This is a rare and welcome approach to ethical discourse in Islam. Amyn Sajoo is a political theorist with legal training and philosophical instincts. He identifies vistas without trying to map a program for reconstructing Muslim ethics.
The breadth of Sajoo's vision can be deduced from the content of each of the four chapters. Chapter 1 looks at the coding of medical issues within a Muslim worldview that stretches from the 12th to the 21st centuries. Abortion, genetic intervention, euthanasia, and organ donation and transplantation are treated with reference to intuitive capacities and cultural proclivities as well as juridical guidelines that distinguish right from wrong. Adab is the code word for that deepest reflex of Muslim humaneness: even while attention to fiqh is indispensable for its application, it also encompasses literature, art, and cinema. Chapter 2 moves the focus to civil society. Sajoo posits civic virtue as the key to civil society: how, he asks, can moral reasoning inform, protect, and enhance civic virtue? Chapter 3 turns to Muslim public intellectuals, examining how they can forge links and make common cause with their non–Muslim counterparts. Throughout this chapter one hears Abdolkarim Soroush, Fazlur Rahman, Nurcolish Madjid, Chandra Muzaffar, Abdullahi Naim, and Ebrahim Moosa in conversation with their counterparts, whether Gertrude Himmelfarb, Robert Putnam, Michael Walzer, Ronald Dworkin, Margaret Visser, or Charles Taylor. The combination of these talents and interests converge toward an agenda of pluralist governance, which is then advanced in the final chapter, chapter 4. Here, Sajoo pushes beyond legal definitions of tolerance and/or pluralism, advocating “a lived ethics of engagement by ordinary citizens” (p. 91). Ethics and human rights are seen not as competitive but as complementary domains for both collective and individual identity.
Can one have an ethics that embraces secularism for its instrumental benefits without accepting its metaphysical agnosticism? For Sajoo, the answer is an unequivocal yes. In his view the key to Muslim ethics qua Muslim ethics is rereading the past not as a palimpsest of perfect societies gone astray or powerful polities defeated by global change but, rather, as a set of resilient resources for forging an interactive future that includes religious as well as other affirmations of the good. High on this list of resources is the 13th-century philosopher and jurist Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 1274). Nasirean ethics influenced a range of premodern polities, from the Persian Safavid to the Turkish Ottoman to the Indian Mughal empires. For Tusi, moral reasoning was the foundation stone for charting lived ethics. In technical language,

aql, or reason, preceded without canceling naql, tradition. Tusi prioritized the divine order, or namūs allāh. Though he did assign a role to shari

a, it was a secondary role. Muslims could, and should, channel the divine order through shari

a without, however, denying its openness to other instrumentalities for non-Muslims. (For more on Nasirean ethics, see Muzaffar Alam, The Languages of Political Islam in India, c. 1200–1800.)
The modern day successor to Tusi seems to be Abdolkarim Soroush. Soroush, like Tusi, acknowledges the power of specifically Islamic discourse yet stops short of acceding to its ultimate authority. For Soroush, modern ethics requires a mediated subjectivity, one based on the distinction between religion in itself and religion as a branch of human knowledge. The first, religion in itself, endures without change: the divine creation, like the final consummation, of humankind is affirmed. The attempt of Muslim specialists to understand and apply scriptural dictates, however, does change. It varies according to individual skills, social circumstances, and global forces. In any given period of human history, therefore, religious knowledge is dependent on other forms of human knowledge, including scientific and philosophical interventions.
Ethics, like law, is deemed to be a form of religious knowledge, subject to the same temporal and spatial conditions as are other forms of knowledge. (Soroush's thought is nimbly explicated in Farzin Vahdat, God and the Juggernaut: Iran's Intellectual Encounter with Modernity.) Religious democracy, for instance, cannot be grounded in Islamic principles of contract, consultation, or consensus, even though these Islamic key words, properly understood, have their correlates in secular principles such as human rights, justice, and spheres of power. Still, a religious democracy (albeit not a theocracy in democratic garb) is to be preferred. Why? Because, unlike its nonreligious counterpart, a genuine religious democracy can require its citizens and leaders to respect both human rights and the rights of God.
An applied ethical project accenting inclusiveness also has its Western advocates, none more salient than Charles Taylor. Taylor argues that the collective is not inalterably or essentially opposed to the individual. Indeed, the price of radical subjectivity is to exclude the communitarian notion of the good society. Taylor, like Soroush, wants to reclaim a neo–Durkheimian order, one where “the senses of belonging to a group and confession are fused,” where moral issues “coded in religious categories” can be addressed in a public forum that is also secular—to wit, the modern, constitutional state with its democratic principles and diverse electorate (Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002], 78).
While recognizing that the full scope of inclusive, applied ethics would entail multiple linguistic and cultural resources, Sajoo limits himself to contemporary ethical writings available in English. He wants to provoke broad, engaged thinking about Muslim ethics, civic virtue, and democratic discourse in Euro-American circles. His monograph opens a debate that is as healthy as it is overdue, not only for ethicists but also for concerned others in today's globally connected yet culturally divided world.
