In December 2011, the four European Union (EU) members of the United Nations Security Council—Britain, Germany, France, and Portugal—expressed in a joint statement their dismay at Israel's decision to accelerate Jewish settlement building in the occupied West Bank, which they regarded as an utterly negative development and a threat to the faltering peace process. In an angry response, the Israeli Foreign Ministry accused the four EU countries of interfering with Israel's domestic affairs and warned that by indulging in “inappropriate bickering” with Israel they are bound to make themselves “irrelevant.”
The truth of the matter is, however, that the Israelis have long behaved as if the EU were irrelevant as far as the Arab–Israeli conflict is concerned. But as Rory Miller's Inglorious Disarray convincingly shows, the EU has been anything but irrelevant to Israel, to the Palestinians, and to the conflict during the past four and a half decades. Not only has Europe been heavily invested in the attempts to resolve the conflict on many levels, but also it bears a hefty burden of historical responsibility for the decades-old conflict: European anti-Semitism led to the emergence of the Zionist movement in the late 19th century; the British Balfour Declaration of 1917 stimulated Zionism by promising the Jews a national home in Arab-inhabited Palestine; and the destruction of European Jewry in the Nazi Holocaust of the 1940s generated international sympathy for the survivors and encouraged support for the foundation in 1948 of the State of Israel on more than three-quarters of Mandatory Palestine at the expense of the Palestinian natives of the land.
Much has been written about Europe's engagement in the conflict during the years preceding 1948 and, to a lesser extent, during the first nineteen years of independent Israel (notably, the 1956 tripartite collusion between Israel and the two expiring colonial powers, Britain and France, in going to war against Egypt). By 1967, Europe's role in the Middle East had been replaced by the two competing superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Middle East has remained vital to Europe's interests, primarily due to the latter's dependence on Arab oil, the subject of European involvement in the Arab–Israeli conflict during the decades following the June 1967 Six Day War has been rather marginal in the scholarly literature on the conflict.
Inglorious Disarray is thus a welcome contribution to the field. The book, whose jacket anachronistically portrays Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and French President Charles de Gaulle at their June 1960 meeting in Paris during the two countries’ honeymoon period, covers the post-June 1967 war era up to 2009. It offers a detailed account of the attempts of the European Economic Community, or EEC (until 1993), and the EU (thereafter) to have a significant impact on the Arab–Israeli conflict.
In Miller's telling, the story of Europe and the conflict is a pathetic saga of a powerful grouping of nations aspiring to establish itself as a major global force but incapable of speaking with one voice and, more crucially, unable to translate its economic might into political influence. Despite Europe's steadily increasing support for the Palestine Liberation Organization's struggle for self-determination and statehood from the 1970s onward, and the whopping sums of money the EU poured into the disputed region in the 1990s and the 2000s, both the Arabs and the Israelis have looked to the United States as the only external actor that matters. The EU has been cast not as a central player but as the principal payer. Europe, Miller concludes, will continue to play second fiddle.
Inglorious Disarray's thrust is its European perspective. Drawing on a wealth of books, periodicals, newspapers, and fewer primary sources, Miller fully corroborates the theme that runs throughout the ten chapters of the book, aptly captured by its title—the persistent disunity of the European member states. In this sense, Inglorious Disarray serves a useful purpose: it sheds important light on a neglected aspect of the conflict as well as on Europe's foreign policy. Yet the book suffers from a number of unfortunate weaknesses.
Miller's narrative traces chronologically Europe's evolving approach vis-à-vis the conflict in the period under review, during which it was seeking by stages to develop a common foreign policy. However, the book is too often more of a chronology than an analysis. A good example is the discussion of the chronic corruption that plagued the Palestinian Authority (PA). The author tells us that close to one billion dollars of foreign aid, including European money, was unaccounted for by the PA and that the EU failed to take the PA to task for such enormous embezzlement—but he does not provide any reasons for Europe's indulgent attitude (p. 164). In a similar vein, Miller offers a fascinating account of the thriving business that Europe was doing with Israel, a high-tech superpower, despite the EU's deep consternation at, and strong criticism of, the Israeli government's behavior—again, with no clear explanation for the contradiction (pp. 190–92). It would have been helpful to the reader had the author sought answers to such pertinent questions arising from the factual data by interviewing European decision makers. Of course, honest answers might have not been forthcoming, but this in itself would illuminate the seriousness of the problems at hand.
Conversely, the text is studded with far too many quotations from politicians, officials, and the media, many of which are simply redundant. For example, while arguing that there was a profound gap between the U.S. and EU approaches to dealing with the conflict following 9/11, is it really necessary to attribute the expression “profound gap” to an unnamed “leading U.S. commentator” (p. 159)? While reading the book I could not help but feel that Miller chose to tell the story not in his own words but in the words of others—that he has allowed the myriad quotations he gathered to lead his narrative.
The book contains some inaccuracies and mistakes. In discussing the status of the PLO in Europe in the late 1970s, Miller says that the New York Times, in an article entitled “PLO Gains in Western Europe,” speculated which of the Common Market countries would be the first to receive Yasir ʿArafat on an official visit (p. 79). In fact, it was not the Times that speculated but the “European leaders” whose speculation the Times merely reported from Paris (New York Times, 30 October 1979; the actual title of the piece is “P.L.O. Gains Ground in Western Europe”).
The Khartoum Arab Summit's resolutions were not only about the “infamous Three No's” (p. 12) but mainly about the Arab leaders’ determination to employ political and diplomatic means—rather than military ones—to regain the lands Israel had occupied in June 1967. Even Washington viewed the Khartoum resolutions as a sign of Arab moderation.
The discussion of the emergence of Hamas (pp. 175–76) fails to mention that in the 1980s Israel aided the movement, hoping to use it as a counterbalance to the PLO; the UN Security Council meeting on 5 June 1982 did not take place in the wake of the Israeli invasion to Lebanon, as implied (p. 104), because the invasion began on the next day; on 6 October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces did not invade Israel (p. 28) but Israel-occupied territories; 7 June 1967 was the third day of the Six Day War, not the second (p. 14); Benjamin Netanyahu became Israel's prime minister for the first time not in May 1996 (p. 141) but in June; the Palestinian National Council is not “the governing body” of the PLO (p. 17) but its legislative body; the name of the “celebrated Palestinian-American academic” cited on p. 81 is Hisham Sharabi, not Shirabi; Cecil Hourani's ideas about exploiting Arab oil in order to influence Europe were expressed in 1967, not 1969 (p. 30).
Despite these shortcomings and other flaws (some of which come from sloppiness), Inglorious Disarray is a highly informative work that draws attention to an important subject that has hitherto received little attention. The book underlines the need for similar studies dealing with the Arab and Israeli perspectives on Europe's involvement in the conflict during the same period.
