Richard Moore's study of Britain's nuclear weapons programme in the late 1950s and early 1960s provides perhaps the most comprehensive account yet of this defining period of Britain's technological, military and political history. Moore characterizes the period as one in which the public face of Britain's nuclear strategy was often out of kilter with the technical and operational reality of its weapons programme – the illusion and reality of the title.
The first half of the book covers the period from 1958 to 1961, when, Moore shows, Britain's nuclear capability existed more on paper than in practice. Despite the well-documented shift in British defence policy in the late 1950s towards a posture of greater reliance on the nuclear deterrent, in 1958 Britain only had perhaps fifty atomic bombs in its stockpile, and command-and-control arrangements for their use were relatively undeveloped. It was not until the period covered in the second half of the book, 1961 to 1964, that Britain's nuclear forces began to resemble in reality the strategic aims and political rhetoric of this early period. By 1964, the British stockpile comprised more than 250 British-made nuclear weapons, including at least 120 megaton H-bombs, with many bombers at fifteen minutes’ readiness to strike.
Perversely, as the reality of Britain's nuclear programme finally began, in the 1960s, to catch up with the ‘illusion’ of the late 1950s, its credibility as an independent nuclear power began to be called into question. Moore shows how the cancellation in 1960 of the Blue Streak medium-range ballistic missile project left Britain's future nuclear independence in question, and gave ammunition to those who, for various reasons, opposed the deterrent. In particular, the Labour Party used the replacement of the British-built ballistic missile, Blue Streak, with the American air-launched missile, Skybolt, as an opportunity to question the independence of Britain's deterrent and to portray Britain's nuclear status as little more than an illusion. Public concern about nuclear weapons was also reaching a peak around this time, with CND, although never truly representative of majority public opinion in Britain, continuing to attack Britain's possession of nuclear weapons from any angle it could.
The contrast between the nuclear deterrent that existed on the pages of British policy documents and in the public discourse, and that which existed in Britain's research establishments and on its airfields, also frames the structure of Moore's chapters, which he separates into ‘policymaking’ and ‘policy execution’. Moore argues that the relationship between the two was not as straightforward as might be assumed: indeed, he likens it to ‘two distinct British nuclear weapons programmes underway at the same time’ (p. 2). While politicians pondered Britain's role on the world stage, and strategists debated the finer points of global nuclear war, the scientists at Aldermaston grappled with shortages of fissile material and trade-offs between yield, safety, economy and operational requirements, and V-bomber pilots practised frantically to ensure they could scramble within the short timescales demanded in an age of deterrence.
Yet Moore is also careful to show the interaction between the two worlds, unpicking the complex web of often conflicting priorities and concerns – strategic, technical, political, economic and diplomatic – out of which key decisions emerged. He avoids the trap of taking at face value the explanations of high-level policy documents, which tend to show policy unfolding rationally as if following some internal logic, and shows instead how numerous interests and actors came together to shape the course of Britain's nuclear programme. The result is a convincing and detailed account of the sometimes messy process of policymaking, in which decisions are influenced as much by personal preoccupations and ‘grubby domestic concerns’ (p. 7) as by abstract intellectual or strategic notions.
It is its unprecedented level of technical detail, and the deftness with which this detail is woven into the political and strategic debates, that sets Moore's book apart from the many existing accounts of this episode in British history. He highlights the vast array of projects that preoccupied British nuclear scientists and engineers, moving beyond the familiar high-profile programmes to consider the diverse designs and applications considered for nuclear weapons. However, familiar stories are also there, and Moore's account often casts them in a new light. His description of the Royal Navy's response to the nuclear age, for example, contrasts with the often-told story of a battle between the services to command Britain's nuclear deterrent: in fact, Moore argues, the Navy considered Polaris a threat to the ‘real navy’ and feared its impact on funding and conventional forces.
Naturally, the Anglo-American relationship plays a central role in this story. Moore's argument that the deterrent was a tool of foreign policy, aimed more at the United States than at the Soviet Union, will come as little surprise to those familiar with the period. However, Moore describes a more complex, less subservient relationship in which Britain played an important, if far from equal, role in the nuclear partnership, and British scientists and engineers made a real contribution to various strands of research. This is not Britain as the deluded former world power, struggling to keep its place at the top table in the face of economic and political decline – the man who ‘dare not admit that he cannot afford a television set and who … just puts up the aerial instead’ (p. 190), as Harold Wilson taunted Macmillan in the wake of the Blue Streak cancellation. Rather, this is the ‘warfare state’ in action, as Britain's policymakers and scientists oversaw the growth of a large technological military project while attempting to define a new role for their country in the post-war world.
Moore has produced a thorough and very readable account of this well-trodden period in British history, bringing together a huge amount of archive material and using it to tell a coherent story that embraces the complexity of the policymaking process. While many years of digging by historians may have left Britain's nuclear history with few big secrets left to reveal – ‘no wizard behind the curtain’ (p. 6), as Moore puts it – this book is nevertheless a valuable addition to the literature, and a valuable resource for any student of the period.
