In Anatomy of Authoritarianism, Joseph Sassoon sets out to answer a “myriad of questions” about the inner workings of the Arab world's post-independence republican dictatorships. Building on a vast range of primary sources, the book does not seek to provide a focused argument about how Arab authoritarianism functions or why it survives. Instead, it conveys a wide-ranging survey of the empirical features of dictatorship in eight republics: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. If there is a core claim that runs through the book, then it is that these cases have more in common than expected—a claim that is substantiated with meticulous source work across a wide range of spheres.
Sassoon draws on a large number of primary documents, including numerous Arab political memoirs, a hitherto largely unexploited source that yields much individual color and anecdotes for his structural analysis. He accordingly begins with a detailed discussion of this particular type of document and its limitations, which in itself will be of much use to future researchers working with Arab memoirs.
The first empirical chapter party and governance structures in Arab republics, illustrating in particular the extent of party dominance in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Tunisia. The next chapter investigates the prominent role of the military in all ruling structures bar the Tunisian one, the politicization of the military and, among other things, the historically consequential social divides between junior and older officers.
The subsequent chapter covers the functioning of republican security services. It is the longest and arguably best part of the book. The similarity between countries with quite different party or military structures is particularly striking. Sassoon explains how in all cases security agencies have been designed to overlap so that none could dominate. Their heads usually report not to a minister but directly to the president. Security services across the board nurtured a deep fear of foreigners and have resorted to systematic torture, sometimes on an industrial scale. The book provides gripping accounts of abuse in the region's prisons, which sometimes happened without any obvious rationale, as was the case with the routine torture of criminals in Qaddafi's Libya.
Chapter 5 describes the economic systems of the eight republics. All possess a legacy of deep state intervention along with ruling families who have become involved in the private sector over time, often building kinship links to leading merchant families. Chapter 6 investigates leadership and personality cults in Arab republics, which have typically replaced the socialist ideologies of the post-independence period. The final chapter discusses transitions to democracy. It highlights problematic institutional legacies that will continue to hamper full democratization across the region and focuses in particular on the travails of Tunisian democracy since 2011.
Few books on the Middle East are based on a wider range of primary sources; the book's bibliography reaches 37 pages. Sassoon also presents numerous interesting snippets of information. For some examples: 30 of 41 presidents from 1952 to 2011 have come from a military background; against our expectations, non-Sunnis played an important role in Iraqi intelligence services under Saddam; after Qaddafi's henchmen (allegedly) murdered Shi‘i leader Musa Sadr, they decided to kill the pilot who had transported Sadr to eliminate a key witness; and Iraq passed an official law protecting political informants and giving them pensions rights.
The book also provides broader theoretical insights across the chapters, even if these sometimes remain implicit. The decline of regimes’ political ideologies since the 1980s is illustrated vividly. The augmented personality cults taking their place may be unequalled outside of the Communist sphere. Saddam in particular was treated as god-like in the public sphere, while Tunisians were addressed as “children of Bourguiba.”
At the same time, ageing rulers’ grip on sound political judgment often slipped over time which, given their lack of accountability, often had devastating domestic and international consequences. Sassoon convincingly highlights Arab dictators’ irrational inability to admit and correct mistakes. He also points to a systematic decline in the quality of government and the rise of cronyism even in critical bodies like the military, where kinship has tended to become more important for promotion and admission to military colleges.
Perhaps the theoretically most interesting insight that the book provides is that Arab dictatorships, despite their ambitions of social engineering and top-down control, have in fact been deeply dysfunctional: in most of the bureaucracies Sassoon describes, information either does not travel upwards or is systematically distorted to settle accounts or to please superiors and rulers. Deliberate duplication of structures might make coups less likely, but reduces efficiency. Fear of superiors undermines any bureaucratic initiative. Sassoon points out that Egyptian security services did have relevant information that could have prevented President Sadat's assassination in 1981, but were too incoherent to act on this.
Obsessed with internal security and rivalries, most Arab regimes had limited external intelligence that could have prevented catastrophic mistakes like Saddam's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Economies are chronically mismanaged, to an extent that cronyism alone cannot explain. Despite their longevity, Arab dictators in Sassoon's analysis appear bumbling rather than all-controlling. Fear-based rulers do in fact have limited information about what is going on in both state apparatus and society, despite their investment in surveillance.
Sassoon points to many wider comparisons with non-Arab authoritarian systems. Because this is not the main ambition of the book, these insights are alluded to rather than fully developed. This does nothing to reduce the book's future utility as a key resource not only for area studies researchers but also for scholars interested in comparative authoritarian rule in general.
