Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2004
When I started doing clinical ethics rounds, in the mid 1980s, I decided to venture onto the pediatrics ward. The first patient I encountered was a 3-year-old girl returning to her room, groggy from general anesthesia. When I inquired about her, the nurse explained that she had just gone through the procedure to donate bone marrow for her 1-year-old sister, who was preparing to undergo bone marrow transplantation for leukemia.
When I started doing clinical ethics rounds, in the mid 1980s, I decided to venture onto the pediatrics ward. The first patient I encountered was a 3-year-old girl returning to her room, groggy from general anesthesia. When I inquired about her, the nurse explained that she had just gone through the procedure to donate bone marrow for her 1-year-old sister, who was preparing to undergo bone marrow transplantation for leukemia.
I was astounded. This was not a simple procedure. I knew an adult who had donated bone marrow recently, and he reported that it was a very unpleasant experience. I wondered on what basis a child could be subjected to such a process? Who had consented? Who had weighed the risks and made the decision? What physicians were comfortable with such an arrangement, where a perfectly healthy child is put in harm's way for an untherapeutic purpose?
When I explored the ethics literature to see what had been said on the issue, I found very little. There were attempts to develop arguments justifying the choices that apparently had been made in the sort of case that I encountered (and I shall review them shortly). However, the arguments were developed primarily by psychiatrists and psychologists with no perspectives provided by anyone doing bioethics. As a result, I became increasingly interested in the area. In what follows I describe the development of that discussion and indicate how the articles included in this issue attempt to enter into it.
The first approach involved a mixture of concern for both the child's consent and the child's best interest. Informed consent was a notion recognized as important in the developing ethics literature, and the case in question involved 7-year-old twins, one dying of kidney disease. The question was whether it was possible to obtain a valid informed consent from the donating child, as well as an accurate identification of his best interest. The latter was a notion with which psychiatrists and psychologists were comfortable, and they were involved in developing the early literature.
In the 1975 article “The Medical Ethics of Bone Marrow Transplantation in Childhood,”1
Levine MD, Camitta BM, Nathan D, Curran WJ. The medical ethics of bone marrow transplantation in childhood. Journal of Pediatrics 1975;86:145.
See note 1, Levine et al. 1975:148.
Norman Fost, in his 1977 article “Children as Renal Donors,”3
Fost N. Children as renal donors. New England Journal of Medicine 1977;296:363–7.
See note 3, Fost 1977:365.
Questions can be raised about Fost's approach. First, the study describes what most adults do. Apparently, some choose not to donate a kidney to a sibling. Therefore, it is only possibly correct to substitute a probable adult decision for the child in question. Second, the study indicates that, a year later, most adults continued to feel that they had made the right decision. Aside from the fact that this is, again, only about what most adults feel, there is also the question of whether, a year later, the individuals in this study, at some level, were engaged in cognitive dissonance. After surrendering a kidney, it might be difficult to admit that one had made a mistake.
The next notion that appeared in the literature justifying the use of the child as organ donor was that of forced altruism. This view surfaced in a case commentary by Daniel Maguire.5
Maguire DC. Can the fetus be an organ farm? In: Crigger BJ, ed. Cases in Bioethics: Selections from the Hastings Center Report. New York: St. Martin's; 1993:264–5.
A baby is not born outside the pale of human solidarity. It is a horrid individualism that sees the baby born into a “state of nature” with no debts in the social contract…. Part of the awesome grandeur of parental care is the right and duty to interpret sensitively what a baby's humanity entails. And it may entail the surrender of a paired organ when that surrender is a “gift of life.”6
See note 5, Maguire 1993:265.
Maguire claimed that too much emphasis is focused on individual autonomy and that increased attention ought to be directed toward the community. Additionally, an appropriate parental task is moral education. The problem with the first point is that simple increased concern about the community, without further argument, does not justify harvesting a kidney from an infant. The second point begs the question of the nature of the “moral education” that is the responsibility of parents. It is one thing to tell Billy that if he wants to take his toys to school he has to be prepared to share them. It is another thing to take Billy's toys to school and distribute them to his friends. The same can certainly be said for one of his kidneys.
More recently, John Lantos attempted to develop a version of the forced altruism argument.7
Lantos JD. Children as organ donors: an argument for involuntary altruism. In: Burgio GR, Lantos JD, eds. Primum non Nocere Today: A Symposium on Pediatric Bioethics. New York: Elsevier; 1994:67–75.
Three objections can be raised to Lantos's attempt to set limits. First, acting in a theater and donating kidneys are very different. The risk in a theater is that one may be targeted with tomatoes. The risk in kidney donation is much more significant. Children could effectively work certain passages in a coal mine better than adults. Should they be used? The second limit begs the fundamental question. That an adult cannot donate a heart means that a child should not be permitted to donate a heart. But if an adult can donate a kidney, what follows? The third limit, which involves judging what a parent is willing to do, involves a subjective evaluation. Furthermore, it is not clear why willingness on the part of the parent is moral justification for permitting the child to engage in a particular action. The parent is willing to forgo a blood transfusion. What follows concerning the child? It is one thing to encourage children to act altruistically. However, recognizing that children are idealistic, a responsible society will ensure that this idealism is not exploited or manipulated.
The last, and most recent line of argument, involves positing certain ideas about the family. In “Rethinking Transplantation between Siblings,”8
Dwyer J, Vig E. Rethinking transplantation between siblings. Hastings Center Report 1995;25(6):7–12.
The articles selected for inclusion in this issue reflect efforts to rework and extend versions of these different arguments. Several of the authors (Zinner, Jansen, and Ladd) suggest that new research concerning child and adolescent consent is relevant in that it supports the notion that consent by children may be thoughtful, aware, and voluntary. Two of the authors (Zinner and Jansen) focus further on the “best interest” standard and identify additional, though subtle, ways in which the concept might be legitimate to pursue. Also, the notions of family autonomy and parental authority are explored and acknowledged as worthy of additional attention.
The article by Pentz et al. has a different focus. Of interest to these authors is the conflict of interest that exists for providers, as opposed to parents. Furthermore, their paper represents an effort to operationalize the different standards that have been in question in the literature. Only the following article, a summary of the report from the past chairman of the Danish Council of Ethics, expresses a negative note, and the latter is not expressed by the majority but the minority members of the committee.
In closing, I should say that I continue to be puzzled and perplexed about this practice in which we have engaged for the past 30 years.9
Sheldon M. Children as organ donors. In: Speilman B, ed. Organ and Tissue Donation: Ethical, Legal, and Policy Issues. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press; 1996:111–9.