1. Introduction
It has already been more than a decade since the member states of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) unanimously adopted the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) under paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD). Considered as a historic moment in the evolution of an emerging international norm, which was first introduced in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the international community’s adoption of R2P officially instigated the process of its implementation through the United Nations (UN).
Nevertheless, the last ten years have proven certain difficulties true in turning the international community’s ‘words into deeds’1 under the mandate of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Since 2009, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has published eight reports targeting various aspects of R2P implementation, some of which underlined the important role played by regional arrangements/organizations. Following from such emphasis, we question the way forward in R2P’s second decade and seek alternative paths for the norm’s timely and decisive implementation. To this end, we focus on the potential contribution of the European Union (EU) both through its foreign policy and the UN fora. In the face of the varying responses to the cases of Libya and Syria, as of 2013 the European Parliament recommended ‘to reconfirm the EU’s commitment to R2P by adopting an interinstitutional “Consensus on R2P”’. It is not necessarily only the references to the R2P norm or a renewed rhetorical commitment to R2P observed in the EU’s discourse that raises curiosity about the role the Union can play in this evolving norm’s implementation. Our contention is that, whether due to the role it plays via its member states in the UNSC and the UNGA, or due to its non-military and military capabilities, the EU holds a potential in terms of contributing to the evolution and implementation of the R2P norm.
With our analysis, we make a significant contribution to the existing literatures on R2P and EU foreign policy in three ways: the unique nature of the EU – neither an intergovernmental organization nor a federal state – has led many in the literature to discuss what kind of capabilities the EU possesses in global affairs. In what follows, first, we extend this debate to cover the EU’s potential in the implementation of the global responsibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes.2
Second, to date, the EU’s contribution to R2P has rarely been studied.Reference De Baere, De Franco, Meyer, Smith, Knudsen, Jorgensen, Laaitkainen, Wouters and De Man3 Building on this understudied aspect of the R2P literature, we aim to answer the following questions: what are the existing capacities of the EU in contributing to R2P; and what can the EU do to be a more responsible actor in the future, especially in terms of enabling a consistent implementation of the norm by the international community?
The EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, launched a strategic review of the EU’s foreign and security policy. This strategic review is aimed to produce an ‘EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy’ by June 2016. What we put forward in the following analysis is also relevant to this review process as it maps out why and how the EU can incorporate R2P to its foreign and security policy framework as agreed upon in the inter-institutional consensus on R2P.
Following a brief overview of what has proven problematic in R2P’s implementation through the UN in the first decade of the norm’s adoption, we focus on the EU’s responsibility. We first use the criteria of responsibility identified by SzigetiReference Szigeti4 to analyse the EU as a responsible actor in protecting populations from atrocity crimes. We base our discussion on the EU’s capacities in the literature as a normative, civilian and small power Europe, and assess the EU’s capacities on grounds of such taxonomy. Having identified the existing capacities of the EU in contributing to R2P’s evolution and implementation, we finally analyse what the EU can do in the future to become more responsible and to make the international community assume its responsibility in a timely and decisive manner in R2P’s second decade. Accordingly, we argue that the EU needs to mainstream the R2P norm in its foreign policy machinery to be able to mobilize its various instruments to be a responsible actor.
2. R2P’s Stalled Implementation through the United Nations
A decade of inconsistent implementation of R2P by the international community in numerous situations – such as in Burma, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and most recently in Syria and Iraq – reveals that R2P has not yet become ‘a core part of the world’s armor for protecting vulnerable populations from the most serious international crimes and violations’5 as Ban Ki-moon once suggested.
In the aftermath of its instigation by the ICISS, R2P was first placed on the agenda of the UNGA by the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In 2005, WSOD officially made R2P part of the UN system by turning it into a unanimously accepted written commitment under two main paragraphs. Based on the duties arising from existing international law, Paragraph 138 established the individual responsibility of states to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, whereas Paragraph 139 set the scope for the collective responsibility of the international community to protect populations from these atrocity crimes in a non-binding manner. Following the UNSC’s extended perception of its mandate, which emerged in the immediate post-Cold War era, that humanitarian crises can be viewed as a threat to international peace, WSOD placed the implementation of R2P under the authority of the UNSC. Whilst this enabled the most authoritative body of the UN to exercise its powers on behalf of the international community, it also happened to place R2P matters in a political rather than a judicial forum, which consequently made the norm’s implementation vulnerable to the clashes between the great powers of the UN.
In a nutshell, while its institutionalization through the UN integrated R2P into the Organization’s machinery and unarguably widened its area of potential impact, the way it was institutionalized limited the norm’s capabilities since it did not allow for any structural or procedural changes to the UN’s system. With a state’s individual responsibility based on its existing commitments to the established standards of protection of fundamental human rights as well as international criminal and humanitarian laws, the international community’s responsibility was loosely defined under the WSOD, without imposing any legal duties because it was placed under the authority of the UNSC only. Such a limited mandate also made it subject to the political will of the permanent members of the Council (P5) and their veto, 6 as well as a case-by-case evaluation, which in turn allowed for varying reactions or no reaction at all, as the recent case of Syria has demonstrated on various occasions.
While the politicization of R2P cases highly scrutinizes the possibility of a proper international response – as for instance experienced in the cases of Darfur and Syria – the UN’s lack of certain capabilities has made the timely and decisive implementation of the norm further complicated. Given that the UN does not have a standing army, and its budget is provided by the contributions of its member states, the practice of the coercive end of Pillar 3 becomes fully dependent on the will of its member states, and possibly with the assistance of regional organizations. As Hehir observes, ‘this twin problem – the lack of will and the absence of sufficient military resources – has been responsible for arguably all those cases where the international response to a particular crisis has been lamentable.’Reference Hehir 7
3. A Regional Framework for R2P: Potential EU Contribution
Following the 2010 report on early warning and assessment – which reiterated that ‘[t]he Charter, in Articles 33 (1) and 52 (2), envisioned a world in which preventive diplomacy would begin with local and regional initiatives, to be complemented or supplemented by global efforts by the United Nations, as needed’ 8 – the Secretary-General’s 2011 report placed special emphasis on the role of regional organizations 9 in R2P’s implementation through Pillars 2 and 3, wherein Ban argued that due to their proximity, regional organizations
may have access to more detailed information, may have a more nuanced understanding of the history and culture, may be more directly affected by the consequences of action taken or not taken, and may be critical to the implementation of decisions taken in New York. Timely and decisive response is most likely when inter-governmental bodies at both the global and regional levels favor similar courses of action. In such cases, decision-making at each level reinforces the political legitimacy of the other. 10
To date, regional organizations such as the African Union and Economic Community of West African States have acted as prominent actors in their regions, as they have demonstrated in the cases of Kenya (2008) and Guinea (2009). 11 Similarly, while the Organization of American States, the Association of South East Asian Nations, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and South African Development Cooperation hold similar powers, they have rather been inclined to adhere to the principle of non-intervention. Compared with these organizations, given the distant location of most R2P crises, the EU’s prominence for the implementation of R2P lies elsewhere.
After identifying the main problems of consistent and timely implementation of R2P, as well as where the norm lies within the UN system, now we turn to the potential EU contribution to R2P’s implementation and analyse it through both EU foreign policy and the UN fora. However, the first question that requires an answer is why should the EU assume such a responsibility to protect populations? Based on the responsible Europe framework,Reference Szigeti 4 which puts forth six principles – namely the contribution, beneficiary, community, capacity, legitimate expectations, and the consent principles – we first assess the ‘special responsibility’Reference Ralph and Souter 12 of the EU to protect populations from atrocity crimes with a special focus on the capacities of the Union. 13
Capacity principle suggests that if the EU has the capacity to alleviate the problem, then it should assume R2P. In assessing the EU’s capacities, we rely on the existing literature on what kind of power the EU is in the international arena. In this vein, we outline the capacities of the EU in its foreign relations, because the capacities it has directly impact what responsibilities the Union should bear in protecting civilians.
3.1. Civilian, Small and Normative Power Europe 14
As early as the 1970s, Duchêne argued that the EU had a source of power, other than military, to shape other actors’ conduct, namely a civilian power. Duchêne observed that the EU was ‘long on economic power and relatively short on armed force.’Reference Duchêne, Kohnstamm and Hager 15 In a world of economic interdependence, to shape other actors’ conduct the EU could rely on the civilian tools at its disposal, such as international cooperation and the ability to utilize its economic power in its relations with the outside world to achieve non-military objectives. The Union’s use of trade preferences in its foreign policy, as well as its preference for working through international cooperation to achieve its economic and political objectives are among the examples.
Manners argued that the EU has the power to define what is normal in international relations by spreading its norms, rather than coercing other actors or offering them incentives to change their behaviour. In his ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) framework, Manners observed that the EU is built upon certain norms, which have a place in the founding treaties of the EU – such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights – and which the Union also defines as the standard for appropriate behaviour for other states in the system.Reference Manners 16
Such norms of the EU are diffused in the international context through the Union’s economic and diplomatic relations with other actors. The EU defines what it means to be a European state with reference to these norms. In international organizations and its bilateral relations with other states, the EU tries to persuade relevant actors that these norms are the right thing to do. Accordingly, the EU’s enlargement and foreign trade policies, as well as its development aid and efforts to spread these norms in international organizations are the channels for diffusing these norms.
Toje disputed the NPE argument on the basis that the EU can be categorized as a small power. While offering a realist view of EU power in international relations, Toje did not expect the EU to become a great power. Since small powers are actors that do not have sufficient military power to influence other actors’ behaviour, Toje argued, they are left with a limited number of policy choices.Reference Toje 17
As they cannot rely on their military power to ensure their survival, they depend on another actor for security purposes, hence the EU’s strong ties with NATO and the United States (US). Indeed, from the early years of integration, the EU has largely been dependent on the military protection of NATO and the US. Therefore, rather than trying to balance the US military power, the EU can be seen as defining its foreign policy objectives moderately, aiming for only the things it can achieve with its limited material power. Toje also linked the EU’s commitment to multilateralism and international law to its lack of military power because participation in international organizations can be the only way for the EU to achieve its objectives.Reference Toje 17
Mogherini’s strategic review signals the EU’s turn towards the acknowledgment of its small power status. The report acknowledges the changing nature of the international system and forecasts the rise of emerging powers such as China and India to persist. While arguing that it is necessary for the EU to protect its citizens and promote its interests and values globally, the report also recognizes the shortcomings in the ‘D’ of the CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy, formerly European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – of the EU. 18 Therefore, in what follows, we focus on the EU’s potential contribution to R2P within its small power capabilities.
3.2. Non-military Instruments
The EU has mostly relied on non-military instruments to achieve its global objectives. In the words of Knudsen, ‘[h]ard power is still a matter for France and the UK, it seems. On the other hand, diplomatic initiatives, non-forceful measures and post-war reconstruction certainly seems to be matters for the EU’ (Ref. Reference De Baere, De Franco, Meyer, Smith, Knudsen, Jorgensen, Laaitkainen, Wouters and De Man3, p. 166). Part of these civilian tools is the Instrument for Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP, formerly Instrument for Stability and Rapid Reaction Mechanism). In 1999, after the creation of the ESDP, the civilian capabilities, as well as military capabilities were recognized to be in need of development. To address the civilian side of the rapid reaction capability, a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management unit inside the Commission was created and a fund for rapid reaction to crises was also established.
Since 2014, the IcSP replaced the previous instrument as one of the ‘key external assistance instruments enabling the EU to take a lead in helping to prevent and respond to actual or emerging crises around the world.’ 19 While this instrument can be used for short-term and long-term responses to crises, it was used to support security sector reform in the DRC and to support elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya after the Arab uprisings. In 2013, €20 million were given to support local capacity building in law enforcement, dialogue and reconciliation in Mali, as well as to improve the Libyan security sector reform.Reference Lavallée 20 In principle, measures costing less than €20 million can be directly dispatched by the High Representative/Vice President through the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) without the approval of the Council. The FPI relies on the EEAS regarding the expertise required for crisis assessment and it is legally part of the Commission concerning its budgetary role since the creation of the EEAS (Ref. Reference Lavallée20, p. 382). As part of its crisis-preparedness measures, IcSP funds the capacity building activities of NGOs ‘to develop early-warning systems, to provide mediation and reconciliation services and to address inter-community tensions. It also addresses measures for improving post-conflict and post-disaster recovery’. 19
The IcSP is a complementary instrument that can be used when other measures are not sufficient or available. It does not replace or compete with other major streams of EU assistance such as humanitarian aid and development assistance. Humanitarian aid by the EU is delivered through the European Commission from the EU budget following the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid that was signed by the members of the Council of the EU, the European Commission and the European Parliament. 19 Its objective is to provide impartial and needs-based emergency aid to alleviate human suffering and save lives when local actors are unable or unwilling to act. For the 2014–2020 period, the humanitarian aid budget allocated is €1.1 billion per year. 21 Most humanitarian aid is distributed through NGOs, UN agencies and other international organizations. The EU also funds civil society in third-world countries to promote democracy and human rights through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EiDHR). Such funds can be withheld in cases of major human rights violations by the recipient countries. Therefore, they are part of the EU’s potential toolkit or response to atrocity crimes, both as incentives to promote domestic reform in the long run and as penalties for human rights violations.
The trade policy is closely linked to the EU’s development recipe and is one of the most powerful non-military instruments available to the EU to promote R2P globally. The EU is dubbed by DamroReference Damro 22 as a ‘market power’ due to the sheer size of its market and trade capacity in the world. The EU’s trade policy has always been geared towards free trade, with the exception of a quite highly protected agricultural market that was a counter-example of liberalization. Indeed, a protected agricultural market was most hurtful to developing countries. Since 2003, the EU has been negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). These negotiations are premised on the creation of seven regions in Africa and the Caribbean, which are supposed to negotiate with the EU as regions. Put simply, the EU first creates regions in its own image, and then, aims to sign inter-regional trade deals with them. This aspect of the EPAs arguably relates to the UN Secretary-General’s reports on R2P, emphasizing the vitality of regional organizations. Accordingly, through its region-building activities, the EU may contribute to the emergence of new regional organizations that can uphold R2P in their respective regions. However, as the recent strategic review of Mogherini also points out, ‘[w]hile in some cases – notably Asia – bilateralism can pave the way to inter-regionalism, in other cases, there may be trade-offs warranting more careful reflection’. 18
EPAs seem to contradict both the EU’s region-building goal and development objectives.Reference McDonald, Lande and Matanda 23 These countries will have to eliminate tariff barriers on nearly all of their European imports, therefore decreasing the market shares of local producers and non-European exporters. This could in turn harm not only the ACP industries but also the regional integration process by substituting European imports for regional exchanges. These countries are expected to sign reciprocal free trade agreements with the EU. The EU, therefore, uses trade as a tool for development, but as Siles-Brügge pointed out recently, its development objectives are subsumed under its commercial interests.Reference Siles-Brügge 24
Another non-military tool at the disposal of the EU to promote R2P is the adoption of autonomous or UN-coordinated sanctions. Such sanctions are economic and diplomatic restrictions targeting governments of third countries, or non-state entities such as terrorist organizations and individuals. Sanctions implemented by the EU range from arms embargoes to limited or general trade and financial restrictions. Individual political actors are targeted by visa and travel restrictions as appropriate. For instance, in the case of Libya, the EU implemented sanctions in line with the UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973. 25
The civilian capabilities of the EU range from short-term tools – such as rapidly deployable IcSP, humanitarian aid and sanctions – to long-term and less flexible ones – such as those concerning development, trade and EiDHR. The EU also wields its enlargement policy, which De Baere labels as the Union’s ‘Member-State building tool’,Reference De Baere, De Franco, Meyer, Smith, Knudsen, Jorgensen, Laaitkainen, Wouters and De Man 3 as another long-term and arguably effective policy tool. The EU has been able to assist with significant domestic change, including democratization reforms and solving border conflicts in the applicant states when they were given the credible prospect of membership. A recent example is the EU involvement in the resolution of the problem of Serbian non-recognition of Kosovo. However, as Mogherini also notes in her strategic review, the fairness and credibility of the enlargement policy are key to its success. 18
For the EU to be able to use its non-military capabilities to transform human rights practices of third states, it cannot only rely on material rewards or punishments, a.k.a. ‘carrots and sticks’. The literature studying the domestic impact of the enlargement policy on candidate states shows that the EU should give a consistent message through its own practices, and domestic actors should perceive and agree with the message. For this to succeed, consistency and clarity of the EU message is important.Reference Grabbe 26 However, beyond the prize of future EU membership, there is uncertainty that human rights conditionality in international agreements can achieve lasting results.Reference Meunier and Nicolaidis 27 In the meantime, a possible pitfall for the EU is not practising what it preaches, and consequently rekindling suspicion among third countries that it might be an ‘Imperial Power’.Reference Sepos 28
Another possible way for the EU to protect civilians is, in fact, offering protection to them as refugees.Reference Weissman 29 The recent Syrian refugee crisis has revealed the distance of EU member states from considering this as an option. For the protection of refugees to be a feasible option, the Dublin Convention needs to be revised, and each member state should be allocated a fair number of refugees and applications to process.
3.3. Military Instruments
Since 2004, the EU’s goal in building up its military capability has been forming multinational battlegroups that would be rapidly deployable when crises break out. Battlegroups are ready forces consisting of 1500 personnel that can be deployed within ten days and sustained for 30 days to provide rapid action across the full range of Petersberg tasks sanctioned by the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty lists these tasks as follows: ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilisation tasks’. 30 As the Petersberg tasks indicate, these battlegroups can be deployed for R2P missions authorized by the UN since their task description suits the variety of military tasks that could be associated with Pillar 3 R2P action.
The battlegroups that were on standby during the Libyan crisis were taken into consideration for the EUFOR Libya mission. The European Council took the decision on 1 April 2011 (Decision 011/210/CFSP) for a mission to support the delivery of humanitarian aid, and it was tied to the request by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.Reference Gottwald 31 As the request never materialized, the mission was not deployed.
Similarly, although the battlegroups exist on paper, they have not been deployed yet. The cost considerations of member states that contribute to standing battlegroups, hamper immediate deployment. Furthermore, priorities of the standing battlegroups are put forth as reasons for non-deployment.Reference Andersson 32 Accordingly, one of the barriers against developing the EU’s military capability has been the national defence budgets that have mostly been in decline. 33 The budget for CSDP operations comes from individual contributions by member states on the basis of their GDP, and CSDP operations spending is not charged to the EU budget. At a time of economic crisis in many EU member states, CSDP operations have become more costly. While the Athena mechanism for financing common infrastructure costs of CSDP operations was created as part of the Community budget, this has not been sufficient to alleviate the concerns of the member states.
In 2013, the EU adopted the ‘Enable and Enhance Initiative’ to provide advice, training and military equipment to partner countries or regional organizations so that they can build sufficient capacity to respond to and/or prevent crises.Reference Major, Mölling and Vorrath 34 The initiative was instigated by Germany and aimed to find a way ‘to develop a new framework for justifying arms exports to target countries, predicated on the notion that Germany and the western countries recognize these states as “strategic partners”’ (Ref. Reference Major, Mölling and Vorrath34, p. 210). This initiative, therefore, sits uncomfortably with the arms embargoes towards ‘strategic partners’.
Furthermore, capacity-building in the security sector is a crisis prevention tool (Ref. Reference Major, Mölling and Vorrath34, p. 211). Yet, the EU’s early warning system is not developed enough to enable it to undertake such preventive measures. For instance, although early but weak signals were extensively collected by national and EU delegations on the field in Kenya prior to the 2013 elections, there was no early-warning mechanism to put these signals together and call for action at the EU level.Reference Babaud and Ndung’u 35
Putting aside the manoeuvre capability it creates, building such military capacity is in the meantime a risky enterprise as it is difficult to track where the military equipment and trained personnel end up in the near future. On the basis of this overview, it can be argued that the EU’s added value is overshadowed by its non-military instruments. All in all, the EU’s primary contribution regarding military instruments can be military training and capacity-building activities, as opposed to the hard power capacities some of its member states such as France and the United Kingdom hold.
4. The European Way Forward
Since the initial stages of R2P’s institutionalization within the framework of the UN, favouring such development of the norm, the EU and its member states have been among the proponents of R2P. Just two months after WSOD, the European Council ‘reaffirm[ed] the importance which it attributes to the concept of responsibility to protect, which must be implemented by the Security Council’. Later that year, it considered R2P ‘an important tool of the international community for addressing the worst atrocities’. 36 A year before the Secretary-General’s first report on R2P, in listing its priorities for the 63rd UN General Assembly, the EU affirmed the ‘great importance’ it places on the implementation of R2P, and underlined ‘the need for further consideration of [R2P …] in the General Assembly and the Security Council’, while it also welcomed the increased mandate for the Special Representative for the Prevention of Genocide as well as the appointment of a Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on R2P. 37
At the regional level, the EU has been a standing example of supranational values for conduct. With the membership criteria it imposes on candidate states and the human rights principles and standards it has embraced institutionally, the EU contributes to decreasing the potential for atrocity crimes within its region. Although this arguably is a prominent contribution to the internalization of Pillar 1 responsibilities, the main potential of the EU in contributing to an effective implementation of Pillar 2 and 3 responsibilities lies deeper.
4.1. The EU’s Potential Role in R2P Implementation
Given an overview of the EU’s non-military capacities, it would not be surprising to argue that the Union’s such capacity allows it to contribute to the preventive mechanisms of Pillar 2. On the one hand, the EU is capable of assisting states through humanitarian aid and development assistance, as well as in developing early warning mechanisms. On the other hand, it can help states at the post-conflict stage, as it did via EULEX in Kosovo.
Furthermore, the EU’s persistent support for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and adherence to the basic principles and goals of the Rome Statute may help to pursue a more effective judicial practice first within states and then in the case of national failure, through the ICC itself. 38 Gözen Ercan argues that the ICC can judicially assist R2P’s implementation at two levels: (1) determination – that is by establishing ‘that an authority has manifestly failed to protect its population;’ and (2) enforcement – that is by beginning ‘proceedings on alleged crimes, or if the individuals are found guilty, to impose punitive measures on the individual perpetrators of the mass atrocity crimes so that they can no longer continue to commit these crimes’ (Ref. 11, p. 192). In this vein, the political, diplomatic, logistical and financial support provided by the EU to the Court becomes of significance also in terms of the implementation of R2P. In the absence of a world police, the EU member states may also become functional in enforcing the issued arrest warrants.
Although, as for its regional location, the EU is not in the proximity of most areas of conflict, the Union and its member states have representations all around the world. When combined, these provide a notable potential for EU early warning. Furthermore, as Wouters and De Man remind us, ‘the strategic origins of the Union as an economic and political partnership aimed at eradicating conflict among its member states’ (Ref. Reference De Baere, De Franco, Meyer, Smith, Knudsen, Jorgensen, Laaitkainen, Wouters and De Man3, p. 16) may contribute to resolution processes through the close economic and political relationships developed between the EU and non-member states in a way to enhance the effectiveness of the sanctions that are applied under Pillar 3 of R2P. Although the impact of the sanctions would vary from state to state, 39 the collective nature of the sanctions unarguably makes them more effective than those imposed by states individually.
4.2. Mid- to Long-term Potential Impact
With its current powers, the EU’s capacities as a normative and civilian power also provide it with a potential impact on the UN as its privileged partner. Considering its reckoning of the need for further exploration of R2P, as well as its continuing mandate under the UNSC, the EU as a normative power first and foremost may play a leading role in bringing certain aspects of R2P back into the UNGA’s agenda, such as the criteria for intervention, restraint on the veto, as well as the responsibility to rebuild for more effective and consistent application of the norm. In fact, in recent years, as one of the P5, France has been a staunch advocate of the restraint on the veto in R2P situations through endorsing its initiative entitled the ‘Code of Conduct’, which took after the original proposition of the ICISS in its 2001 Report. In 2013, at the 68th Session of the General Assembly, reflecting on the worsening circumstances in Syria, French President Hollande stated that ‘the most serious threat of all was inaction; the worst decision was no decision; and the worst danger was to see no danger. Every time the United Nations did not act, peace suffered.’ Considering the P5 veto as the main problem, Hollande called for ‘a code of good conduct’, which translates into a mutual commitment of the P5 to restrain their veto when deciding on cases of atrocity crimes. 40
While a voluntary restraint on the P5 veto is a first step towards the effective implementation of R2P, a permanent solution lies in the question of the UNSC and/or a general UN reform, which has been voiced by numerous states on various occasions of the R2P debate within the UNGA. The issue of the UN reform is also listed among the EU’s priorities for the UNGA as noted during the 69th General Assembly. 41 As Buchanan and Keohane assert, ‘[t]he central problem with the Security Council is, […] not what it does, but what it fails to do’,Reference Buchanan and Keohane 42 hence, a much needed change for the proper implementation of the collective responsibility to protect relates to the mandate of R2P.
Regarding the norm’s implementation, as Hehir aptly labels it, the UNSC has been the ‘perennial problem’ for R2P.Reference Hehir and Murray 43 In the absence of a realized scenario of reform, considering instances of UNSC deadlock, a common EU position could help an attempt to discuss an immediate R2P concern in an emergency special session at the UNGA invoked via the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Mathematically speaking, two of the P5 are also prominent members of the EU, and the EU member and candidate states comprise around a quarter of the two-thirds of a fully attended voting session in the UNGA. Such a large number of seats is not to be disregarded, especially when it comes to the issue of larger reform. Considering the strategic regional partnerships it has with Africa or regional organizations such as the ASEAN, the EU, arguably, would have an extended sphere of influence over various other states in a quest to push for UN reform, especially that of the UNSC, which it has been trying to put on the table for some time.
Last but not least, the EU may help the legal development of R2P into customary international law through adopting a clear language invoking the collective responsibility of the international community in its resolutions and statements in a way that would be indicative of state practice and possibly of opinio juris. 44 As argued elsewhere, without legal obligations on the part of the international community, R2P cannot turn into a genuine commitment having a coercive effect over state behaviour.
5. Conclusion
Based on the existing literature analysing the EU’s capacities as a normative, civilian and small power, this article has focused on the potential of the EU to enhance the implementation of R2P, which has been stalled by the inconsistent practices of the UNSC. Given its existing non-military capacities, not to disregard its latent military capacity, the EU holds a genuine potential for further evolution and implementation of the norm. Especially at a time of strategic review of the EU’s foreign policy tools and objectives by the EU High Representative, Mogherini, assessing the EU’s potential role in R2P’s future evolution is crucial.
Franco et al. observe that ‘the EU’s implementation has been more limited and slower than one would expect from the NPE procedural ethics of “living by example”’ (Ref. Reference De Baere, De Franco, Meyer, Smith, Knudsen, Jorgensen, Laaitkainen, Wouters and De Man3, p. 1). Brockmeier et al. identify the reasons for this slow implementation as the lack of a ‘consensual position on R2P’, even though ‘European governments, parliaments and civil societies’ have been among proponents of R2P.Reference Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk 45 In order to realize its true potential, the EU needs to adopt a coherent R2P perspective at the UN and mainstream the R2P norm in its foreign policy machinery, not only to assist the diffusion of the norm but also its implementation.
Having identified the potential routes the EU can take to enhance R2P’s implementation, this study paves the way for further research. Future studies can develop geostrategic scenarios in which the EU might be likely to opt for unilateral measures to uphold R2P, i.e. the EU’s foreign policies and instruments, or choose the UN mechanism and its reformation to be a more responsible actor. Moreover, given the problems inherent in R2P’s practice under the UNSC mandate, future research may look into the cataloguing of resources available to other regional organizations to find synergies between different organizations and to improve Pillar 2 and 3 implementations.
About the Authors
Pınar Gözen Ercan is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations of Hacettepe University, Turkey. She does research on the Responsibility to Protect, human rights, international law and IR theories. She is the author of Debating the Future of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: The Evolution of a Moral Norm (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), and The Territorial Sea Issue in Greek–Turkish Relations (VDM Verlag, 2009), and is the Editor of Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
Defne Günay is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations of Yaşar University, Turkey. She holds a BA in Political Science and Public Administration, and an MA in International Relations from Bilkent University, Turkey. She obtained her MPhil and PhD in Politics from the University of Sheffield, UK. Her recent research on Europeanization, Turkish politics and Turkish foreign policy was published in South European Society and Politics, Mediterranean Politics and Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies. She also has chapters in edited volumes published by Palgrave Macmillan and Routledge.
