This dense and meticulously researched book by Peter Wallensteen on “Quality Peace” is a must-read for anyone seriously engaged in the peacebuilding field. Wallensteen’s stated purpose is to address the shortcomings of academics and practitioners alike on the issue of peacebuilding, as opposed to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and conflict prevention. In this regard, he argues that most researchers have neglected the outcomes of victory and victory consolidation as they look at postconflict peacebuilding. Early on, he says that “scholarly inquiry is going in different directions without systematically responding to [the] pertinent challenges” of peacebuilding (p. 30).

Using a mountain of references to almost every scholar who has ever tackled the issues of peace, Wallensteen outlines in his first five chapters the findings of those authors, sometimes compatible with his thesis and sometimes contradictory, on how postconflict actions impact the notion of “quality peace” that he sets forward as the objective of peacebuilding. His repeated definition of quality peace is postwar conditions that give inhabitants of a society “dignity, security, and predictability” (p. 3) now and for the foreseeable future. The studies he cites throughout are comparative ones that look, for the most part, at quantitative evaluations of responses to conflicts. He begins his overview with the post–World War II approach by the world powers to consolidate their victories in Europe and Asia, but primarily looks at two “world orders,” as he terms them: the Cold War (1977–88) and post–Cold War (1989–present). These time frames are loosely based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program database, which Wallensteen helped to found and directed for years.

The narrative examines a plethora of case studies from around the globe of successful and less successful conclusions to conflicts, including a look at the role of the international community, which has increased and become more effective since the end of the Cold War. Dealing with dozens of examples of intrastate (civil war over governance), state-formation (territorial disputes), and interstate conflicts, Wallensteen looks at outcomes through negotiation or victory by one side or the other.

As a practitioner of peacebuilding, rather than an academic or researcher in this field, I am greatly impressed by the scope of this study and the wealth of material that Wallensteen brings to the table to fuel his discussion. However, I do have some reservations and am reminded in reading the book of a movie with an ending that obviously sets up a sequel. Wallensteen comes down strongly on the conclusion that negotiated settlements, whether local or internationally initiated, lead to more sustainable “quality peace” than do victories in conflicts, either by governments or rebel forces. Beyond these points, though, he seems to be setting the stage for his next book. He ends with an elaborate listing of 25 “conclusions … for further considerations by the academic and policy communities” (p. 206). He openly challenges the authors he has cited for neglecting the different victory outcomes and consolidation approaches after conflict, and for not fully taking into account the different kinds of conflicts or the time frames in which they occur, Cold War or post–Cold War. I will not iterate the 25 conclusions here, but by identifying these areas of needed research and study—albeit a valuable finding that makes the book worthwhile—Wallensteen leaves this reader wanting more in the way of conclusions. I must assume that a future book will address some of these challenges he puts forward.

I must hasten to say that I certainly agree, from my own field experience in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, with a number of the author’s conclusions. He correctly, in my mind, postulates that judgment on outcomes needs to be couched in longer time frames than the normal two to five years that most studies, international organizations, and donor nations use. Wallensteen prefers looking at 10-, even 15-year perspectives before firm conclusions can be made. I have found in my work in Burundi, Timor Leste, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo that the international community is far too quick to take its resources and influence away from a postconflict scenario after sometimes very expansive and expensive engagements that bring about a peace settlement. Commitments almost always follow the pattern he details. Commitments of 10 or even 20 years would allow for cycles of leadership and reconciliation to take place and would solidify the postconflict period.

Wallensteen, as mentioned, also believes on the basis of his research and that of others cited that the impact of democratic transitions goes a long way toward ensuring the sustainability of a postconflict quality peace, not just the “absence of war,” as he puts it (p. 3).

Having worked closely with the United Nations, the Africa Union, the European Union, and governments, originally as a diplomat who worked on the peace settlements in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and Southwest Africa/Namibia, and later as a nongovernmental organization manager, I also agree with Wallensteen on the positive impact that regional and international organizations bring to postconflict settlements. Where they are involved, he concludes, peace consolidation has a more lasting impact, more often than peace processes that are brought about through a military victory or locally initiated negotiation. He does make a pertinent point about one weakness of international engagement: The focus still remains primarily on resolving the conflict and seeing to humanitarian needs during the conflict, then addressing conditions after the war.

There are a number of other very valid points that Wallensteen brings up, but with limited space for this review, I want to focus on one seminal weakness in his study that concers me. This is the very theme of his book, his concept of quality peace. I think I agree and know what he means, but am concerned that it does not go far enough. At one stage, when discussing the origin of the concept of peacebuilding, he cites the UN secretary general’s “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” in 1995 that says peacebuilding addresses “demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved policy and judiciary systems, monitoring of human rights, electoral reform, and social and economic development” (p. 13). I find this phrase far more comprehensive than Wallensteen’s general referral to “dignity” and “security,” although the details of the secretary general’s statement can be subsumed under those terms.

Based on my field experience, a sustainable or “quality” peace requires elements that receive scant attention in this book. Those are postconflict reconciliation and trust building, working with protagonists to understand their interdependence and build their capacity to work together to implement the democratization and developmental/recovery agendas that must follow. Wallensteen comes back in several places to the need to build democratic institutions of political parties, elections, judiciary, free press and media, and so on with which I agree. But those institutions will not succeed if the individuals filling their ranks do not see a common interest in making them work and abide by the agreements and decisions made through them. He alludes to these issues, saying at one point that “history is understood in divergent ways” (p. 107) and “respecting the roles of others could be key” (p. 209). He also refers to the need to protect minority rights, particularly when military victory has been the solution. However, his only reference to dealing with the core causes of the conflict in the first place, comes in his introductory chapter on page 2, when he says that a peace agreement must deal “with the disagreement that led to the war in the first place” and adds that removing this “incompatibility” is a “first step.” I would say that this should be the first and possibly most important step. There is always an issue around which conflict occurs, be it ethnic, environmental, territorial, or the exclusion from economic, educational, and social opportunities of one or more segments of the society. Until this is addressed, peace cannot be sustained. Democratic institutions put in place after the conflict can monitor and regulate these issues, but not until the parties to the conflict have reconciled their differences and agreed to a common vision and future. Wallensteen only alludes to this and needs to incorporate this tenet of conflict resolution into his thinking.

In conclusion, Quality Peace is a must-read for the scholar of peacebuilding and a most useful reference for all students. Its strong point is the priority it gives to peacebuilding in a world where peacemaking and peacekeeping are seldom followed up in a manner that ensures a sustainable peace in a divided postconflict society. In this context, I would like more emphasis on postconflict reconciliation and trust building, but that does not diminish the value of this superb book.