Atatürk and the Nazi Imagination is a significant new scholarly inquiry into some of the early events and forces that motivated Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist movement. In post–World War I Germany, the “New Turkey” of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that emerged in the early 1920s was not dismissed by the German Right, and certainly not by the fledgling Nazi Party, as merely another futile nationalist movement of a backward “eastern” or “Asiatic” people of inferior racial stock. Rather, the author presents Atatürk and the modern, secular, and nationalist Turkey as an accepted model for a defeated Germany, one that for some Nazis became even more significant than Mussolini and the early successes of the Fascist movement in Italy. Atatürk's Turkey very quickly became a dominant theme in the larger right-wing media during the Weimar years, one that the Nazis in particular embraced as a model to be emulated in their quest to build a strong, modern, nationalist, and völkisch state and society in Germany. This book effectively demonstrates that in the discourse on Turkey among far-right nationalist and National Socialist organizations and media from the immediate post–World War I years through the years of the Third Reich there existed “a remarkable unity and conformity” (p. 7), one that consistently exhibited admiration and uncritical support for the Turkey of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
Stefan Ihrig begins with the enthusiastic reception in Germany of Atatürk and his nationalist Turkish movement within the broader context of the political and economic chaos of the immediate post–World War I years in Germany. He examines the center-right and far-right of the political spectrum in early Weimar Germany, its interpretation of the causes of Germany's disastrous political and economic condition, and its prescription for Germany's future. Drawing primarily on the print media of the center-right and far-right in Germany as sources, Ihrig notes the popular and almost dominant coverage of Atatürk's nationalist movement and its successful military campaigns against the defeated and moribund Ottoman government in Istanbul and the occupying forces of some of the victorious Entente powers. He provides a specific focus, within the context of Germany's military defeat in 1918, on the widespread rejection in Germany of the “dictated” Treaty of Versailles of 1919. Versailles is portrayed as a humiliation for Germany that was comparable to the humiliation felt by the Turks due to the “dictated” Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, a peace treaty that was imposed on the Ottoman Empire by the same Entente powers. The rightist media consistently praised Atatürk's political and military success in taking control of all of Anatolia and evicting Greek and other Allied military forces by 1923. These newspapers consistently highlighted the symbolism of Atatürk's strength and determination in forcing the revocation of the Treaty of Sèvres. Atatürk and the “New Turkey,” were praised for their success in negotiating the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne from a position of strength. They were repeatedly hailed in the rightist media in Germany, including Nazi publications such as the Völkischer Beobachter, as the perfect model for a “New Germany” to follow.
Particularly within the National Socialist party, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was continually portrayed as the desired role model for a “New Germany” and its “New Führer” through the rest of the Weimar years and into the Third Reich. Indeed, Hitler himself periodically reaffirmed the significant and iconic role of Atatürk for him and for the Nazi movement in its struggle to attain power in Germany. In the minds of some Nazis, including Hitler, the successful new “Turkish Führer” even eclipsed Mussolini as Germany's desired role model (pp. 113–29). Two of the key values in the Nazi discourse, namely a state founded on the Führer principle and on racial (völkisch) ideals and policy, were repeatedly, if in some respects unrealistically, ascribed to Atatürk and the modern state that he was building in Turkey. It was not surprising that Hitler and others in the Nazi leadership made references to the inherent “racial value” of the Turks, on a par with and perhaps related to the German Volk. Indeed, on more than one occasion Hitler and other Nazis made positive references to the Ottoman genocide of the Armenian people during World War I, and the forced expulsion of the Greeks by the Turkish nationalists following the war. These forms of ethnic cleansing were portrayed as positive examples of a Turkish determination to preserve the presumed racial health of the Turkish people, and the strength and security of the new Turkish state (pp. 206–7). Ihrig also reveals other Nazi values that they admiringly ascribed to the Kemalist Turkish Republic, including strong secularism with a total separation of church/mosque and state.
It is not the task of this original and innovative scholarly work to consider Turkish responses to Hitler's admiration and public support in Germany during the 1920s and 1930s. However, the last chapter's very brief and cursory treatment of Turkish–German relations during World War II is surprising. Although the focus of rightist and Nazi admiration was directed primarily at the person of Atatürk himself, it was also meant for the new Turkish state, its policies, institutions, and culture, that Atatürk was credited with creating. If, as is apparent in the final chapter, this positive and comprehensive inclination on the part of Hitler and the Nazis survived Atatürk's death in 1938, then a somewhat more substantive analysis of German–Turkish relations during World War II might have been useful.
This final chapter begins with the important observation that the war complicated what the book portrays as a straightforward and consistently positive relationship between Ankara and Berlin since 1933. As observed above, that consistency reflected the positive attitude toward Atatürk and the Turkish Republic among Hitler and the Nazi leadership that had remained more or less unchanged since the early 1920s. Moreover, the author correctly observes that Turkish neutrality was for the most part consistent with German wartime strategic interests, primarily as a way to protect the Reich's southern flank during its invasion of the Soviet Union. Yet there is little analysis of some of the conflicting issues that Turkish neutrality and some Turkish policies seemed to create for the Nazi state during the war. These include Turkey's deep distrust of Italian ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean, potentially conflicting interests in Turkey's simultaneous friendship treaties with Britain, France, and Germany in 1941, German interest during the campaign in the Soviet Union in Turkey's somewhat inconsistent position on leading a possible pan-Turanism movement of other Turkic-speaking peoples and states in Central Asia, and Turkish willingness to grant transit visas for Palestine to Jewish refugees from Nazi-occupied Europe during the “final solution,” just to mention a few. Berlin's indifference toward Turkey's break in diplomatic relations with Germany in late 1944 and, with little more than two months of war remaining, Turkey's 23 February 1945 declaration of war on Germany, certainly go without saying. But Nazi admiration for Atatürk and his “New Turkey,” notwithstanding the Turkish leader's death in 1938, seems to have been tested by several other wartime issues that perhaps warrant further consideration.
Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination is a welcome addition to the literature on the history of National Socialism and the Third Reich. In particular, it provides an original and valuable new lens for our understanding of Hitler's worldview in general, as well as the foreign policy approaches of his regime in the Mediterranean and the Middle East before and during World War II. It also provides some new insight into Hitler's racial worldview, and its potential implications for the world beyond Europe had the outcome of World War II been different. It is an extremely well-organized and well-written historical monograph, one that this reviewer strongly recommends.
