be coerced by the rules of the institutional church (33–34); the latter essay declares two important principles: first, that while temporal authority has the right to coerce its subjects “externally” for the sake of peace and order, it cannot coerce “internal” faith; second, that the church, insofar as it belongs to the spiritual realm, cannot employ coercion to impose doctrine. Carty derives from these assertions an attractive generalization concerning Luther's fundamental stance: “temporal authority” cannot “require or impose beliefs” nor can “heresy be prosecuted by it” (43). If this were true, then Luther would be rightly celebrated as the progenitor of modern liberalism.
But Carty knows this is not true. Luther retreats from these claims as he finds himself having to go on with the business of living: founding a church, dealing with social upheaval such as the Peasants’ War, and living his life marked as a heretic in the empire, dependent for protection on the grace of his Saxon prince. Luther's religious rebellion unleashed a force that led to a century of religious warfare engulfing Europe. Luther was led by circumstances to assert that the coercive power of temporal authority inexorably extends into the spiritual realm; and it does so on behalf of the Bible and gospel. Thus Luther affirmed the state's duty to police the content of preaching (112, 117), suppress heresy to combat “rebellion or sedition” (76), and treat blasphemy as a “crime” (119). In this regard, Luther considered “Papists” and “radicals” to be blasphemous enemies of the social order. He deemed the Jew to be the worst case. Carty does not shy away from stating the obvious: Luther was clearly “anti-Semitic” (121), excoriating the Jews as blasphemers for their rejection of Christ and their behavior. He advocated their persecution and the burning of synagogues (120). Luther's hatred of the Jews intensified in his later years, even to the last month of his life.
On the important matter of deference to authority, Luther is inconsistent. At first he asserts that the gospel requires “complete submission” (91). Later he supports Protestant princes in the right to resist for the sake of “divine law” (103).
Carty knows his material. Notably, he integrates a wide range of Luther's biblical commentary into his account (see esp. 60–84). This is a valuable contribution. Where Luther fits in the history of political thought is a matter of debate. Is he the defender of subjection of church to state? Is he an anti-institutionalist who plants the seeds of modern individualism? Are the political effects of his theology the result less of his ideas than of the tumultuous history of Europe? Carty surveys a few notable examples in the debate such as Quentin Skinner, Sheldon Wolin, and Brad Gregory. Leo Strauss makes a brief but significant appearance (175–76). Carty takes no sides. At the end Carty defines his purpose: “to provide a clear and succinct account of what [Luther's] ideas were, based on a wide range of his works, and their immediate historical contexts … as close as possible to how Luther would have described the body of his political thought” (177). In this purpose, Carty succeeds.
