In early 2014 President Obama came under heavy partisan fire for his public embrace of “pen and phone,” as he touted unilateral action as a means of evading legislative gridlock. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) griped that there “was simply no precedent” for such “lawlessness.” But in fact Obama's pen was hardly new to the Oval Office desk drawer. Indeed, the title of Graham Dodds's new book echoes Thomas Jefferson's exhortation to James Madison in 1793, urging the latter to denounce the “heresies” of Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton, writing as “Pacificus,” had taken to the op-ed pages to defend presidential executive authority generally, and Washington's Neutrality Proclamation specifically. Madison responded as “Helvidius” (a Roman republican executed in AD 93); and Dodds is broadly sympathetic to the case he put. But as this book makes clear, Hamilton not only got the better pseudonym but the better of the argument as well—at least in practice.
Take Up Your Pen joins a burgeoning political-science (as opposed to a law-review) literature centered on executive unilateralism, joining important work by Kenneth Mayer, Phillip Cooper, William Howell, Adam Warber, and others. Dodds's approach is perhaps most similar to Cooper's By Order of the President in its inclusiveness and qualitative approach, though Dodds is much more self-conscious, even defensive, about his methodology. Some of this comes, a bit oddly, in the concluding chapter, framed in extended praise of Stephen Skowronek's undoubted contributions to APD research.
But it is in any case the detailed historical material here that makes this book such a useful addition to previous scholarship. Like Cooper, Dodds extends the discussion well past “executive orders” per se. An executive order, after all, is a specific type of presidential action, albeit an important one; and while the number of EOs has declined quite dramatically since World War II, presidents' efforts to control bureaucratic behavior have surely not. Therefore the field here expands to “unilateral presidential directives,” defined as “documents that the president issues to direct the activities of the executive branch” (4). He identifies at least two dozen of these, from proclamations to national-security findings. If at times the approach conflates too much—it ranges from the pardon power to Harry Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb—it is nonetheless a crucial reminder of the scope of the unilateral toolbox and the difficulty in measuring it consistently.
The book first seeks to locate presidential power to issue unilateral directives in constitutional text and political theory, ranging from John Locke in the seventeenth century to Harvey Mansfield Jr. in the twentieth. It proves hard to do: such power is largely inferred from constitutional ambiguity and justified by extraconstitutional pragmatism. As Dodds notes, quoting Ferdinand Lundberg, presidents feel that “whatever the Constitution does not expressly forbid, and it forbids very little, they may do. . . . Whatever the Constitution does not expressly command, they may with a little ingenuity deduce” (35). Thus over time, presidents have pushed—and, critically, other political actors have accepted—a broader range of unilateral authority than the Framers likely had in mind.
The heart of this book lies in tracing this development, especially from “Roosevelt to Roosevelt” (152). The nineteenth century has its headline moments of unilateralism, to be sure (“Louisiana!”; “Nullification!”; “Emancipation!”). But these are exceptions to a century mostly dotted with smaller-scale orders centered on topics like maritime seizures. The rule they prove, and a vital one, is the normalization of and acquiescence to these small-scale orders by courts and later Congress. All presidents—even William Henry Harrison, earning a rare mention in the presidency literature for doing something other than dying—have issued unilateral directives. These “helped to establish precedents and norms, both constitutionally and politically, that greatly influenced subsequent directives, up to and including the present day” (86).
The “pivotal role” in the story (120) is played by Theodore Roosevelt. The book takes great issue with accounts of TR's orders that suggest they broke little new ground. Roosevelt intended to expand the scope and purpose of unilateral directives and succeeded rather grandly, Dodds convincingly argues (though his later nomination of TR as the first “modern president” [229] seems to gild the lily). In eight years TR issued nearly as many orders as all of his predecessors combined, on topics ranging from labor disputes to immigration to conservation and even to simplified spelling. While on this last front the “hornbook tyrant” ultimately had to retreat—“THIS IS TU MUTCH,” carped Harper's Weekly (135)—that was a rare defeat. Most broadly Roosevelt institutionalized a conception of the presidency in which “presidents could freely use unilateral directives to secure their political and policy goals” (151). All of his successors did—not just Progressives but also those Republicans who preached a more restrained brand of presidential power. By the time TR's cousin Franklin arrived in the Oval Office, presidents could not even keep track of their own flurry of directives. (The embarrassment this caused ultimately led to the 1935 Federal Register Act.) In 1942 FDR declared that “in the event the Congress shall fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will act” (170). Obama's “year of action” promises clearly echo this pledge.
That echo resounds through the last historical chapter, which traces the use of directives from 1945 to the present. This compression requires a sort of “greatest hits” approach to nearly seventy years of history that necessarily scants recent developments. Those seeking in-depth treatment of the bipartisan post-9/11 security regime, the substantive reach of centralized regulatory review, or the 1990s evolution of presidential memoranda will want additional sources (Clinton aide Elena Kagan's Harvard Law Review novella “Presidential Administration,” for instance). This organization does serve to emphasize, though, that today's unilateral directives are part and parcel of a long lineage. Indeed, Dodds entitles a summary section “The More Things Change. . .” (215). That is also true with regard to interbranch relations. In some cases, Congress explicitly grants the president discretionary authority; in others presidents move into a vacuum and dare other actors to rebuke them. Rarely does that rebuke occur.
The concluding chapter notes the issues that result. Dodds argues that “extensive governance by unilateral presidential directives may be convenient and widely accepted, but it is in tension with all but the most narrow conceptions of democracy” (223). This might be unpacked. After all, a constant stream of “ambition,” in the Madisonian sense, is not the only rationale for executive expansion. Many over time—such as the supposedly power-shy Republicans of the 1920s—have seen presidential management as a question of organizational efficiency, thus perhaps converging on unilateral tactics by a different route than via TR's inspiration. From another direction still, some scholars and practitioners (e.g., Paul Appleby, Harold Smith, Norton Long) have seen the executive branch as more democratic or at least representative than a sclerotic, parochial Congress. Obama's allies might agree.
Still, Dodds is surely right that unilateralism risks substituting dictate for deliberation. This welcome volume adds greatly to our ability to ground those deliberations in history and law.
