The financial and economic crisis that began in 2008 set off a flood of new, and often repeated, work on the twentieth century’s most famous economist; fortunately for prospective readers, this latest offering by Backhouse and Bateman falls into the ‘new’ category. Granted, the resuscitation of interest in what seems like every aspect of Keynes’ life and work has made the job of those trying to posit some original idea or angle increasingly difficult. However, the authors of the current volume neatly swerve this pothole by concisely intertwining, in a non-technical way, Keynes’ varied life experiences with his output as an economist, the implication being that his ideas were constantly changing and would, no doubt, have changed again had he lived longer (even if this probably would have further expanded the multitude of interpretations put on his work). Equally important is the stress that the authors put on Keynes’ fundamental view of capitalism: echoing Churchill’s observation that democracy is the worst form of government apart from all the others, Backhouse and Bateman point to Keynes’ recognition, in his role as a moral philosopher, that capitalism is not stable but that it is probably the best way to run an economy so far discovered.
Capitalist Revolutionary consists of six chapters and a very readable bibliographic essay documenting the primary and secondary literature relating to Keynes and the Keynesian Revolution. In the introductory Chapter 1, entitled “Keynes Returns, but Which Keynes?”, Backhouse and Bateman lay the foundations for the rest of the book by outlining Keynes’ many different guises, specifically ‘Keynes the Designer of Economic Policy’, ‘Keynes the Economic Theorist’, and ‘Keynes the Moral Philosopher’. These categorizations are then examined at the end of the chapter within the context of ‘The Historical Keynes,’ where the key point is made that Keynes’ different roles are precisely what has led to the caricaturization of his ideas, for good or bad, in particular, those contained in The General Theory.
It is difficult to disagree with the many useful observations made in this opening piece. However, there is a question mark over the argument the authors make about Keynes’ propensity to use mathematics in his work. For one, the mathematics contained in The General Theory can probably be omitted by the reader without their understanding being compromised. Second, there is clear evidence of Keynes deciding not to use particular mathematical formulations in The General Theory. For example, Dimand (Reference Dimand2007) shows that Keynes had mapped out a simultaneous equations approach in lectures he delivered at Cambridge in 1933 and in a 1934 draft of The General Theory. However, he decided to drop these equations from the published version of the book, aware of their limitations and also influenced by the rules of publishing laid down by Marshall, which dictated that mathematics should be used only as an aid to thought, and should, whenever possible, be discarded when symbols can be converted into words. Third, contemporaries of Keynes who were also working on business cycle theory often adopted a much more technical modus operandi, the standout example being Kalecki. The fact that the average economist at the time had relatively limited mathematical ability was one of the contributing factors to Kalecki’s failure to gain recognition during the 1930s and 1940s.
An absorbing Chapter 2 considers “The Rise and Fall of Keynesian Economics”. The second part of this chapter considers Keynes’ growing influence in the three decades after the war, ending with the onset of stagflation in the 1970s, which exposed the vulnerabilities in The General Theory. However, it is the first part of the chapter, called ‘The Myth of the Keynesian Revolution’, which is particularly interesting. Backhouse and Bateman begin by pointing out that The General Theory makes use of a number of different ideas that had already been developed in the 1920s and 1930s, such as the distinction between saving and investment, and the concept of effective demand, which, even though it was employed by Hawtrey, has a history that goes back to Malthus. In what was a classic example of the ‘shoulders-of-giants’ argument, Keynes did indeed make use of existing ideas, in spite of his simultaneous claim to be knocking over the classicals. However, as an addendum, it is also worth remembering that The General Theory can be seen as a synthesizing work, one of the most important products of which was the notion of underemployment equilibrium (reference is made to this on p. 123), a theory that was novel and one that the classicals could never entertain.
To be fair to Keynes, he did state in his much-quoted letter to George Bernard Shaw that his revolution could take up to ten years to complete, and in this he was more or less correct, if the Second World War is subtracted out. Moreover, even if it may have been the case in the US that demand management was introduced without any reference to Keynes, his influence in Washington was perhaps beginning to become apparent even earlier than 1940, as claimed by Backhouse and Bateman (p. 29). In particular, Alvin Hansen was highly influential in his role as a consultant to the Federal Reserve Board—he was close to Marriner Eccles, chairman of the Fed from 1934 to 1948—and from late 1934 onwards was instrumental, with the help of Lauchlin Currie, in converting the Fed to Keynesianism. There was also Hansen’s Fiscal Policy Seminar at the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard, which began in September 1937. The seminar would regularly draw in senior officials from Washington, keen to hear Hansen’s latest views on budgetary policy, views that began to take on an added interest for officials as a result of the 1937 recession.
Chapter 3 examines “Keynes the Moral Philosopher”. The authors successfully capture Keynes’ evolving views on the morality of capitalism and how these were shaped by the events of his life. First, there was the shock of the First World War, which caught Keynes and his circle off-guard and changed forever the way they viewed human behavior, this being reinforced in Keynes’ case by his haunting experiences at Versailles. Second was Keynes’ membership of the exclusive Apostles at Cambridge and its London offshoot, the Bloomsbury Group, which placed the love of art and friendship above all else. Third, and in a more abstract sense, was Keynes’ condemnation of money making. Given his long-standing indulgences with the stock market, it is difficult to square Keynes’ theoretical views in this area with his own investment activities. Two points of reconciliation suggest themselves. Although Keynes may have aspired to be an artist in the narrow sense, he, of course, was not one. However, he made up for this by generously funding the activities of actual artists. In addition, Keynes was aware that his own fulfilment as an artist, in the wider sense, could be realized only through academic originality, which, in his case, came to be embodied in the achievement that was The General Theory. However, it was his self-made fortune that allowed him the time to write his magnum opus while his financial arrangement with Macmillan, which often saw him foot all or some of the production costs of his books, meant that The General Theory could be priced at just five shillings, low enough to encourage a wider than normal readership, especially among students.
In Chapter 4, Backhouse and Bateman consider “Keynes the Physician”. They begin by describing Keynes’ output as an economist in the years between A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) and The General Theory (1936). Needless to say, this was a crucial period in Keynes’ intellectual and reputational development, one that again was heavily influenced by real-world events. For example, he battled to find a solution to Britain’s stagnation in the 1920s. Initially, this resulted in A Treatise on Money (1930), which, as the authors note, led Keynes to the very narrow proposition that the cure for all economic ills was a ‘correct’ interest rate policy. Against the background of the unfolding Great Depression, Keynes quickly realized his mistake and changed course on to the long and arduous road towards The General Theory, where he argued that a much wider set of factors, including uncertainty and expectations, was responsible for macroeconomic fluctuations. All the main bases are covered by Backhouse and Bateman, although a description of the fascinating relationship between Keynes and the Cambridge Circus might have further illuminated the story.
Between 1923 and 1936, Keynes also carried on those other activities that built on his reputation for controversy and originality, and thus added to the sense of expectancy immediately prior to the publication of The General Theory. For example, there was The Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill (1925), Can Lloyd George Do It? (1929), and The Means to Prosperity (1933). The remainder of the chapter discusses Keynes’ involvement in wartime economic planning, in particular the flexibility of The General Theory in being able to offer a solution to the threat of inflation; his crucial role at Bretton Woods; and ‘Keynes as an Economic Theorist’, where the authors highlight Keynes’ abandonment in The General Theory of the magic formula approach he had adopted in the Treatise, not only because it was the correct thing to do on theoretical grounds but also because a more rounded explanation of fluctuations stood a much greater chance of being accepted in political circles.
“Keynes’s Ambiguous Revolution” is the subject of Chapter 5. Beginning with an examination of Keynes’ legacy, the authors look in particular at how he dealt with the various interpretations and criticisms of The General Theory, especially his tendency, in line with Bloomsbury, to say nothing. Even when Keynes did respond, such as to Hicks’ IS-LM derivation, it is not always unambiguously clear what his views were. The chapter proceeds by stressing Keynes’ belief in the importance of private investment as the engine room of a capitalist economy, and that it is the government’s responsibility, through capital expenditure, to step in when animal spirits appear to be waning.
In the concluding Chapter 6, “Perpetual Revolution”, Backhouse and Bateman sum up their analysis by considering Keynes’ relevance in the context of the ongoing global financial and economic crisis. The authors make a strong case for considering Keynes’ approach to economic theory as one that gave priority to the idea of constantly challenging old orthodoxies, especially when existing theories fail to fully provide adequate solutions to new economic problems. In this sense, it could be argued that The General Theory has, so far at least, been the pinnacle of achievement as far as macroeconomic theorizing is concerned, in that it has provided subsequent economists with an unrivaled variety of different research avenues; the fact that Keynes has returned to the forefront of policy discussions provides further evidence of the longevity of his ideas.
