That this book appears now is propitious. At a time when moral philosophers are openly worried about the future of moral philosophy in bioethics,Footnote 1 when the role of the philosopher at the bedside continues to be contested, and when a “divorce” between academic centers in bioethics and university philosophy departments is both predicted and perhaps welcomed,Footnote 2 Chris Meyers boldly reasserts the importance of the connection between philosophy and clinical bioethics.
Meyers' book affords a timely opportunity to rethink nagging questions that have dogged the profession of ethics consultation from its inception: What is the role of ethics consultants within the clinic? Whom do they serve? What kind of training should ethicists have? Can they claim a kind of “moral expertise”? If so, in what can that consist? Should ethicists make moral recommendations? Or merely “facilitate” problem solving?
Meyers argues for answers to many of these questions and does so along two general dimensions. With the caution that a “practical ethics that relies too heavily on conceptual analysis is of little to no use to clinical practitioners” (p. 2), Meyers proposes and then tries to defend the claim that clinical ethicists “need the theoretical and conceptual analysis skills that are a standard part of a philosophical education and mindset” (p. 3). A philosopher and experienced consultant in several hospitals, Meyers confesses that he came eventually to question what is probably the reigning model of ethics consultation, a model that says the ethicist must remain within the role of a “consensus facilitator.” Rejecting this, Meyers decided to experiment with giving prescriptive advice to physicians. Yet, he adds “who was I, or any philosopher, to be telling them the ‘correct’ moral choice?” (p. 4).
This book is Meyers' response to that conundrum. In it, he argues that philosophical training is, all things considered, an essential part of the preparation of a clinical ethicist. Assuming “a number of crucial caveats,” Meyers states, philosophers are “the best persons to provide clinical ethics consulting” (p. 4). This thesis is argued for from several directions in the book. The first chapter claims that philosopher–ethicists can qualify in an appropriate sense as moral experts who can and ought to make, as part of their consulting work, prescriptive moral recommendations regarding the correct course of action in a clinical situation. The second chapter attempts to support and elaborate upon this claim by outlining a method of moral reasoning the ethicist can deploy. The other dimension along which Meyers' argument moves is explicitly hortatory. Meyers' wants to incite ethicists to take up a challenge hitherto overlooked. Too much of the (voluminous) literature in clinical ethics approaches such common issues as forgoing artificial supportive interventions in a way that is dangerously decontextualized and naïvely apolitical. In his third chapter, Meyers recounts several familiar clinical dilemmas and critiques the usual analyses of them. The commentators (and indeed most of us, Meyers is saying) routinely miss the asymmetries of power operating behind the scenes in a modern clinic. Sexist and homophobic assumptions, veiled prejudices against the indigent, unacknowledged “turf wars,” and the ubiquitous silencing of patients by doctors who inappropriately wield their authority—all are barriers to sound ethical decisionmaking in clinical medicine. Thus, “clinical ethicists must become politically informed, aware of and responsive to political and institutional structures and their relationship to specific clinical cases” (p. 83). Healthcare institutions possess an ethos, Meyers reminds us, a pervasive set of attitudes that often promotes organizational values (such as productivity) over moral principles, framing practice issues by disregarding important moral questions. Hence, the clinical ethicist should function as a kind of medical ethnographer, taking note of the elements of the institutional culture that undermine ethical reasoning and decisionmaking.
Despite its title, this work is not a pocketbook to be carried on rounds by busy clinicians, nor does it purport to provide a detailed recipe for how to conduct consultations. But this is not to say that working consultants will not find its advice and insights useful. The book is really aimed at a dual audience: those who primarily do clinical ethics work and those who debate about the role of the ethicist within the larger conversation about the place of moral philosophy in bioethics.
The second half of Meyer's book comes closest to giving guidance to the individual consultant. Because so much of bioethics is premised on “analyzing” case studies (whether in print or in action), we must, Meyers believes, attend to the contextual—particularly political—assumptions that too often invisibly frame how our cases are discussed. Here Meyers joins forces with moral particularists who warn us of the power of “master narratives” to set the terms of deliberation and discussion of moral issues. Clinical ethicists must politicize their work and become “ethical activists” (p. 77). They should educate colleagues self-critically to reveal and examine their own assumptions, and “work to sensitize practitioners … to the genuine health care-related hardships faced by the poor” (p. 75). In what is perhaps the most important of this book's contributions, Meyers argues that an effective ethics consultant must learn to see the narratives of patients, families, and physicians through the lens of the organizational culture of modern healthcare facilities. As an ethnographer of the clinic, the ethics consultant realizes that meanings are constructed and assumptions enacted by patients and physicians who are largely unaware of their presence. The hurried resident who fails properly to consent a patient for a simple procedure may not be a “bad” doctor, just a victim of a hierarchy of authority and power within the institution, someone with too little power and too much to do. An ethicist must be attentive to these realities of practice. In thus placing emphasis upon ethnographic understanding, Meyers recovers a claim first argued for at the “birth” of bioethics: namely, that the ethicist must remain an “outsider” to the community he or she wishes to serve, an individual with an essential combination of critical distance and “local” knowledge.
It has to be said that the insights of the second half of the book sit somewhat uneasily with the argument of the first two chapters. For in those sections Meyers seeks to defend two controversial claims: (1) that ethics consultants can be moral experts who not only may but in some cases ought to offer specific recommendations as a consequence of the consultant's expertise at getting at the “right answer” (or at least closer to the right answer than others) (pp. 5, 15), and (2) that philosophers are the professionals best suited to perform this role (p. 4). Yet if an attentiveness to context and an ethnographer's insight into institutional ideologies and power structures to which insiders are blind is essential to being a good ethicist, why think that philosophers (as opposed, e.g., to medical anthropologists or sociologists) are well positioned or even adequately qualified by virtue of their training to undertake such tasks? But there are deeper concerns here than this one.
Part of the difficulty in assessing Meyers' claim that philosophers can properly function as “moral experts” in the clinic is in deciding just what he means. (Indeed, the book would profit from more examples purporting to deploy that expertise.) In one case, a meeting was held to discuss possible withdrawal of aggressive treatment on a patient neurologically devastated due to head trauma. The surgeon was firmly opposed to this and attempted to use his power to cow the team into conformity with his position. Meyers comments:
On the traditional model, my job would be to help clarify the values at stake … to make sure everyone's voice was respectfully heard and … to try to get all the parties to agree…. Instead, I pushed [the surgeon] on a number of inconsistencies in his argument…. I also strongly expressed my own moral judgment, using intentionally harsh language like “condemning this poor man to a life without living.” … I strongly advocated for a position, rather than just analyzing and facilitating. (p. 28, emphasis in the original)
What's troubling here is the suggestion that philosophically trained ethicists may engage in such advocacy because they are moral experts—rather than philosophical ones—and that this status confers upon their claims an implicit epistemic authority when it comes to dilemmas involving patients. Admitting that Meyers appropriately made use of philosophical skills in setting out a case opposed to that of the surgeon, it still remains to ask: What transforms this philosophical skill into moral expertise? Meyers' answer lies in a rejection of “relativism in ethics”: “[C]ertain basic claims in ethics … are not only true but also are known with certainty by minimally rational agents” (p. 12). Philosopher–ethicists are those who “are typically in a better position to get at least closer to the moral truth than are their clinical counterparts” (p. 12); they seek to get as near as possible to “the right answer.” Meyers correctly observes that philosophers adhere to canons of careful argumentation just because we believe that doing so will “give us better, more accurate answers” (p. 16). But “accuracy” at what level of abstraction? As a philosopher, I may be expert at precisely and cogently constructing a theoretical justification for some claim about what people ought to value or how they should act. But does this entail that I know better than my interlocutors in the ICU what is best for this patient in these circumstances at this time? Here I suspect many will remain skeptical. (How could there even be a moral truth about such particulars?) I doubt that Meyers or any of us would want to endorse the view that decisionmaking authority in difficult cases like these ought to be vested in whomever we believe most likely to be in possession of whatever truth moral philosophy will ultimately yield. Short of that, it is hard to see what the pretense to moral expertise licenses the ethicist–philosopher to do beyond simply making clear arguments and doing so as a contribution to the consensus-building process the author want to transcend. Meyers does, however, correctly condemn the too frequent and facile move from “it's all relative” to “whatever we agree to do (with this patient) will be right.” Such sloppy thinking has an unfortunate tendency to creep into clinical ethics.
In sum, this book is sure to stimulate questions that clinical ethicists need to ponder, and it may provoke us to broaden our conception of what we do and our awareness of the settings in which we do it.
