The ambition of this excellent volume is to revise our understanding of John Adams from an American apologist for the balanced regime to, instead, a relentless republican who sought to inhibit the emergence of a homegrown oligarchy by confining its influence while channeling public sympathies toward more admirable objects than wealth. Luke Mayville persuasively identifies oligarchy, understood as the outsize influence of wealth driven not by its purchasing power but rather by its ability to command public fascination, as an abiding obsession of Adams's political theory, which is cast here as a blend of the ancient emphasis on institutions and experience with the Scottish Enlightenment's exploration of the moral psychology of commercial societies (14).
Adams has been received into the more recent American canon as a conservative who defended the balancing of orders in society, giving the impression that he endorsed the division of those orders as a normative good. Adams's contemporaries thus attacked him as antirepublican, an image that has endured even by way of later laudatory treatments. Mayville's Adams is a committed republican if not an outright populist who seems at times to have more in common with the Anti-Federalist critics of the emerging American regime than with the defenders with whom he locked partisan arms in the early constitutional period. Adams was less an “apologist for aristocracy” than a searing critic of oligarchy, about which revolutionary ideologues were so naive as to have endangered republican liberty. What they “had failed to understand was that the power of privilege was so deeply rooted that it would persist even in modern democratic republics” (6).
This observation of Mayville will prove arresting to the casual reader of Adams, who may recall the latter's belief that a Senate should uniquely represent wealth. As Mayville shows through a comprehensive analysis mainly of Adams's books but also other sources, including his long correspondence with Jefferson, Adams's motive was in fact to quarantine the influence of wealth in a single institution rather than allowing it, as was its natural tendency, to overtake all others. This much the more careful reader of Adams's best-known writings can discern, in, for example, his essay “Thoughts on Government,” which describes the exile of the wealthy to the Senate as an “ostracism.” Mayville's insightful contribution is to connect this observation with Adams's analysis of the psychological fascination wealth commands. Mayville calls this “soft oligarchy.” On this understanding, the source of money's power in politics is not so much the purchasing of influence—though neither Mayville nor Adams denies that this occurs—as wealth's “grip on the human mind” (15). “It was the grandeur of wealth, and not merely its purchasing power, that accounted for its immense political influence” (17).
Because of its rootedness in human psychology, the inflated power of the few was “a perennial problem of political life, a problem that would not vanish in a new age of democracy.” This concern places him, intriguingly, on the more egalitarian end of a divide with Jeffersonian advocates of a “natural aristocracy” of merit. Such an arrangement offended what Mayville portrays as Adams's instinct for equality: “By an aristocrat,” Adams wrote, “I mean every man who can command or influence two votes; one besides his own” (87). On this reading, Jefferson, the Virginia planter and advocate of a meritocratic elite, performed a heroic feat of inversion on Adams, the Massachusetts yeoman who feared that “power flowed naturally [to the few] even in the absence of formal privileges” (59).
The mistake, Mayville argues, is to assume that because aristocracy is ineradicable, Adams imputes moral worth to it. The opposite is true. In this, Adams was influenced by Adam Smith, who noted, and disapproved of, the tendency in commercial society toward fascination with wealth. In this sense, Alexis de Tocqueville appears in Mayville's study as a sort of foil by proxy. While Tocqueville later claimed that the American obsession with wealth exerted an equalizing influence, Adams had argued the opposite. Mayville observes: “It was not just the ability of the rich to buy influence, but also the sentiments of sympathy and admiration for the rich among the people that tended to concentrate influence in the hands of the wealthy” (97). The operation of sympathy, in Smith's sense, is vicarious: “When we sympathize with the rich and follow them in their pursuits,” Mayville writes, “we merely indulge the vanity of celebrating their out-of-reach success” (118).
This problem would become especially acute in a society devoid of formal distinctions in which wealth would consequently be the only object of public fascination. Thus Adams's solution, the topic of Mayville's most provocative, but also persuasive, revisionist account: “dignified titles” for public offices that would redirect public admiration toward laudable pursuits (123). Adams wrote that he personally despised these elaborate honorifics. However, “such ‘marks and signs,’ [Adams] wrote, ‘attract the attention of mankind more than parts or learning, virtue or religion’” (130). “A dignified democracy, by contrast,” Mayville concludes, “would be a democracy in which distinction is made to counteract distinction” (147).
Rigorously researched and lucidly written, this account's most impressive strength lies in the ingenuity of its analysis. Mayville has identified and elucidated an angle in Adams's thought that has received scant attention and spun it into a full study that speaks to contemporary political problems, most compellingly by complicating the simplistic explanation that money corrupts politics through the mechanism of purchasing. The question is in what sense, on the account of Mayville's Adams, wealth should be understood to be corrupting at all. Put otherwise, is “soft oligarchy”—that is, oligarchy to which free assent is given on the basis of trifles, not even corrupting benefits or manipulations—really oligarchic? It is unclear, and Mayville does not fully explain, why exactly oligarchy as Adams presents it is a problem.
There is of course the instinctive response that allotting influence according to wealth is irrational, corrupt, or both. But this does not appear to be Adams's account, at least not fully. The closest we get to an explanation—the idea that the oligarch, by means of his or her influence, holds two votes rather than one—would seem to unravel quickly into an attack on the idea of influence, and thus political life, itself. But Adams wrote this in books. Certainly he attempted to influence the political action of others. Presumably the difference is that he attempted to persuade by means of reason. But on no account, at least none presented here, is the public compelled by any values other than its own to accept the oligarch's influence. In Aristotelian terms, by contrast, oligarchy is imposed, not acceded to. This, of course, is less a quarrel with Mayville than with Adams. But the diagnosis of the problem motivating the book might receive deeper attention: if the people wish to venerate the economically privileged for whatever reasons, rational or otherwise, suit them—if they wish to elect or take electoral advice from their financial betters because they are fascinated with their glittering wealth—it would seem to be a strange populism that stands in their way on the grounds that their voting standards do not conform to those of the intellectual elite.
The range of available solutions might have received more attention, too. Having sullied Adams's reputation as much as it did, and given its centrality to his theory, the debate over titles deserves the attention it receives in these pages. But one cannot escape the feeling that if the human fascination with wealth is as ingrained as Adams assumes, a more comprehensive response may be required. These are, though, quibbles with a book that on the whole goes a considerable distance toward explaining perhaps the most systematic political thinker of the Founding era while rendering his thought relevant to contemporary problems. Mayville's achievement is substantial, and students of Adams are in his debt.
