Onn Winckler's Arab Political Demography is a detailed account of the links between political contexts, population dynamics, and macroeconomic conditions in the Arab world. Winckler argues that socioeconomic inequality among Arab countries today is partly a function of the varied approaches that states have taken to confront rapid population growth during the 20th century. Winckler addresses this argument with a critical regional account of (1) the collection, quality, and dissemination of demographic data; (2) demographic trends and especially rapid population growth in the 20th century; (3) the emergence of high rates of unemployment; and (4) shifting population policies in response to emerging macroeconomic and demographic conditions. Winckler argues that the failure of many Arab states to confront high rates of population growth have created a demographic, economic, and political Catch 22 in which historically high rates of population growth have impeded the economic gains that ultimately would have led to slower rates of population growth in the region. The strength of this book lies in its detailed account of macroeconomic, demographic, and policy trends and their ecological linkages in the region. However, I finished the book wanting more conceptual synthesis of the wealth of statistics that are presented. I also finished the book wondering if it might more accurately be titled The Political Economy of Arab Demography.

Chapter 1, although isolated from the other chapters, is an important contribution to understanding the structural conditions that affect the production of national demographic data. Compared with other (often humdrum) texts about the sources of demographic data, Winckler persuasively discusses the ways in which political and economic conditions in the Arab world have affected (and often hampered) the collection, quality, and dissemination of such data. Winckler exposes the sensitivities of collecting and disseminating data on the ethnic and religious compositions of many Arab populations and reveals the economic and political conditions that have lead to distortions of national estimates of labor migration, unemployment, and underemployment in several Arab countries. His use of country case studies in this chapter illustrates the common and distinct features of national political histories that have affected the production of demographic data.

Indeed, Winckler's discussion seems so convincing that his brief concluding remark that “it is [still] possible to describe and analyze the major socio-demographic developments of the Arab countries…” (p. 31) seems unsubstantiated. A welcome addition to this chapter would have been more discussion of the ways in which demographers have overcome some of the data limitations that Winckler artfully describes. What roles, for example, have various national demographic and health surveys played in the monitoring of demographic trends for national and international bodies? What roles have anthropological and microdemographic studies on the formal and informal economies played in exposing potential deficiencies in national estimates of employment and per capita income? Because Winckler later draws from other sources, a more nuanced comparison of the more and less problematic demographic databases in the region would have strengthened the final remarks in this chapter.

In chapters 2–4, Winckler links the history of Arab demographic change—from high rates of fertility and population growth before the mid-1980s to falling rates of fertility and population growth since the mid-1980s—to a complex of national and global social, economic, and political conditions. Winckler superficially attributes high rates of population growth before the mid-1980s to socioeconomic conditions that other regions have faced in their pretransition periods, including the demand for children as sources of family labor and social security, women's low status, early universal marriage, and religious and cultural mores opposing contraception. The more interesting piece of Winckler's explanation for relatively high rates of Arab fertility relates to structural conditions in the region. Winckler argues that many Arab states delayed implementing family planning programs fundamentally because the “illusion” of Pan-Arabism and the 1970s oil boom obviated the needs to limit economic étatism and to institute direct population policies. Thus, direct or tacit pronatalism survived because of historically specific, regional demands for labor. In turn, Winckler attributes the adoption of direct family planning policies and programs in many Arab states to interrelated declines in the price of oil, inter-Arab labor migration, grants from the Arab oil states to the nonoil states, and work opportunities for the large pool of (often well-educated) youth. These conditions arose in a context of global pressure to implement direct family planning programs. Thus, Winckler argues that the short-term economic loophole provided by the 1970s oil boom enabled many Arab states to delay the implementation of macroeconomic reforms and population policies that would have fostered long-term economic growth in the Arab world. Winckler concludes with a grim picture of the future of many Arab populations, which he argues are “trapped” by continued population growth, limited work opportunities, and insufficient economic growth to accommodate large numbers of youth.

Although Winckler's conclusion does not address directly other implications of this “trap,” he cites earlier a statement by King Abdullah of Jordan that for “young people, who … see themselves and their societies held back by poverty … and more … Is it any surprise that these communities can become recruiting grounds for extremist ideologies?” (p. 109). This circuitous link between population growth and Islamic extremism is curious, especially when general concerns about population growth have declined and specific concerns that it fosters political instability waned with the end of the Cold War. In the words of another demographer, S. W. Sinding, the relative “latecomers” to family planning may benefit from historical experience (“The Great Population Debates: How Relevant Are They for the 21st Century?” American Journal of Public Health 90 [2000]: 1841–45).