This book provides a clear and well-paced account of Roman imperial expansion from the outbreak of the First Illyrian War in 229 b.c. down to the destruction of Corinth in 146 b.c. The focus is firmly on the Balkan peninsula, although there are occasional excursions east and west when this is relevant to the story of the conquest of Greece. The target audience, according to W., consists of scholars, ‘undergraduates and anyone interested in ancient history’ (p. x).

One can certainly see the work being useful and engaging for non-specialist readers. The inevitable accounts of intricate diplomatic exchanges are balanced by discussions of war strategy and the tactics of specific battles – no doubt to the delight of those whose tastes run to military history. There is not only a thorough narrative, but also several judicious digressions on aspects of Roman political culture (pp. 14–20, 34–7, 232–6), on Roman and Macedonian practices in war (pp. 57–8, 75–8, 128–34) and on interactions between Greek and Roman culture (pp. 59–61, 141–3, 206–13). The book will therefore allow readers unfamiliar with Roman imperialism to glimpse something of the cultural backdrop to this phenomenon.

If the book proves useful to scholars specialising in Roman imperialism, it is likely to be as a mine for particular factual details, rather than as a source for significantly fresh interpretations or as a comprehensive summary of the status quaestionis. The overall interpretation of Roman imperial behaviour will be familiar to anyone who has read W.V. Harris's work from the 1970s on this topic: the extreme aggression and avarice of the Romans in seeking war and imperial control is emphasised throughout. The predominance of narrative means that there is little space available for the analysis of the deep origins of Roman behaviour in Greece in patterns of interstate relations in the Mediterranean or in the structures and ideologies underpinning social relations at Rome. Recent work on such topics by scholars including A.M. Eckstein and P.J. Burton is acknowledged in passing but has not been fully digested or integrated (pp. xi, 19–20, 149–52).

As for scholarly debates on more narrowly factual matters, W. sometimes acknowledges in the notes controversies on matters of detail, although concision usually requires him to take a position without much argument. Not all major disputes are acknowledged, however. For instance, although Chapters 1 and 2 cover the Romans' motives for military intervention in Illyria in 229/8 and 219 b.c., and the nature of their influence in the region between these wars, there is no acknowledgement of the extensive debates in the modern literature over these issues. Likewise, in the discussion of the origins of the Third Macedonian War (Chapter 9), there is no hint of the fact that Roman aims and motives have been heavily debated by scholars. Such omissions cannot, however, be fairly judged to be a defect in such a work: to produce a coherent and engaging introductory account like this, certain sacrifices surely must be made.