In the grand scheme of things, how do we know where we stand politically? Are we faring well in comparison with political orders remote from our own? By its own standards, liberal democracy is thriving. But this tells us very little; the same could be said of ancient Han China, or of the Aztecs in their heyday, or of many abhorrent tyrannies. You cannot keep a fair tally when you are not playing by the same rules, and every enduring regime makes up its own rulebook, relying on its own vision of legitimate authority, right conduct, freedom, and so forth. In Reason and Politics, Mark Blitz revives the ancient pursuit of a deeper standard with which to cut through this tangle of competing rules. Even those who doubt reason's clarifying power in this regard will find Blitz's confidence bracing. In a slim essay of a scant 160 pages, he proposes to reveal what is “unmade, general, and essential” (2) in the basic human experience of action, freedom, power, virtue, and the common good.
Blitz's vast project demands somewhat less chutzpah than one might think, for two reasons. As he freely admits, a detached philosophical standpoint cannot tell us all we need to know about these cardinal issues. It may lay bare the foundations of, say, freedom. But the rest of the edifice, in which actual humans dwell, is built up by a particular regime. The emphasis on regimes is one important sense in which Blitz's approach is Aristotelian. Reason and Politics considers and ranks only three broad categories of political regime: classical (aristocratically tinged) democracy, “religious ways,” and liberal democracy. If you want to know the final score, here it is: aristocratic democracy is best, liberal democracy is runner-up on account of its practicality, and theocracy settles for bronze. What is refreshingly novel is not the final ranking but the mere fact that all three contestants appear on the same podium as decent, intelligible options.
The signal strength of the book, in my view, is the uncommon route by which Blitz arrives at otherwise familiar doctrines. One central doctrine is Aristotle's claim that the political community is the supreme context of human action, which inevitably and rightly colors every facet of life. For the liberal democrat, such an idea sounds either ludicrous or tyrannical, or both. Blitz takes an unexpected path to the same destination. Prescinding from the usual talk of power and loyalty, he argues for the supremacy of politics in the register of practical intelligibility. We grasp and choose our own actions only insofar as they belong to a shared context of meaning. He then asserts that “the usual practical order or whole in which specific contexts reside is the political regime . . . [which] is composed from a sense of goodness and justice” (20). I find this a promising approach, elaborated in a fresh idiom reflecting Blitz's long study of German thought. Unfortunately, given how few arguments Blitz marshals in support of this claim, the skeptic may well accuse him of begging the question: cultural context is all well and good, but who put the regime in charge of it? The book's power to persuade would have been far greater if Blitz had allowed himself space to defend his interestingly novel account from the most salient objections of this kind. It requires the utmost economy and discipline to be comprehensive, concise, clear, and convincing, all at once. Reason and Politics can hardly be blamed if it does not succeed on all counts.
To further illustrate Blitz's recurrent method and conclusions, I will focus on “The Nature of Freedom and Rights,” the longest chapter in the book. Blitz begins by listing no fewer than twenty-four typical uses or meanings of “freedom,” in both its negative and positive variants. (Every chapter begins similarly. If political philosophy needed a thesaurus, Blitz would be the man for the job.) Blitz sifts through this grist of common opinion on his way towards a unified account of freedom. The metaphysical waters get very deep, very quickly. The “nature” of freedom is said to lie in activities and goods that “approach us meaningfully” (37) and in the soul's response of love (eros) and spiritedness (thumos). Here is the ultimate distillation: “to be free is to be open, to stand unhindered within a horizon of meaning, of goodness and intelligible order, and to gather and direct oneself within this, seeking and experiencing oneself and what is good” (54). This modern-sounding definition leads Blitz to another classical conclusion: “The full unity of the elements of freedom is the philosophical life and its openness to the whole of things or, to a lesser degree, the experience of political greatness of soul” (47–48). If the general account of freedom smacks of Heidegger, the teleology might well have been lifted straight from Aristotle. Blitz then pivots to the topic of rights, which dominate the liberal discussion around freedom. His overriding goal here is to show that rights are not ultimately the invention of medieval jurists or modern founders, but are best seen as a way of concretizing the general “nature” of freedom just described. While Blitz seems to relish the liberating power of individual rights from “priestly obfuscation” (65), he also appreciates that they narrow our shared understanding of freedom by highlighting equality and the satisfaction of desire. The big idea is that, whatever our political context may be, reason can lead us back to the highest human goods, and the correlated ranking of regimes.
Blitz has written books on Greek, German, and American thought, all longer than the present volume, which weaves together all three. It is not clear, to this scribe at any rate, whether Reason and Politics is intended as a beginner's introduction or a masterly synthesis of this lifelong study. For instance, it is hard to see how rookies could benefit from Blitz's one-page asides on Hegel or Nietzsche, or from endnotes such as these, which I quote in their entirety: “Virtue is largely knowledge” (178n19); “Consider Locke, Two Treatises of Government” (175n31). Yet the veterans, who share some of Blitz's erudition, will readily see how contentious and incomplete are many of his almost-breezy assertions about the “nature” of political things. Aquinas's Summa Theologiae manages to interest both the neophyte and the master, but it is three thousand pages long.
Reason and Politics has bitten off more than it can chew, or at any rate more than the reader can digest. The only way to realize such large ambitions in such small compass would be to restrict the scope or complexity of human affairs by brute stipulation, as does Hobbes in Leviathan, with its exaggerated juridical precision. Blitz refuses to follow suit, for better and worse. Almost by necessity, the treatment of each issue is sketchy. And Blitz's heterogenous philosophical idiom often inhibits clarity. You might think of the resulting book as a tapestry in which only the middle has been completed, while the borders remain a mass of loose ends. If I read him right, Blitz might be charmed by this characterization, and his aspiration would be for the reader to plait them for herself, seeking a creative harmony with the central patterns that nature has woven into the political world.
Reason and Politics will not convert anyone who is convinced there is no such pattern. But for those who suspect there might be a meaningful natural foundation beneath the endless variety of human regimes and ideologies, Blitz's provocative synopsis should inspire them to combine all their best insights, whatever their origin, in pursuit of political philosophy's ultimate peaks.
