Horace Mann is best known, of course, for advancing public education as a foundation stone of American democracy, not as a democratic theorist. But Bob Pepperman Taylor makes clear in this valuable and well-written new study that Mann's efforts on behalf of public education were tied to a dim view of democratic citizens. Education must elevate them or democracy would perish, Mann insisted. Echoes of these ideas continue to animate contemporary discussions of civic education, and not for the better.
For Taylor, Mann's “troubling legacy” reflects his skepticism of Madisonian politics as a response to the unruliness of citizens, people driven by passion, ego, and interest. The Framers set up the Constitution to organize, moderate, and limit what they foresaw as the inevitable conflicts dividing a fractured and parochial citizenry: so far, so good. But these arrangements were insufficient to the democratic dangers ahead. Unless common schoolteachers taught citizens to embrace a unifying moral purpose, Mann warned, Americans would become trapped in a downward spiral of corrupting passions and conflicting interests, especially so as the nation could no longer count on its once-strong Puritan tradition to contain its contentious pluralism. Political institutions alone could not remedy the defects of untamed citizens; the character of those citizens had to be suitably guided and bent toward a substantive moral consensus. Democracy, in short, requires more than well-designed institutions; it needs a particular kind of public education, a political schooling “to make citizens worthy of the political respect we seem to owe them in the first place” (p. 7). Only then could American democracy advance beyond the discordant, corrosive politics of rival factions and parties.
Given the deepening embitterment of antebellum America, Mann's political anxiety is more than a little understandable. Taylor might have made this point; the looming national divide over slavery goes unmentioned in his study. But he is certainly right to emphasize that Mann's educational project could not have been more political in its antipolitical animus. His “program of civic education” promised “to dissolve political disputes,” inspiring a “political life without any significant controversy at all” (p. 14). Yet even as Mann despaired over the prospects of a political system geared only to managing conflict, he was deeply optimistic about the educability of citizens and their trained capacity to rise above discord.
Such optimism was rooted, as it often is, in a misguided faith in the capacity of science to transcend politics. Thus, Taylor shows how Mann's hopes were anchored to the work of George Combs, an influential mid-nineteenth-century phrenologist. Combs believed that human brains harbor capacities to grasp the universal laws of physical and human nature, including moral and intellectual laws. Although we may observe these laws independently, we achieve true well-being when we learn to obey them together, as God intended. Thus, education could help us to realize our highest moral capacity. Mann's faith in the redemptive qualities of public education was embedded in Comb's physical and moral psychology. He wanted public schools to tap and develop students' innate moral judgment and thus to fashion a citizenry able to resist poisonous conflict.
Crucial to this project, and to Taylor's critique of it, was Mann's insistence that teachers privilege moral over intellectual education. Guided by his misplaced faith in the possibilities of political harmony, Mann emphasized, in his educational philosophy, the instrumental, functional, indeed quite political role of education in smoothing the tensions of the political system. He aimed to realize an impossible dream, a utopia of nonadversarial politics. In essence, Mann conceived of education and students not as ends in themselves but as political means to a higher moral purpose, a purpose that he never actually defined, nor could he.
For Taylor, Mann's teaching to the avoidance of conflict represented a profound disservice to students. It prepared them neither for the aggressiveness of political conflict nor for the informed capacity to make up their own minds about political controversy. His design for teaching impeded their exposure to uncertainty, ambiguity, skepticism, and doubt, the epistemological conditions of democracy as it really exists. Experiencing the ambiguities of great literature and the skeptical habits of the scientific mind, Taylor argues, is essential to the growth of mature citizens, people able not only to tolerate difference but to form their own well-reasoned evaluations of major issues. That is, not only did Mann forsake the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake—a problem in its own right, for Taylor; he also counseled against the intellectually centered education that democratic citizens most urgently need in order to face the trials and tensions of the actual political world in a responsible manner.
Aggravating these dilemmas, for Taylor, is the fact that Mann's legacy lingered, influencing such giants of educational theory as John Dewey, who likewise taught that education should serve instrumental and collective ends. His influence can also be seen in the works of such contemporary authors on civic education as Amy Gutmann and Thomas Erlich. Against the grain of Mann's educational theory, however, Taylor celebrates the minority view of John Stewart Mill and Robert Hutchins, who each urged the promise of education in the humanities and sciences, the classics of Western civilization, as more reliable emancipators of democratic citizens.
I sympathize with Taylor's urging to put intellectual matters first and let civic education “take a much more gentle, modest and less ideological form than that which is often advocated” (p. 122). It is best to permit conditions of hard intellectual work to shape students' growing facility to face a disputatious world. Civic virtues should grow slowly from intellectual ones; teachers should keep the politics at bay. But the issues here are demanding, controversial, and difficult, perhaps even more than Taylor acknowledges. What are we to do when moral or spiritual conflict undercuts the very distinction between politics and education that Taylor wants us to preserve? Heated battles over creationism, for example, set religion against science, politicizing the curriculum in inescapable ways. At the same time, many contemporary teachers of literature and language are bent on unmasking class, racial, or gender biases in Robert Hutchins's “Great Books.” Indeed, many such teachers refuse even to teach them. If politics is embedded deep inside such texts, indeed, if as Michel Foucault said, knowledge power is our master design for social control, the separation of knowledge and politics dissolves; the value-free classroom implodes. And these ideological contradictions, wrenching as they are, overlap with raw political pressures on state legislatures to cut funding for both public schools and higher education, even as parents and politicians demand ever more vocationally relevant education.
Many decades ago Robert S. Lynd's Knowledge for What? (1939) posed the key question. It is hard not to conclude that we are bound to keep fighting over mutually exclusive answers. The inevitable schoolroom battles will continue to test the strength of what passes for an increasingly elusive American consensus.
