There is always something mysterious about power in social relations: where it comes from, what it does, who has it, who does not. Max Weber was obliged to reach for an obscure theological term, charisma, to describe it. Since the Enlightenment ushered in the modern by telling us that we all are, or should be, ‘rational’, it has been difficult to know what to do with ‘religion’, inadequately defined as ‘belief in spiritual beings’, mysterious forces rationality says should not be there. To the believer, however, spirits are real, they are known. To paraphrase the anthropologist Jean Pouillon, ‘It is only the non-believer who believes that the believer believes in spirits.’ It follows that we would not be aware of our own beliefs as such. More and more evidence, from brain scans and even from economists, suggest that ‘rationality’ and ‘beliefs’ are closely entwined. The idea of exclusively rational man, David Gordon suggests, may be no more than ‘the Enlightenment's publicity stunt’ (p. 3).
From its nineteenth-century beginnings, historiography has been deeply committed to the idea that history is made by rational, goal-oriented actors. In African studies in particular, to suggest otherwise carried the embarrassing suggestion that Africans were to some extent irrational. Gordon's book is framed by the argument that ‘Historians have imposed their own civilizing mission on the spirits that refuse to abide by the constraints of a post-Enlightenment historical imagination. They have separated out the spiritual from the secular, recasting spiritual beliefs as symbolic systems, statements about something else.’ (p. 201) Historians of Zambia, he says, have explained away popular beliefs by reducing them to patronage politics, resentment of colonial rule, class struggle, and other supposedly material interests with which they feel comfortable.
Gordon retells the history of Zambia, restoring a sort of rationality to the actors, including missionaries and Christian converts, by taking seriously their belief in the reality of spirits. Missionaries and Africans agreed on the prevalence of evil, but whereas missionaries attributed it to sin and located their spirits in another world, Africans blamed most of it on witchcraft and on spirits firmly established in this world. Even as Christianity took hold, a series of popular movements attempted to rid the country of evil, each generation's struggle with evil ‘built on several layers of previous spiritual discourses’ (p. 189); the Bamuchape in the 1930s; Watchtower (substituting Satan for witchcraft); Alice Lenshina and Lumpa; nationalism; Kaunda's ‘humanism’ (deeply influence by his Protestant background); Chiluba's born-again Christian Zambia; and the influx of international Pentecostalism. As Kenelm Burridge wrote about Melanesian cargo cults, religion is concerned with the truth about power and concern with the truth about power is a religious activity; it follows that, as Gordon demonstrates, belief and politics are inseparable. Religion itself is therefore bound up in history and evolves with it.
Gordon's ‘Introduction’ provides a tour d'horizon of the extensive literature on religion in Africa, noting the inadequacy of reductionist arguments and the multitude of authors who have attempted to deal with relations between belief and action. He makes many cursory references (‘for X see this, for Y see that’), without offering much guidance. Nor does he solve the problem himself by his insistence on the historical importance of the spiritual. What are spirits that we should be mindful of them? In the first chapter, Gordon offers an unpersuasive analysis purporting to show that the message of the foundational Bemba myth of Chitimukulu is that, for the sake of the common good, the chiefs should control the ‘spiritual emotions’ of love and anger. On his first page he mentions ‘love’, ‘freedom’, ‘fate’, and ‘the state’ as invisible forces whose influence he says we accept while ignoring or rejecting ‘the invisible worlds of others’. Is any linguistic abstraction ‘spiritual’? Many Africans take it for granted that a person may cause harm by burying a concoction of leaves in a rival's compound; is a mistaken relationship of cause and effect to count as spiritual? Was seventeenth-century English astrology spiritual, though its practitioners, including Isaac Newton, believed themselves to be engaged in scientific inquiry?
Gordon's own argument, taken a step further, would do away with the ambiguous category of ‘the spiritual’ altogether, replacing it as necessary with the actors’ own terms for the forces they contend with. Let us assume, as Paul Landau recommends, that all people act and react in the landscape of what they regard as the real. Whether, from an outsider's perspective, their beliefs are true or false becomes irrelevant to writing the history of their actions. Whether a belief is true or not belongs to another discourse.
