This book is, in many ways, a worthy follow-up to Jason Frank’s excellent and inventive Constituent Moments (2010). The earlier book explored postrevolutionary American political thinking focused on the “question of the people”: the moral ambiguities (and logical paradox) of a people declaring itself into being. In it, Frank drew on an array of different kinds of sources (speeches, novels, meeting minutes, proclamations, pamphlets, even an engraved image published in Berlin); here, instead, we focus on the classic tract of early American political theory, The Federalist. What is imaginative now is the manner of thinking that Frank draws out of the text: not realism or a new “science of politics,” as is so often claimed, but a “political imagination” that creatively adapted the extant political culture in the service of an unprecedented constitutional project.
As a collection of essays, Publius and Political Imagination is less unified than Constituent Moments, and perhaps less pathbreaking. The title chapter is very strong, adding a new dimension to some of the most well tilled ground in Western political thought. The other chapters are not quite as successful, or digress from the flow of the argument. But if the book itself has some of the weaknesses common to collections of essays, this is a trifling price to pay to follow an inventive mind at work on some fundamental, if underappreciated, aspects of The Federalist.
The “wager of this study,” Frank explains, is that the mythical status of Publius’s writings has actually been an obstacle to appreciating some of the “subdued elements and minor tones” (the imaginative aspects) present in the Federalist, but rarely explored or pursued on the questions Frank addresses. For the reader, this bet pays off handsomely. It has been a couple of decades since the historian Lance Banning lamented that scholars had been so taken by Madison’s institutional reforms that they had lost sight of much else (Sacred Fire of Liberty, 1995, p. 219). This myopia persists, but Frank takes us a long way toward restoring our vision by recovering how the formal features of the proposed constitution were interdependent with the broader political culture and especially Publius’s imaginative formulation of it.
“Political imagination” is “an essential part of the architecture” of Publius’s argument, Frank persuasively argues (p. 20). By political imagination he means “a formative politics” (p. 152) centered on the “inescapably aesthetic dimensions of political life” (p. 18). This includes civic education, narratives, and public spectacles such as parades and festivals. Ultimately, it amounts to the “entire way of life of a community” (p. 108). The book uses this broad lens to follow Publius from his invocation of the people’s constituent capacity to his strategies for disciplining popular power and political imagination. The result is an insightful analysis of Publius as neither a realist nor a deliberativist but, rather, “a political visionary with an acute understanding of the formative role of imagination in republican politics” (p. 21).
Following the path he cleared in his earlier book, Frank begins with the question of constituent power and the Philadelphia convention’s extralegal act of constitution making. Publius wisely avoids the “all-or-nothing formalism” of Carl Schmitt and the stark dichotomy of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s norm and exception, instead conceptualizing “constituent power as a claim that can only ever achieve a retrospective authorization from the authorizing entity on whose behalf it speaks” (p. 31). Publius thus moved the discourse away from the juridical to the ethical and cultural, justifying the convention’s rejection of the Articles of Confederation on the informal grounds that it involved an appeal for popular ratification submitted by “patriotic and respectable” delegation. Publius recognizes that this does not resolve the dilemma, but it does, as Frank observes, avoid a normative void (p. 33).
The second chapter is the core of the book, and although it simply reprints a previously published journal article, it deserves the even broader audience a book can command. Here, Frank demonstrates the losses entailed in the common portrayal of Publius as a “realist.” Interpretations that focus on the new political science of The Federalist (especially nos. 10 and 51), as well as those that highlight the deliberative “great debate” over the constitution, each in its own way denigrates imagination as an obstacle to a more enlightened and more chastened republicanism. In fact, the constitutional project was embedded in and predicated on an aesthetics of self-rule that imagined a Providential nation and fostered attachment to the federal government and the Constitution itself. For example, there is a great deal more imagination than realism in Publius’s very first substantive letter (no. 2), which waxes poetic about a people (envisioned as) united by religion, ancestry, customs, and language.
Frank extends his critique of prominent “realist” readings of The Federalist by arguing that they overlook an aspect of Publius’s use of the concept of interests. More than a mere description of human behavior, “interests” are part of a “program of reform,” part of the “emerging logics of [Foucauldian] governmentality” (p. 78). Interests, on this view, were not a problem to be solved—mere passions to be counteracted—but rather the solution, since they could be molded, reconciled, and even controlled in a stable, readily governed manner. This approach is certainly innovative and insightful, but Frank tends to lean rather heavily on Hume (and Michel Foucault) here, and less heavily (and less persuasively) on evidence from Publius himself.
The book then turns to Straussian approaches to the Founding, which amounts to something of a tangent, despite a return to the question of constitutional foundations through an illuminating analysis of Leo Strauss’s response to Carl Schmitt’s existential decisionism. Given the influence of Straussians on the study of the founding era, some attention here is valuable, and it is laudable that Frank eschews the “inventive hagiography” (p. 104) of some recent Straussian accounts of the Founding to highlight the more penetrating analysis of the first generation of Strauss’s students, Martin Diamond and Herbert Storing. But the chapter focuses much more on Diamond and Storing than on Publius, and Storing himself famously analyzed the Anti-Federalists. More importantly, Storing demonstrates that many Anti-Federalists read Publius to be conceptualizing “interests” in the now-standard way, and without the “formative imagination” and governmentality posited by Frank.
A final substantive chapter and conclusion round out the book’s potent argument. We have seen Publius imagine and thereby empower the (prospective) people to form a new constitutional government, but also—in that same act—limit and constrain popular power. Frank forcefully demonstrates that Publius conceptualized the constitution as channeling the vibrant, multifaceted popular politics of the era into occasional election rituals, rituals meant to “refine” popular input, which was to be then further limited by a series of other checks and governmental bodies. The Federalist does, in many ways, take us from “We the People” to “We the Electorate,” in the author’s apt phrase: A robust world of petitions, conventions, court closings, organized tax evasion, and many other participatory practices was being reconceived as centered on infrequent votes confirming some gentleman’s position in a distant government.
And Frank is absolutely right to close by exhorting us to try to think through and beyond the vision of popular politics that Publius bequeathed to us. But since his nuanced Publius mostly denies, disavows, or at least attempts to discipline our constituent capacities, these famous 85 essays are perhaps not the best place to start an interrogation of the “unfulfilled promise” of the “potential people that haunt The Federalist” (p. 154). Rather, we would do better to look to the Anti-Federalists and their progeny. Unfortunately, few will likely do so, and since Publius has such a grip on our own political imagination regarding the Founding and our future, Frank’s work is essential in revealing ways in which a “potential people” does indeed haunt the hallowed pages of The Federalist.
All in all, Frank does well in placing The Federalist in the wider world of the conflicted social history of the time. That might not be exactly what readers are expecting from a book on “political imagination,” but it is an absolutely essential approach to our thinking about The Federalist and the Founding more generally. Furthermore, many who read Publius tend to undervalue or altogether miss what Frank reveals: that Publius was also confirming some aspects of citizen power even as he was imagining a constrained citizenship.
For many political scientists, and even some political theorists, this book will provide more than enough historical detail, even as it places Publius in conversation with Rousseau, Hume, Schmitt, Strauss, and Jacques Derrida, among others. Nevertheless, focusing more deeply on the historical era would have strengthened the important arguments here. Considering the Founding as a constituent moment, for example, Frank turns to Rousseau not because of “any discernible influence” on Publius (p. 37) but because Rousseau's “Lawgiver” employs “the ‘aesthetic-affective’ and imaginary registers of ethico-political life” to deal with the dilemma of how a people creates itself as a people (p. 38). This model is analagous to Publius's problem and even his solution, but—as Frank readily concedes—the Lawgiver is also semidivine and elicits in the people persuasion “‘without convincing’” (p. 40). That kind of support is a good deal less robust than what Publius sought from public ratification, and sounds more like the Anti-Federalist critique that Federalists were trying to foist a constitution on the people while they were still blinded by the “glare” of great names like Washington and Franklin. Closer attention to Publius's actual interlocutors rather than Rousseau would have allowed Frank to explore exactly how Publius—in this case, Madison—thought the affective was embedded in the rational.
Similarly, in the chapter on interests, there is considerable reliance on Hume to support Frank's case about the mutable nature of interests, while the evidence from Publius is comparatively light, or less clear (pp. 87, 92). There is a tendency, when Publius does not explicitly support a claim, to state without citation that “Publius would agree with Hume” (p. 93). Perhaps. There are many theorists who see a powerful Humean influence on Publius, and Frank cites them in passing (p. 70 n. 20). But this influence is also widely debated, and since the details of his influence are at play here, more attention to the degree and nature of Hume's influence in 1787–88 would have solidified the argument. Here again, I find Frank's insights powerful and generally convincing, but cannot help wishing that he had gone further and focused more deeply and directly on Publius and his context.
Certainly, addressing Publius historically can bring its own problems. To read him as he was read in 1787–88 is to read him as one author, as Frank does here. But it is also to see him as having a middling importance and little influence. More importantly, it means reading him as a polemicist, or at least a partisan, if an especially insightful one. As a polemic—with multiple, noncoordinating authors, no less—The Federalist is rife with tensions resulting from the partisan need to stress popular claims in the process of defending a document that was itself full of tensions borne of compromise and competing political pressures. Frank is well aware of the rhetorical character of The Federalist (p. 19), and if he does not fully tease out which tensions result from which source—Publius’s mind(s), his specific context, or the nature of all foundings—Frank reveals Publius’s rejection of the “theoretical straitjacket” inherent in the strict opposition between norm and exception.
Real historical moments, unlike theoretical abstractions, are much more fluid. Just as individuals often do not know themselves until they deliberate with others (and actively listen to the narratives of others), so too a “people” is always reimagining and reforming itself. Thus, as Publius explains (no. 40), the Philadelphia convention always had to imagine what the people of three months later would be likely to endorse. The constitution, as Madison would later say and Frank wisely reminds us, was a “dead letter” unless and until the (imagined) people chose to breathe life into it (p. 29). And since the document itself included an amendment process, it intrinsically envisions a continuing reformation. Thus, the founding is less paradoxical because it was never simply a constituent moment but always already anticipated as an ongoing constituting process. But even this kind of process will have its outsized, formative moments; the Philadelphia convention was precisely such a moment, and The Federalist its enduring defense. Accordingly, we are very fortunate to have such an astute mind revealing the creative force inherent in imagining a democratic American people.
