Eric Schliesser’s new book, the culmination of two decades of research, is a scholarly feat of the first order and an asset to Adam Smith’s expansive readership across disciplinary divides. The book investigates the systematic nature of Smith’s work, not, as one might expect, as an economic thinker but as a philosopher. This shift in focus gives immediate context to Smith’s political economy within an Enlightenment project dedicated to the flourishing of individuals, communities, and nations. The book’s structure reflects this philosophical emphasis, starting with the basic elements of human and social life, followed by their application to social structures and processes, and concluding with the life of the philosopher as a public figure, reformer, and guide.

As stated in the Introduction, Smith’s position on systems is cautious and ambivalent. On the one hand, systems please humanity’s “aesthetic desire for ‘order’ and ‘harmony,’” but on the other, an overly zealous “spirit of system” threatens to treat humans as means rather than ends (pp. 6–7). Above and beyond its nuanced exegesis on an extraordinary variety of themes—from monetary theory to religion and to happiness—the stakes of this book are therefore distinctly political: It is the statesman, as Smith warns, not the state, that requires a system (p. 10). The task of philosophy becomes to delineate and safeguard the boundaries between the two.

One of Schliesser’s main arguments is that Smith has not one but two philosophical systems: a system of “anthropic” philosophy and a system of knowledge making. The latter, an (incomplete) system of systems, determines how a human science is constructed and outlines the moral and political limits of all systems (p. 16). Two of Schliesser’s core concepts demonstrate the interconnectedness of Smith’s systems: “Smithian social explanation” and “environmental rationality.” Smithian social explanation is rooted in a theory of the historical development of natural human propensities, which grow intermixed and institutionalized through social interaction. Social “effects” are “locked in,” refined, and maintained by their beneficiaries (pp. 33–34). This is true, for example, for our “propensity to barter,” which evolved into the modern institutions of divided labor and market exchange, as it is true for language, born of our ambition to rule and control through persuasion (pp. 27–30). With this definition of Smith’s social explanation, Schliesser distinguishes between social entities that emerge from permanent human needs, evolving over centuries, and artificial creations, the products of philosophy, policy, or local habit that yield temporary patterns and institutions. Importantly, the much-invoked “invisible hand” mechanism is an example of the latter only (p. 234).

A second core concept in the book is “environmental rationality,” a proto-evolutionary feedback mechanism. Schliesser argues that for Smith, our emotions, ideas, and behaviors are driven by a constant need to make sense of our surrounding environment. A well-ordered society is one in which “expectations match the world’s natural order” and where “the right kinds of habits” of conduct and especially of thought are cultivated. Morality, rationality, and sanity are experienced as fit with one’s environment, while immorality, but also curiosity and inquisitiveness, begin as a form of alienation (p. 67). This idea of “fit” is especially significant for Schliesser’s analysis of Smith’s political and social theory. The legislator must preserve a coherent environment, even as he or she adjusts the guiding principles of society toward greater enlightenment. Similarly, the public philosopher revises social ideals and truths while respecting the rootedness of all knowledge in some degree of error and superstition (p. 271). Environmental rationality, therefore, allows Schliesser to recognize the methodological and pedagogical value that Smith places on historical explanation. History teaches the scientist that his or her truths are temporary and the reformer to accept the constraints of local prejudice and “confirmed habits” in institutional design (pp. 184–85).

Political theorists will be particularly interested in the way that Schliesser applies these core concepts to Smith’s account of the moral foundation of institutions and his proposals for social reform. He follows Smithian social explanation from our natural propensity, in a social context (p. 46), to seek praise and praiseworthiness, to the emergence of general rules of conduct and social institutions (p. 96). He emphasizes the role of sympathetic identification: Smithian individuals adopt the point of view of idealized others on their conduct. As they develop, they internalize an “impartial spectator” as a social reference point. Environmental rationality then explains how this impartial spectator continues to adapt to perceived changes in our environment (p. 138). As Schliesser shows, the idea of an impartial spectator highlights the importance of the objects of our admiration: That which inspires us becomes that which shapes our inner world and consequently our society. This helps him explain Smith’s ambiguity toward the admiration of wealth and greatness, characteristic of commercial society, which engenders respect for the given order and replaces the “fawning kind of persuasions common in hierarchical societies” (p. 32), but also corrupts our better nature, breeding contempt for true enlightenment (pp. 140, 229).

In Schliesser’s reading, Smith is a social reformer deeply concerned with stabilizing our environment while promoting change—an avowed gradualist. Smith’s proposals aim to reconcile his profound critique of inequality with the need to preserve order and hierarchy. It is only under a stable status quo, Smith believed, that claims to justice can be made (p. 375). There is a tension, therefore, between Smith’s social conservatism and what Schliesser convincingly depicts as his theoretical “bias” in favor of the working poor, calling for measures such as progressive taxation (p. 199) and extensive market regulation by the state (p. 220). Tempering some of the recent scholarly enthusiasm with Smith as a champion of the poor, Schliesser illustrates Smith’s relative restraint by comparing him to his more radical students and readers, most notably Sophie de Grouchy, who argued for a comprehensive restructuring of social norms and institutions (e.g., pp. 94, 211).

Finally, Schliesser’s approach offers valuable insight into some of the less discussed facets of Smith’s thought, including the role of luck in the human condition and Smith’s philosophy of science. Fortune, chance, and uncertainty, the author argues, “govern the [Smithian] world” (p. 128). “For Smith,” he writes, “the ultimate point of law is to reduce uncertainty and generate reasonable expectations that secure liberty and flourishing” (p. 202). Schliesser’s discussion of the “piacular”—“the feeling that arises when we have been an involuntary cause of another’s harm” (p. 122), motivating atonement—offers a fascinating cross-section of this ethical-political nexus. The uneasiness that emerges from the piacular, a regret or shame divorced from any sense of direct blame, signals the recognition of the “moral significance of fortune,” of ourselves as a cause (p. 123). For Smith, the sentiment also carries institutional ramifications. The “price” of atonement, for example, is relative to the importance of the social institution violated (p. 126). Conversely, the early success of the church is due to its more efficient “market of consolation,” replacing sacrificial atonement with prayer (p. 132).

The book also presents a valuable analogy between science and politics. Schliesser’s account reveals how Smithian science looks and works a lot like any other community: It relies on the individual’s need for approval, on widely spread, internalized norms and models, and on recognized means to update and replace them (p. 304). Scientific theory is thus perfected by exploring, not bracketing, its failures and inaccuracies (p. 263). Schliesser’s Smith is a predecessor to Thomas Kuhn (p. 271), and a successor of Spinoza (p. 237), depicting a scientific community that evolves in complex dialogue with myth and superstition, which make knowledge about the world both accessible and agreeable (p. 286). The scientific urge, moreover, resembles the impulse of the legislator or the virtuous person. Curiosity is a passion rooted in the uncomfortable sense of surprise and wonder that motivates us to seek better explanations and greater harmony with our environment (p. 354).

In Adam Smith, Schliesser offers a comprehensive and balanced guide for the uninitiated, and a fresh perspective for the well acquainted, one that includes wide coverage of Smith’s main interlocuters (David Hume in particular) and contemporary scholarship. Given the project’s profound engagement with the Smithian corpus, some might find its self-consciously exegetical and scholarly focus overly limiting, especially in light of Smith’s recent resurgence. While the author intentionally avoids explicit intervention in various contemporary debates, the book nonetheless invites readers to draw their own parallels and conclusions. It demonstrates, rather than argues, Smith’s continued relevance to our present day with its discussions of uncertainty, populism, and the moral crisis posed by extreme inequality. The book is also helpful in pointing to the limits of Smith’s applicability, for example, his endorsement of a somewhat static society or the centrality of the local example in his economic theory. More directly, the author asks us to accept Smith as an exemplar of publicly responsible systemic philosophizing (p. 375). In that, the book is a call for debate and reflection on the role of philosophers today, proposing a Smithian focus on social reform combined with public enlightenment.