Introduction
The concept of path dependence as a central feature of institutional behaviour and processes has had a pervasive influence across various disciplines in the social sciences, not least political science, over the course of the past five decades. However, the discussions in the academic literature have tended to focus on the national level of analysis (Lowndes, Reference Lowndes, Marsh and Stoker2010; Kay, Reference Kay2005; Thelen, Reference Thelen1999). Local jurisdictions such as cities and regions in particular have been largely ignored in the literature, except for the pioneering work of a few scholars (Amin, Reference Amin and Martin2008; Rast, Reference Rast2012; Stone, Reference Stone2015; Wolfe, Reference Wolfe2010). The first and main objective of this paper, therefore, is to address this oversight and contribute to the nascent research applying concepts of path dependence at the local level.
This paper particularly focuses on the Niagara region in Ontario, critically assessing the region's adaptability in the face of structural changes in the global economy. The central research question is why and how has the governance of economic development policy in the Niagara region changed—or failed to change—to adapt to the imperatives of global economic upheavals and restructuring over the past forty years. The concept of adaptability as used in this paper refers to the ability of a city to transform its institutions of local economic development governance to fit the changing imperatives of global economic restructuring. This paper particularly problematizes the adaptability (or lack therefore) of governance structures in explaining the adjustment (or stagnation) of city-regions to the change pressures of global economic upheavals.
The second but no less significant objective of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the institutional infrastructure of governance underpinning the economic landscape of city-regions. The term “city-region” is used in this discussion to denote a metropolitan area and its surrounding hinterland. City-regions often consist of one or two relatively large cities forming a conurbation or urban zone along with a number of smaller towns and rural areas sharing resources, such as a central business district, transport network and a common labour market. A city-region does not presuppose a single administrative unit since most entities tend to be characterized by multiple administrative districts such as municipalities. However, to enhance the administrative efficiency of managing common resources and economic interdependency most city-regions in Canada and the United States have over the years developed regional administrative arrangements aimed at enabling such geographic zones to function as a single unit. It is the complexities and challenges associated with this effort that forms the substance of the present discussion.
The paper focuses on a mid-sized region like Niagara because much of the research on economic development governance in Canadian cities and regions has examined larger city-regions like Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal. A few studies (Bradford and Bramwell, Reference Bradford and Bramwell2014; Lightbody, Reference Lightbody2006; McAllister, Reference McAllister2004) have shed significant light on the politics of local government in mid-sized cities. However, our understanding of the specific processes and challenges of institutional adaptation of the governance structures of mid-sized city-regions such as Niagara remains underdeveloped.
The significance of the study is underscored by the fact that mid-sized cities tend to be most vulnerable to the emergent global economic transformation because they are smaller, less economically diversified and possess less institutional and professional capacity (Wolfe, Reference Wolfe2010). Major changes in one industry (for example, General Motors in St. Catharines, Ontario) can be economically and socially devastating to the local community (Conference Board of Canada, 2014). Moreover, mid-sized regions like Niagara and others across Canada have been combating economic stagnation, industrial dislocation, demographic decline, youth outmigration, citizen apathy and loss of business confidence (Council of Canadian Academies, 2009; Statistics Canada, 2006, 2011) with often very limited resources (compared to their larger counterparts) to stem and reverse the tide of these devastating trends. Their unique challenges thus justify special analytical attention.
The rest of the discussion is structured as follows. The next section lays out the research method that informed the collection and analysis of data for the empirical section of the paper. This is followed in the third section by an explication of the conceptual framework of path dependence that serves as the analytical lens for answering the central question of this study. This section will clarify the conditions in which “path dependent” processes occur as well as specify the key mechanisms involved. The fourth section then delves into the case study, using the conceptual framework to examine the key features and challenges of economic governance in the Niagara region. The focus here is on highlighting the empirical indicators that demonstrate the nature of path dependence processes in the case study. The fifth and final section concludes with some theoretical inferences and practical policy lessons that should deepen our appreciation for the institutional challenges and prospects of economic governance in mid-sized city-regions in Canada and around the world.
Research Method
In terms of analytical scope, this paper examines a city-region in Canada, providing an in-depth case-study analysis of the institutional configuration of economic governance, with some tentative generalizations for similar multitiered jurisdictions. In this regard, the paper employs a disciplined configurative idiographic single case study (George and Bennett, Reference George and Bennett2005) to explain path dependent processes of economic development governance in Niagara. The case study approach provides a detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations or theories that may be generalizable to other events (Gerring, Reference Gerring2009). Our present interest in explaining the mechanics behind the historical phenomenon of institutional adaptation or lack thereof in city-regions is a case in point.
Moreover, the case study method provides a more thorough empirical basis for modeling complex causal relations played out over time. Furthermore, the case study method puts emphasis on conceptual validity. For example, in using the framework of path dependence in the present study, the case study methods allows the authors to spell out the specific mechanisms by which the concepts that make up the analytical framework actually manifest themselves in the events being observed. It is in this regard that process tracing is particularly invaluable to the case study method, allowing the scholar to systematically establish links between possible causes and observed outcomes.
The data for this paper were collected and analyzed over a period of three years (2012–2015) by a combination of semi-structured interviews, reviews of primary (mostly government) documents and, as noted above, process tracing. The semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty-four individuals (retired, high level, mid-level and front line officials) drawn primarily from public sector agencies (regional and municipal), private sector associations and non-profit organizations in the region. It is worth noting that the two retired and four senior public officials in the sample have served in the region either as administrative staff or elected politician for over forty years. The interviewees were thus able to provide a retrospective analysis of the institutional changes. We also requested their interpretation of, and perspective on, some reports and studies of events over the last forty years. Each of the interviews took an average of one hour and consisted of questions relating to the mandate of the interviewee's organization, their relationship with key partners in the region, and how the interviewee's operating environment might have changed over time in light of unfolding events in the region. Not all the interviews are directly referenced in the discussion, but together they provided considerable insight that enriched the analysis of the case. The authors’ independent review of primary documents (archival reports, commissioned studies and web-based departmental information relating to economic development governance in Niagara) provides some measure of triangulation with the semi-structured interviews. The next section provides an overview of the conceptual framework, which is then followed by an empirical analysis of the case study.
Conceptual Framework: Path Dependence
The analytical framework of path dependence is rooted in the well-established research tradition of historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, Reference Hall and Taylor1996; Lowndes, Reference Lowndes, Marsh and Stoker2010; March and Olsen, Reference March and Olsen1984). In this regard, the aim of this discussion is to develop a synthetic theoretical framework of path dependence which incorporates several elements of relevant concepts within historical institutionalism. In so doing, the discussion clarifies the conditions under which path-dependent processes occur and specifies the key mechanisms involved. A core thesis of historical institutionalism is its emphasis on how institutions emerge from, and are embedded in, concrete temporal processes (Hall and Taylor, Reference Hall and Taylor1996; Steinmo, Reference Steinmo, Clarks and Foweraker2001). For analytical clarity, we restrict the use of the term “institution” in this discussion to formal institutions and rules. Some historical institutionslist have included in their conceptualization of institutions a set of practices and attitudes embedded in structures of meaning and resources as well as deeply informal conventions, norms and attitudes within the system they are observing. However, the problem with this approach is that if institutions include all of these things, then it becomes difficult to persuasively specify the causal mechanisms within institutions that produce the path-dependent processes in a policy subsystem. In this regard, the emphasis in this discussion will be on formal institutions and policies.
The intuitive appeal of path dependence in political science can be ascribed to the fact that while politics involves some elements of contingency and chance as manifest in the strategic behaviour and choices of agents, there is a tendency for most policy subsystems to be locked in specific patterns of institutional configuration and collective action over time (Thelen, Reference Thelen1999). Once such patterns consolidate, major actors within that subsystem will tend to adjust their strategies to adapt to, and maximize their interests in, the status quo. Path dependence captures the essential characteristics of politics as systematized conflict over goals, differences in power structuration, resources and access among actors, and the tendency of institutions to reinforce such power disparities (Beland and Powell, Reference Béland and Powell2016; Hall and Taylor, 1986).
Two key concepts that explain the conditions in which path-dependent processes occur are as follows: “critical junctures” and “policy feedback mechanisms” (or “developmental pathways”) (Béland and Powell, 2010; Mahoney and Thelen, Reference Mahoney and Thelen2010). The combined insights from the mechanisms involved in critical junctures and developmental pathways (or policy feedback mechanisms) provide a lens for empirically explaining processes of institutional continuity and change over time. Rather than emphasizing a dichotomy between institutional stability and change, the concepts of policy feedback and critical junctures can integrate the two and highlight their tensions within a given policy subsystem over time (Sabatier and Weible, Reference Sabatier and Weible2015). The concept of punctuated equilibrium in particular captures and elucidates this tension at work within this mechanism (Baumgartner and Jones, Reference Baumgartner and Jones1993; Howlett and Cashore, Reference Howlett2009) in its emphasis on the complex coexistence of stability and change by which extended periods of stasis can be punctuated by sudden shifts. Such shifts, however, need not be radical since systems change only incrementally due to the “stickiness” of vested interests, accumulated patterns of behaviour and the bounded rationality of actors.
The mechanism of “critical junctures” consists of seminal moments of institutional reconfiguration that establish specific trajectories of governance. Pierson and Skocpol stress that “outcomes at a ‘critical juncture’ trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future” (Reference Pierson, Skocpol, Katznelson and Milner2002: 6). Accordingly, path dependence does not rule out change but assumes such change to be the result of exogenous shock to the equilibrium of a policy subsystem (Hall and Taylor, Reference Hall and Taylor1996; Peters and Pierre, Reference Peters and Pierre1998; Thelen, Reference Thelen1999). Exogenous perturbations such as international events and processes could potentially break the otherwise endless cycle of institutional reproduction. Domestic political changes are thus contingent upon the mechanism of external shocks (Jacobs and Weaver, Reference Jacobs and Kent Weaver2015; Lecours, Reference Lecours2005).
However, because critical junctures by their very nature emphasize exogenous shocks and the strategic interaction of actors, they often fail to specify how these mechanisms morph such seminal moments of change into enduring legacies. The concepts of developmental pathways and policy feedback, on the other hand, identify and explain the mechanisms that are actually producing the path-dependent processes that the scholar observes. Paul Pierson (Reference Pierson1995) has provided a detailed illustration of the self-reinforcing positive feedback mechanisms by which actors recalibrate their strategies in ways that reinforce the “logic” of the status quo. A significant characteristic of the concept of developmental pathways is that it makes allowance for the fact that even while on specific trajectories, institutions tend to continue their evolution in response to changes in environmental conditions and the ceaseless strategic actions of agents who still hope and endeavour to maximize their preferences while at the same time adapting their behaviour to existing institutions.
A closely related characteristic of this feedback mechanism (or developmental pathway) is the distributional effects of institutions (Ikenberry, 1994; Kay, Reference Kay2005; Lowndes, Reference Lowndes, Marsh and Stoker2010). In addition to actors adapting their behaviour to existing institutions, these same institutions reproduce and consolidate particular structuration of power in a policy subsystem, thereby empowering and legitimizing the access and influence of certain agents while constraining or even marginalizing other actors. This pattern can distill and consolidate over time until marginalized or constrained voices are so effectively excluded or silenced that the preferences of dominant interests seem to be the only viable option of governance. However, to the extent that institutions rest on a set of ideational and material foundations that can be shaken, change is possible (Béland, 2010; Thelen, Reference Thelen1999). It is in this respect that the mechanism involved in critical junctures enriches the explanatory power of the framework of path dependence. It draws attention to issues of sequencing and timing, focusing on the nature of the interaction between ongoing political processes and the effect these interactions is having on institutional configurations and trajectories.
Therefore, to overcome the problem of deterministic or overly mechanical accounts, scholars working in the tradition of path dependence tend to highlight the specific configuration of timing, sequencing and interaction of political and economic processes that would explain exactly how enduring patterns have distilled in a given subsystems. They would also explain how such patterns constrain or narrow, if not foreclose, certain choices even while allowing for some variation in governance trajectory over time. In this regard, the framework of path dependence need not strip actors of their agency (Kay, Reference Kay2005). In fact, it is the tension between actors’ adaptation to prevailing institutions and their ongoing attempt to exploit contingent events to reconfigure these same institutions that makes path dependence a rich and complex analytical framework for understanding collective action. Thus, the real currency of path dependence rests on how well scholars in this research tradition elucidate the reproduction mechanisms specific to policy subsystem that sustains the trajectory of a given institutional arrangement. Existing institutions structure responses to new challenges as policy legacies constrain subsequent policy choices (Kay, Reference Kay2005; Peters, Reference Peters, Flinders, Gamble, Hale and Kenny2009). Once institutions are created, they take on an autonomous life and drive politics (Lecours, Reference Lecours2005). Hence, an earlier course of action is seemingly difficult to reverse, resulting in political inertia.
Path dependence is already proving to be a promising analytical framework in urban politics and local political economy (Amin, Reference Amin and Martin2008). This small but growing literature on path dependence can be found in David Wolfe's work (Reference Wolfe2010) explaining patterns of innovation trajectories in mid-sized Canadian cities. Similarly, Joel Rast (Reference Rast2012) has only used path dependence to explain varying patterns of politics in urban systems. Clarence Stone's work (Reference Stone2015) is also a noteworthy pioneering effort at observing and explaining mechanisms that produce path-dependent outcomes in local or regional contexts. This paper seeks to contribute to this literature but with a particular focus on the institutional configuration of local economic development governance. The next section examines the institutional infrastructure of economic governance in the Niagara region through the lens of path dependence. The concluding section draws some theoretical inferences and also offers some practical policy lessons.
Path-Dependent Economic Governance in Niagara
The case of the Niagara region provides an illustration of the challenges of local jurisdictions in North America and much of the industrialized world struggling to adapt their institutions to the imperatives of change in their socioeconomic environment. This section outlines and explains the mechanisms that create path-dependent processes in Niagara. The section concludes with a highlight of the empirical key indicators of those processes in the region. The discussion is structured to allow for a systematic analysis of the path-dependent mechanisms at play in the region from the 1980s to the 2010s. In this regard, this time frame is divided into two key periods to focus attention on the two critical conjunctures where the potentials for intensive changes emerged: the first period covering the 1980s and the creation of the region's first economic development agency, the Niagara Economic Development Corporation (NEDC); and the second period beginning around the mid-2000s with a major economic crisis that culminated in the disbanding of the NEDC and the creation of the Niagara Economic Development Department (NEDD). A structured comparison of each conjuncture allows for a systematic comparison of the key change dynamics and mechanisms, revealing the interplay of power disparities and vested interests among political actors, associational networks and inter-governmental bargaining, and how these factors came together to engender and constrain institutional innovation. Before proceeding with the analysis, however, it is worth providing a brief description of the structure of local economic governance in Niagara, including the nature and mandate of economic development bodies in the region.
The Regional Municipality of Niagara is a two-tier system of local government consisting of the main regional government and twelve distinct local municipalities ranging from large urban centres to rural towns (Region of Niagara, 2013a). The region has a total population of approximately 430,000. Niagara can be rightly referred to as a city-region because, despite its twelve distinct municipalities, the cities of St. Catharines and Niagara Falls constitute the economic, cultural and political heartlands of the conurbations of cities and towns that make up the region.
The Ontario Municipal Act of 2001 establishes the basic framework of local governments across the province (Government of Ontario, 2001). In two-tier systems of local government, such as that of Niagara, some services are shared between the upper (regional) and lower tiers. Economic development is one such shared jurisdiction. The regional or upper tier is mandated to co-ordinate economic development across the region. However, each of the twelve municipalities reserves the right to pursue their own economic development, identical to what the region is mandated to do. The larger municipalities such as the cities of St. Catharines and Niagara Falls have the resources to do exactly that, whereas smaller towns tend to rely largely or exclusively on the economic development programs and services of the region. This patchwork of overlapping jurisdiction and disparities in policy autonomy among the twelve municipalities provides the backdrop for much of the discontent and contestation discussed below.
The main body responsible for co-ordinating the region's economic development goals and plans has undergone some nomenclatural metamorphosis (as detailed below) but its mandate remains the same: to work with the twelve local area municipalities and other partners in providing a range of services aimed at attracting, creating, retaining and expanding businesses in the region (Region of Niagara, 2014). The regional agency and its municipal partners are expected to provide information and services to facilitate business relocation and expansion and provide market intelligence. The two tiers of government are also jointly responsible for a full range of business support services, including registration, financing, marketing and other assistance.
The discourse of, and experimentation with, governance arrangements in the Niagara region can be traced back over the past 40 years, a period that can be described as a roller-coaster ride of economic growth and stagnation. As the discussion below reveals, these institutional experimentations have largely amounted to the classic case of re-arranging chairs on the deck of a ship; they have done practically nothing to alter the fundamental trajectory of the region's inter-jurisdictional fragmentation. As noted earlier, the analysis will divide this forty-year time frame into two key periods to focus attention on the two critical conjunctures where the potentials for intensive changes emerged, the first period dating back to the 1980s and the second period commencing around the mid-2000s.
The first wave of institutional tinkering
Like other mid-sized city-regions in Canada and the United States, the Niagara region has been struggling over the past few decades to revitalize its local economy after massive industrial restructuring (including plant relocation and downsizing) in the automobile and other hard manufacturing industries dating back to the late 1970s. Over the years, the region's manufacturing sector has been particularly affected by intense global competition from low-cost jurisdictions and environmentally loose regimes in the emerging markets of developing countries. The region lost over 8,000 manufacturing jobs between 1996 and 2011. The median income between 1996 and 2011 was $23,400, taking last place on a list of 11 census metropolitan areas in Ontario. Employment growth was less than 1 per cent from 2005 to 2011, compared to an Ontario average of 17.5 per cent (Durrant and Phillips, 2015). The Niagara region's other challenges include slow population growth, an aging population and mass youth exodus; a lower-than-average number of post-secondary graduates; low relative earnings and high property taxes; and no interregional transportation network (Niagara Workforce Planning Board, 2010).
In the face of its changing economic fortunes, the Niagara region has been subject to intense political and economic pressures from a wide range of domestic actors, especially the private sector, to respond to the new threats from international competition and demographic shifts in the region. Most of the demands have been for the region to address its institutional fragmentation and redesign its governance infrastructure in ways that would better support the region's economy as “one seamless entity rather than twelve distinct economies.”Footnote 1 The underlying rationale of this demand is that the current political arrangement of the region engenders destructive rivalry and dysfunctional competition among the constituent jurisdictional units. Businesses also complain about the challenges and hurdles of dealing with twelve separate municipal bureaucracies in addition to a regional bureaucracy in accessing the region's services and economic development programs.Footnote 2
As noted in the previous section, one of the key mechanisms worth noting in the framework of path dependence is the window of opportunity for institutional change that opens at critical junctures and how actors respond. Such critical junctures make allowance for seminal moments of institutional reconfiguration that establish specific trajectories of governance. In Niagara this critical juncture was a shared sense of economic or social crisis in a system. Cities and towns, large and small, felt a deep sense of unease about the region's economic conditions. Keenly aware of its economic vulnerability and changing industrial fortunes, Niagara has attempted a number of institutional reconfigurations in its economic development governance arrangements (Region of Niagara, 2014). As far back as 1979, a report co-facilitated by the Province of Ontario and the Regional Municipality of Niagara formulated an action plan in response to the region's economic decline (Woods Gordon & Co. and Niagara, 1980).
The report recommended the establishment of a Regional Economic Development Commission with the sole responsibility for economic development functions within Niagara. It further recommended that existing economic development offices in St. Catharines, Niagara Falls, Welland and Fort Erie should be phased out after one year with development activities moved to the new commission. In response, the region established a Regional Economic Development Commission but, contrary to recommendations, the bigger cities resisted giving up their autonomous economic development offices.Footnote 3 The result was a compromise or patchwork in which a regional economic body was created but had to work in co-operation and co-ordination with existing municipal agencies (Region of Niagara, 1981). This created a fractured two-tier system with some municipalities pursuing development independently from the region and other municipalities. Since the compromise became institutionalized, the vested interest of larger and more powerful municipalities calibrated their strategies in ways that consolidated the status quo.
Out of this compromise was born the Niagara Economic Development Corporation (NEDC), a now defunct semi-autonomous corporation. It became the first agency that the region mandated on an ambitious—and in retrospect, unrealistic—drive to “project a single voice and face” for the region into the global economy (Region of Niagara, 2011a). More specifically, the NEDC's mandate was to promote Niagara on a global scale and work in partnership with the region's twelve municipalities to provide services that encourage investment in and travel to the region, along with business support services to attract, maintain and increase jobs in the region (Drewes, Reference Drewes1988). Despite the rhetoric of this ambitious mandate, some municipalities such as St. Catharines and Niagara Falls chose to pursue economic development independently (Drewes, Reference Drewes1988). In total, these municipalities represent 73 per cent of the population and include Fort Erie, Niagara Falls, Port Colborne, St. Catharines and Welland. The remaining seven municipalities have a more limited policy capacity, relying on development policy at the regional level. This body provided a basic oversight of the inter-jurisdictional structure of economic development for the Niagara Region. This pattern of institutional fragmentation became locked in because it served the interests of the bigger and more powerful municipalities. They could draw resources and tap the services of an upper tier economic body while enjoying considerable autonomy in pursuing their own economic ambitions (Drewes, Reference Drewes1988). The Economic Development Offices of St. Catharines and Niagara effectively adjusted their strategies of advocacy to one of preserving the status quo.Footnote 4
The smaller municipalities such as Grimsby, Lincoln, Niagara-on-the-Lake, Pelham, Thorold, Wainfleet and West Lincoln immediately started expressing discontent over the fragmented arrangement, complaining that it mainly served the interests of the larger cities which were attracting most of the NEDC's resources and attention.Footnote 5 Together, these smaller cities and town sought to advance their interests by calling for another review of regional economic governance. However, they were collectively constrained by their limited resources, marginal economic share of the region's businesses and population, and dependence on economic spillovers from St. Catharines and Niagara Falls.Footnote 6
But the smaller municipalities were not alone in their political struggle for institutional reform. Non-state actors, such as post-secondary institutions like Brock University and Niagara College, weighed into the debate and expressed dissatisfaction with the “inconsistent arrangements and rather vague understanding of the division of responsibility in the region.”Footnote 7 It is worth noting that the membership of these non-state agencies is drawn from every part of the region.Footnote 8 For instance, the Niagara Chamber of Commerce whose members are drawn from large and small municipalities in the region vented frustration at the “voluntary nature of compliance of municipalities to regional economic directives,” arguing that a lack of an integrated governance structure is “plagued by poor co-ordination and communication among constituent units that can prove costly for businesses.”Footnote 9 Clearly, actors’ institutional position rather than their city of residence determined their support for or opposition to consolidation (Houle, Reference Houle2015). A good example of this is the fact that regional councillors from larger cities enthusiastically supported consolidation, while their municipal counterparts from the same cities remained opposed. Not surprisingly, most councillors at the upper tier, including councillors representing large and small municipalities alike, enthusiastically agreed with the views of the private sector and post-secondary institutions and sought to form an alliance with them to bring pressure on larger municipalities who seemed intransigent in their opposition to any idea of a more centralized economic governance structure.Footnote 10 The ensuing debate between the region and its larger municipalities only deepened the rivalry and competition, not only among politicians from the two tiers of government but also among their respective administrative staff (Drewes, Reference Drewes1988).
Ever since the creation of the NEDC, the battle had raged on among various interests, including ordinary residents of the region who often reflect divisions of opinions that closely align with the sentiments of political elites in the city of their primary residence.Footnote 11 In fact, the ceaseless nature of the political drama is such that several official reports have called for institutional restructuring in one form or another.Footnote 12 For instance, a second report was issued in 1988, titled “Economic Development in the Niagara Region.” The report rightly noted institutional deficiencies that smaller municipalities complained about, including a lack of clear division of economic functions and an absence of a consistent structural arrangement across the twelve municipalities to govern the regional economy (Drewes, Reference Drewes1988). Other subsequent commissioned reports made similar observations about, and recommendations for, an integrated structure of economic governance (Region of Niagara, 2011c).
However, the institutional rearrangements proposed by all of these reports were effectively undermined by the enduring forces of inter-municipal contestation in the region. Interestingly, it was not just councillors from larger cities that sabotaged efforts at institutional reform. Municipal councillors and staff from smaller cities were not entirely altruistic in their demands for institutional restructuring.Footnote 13 For instance, in most regional council deliberations, politicians from all twelve municipalities, large and small, tended to consistently express stronger affinity with their constituent cities rather than the region.Footnote 14 So while regional councillors, disenchanted with the disproportionate power of the larger cities, championed the cause of regional integration, they were also often competing for resources for their distinct municipalities. This inconsistency only deepened the mistrust and intransigence of the larger cities. The political institutions of the region thus possess a causal force of their own in structuring individual choices and preferences. Institutions, in this regard, are best understood as the formal structures of the region's governance infrastructure which in turn constrain and even shape enduring collection of practices and attitudes embedded in the mental frames of actors.
The creation of the NEDC could thus be viewed as evidence of a patchwork of incremental institutional evolution in response to changes in economic conditions of the Niagara region and the strategic actions of agents who endeavoure to maximize their preferences while at the same time adapting the new environmental imperatives. The bigger cities were willing to allow the creation of a weak central economic development agency that they can tap resources from while maintaining their autonomy. Smaller cities lacked the resources to carve out similar autonomy and yet appeared unwilling to accept what they describe as the “double standards” of larger cities.Footnote 15 Thus, the NEDC is viewed with jaundiced eyes by nearly all parties, albeit for different reasons. In the face of ongoing contestation among municipalities and between municipalities and the region, the NEDC largely groped under the dark clouds of political stalemate and, not surprisingly, failed in engaging the region's twelve municipalities (EDOs).
In the early 2000s, spurred on by the Niagara Chamber of Commerce and post-secondary institutions, the region allocated additional resources to fund the NEDC (Region of Niagara, 2012). The goal was to revamp the agency's mandate and infuse new life into its rather lacklustre legitimacy. However, the injection of funds proved inadequate to save the NEDC from its deeper structural troubles of political stalemate and institutional stagnation.
Economic governance post-2005
It is worth referring back to our discussion in the previous section that path dependence in historical institutionalism does not rule out change but assumes such change to be the result of an exogenous shock to the equilibrium of a system (Peters and Pierre, Reference Peters and Pierre1998). The Niagara region experienced a major economic meltdown in the mid-2000s as major companies shifted from merely venting frustration with the bureaucratic hurdles of doing business to actually leaving the region (Niagara Community Observatory, 2015). Another major exogenous perturbation during this time was the financial crisis of 2007 which unleashed a devastating blow to the region's already ailing economy. The combined effect of business exodus and the financial crisis shocked the collectively psyche of the political system to form a critical juncture of potential institutional reform.
The economic crisis also ignited a new wave of demands for institutional change. An alliance consisting of private sector associations and post-secondary institutions was joined by a constellation of non-profit organizations consisting of grassroots social agencies.Footnote 16 This alliance, which operates right across the region and with an operational presence in every municipality, commands a powerful legitimacy and clout, given the significant social involvement of its partner organizations in the region. It also possesses considerable funds from higher levels of government, especially the provincial government. The NGOs’ participation in this new movement alliance helped project a much louder voice in demanding institutional reform of economic and social governance.Footnote 17
In fact, the effort of the increasingly loud and growing alliance of non-state actors somewhat paid off when the region established an Economic Development Task Force (EDTF) in March 2011 to revisit Niagara's economic development structure (Region of Niagara, 2011b, 2012). Anticipating resistance from the larger cities, the report created room for political manoeuvering by proposing three models of governance for consideration. These models included a separate Economic Development Corporation (similar to the NEDC with modifications), a Niagara Economic Development Department (NEDD) to be housed within the region, or a combined Regional/Municipal Economic Development Corporation with shared responsibilities (Region of Niagara, 2011b). Whatever model was chosen, the task force sought to effectively amalgamate development services for the entire region as the only viable option for Niagara to project its presence in the global economic space where it must compete with larger city-regions for job-creating enterprises and highly trained talents (Region of Niagara, 2011a).
Once again, councillors and senior staff from the larger cities contested this latest move (Houle, Reference Houle2015). In particular, economic development officers (EDOs) from these larger municipalities characterized the task force's recommendations as an attempt by the private sector to dictate to government its vision of market-friendly governance that was not necessarily consistent with the democratic principles of grassroots governance.Footnote 18 Moreover, councillors from the larger cities expressed suspicion that the region was exploiting the new alliance of non-state actors to appropriate development activities from the municipalities. It is worth noting that the two-tiered structure of governance protected by the Municipal Act of 2001 meant that, unless municipalities voluntarily surrendered their institutional autonomy, the region and a whole constellation of non-state actors in alliance still lacked the authority or capacity to implement a reform. However, as the sense of economic crisis deepened, ordinary residents in larger cities began paying attention to the idea of a more integrated governance structure that could fuse together the region's disparate markets and defend Niagara's economy against a turbulent global market. At the height of the economic crisis, there was a public opinion shift across the region in favour of consolidation.Footnote 19
In the face of the emergent economic shock, the intransigence of larger cities was softened and the regional council exploited the window of opportunity that this critical juncture provided to make some rapid institutional changes.Footnote 20 It collapsed the regional corporate model, disbanded the NEDC, and implemented a new regional department model, the Niagara Economic Development Department (NEDD) which is currently in operation in the region (Bolichowski, Reference Bolichowski2013).Footnote 21 The hope was that the departmental model—as distinct from the corporate model—of regional economic governance would reflect the clout as the regional municipality's institutional authority.
The creation of the NEDD illustrates the fact that extended periods of institutional stasis can be punctuated by sudden shifts (Fraser, Reference Fraser2014). However, the concept of punctuated equilibrium provides insight into the mechanisms that explain why such shifts need not be radical since systems change only incrementally due to the “stickiness” of vested interests, accumulated patterns of behaviour and the bounded rationality of actors. In fact, upon careful observation, the NEDD model is very similar to the corporate model on which the NEDC was based, with two minor differences. First, the new model is housed directly within the Niagara Region, whereas the NEDC was a corporation located outside of regional headquarters (Region of Niagara, 2016). Second, the NEDD reports to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and answers directly to Regional Council, which, in theory, should allow Regional Council greater influence over development policy. In contrast, the NEDC was steered by and answered directly to an independent board of directors, largely drawn from the community.
However, in consideration of the broader institutional structure, the NEDD does not represent any significant change. Developmental responsibilities continue to be divided between two tiers of government. Moreover, through a de facto recalibration of their strategies, the larger municipalities ended their vocal opposition, rhetorically embraced the idea of an integrated structure but still effectively pursued their independent economic development plans.Footnote 22 There was a persistent fear of regional takeover among the larger municipalities. In fact, some actors from these municipalities either moderately participated in or flat out refused to attend the NEDD's consultative meetings and collaborative working groups. The institutional fragmentation that had been the bane of governance in the region continued (Thompson, Reference Thompson, Parker and Carvalho2010).
The concepts of developmental pathways and policy feedback discussed in the previous section help us identify and explain these mechanisms that are actually producing path-dependent processes in Niagara. In particular, the Niagara case illustrates the self-reinforcing positive feedback mechanisms by which actors recalibrate their strategies in ways that reinforce the “logic” of the status quo. Institutions in the region continue their evolution in response to changes in environmental conditions and the ceaseless strategic actions of agents who still hope and endeavour to maximize their preferences while at the same time adapting their behaviour to existing institutions.
Therefore, despite the apparent shift in institutional arrangement from the NEDC to the NEDD, the governance infrastructure of Niagara continues to reflect the features of path dependence. The NEDD is largely a repackaged embodiment of the fissures that plagued the NEDC. Path dependence does not exclude change as a possibility, as we see in the NEDD shifting from a corporate to a departmental model. The initial move in the trajectory of a regional economic body with weak authority and mandate relative to municipalities under the now defunct NEDC reinforces further moves in that same direction under the NEDD.
Institutional continuity is not a given. However, institutions can structure a predictable set of responses to environmental pressures. The strategic actions of vested and powerful interests can exploit and consolidate the legacies of past governance arrangements to constrain or frustrate subsequent choices. The age-old two-tiered fractured reality of regional governance in Niagara has taken on an autonomous life of its own, driving politics along a given trajectory. As we noted in the previous section, institutions are creations of actors but the latter have a tendency to be bound by the behemoth of their own creation. The age-old institutions of the region have conditioned and ordered the behaviour and preferences of key political actors in Niagara.
Discussion and Conclusion: Path Dependence and Institutional Tinkering
There is a growing recognition of the significance of cities and local regions as the main engines of socio-economic change in the current age of seismic global economic perturbation (Scott, 2012; Florida, Reference Florida2012; Storper, Reference Storper2013; Wolfe, 2011). Cities, along with their economic opportunities, cultural resilience and ecological fragility, command a visceral claim on the collective consciousness and identities of individuals and communities across the world. The salience of cities as organic engines of human civilization and socioeconomic wellbeing has been particularly evident in the mushrooming of an interdisciplinary academic literature on the subject over the past four decades (Clark et al., Reference Clark, Feldman and Gertler2000). However, conventional analyses in this literature have focused on issues related to easily observable phenomena like the logic of settlement patterns and the structure of trade in various economic landscapes within the broader context of global economic shifts and changes. Nevertheless, some of the extant literature on institutional political economy has shed some light on the local and regional scale of economic governance. This includes the work of scholars in the tradition of regime theory and development coalitions. While the combined insight from a growing and multifaceted literature on local political economy (Bradford and Bramwell, Reference Bradford and Bramwell2014; Kantor and Nelles, Reference Kantor and Nelles2015; Keating and Wilson, Reference Keating and Wilson2014; Morgan, Reference Morgan2012; Sancton, Reference Sancton2008; Stone, 2014; Wolfe, Reference Wolfe2015; Young and Horak, Reference Young and Horak2012) provides a relevant backdrop for the discussion in this paper, however, there is still a gap in our understanding of the institutional configuration and behaviours of cities and local regions as strategic spaces of economic governance. Using the concept of path dependence, this paper particularly problematized the adaptability (or lack thereof) of governance structures in explaining the adjustment (or stagnation) of city-regions to the change pressures of global economic upheavals.
The concept of path dependence has commanded a prominent place in explaining the processes and outcomes of political events and public policy decisions (Lowndes, Reference Lowndes, Marsh and Stoker2010; March and Olsen, 1984). However, it has been mostly applied at the national level and increasingly at the international level. This paper contributes to a small but growing body of scholarship that breaks with this tradition and endeavours to apply the concept at the local level. The framework of path dependence provides a useful analytical lens for our understanding why and how the governance of economic development policy in the Niagara region appeared too “sticky” to adapt to the imperatives of global economic upheaval over the past forty years. The concept of adaptability as used in this paper refers to the ability of a city to transform its institutions of local economic development governance to fit the changing imperatives of global economic restructuring.
What we observed was that the trajectory of intergovernmental fragmentation and duplication of economic development policy functions in Niagara's two-tier system of regional government was perturbed at two critical junctures by exogenous economic shocks to the political system, but managed to remain largely unchanged. Indeed, the combined effects of the most recent economic and financial crisis and the subsequent wave of new political alliances and shifting public opinion by about the mid-2000s sufficiently shook the equilibrium of the political system to soften the intransigence of vested interests and create an institutional shift from a corporate to a departmental model of regional economic development governance. However, despite this institutional tweak, old patterns of fragmentation and duplication quietly resurfaced even as actors recalibrated their strategies to rhetorically embrace the new environmental imperatives while jealously guarding the economic development policy autonomy of their distinct municipalities.
In observing the challenges of institutional reform in Niagara, it would be accurate to say that political actors were not devoid of meaningful agency. At the same time, however, it would be a mistake to ignore the powerful hold that institutions have on actors’ strategic preferences and choices. In other words, political institutions possess causal force as critical factors in structuring individual choices. The Niagara case study illustrates the simple but profound axiom that history matters. However, the discussion sought to highlight and explain the mechanics and political interplay at specific junctures of decision making that positively reinforced the tendency towards institutional stagnation in the Niagara.
The significance of this paper is more than theoretical. At a concrete level of practical policy lessons, the Niagara Region, like other mid-sized city-regions in Canada and the industrialized world, has been struggling to adapt to global economic changes. As noted in the introduction, the salience of cities as organic engines of socioeconomic development has been particularly evident in the interdisciplinary academic literature over the past four decades (Clark et al., Reference Clark, Feldman and Gertler2000; Storper, Reference Storper2013). The extant literature has provided a compelling and multi-layered portrait of cities within the global economic landscape as engines of growth and prosperity (Amin, Reference Amin and Martin2008; Scott, Reference Scott2001 Storper, Reference Storper2013). One of the missing pieces in this research tradition, however, is a lack of clear explanation of the processes of institutional change in local economic landscapes.
The key focus of this paper, therefore, has been to deconstruct the institutional infrastructure of governance underpinning the economic landscape of economically challenged city-regions. Rather than assuming governance structures to be an undifferentiated “black box,” this paper problematized the configuration and adaptability (or lack thereof) of such structures as key features that can explain the adjustment or stagnation of certain regions to the currents of change in their socioeconomic environment. In this regard, the Niagara region serves as a crucial lesson for other fragmented mid-sized regions in Canada and around the world. Major crises can create critical junctures and strategic windows of institutional reform but by themselves are not sufficient to guarantee a desired change. Even mass political coalitions supported by public opinion may not be enough to generate the institutional reforms they desire.
A critical piece that seems lacking in the case of Niagara, and may hold a significant lesson for similar regions, is the existence of sustained political and civic leadership to focus public attention on consolidating the spirit and letter of institutional reforms introduced at critical junctures. The new institutional trajectory once consolidated is likely to grow into a virtuous cycle of self-reinforcing positive feedback loops. Moreover, to the extent that institutions have distributional effects on the power and influence of political actors, an integrated governance arrangement that addresses the vast power disparities among constituent cities within a region can reproduce and consolidate a platform of inclusive governance that may serve to legitimize and strengthen the capacity of that region to unite its resources in effectively exploiting the opportunities and minimizing the threats of global economic change.
