Since Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri, under his nom de guere Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared the establishment of a worldwide caliphate on 29 June 2014 from the Nur al-Din Zenki Mosque in Mosul, Iraq, dozens of books have been written seeking to explain the rapid rise and breathtaking brutality of the Islamic State group. There is a certain “all hands on deck” feel to the flood of commentary on ISIS—journalists, academics, policy wonks, military figures, analysts, and politicians all have had their say. The visibility of the group, augmented by the rhetorical use to which they have been put by unrelated political debates, have perhaps made this inevitable. The four books reviewed here are part of this trend, and their collective strength is in their breadth and factual detail. There is information aplenty, and all the books included in this review do an admirable job, each in its own way, of detailing the history of the organization. The Islamic State group's deft use of online propaganda, its place in the post-9/11 jihadi landscape, its territorial gains and losses, and its prodigious ability, until recently, to draw large numbers of recruits into Syria or online support roles, have all received detailed treatment.
Each of the books under review offers a history and development of the Islamic State group, beginning with its godfather, the Jordanian Abu Musʾab al-Zarqawi. All are in agreement that the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent 2010 withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country precipitated the rise of the Islamic State group in its earlier and later incarnations. Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger note in ISIS: The State of Terror that the Islamic State's “roots lie with Zarqawi and the 2003 invasion of Iraq that gave him purpose” (13). Joby Warrick in Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS offers a compelling narrative on the lead up to the 2003 invasion and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the U.N. in February of that year justifying the war and introducing Zarqawi to the world, “launching the career of one of the century's greatest terrorists” (98). Brian Fishman, in The Master Plan, argues that “The Islamic State was born of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and it was given a lifeline by the United States’ incomplete war in Iraq and withdrawal in 2010” (252). Will McCants, in The ISIS Apocalypse, notes that the rapid expansion of the Islamic State in early 2014 resulted from the fact that “it was left alone” after 2011 (153). The story of Zarqawi, the Islamic State, and U.S involvement in the Middle East are deeply intertwined, and absent the 2003 U.S. invasion one gets the sense that Zarqawi would have remained a second-rate thug. Regardless, these four books usefully connect the rise of the Islamic State group to an overzealous and over-militarized counterterror response to 9/11. This lesson alone is worth the price of admission.
The persistent drumbeat of uniqueness when describing the Islamic State, with few exceptions, can also be heard. Terms like innovative, new, unprecedented, and unheralded all do heavy lifting in assessments of the Islamic State, its success and power. Stern and Berger, in ISIS: The State of Terror, are perhaps most keen to emphasize the innovative nature of the Islamic State, particularly in its use of new technologies for disseminating propaganda. Both terrorism analysts, Stern and Berger write their history from a large knowledge base and many years’ experience examining extremism in a variety of forms, and the resulting book is the most comprehensive of the four reviewed here. Their goal is to “situate ISIS within the global jihadist movement, and within the field of extremism more broadly” (7), and they succeed admirably in that task. In their view, the Islamic State is “rewriting the playbook for extremism,” not only by declaring a caliphate, but by marketing utopia alongside striking brutality. They conclude that the Islamic State has “established a new paradigm, one that is more brutal, more sectarian, and more apocalyptic in its thinking than the groups that preceded it” (235).
ISIS: The State of Terror is well written and, in the breadth of its analysis, makes a clear contribution to our understanding of the Islamic State. The history of the group from Zarqawi's early days is recounted (chapters 1 and 2), as are the Islamic State's organizational and ideological differences from Al Qaeda (chapter 3), the foreign fighter phenomenon (chapter 4), video production and the use of social media (chapters 5 through 7), the Al Qaeda–ISIS war (chapter 8), the psychology of terrorism (chapter 9), apocalypticism (chapter 10), and a conclusion with policy recommendations (chapter 11). Stern and Berger's detailed work on the group and its supporters’ social media strategy, and the response of technology companies (discussed in chapter 7), is a particularly welcome contribution. However, the book's attempt to be comprehensive means that is loses something in depth, especially when Stern and Berger's analytic insights are offered up without being fully articulated. For example, Stern and Berger describe the difference between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State as the move from a “vanguard” model of terrorism to a “smart mob” model—where Al Qaeda was elitist, the Islamic State was populist in its messaging. Al Qaeda thrived on secrecy and barriers to entry, while the Islamic State offered an open invitation to participate in a world-historical project and offered instant meaning for recruits. This is interesting, original, and worthy of a more sustained analysis. How might our interpretations of the Islamic State expand if we understand it against the rise of populist movements globally? Similarly, chapter 9 on psychological warfare in the Islamic State is equally thought provoking. The comparative frame given by, for example, the Khmer Rouge and the long-term effects of violence are useful for understanding the present and future of the Islamic State.
Stern and Berger also argue that Al Qaeda's recruitment message was designed to appear reasonable by pointing to, for example, long-standing historical grievances like the occupation of Palestine or the Bosnian genocide. In contrast, the Islamic State, in their estimation, “seeks more to stimulate than to convince” (194). While it is undoubtedly true that Islamic State propaganda is designed to stimulate, creating a hyperintensified moral space for potential recruits, this case can be overstated. Islamic State propaganda continues to offer rational and historical appeals based on both religious precepts and well-known historical and political grievances. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that Islamic State recruitment propaganda is more diverse and more targeted than that of Al Qaeda, offering rational-religious appeals where those work, and emotional appeals where they don't. On this last point, regarding the religious content of the Islamic State's messaging, it is not the case that the Islamic State has abandoned detailed juridical or theological argumentation. Connected as they are to contemporary Islamist and Jihadi-Salafism discourse, along with recognizable references to the classical tradition, a deeper analysis of the Islamic State's ideological ecosystem would have been a useful addition to the expansive analysis offered in Stern and Berger's excellent work.
William McCants, an historian and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution where he directs the Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, offers a more precise analysis of the theological background of the Islamic State in his ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State. Like Stern and Berger, McCants stresses the innovative nature of the Islamic State group, noting that the Islamic State “defies the conventional jihadist playbook” (3) and “conventional thinking about how to conduct an insurgency” (148). It does so by relying on extreme brutality, apocalyptic fervor, rabid sectarianism, and the declaration of the caliphate now, rather than in some distant future. This is in direct opposition to the strategy of Al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden, argues McCants, who eschewed apocalyptic and messianic thinking (considering them low class, another measure of Al Qaeda's intellectual elitism), avoided excessive sectarianism, and advocated for a gradualist approach to the caliphate which depended on gaining popular support from those over whom one would rule.
The similarities and difference between Bin Landen's jihad and Zarqawi's (now Baghdadi's) provide the narrative thread for McCants’ book. In chapter 1, McCants stresses the Islamic State's strategic ambiguity in the early stages of their formation in Iraq, particularly in their claim to be a state. This is true both in their propaganda and in their communications with Al Qaeda leadership. McCants also offers a straightforward narrative history of the group between Zarqawi's death in 2006 and the American withdrawal in 2011 (discussed in chapter 2), and compares the early experience in governance by Al Qaeda franchises in Yemen, Somalia, and the Sahel (chapter 3) with that of their Iraqi affiliate as it entered Syria during the early days of the civil war, and the eventual divorce of the Islamic State's from its Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, and Al Qaeda itself (discussed in chapter 4). Later chapters discuss the reemergence of the caliphate project under Baghdadi (chapter 6); a final chapter includes basic policy recommendations.
The ISIS Apocalypse is at its best when it approaches the topic promised in its title. Chapter 5, “Sectarian Apocalypse,” is perhaps the most useful in the book for delving into the religious worldview behind the Islamic State. This, along with the appendixes of Sunni eschatological prophecy, helpfully translated for the general reader, make an important contribution to the growing body of literature on the Islamic State. McCants usefully notes that the Islamic State employs the symbolic language of authenticity, and sees certain parallels between the Islamic State and the Abbasid caliphate in their rhetoric and claims to legitimacy; the Abbasids too rose to power on the back of a revolution underwritten by an apocalyptic political theodicy. Michael Pregill has recently noted that there are also striking similarities between the mythology of the Islamic State and the early Fatimid Empire. The Fatimids began as an insurgency and built a state, relying on, per Pregill, “an immanent or already realized millenarianism and an ambivalent embrace of violence against other Muslims” (2016). So much for innovation. Beyond symbols, the Islamic State does recognizably rely on the classical Islamic tradition, and McCants usefully details the justifications of its chief ideologues for the return of the caliphate, as well its practice of slavery, noting that “it's certainly the case that the State's scholars pick and choose scripture to suit their biases and desires. But anyone who reads and acts on scripture does that” (150). This is undoubtedly true. However, the apocalyptic interpretation that the Islamic State chooses as the lens to view the Islamic religious tradition is a better measure for their ideology; apocalyptic expectation is at the heart of the legal justifications offered by the Islamic State in their defense of, for example, slavery (See Dabiq 4, 2014, 14–17). McCants's book is at its best when it describes the immediate context for the rise of apocalyptic thinking in the Middle East. He highlights the growth in apocalyptic thinking in the region post-Arab Spring, and traces these apocalyptic ideas back to early texts, including hadith literature, providing textual and historical background for the group's focus on Dabiq, fitna, tribulations, and end times scenarios. What is ignored in the focus on apocalypticism in McCants’ book is the more recent genealogy of the Islamic State's theological and political activism. McCants is correct that the groups “theology and method of engaging with scripture are almost identical to Wahhabism, the ultraconservative form of Islam found in Saudi Arabia” (151). However, it might be argued that their ideology grows equally from the jihadi-style activism that emerged from post-colonial Islamist ideologues like Sayyid Qutb, as noted by Cole Bunzel, an early watcher of the Islamic State (2015).
While The ISIS Apocalypse and ISIS: The State of Terror emphasize the differences between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, Brian Fishman, another terrorism analyst and former fellow at the New America Foundation, highlights the long-standing operational and strategic connections between the two terror groups in The Master Plan: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory. Fishman has over a decade of experience studying the Islamic State group and its predecessors, and writes firmly from within the field of counterterrorism. The most recent of the books reviewed here, The Master Plan perhaps suffers a bit from that fact; Fishman's book covers, for the most part, relatively well-worn territory in its narrative history of the Islamic State. The real advantage of the book is in the wealth of primary sources Fishman brings to the tale, and its organizing principle. Relying on expansive primary source documents collected by U.S. forces, declassified, and made available through the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Fishman offers a much more granular history of the Al Qaeda–Islamic State relationship, including actors, clandestine meetings, plots, tactical maneuvering. Also unlike the other works under review, The Master Plan is concerned solely with the long-term strategy of jihadism; this is an operational history. Readers interested in the foreign fighter phenomenon, the group's online propaganda, or ideological background are advised to go elsewhere.
That having been said, Fishman's work is perhaps the most exhaustive account to date of the history of the Islamic State group. The book attempts to lay out the strategy of the group through a “history of the people who built the Islamic State by implementing elements of that master plan” (xi). The key source documents for the book are a history of Zarqawi's “engagements with al-Qaeda,” as well as “the master plan—a visionary effort to incorporate the Zarqawiist movement into al-Qaeda's strategic vision” (33), written by Sayf al-Adl, a longtime Al Qaeda operative, while he was under house arrest in the Iranian city of Shiraz. Fishman relates that the two were published in 2005 in a book by Jordanian journalist Fuad Husayn, himself imprisoned with Zarqawi and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in the 1990s. In Fishman's telling, the master plan represents a joint strategic vision for Al Qaeda after Zarqawi joined the organization in 2004 (34). The plan comprises seven stages, stretching from 2000 to 2020, the most important of which, for Fishman's purposes, is the sixth, “The Stage of Declaring the State (2013–2016).” As is well known, it is precisely in this period that the Islamic State was declared in Iraq and Syria. The seven-stage master plan then provides the structure of Fishman's account, with each of the seven chapters covering a stage in the plan.
Fishman's book makes for lively, if dense, reading, and offers a useful corrective to the popular notion that the Islamic State emerged out of nowhere to capture Mosul in the summer of 2014. The Master Plan proves that, at a minimum, the desire to establish a caliphate on a distinct timeline was discussed in jihadist circles well over a decade prior. Of course, the plan itself was more a jihadi wish list than operational blueprint, and the actual declaration of the so-called caliphate by Baghdadi in June of 2014 is more coincidence than well-executed model. For example, the seventh stage, “The Stage of Final Victory (2018—2020)” predicts that the world's 1.5 billion Muslims will rise up on behalf of the caliphate, an unlikely prospect to say the least, given that most victims of the Islamic State's brutality have been Muslims and that the so-called caliphate is loathed by virtually the entirety of the global Muslim population. But that's not really the point. This is a book about the legacy of Zarqawi, and Fishman argues for seeing the document more as an attempt to “codify and contextualize the lessons of Zarqawi's early jihad” (39). Leaving aside the awkward neologism ‘Zarqariism,’ Fishman usefully distills this more virulent form of jihadism into two principles: a doctrinal purity that apostatizes almost all other Muslims; and a devolution of religious authority from scholars to those who fight (60–61). This last point is particularly interesting, and echoes the observations of Stern and Berger—Zarqawi's, and the Islamic State's, political project and interpretation of jihad participates, in some sense, in the current global rise in populist movements, an insight worth further analysis.
Like Fishman's The Master Plan, Joby Warrick's Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS, is particularly good in dispelling the popular myth that the Islamic State emerged from nowhere. Black Flags is a highly readable account of the rise of the Islamic State group, beginning with Zarqawi's upbringing. Its journalistic and fast-paced narrative (Warrick writes for the Washington Post) is a pleasure to read, and it benefits from its substantive interviews with the American and Jordanian intelligence, diplomatic, and military officials who followed Zarqawi for years, many of whom reacted with surprise when the remnants of Zarqawi's group reemerged in 2013 and 2014 to rapidly take land in Iraq and Syria. Warrick lets the witnesses to the history of the Islamic State speak, and each of the twenty-two short chapters is titled by a telling quote from one of his characters. Especially moving is the sense Warrick conveys of the futility felt by Jordanian intelligence officials at the fall of Mosul, many of whom had been following Zarqawi since his prison days. Based on his extensive reporting in the region, Warrick's narrative offers clarity to the Iraqi context of the rise, and fall, and rise again of Zarqawi's “children,” and his account of Iraqi tribal politics and the evolution of the Islamic State's evolving Iraqi strategy provides much needed context to the history of the group. At play here is more than just religious fanaticism and apocalyptic fervor; Warrick describes in detail the Iraqi tribal context and the role of former Baʿthists in the rise of the Islamic State, as well as these groups’ reactions to the ham-fisted nature of both the Shiʾi-led government in Baghdad and U.S. engagement with local populations. The appeal of apocalypticism and the prospect of living in a caliphate might be primary, at least when it comes to the Western foreign fighters who desired to live under the shade of the Islamic State's black flag. For the local Iraqis and Syrians, it is a much more complex story that includes both failed governance and over a decade of warfare and Western military aggression.
Numerous studies of the Islamic State group have been published in the past two years, many of them quite good, and these four are no exception. Each adds to our understanding of the key figures in its formation, critical moments in its evolution, its propaganda and online presence, its on-again–off-again relationship with Al Qaeda, and its populist appeal. The number of books on the Islamic State is likely to grow larger in the coming years as the group loses territory, its affiliates decentralize, and the rabid sectarianism elevated by the group continues to metastasize.
However, there has remained a certain ambivalence on the part of scholars outside the narrow fields of international affairs, terrorism, and security studies to grapple with the phenomenon of the Islamic State. This is, of course, partly a matter of time. However, at this early stage of understanding the Islamic State, we are still left with too little insight about the group's worldview, its theology, sociology, even its soteriology. Apart from the connection to Al Qaeda, there has also been very little comparative attention given to the phenomenon of the Islamic State. What other insurgent groups, or apocalyptic movements, might we usefully compare with the Islamic State? How might scholarship in the humanities and social sciences in general give us leverage on understanding ISIS? Comparative and interpretive work that examines millenarian or utopian ideology in the service of totalitarian state-building would offer valuable additional insight on the Islamic State.
What is also lost in the treatments of the Islamic State groups currently on offer is the humanity of participants engaged in its caliphal project. Whatever their barbarity, it is a uniquely human barbarism, and one that is exceptional only in the extent of its banal repetition throughout human history. The Islamic State is not sui generis, as the books reviewed here show—it emerges from specific political, historical, and religious trajectories. We know what it is, but we still do not yet know what it means. As Jonathan Z. Smith reminds us, “these matters will not be resolved by new or increased data. In many respects, we already have too much. It is a problem to be solved by theories and reasons, of which we have too little” (1982). The task of interpretation is essentially one of reduction through comparison. The work of interpreting the Islamic State is not yet complete, but a beginning has been made.
