Christopher Cordner arguesFootnote ² that Aristotle commits himself to claims about the nature of virtue that modern readers would likely reject. As he puts it,

According to Cordner, Aristotle commits himself to these claims in his discussion of the virtue of megalopsychia (often translated as ‘greatness of soul’ or ‘proper pride’).

In this paper, I will look at Cordner's account of Aristotle's views about megalopsychia and contrast it with an alternative account defended by Roger Crisp.Footnote ⁴ It seems that by emphasizing a different passage of NE, IV.3 than Cordner does, Crisp ends up with an account of megalopsychia on which Aristotle is not committed to the perhaps unpalatable claims that Cordner's account commits Aristotle to. Some might count this as an advantage of Crisp's account. However, I will argue that Crisp's account faces some serious problems as an interpretation of Aristotle that Cordner's does not. Nonetheless, this does not ultimately spell trouble for Aristotle, since, as I will argue, the claims that Cornder's account commits Aristotle to are not as problematic as they might at first seem.

1. What Modern Readers Might Find Objectionable

What Cordner thinks modern readers would find objectionable about megalopsychia is its close connection with a concern for honor. It is difficult to pin Cordner down on exactly what it is he thinks moderns dislike about megalopsychia. However, I propose that there are two seemingly problematic claims that Cordner thinks Aristotle is committed to in virtue of what he says about megalopsychia in NE, IV.3. The first claim concerns the motivations of the virtuous person, while the second concerns virtuous action.

Cordner explicitly says that Aristotle is committed to something like VM: ‘Aristotle goes as far as to say that a desire for honor is actually internal to the motive to action of the virtuous person.’Footnote ⁵ When it comes to the claim about virtuous action, the following passage clearly shows that Cordner takes Aristotle to be committed to VA as well: ‘It is not that [the megalopsychos] just takes pleasure in such honours when they happen upon him. He actively seeks and claims them as his due.’Footnote ⁶ Furthermore, Cordner goes on to say that ‘Aristotle's suggestion here… seems to be that an appropriate worldly self-assertion is not only consistent with, but even a proper part of, the greatest moral virtue [megalopsychia].’Footnote ⁷Why does Cordner take these two claims to be part of Aristotle's view? The main reason, I think, is that Cordner's account of megalopsychia entails them.

2. Cordner's Account of Megalopsychia

In his account of what megalopsychia is for Aristotle, Cordner seems to focus on the passage around 1123b25, where Aristotle says: ‘Honours and dishonours, then, are the objects with respect to which the proud man [the megalopsychos] is as he should be.’Footnote ⁸ Call this Passage B. By contrast, Roger Crisp, as we'll see later on, seems to focus on what Aristotle says at the very beginning of IV.3, at 1123b1: ‘The man is thought to be proud [megalopsychos] who thinks himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them.’ Call this Passage A (since it appears earlier than Passage B in Aristotle).

Emphasizing Passage B, Cordner explains megalopsychia as follows:

If we assume that virtues are firm and settled dispositions of character, we may sketch Cordner's account of megalopsychia as follows:

To fully understand the first of these conditions, we need to know what is meant by the phrase ‘the right attitudes towards honor and dishonor.’ Given Cordner's subsequent discussion, there can be little doubt that he thinks that it consists, at least in part, in the desire to obtain honor and to avoid losing it. Consider, for instance, Cordner's claim that the megalopsychos ‘actively claims and seeks them [i.e. honors] as his due. And doing this is not a feature of his psychology merely external and additional to his virtue: on the contrary, it is what he does qua megalopsychos.’Footnote ¹⁰ Presumably the megalopsychos is so motivated because he desires honor. Accordingly, in order to have the right attitudes towards honor and dishonor, one thing that Cordner seems to think is required is that the agent be motivated by the desire to obtain honor and avoid dishonor.

Furthermore, we need to know what is meant by phrases like ‘obtaining honor’ and ‘avoiding dishonor.’ One might think that ‘obtaining honor’ is here supposed to mean the attainment of things like trophies, medals and privileges. However, this would seem to be a mistake, since it would make the motivations of the megalopsychos come out materialistic and superficial. So instead, ‘obtaining honor’ should be taken to mean the attainment of high status, good reputation, the respect and deference of others, superior social standing and other such social goods (i.e. things of which medals and trophies might perhaps be symbols).Footnote ¹¹ By the same token, dishonor should be conceived of as the loss of such things. Thus honor and dishonor are not concerned chiefly with mere material objects. Rather, honor and dishonor are intimately bound up with one's relationships with others, one's place in society, with how others view one and with how one views oneself.

It would be quite implausible to suppose that having the right attitudes towards honor and dishonor would consist solely in being motivated by the desire to obtain honor and to avoid losing it. If megalopsychia is to be an Aristotelian virtue and fit the schema of the golden mean, then the megalopsychos must desire honor neither too much nor too little, but just the right amount. Thus it would be charitable to suppose that having the right attitudes towards honor and dishonor requires having a desire for honor that is not too strong nor too weak. Other attitudes, as well, are surely required in order to have the right attitudes towards honor and dishonor. Some clear examples are i) a desire to get only the honor one deserves and ii) intentions that cohere with one's honor-related desires. I do not pretend to have given a complete account of ‘the right attitudes,’ however.

What, then, about the second of the megalopsychos' characteristic dispositions? To understand this disposition, we need to know what ‘acting the right way toward honor and dishonor’ means. We saw Cordner claiming that the megalopsychos ‘actively seeks and claims them [i.e. honors] as his due.’Footnote ¹² Elsewhere he asserts that ‘an appropriate worldly self-assertion is not only consistent with, but even a proper part of, the greatest moral virtue [i.e. megalopsychia].’Footnote ¹³ This suggests that Cordner thinks the megalopsychos will do that which would allow him to win honor. So it seems reasonable to assume that for Cordner ‘acting rightly’ towards honor and dishonor would consist in doing what would help one obtain the former and avoid the latter.

So far the proposal is quite vague. What if a certain action, A, will win one a bit of honor, but there is something else one could do instead, B, that would enhance one's honor much more? The action A would indeed ‘help one obtain honor,’ but it would clearly not be the action to pick in order to act rightly towards honor and dishonor. Acting rightly towards honor and dishonor seems to require doing that which would increase one's honor the most – or whenever increasing one's honor is not possible, doing that which would decrease it the least. Thus we should revise the account of acting rightly towards honor and dishonor and say that this consists in doing what would maximize the amount of net honor – i.e. the amount of honor minus the amount of dishonor – that one possesses.

Now a further problem becomes apparent: maximizing the amount of net honor one possesses might require one to do horrible things. Suppose that slandering and assassinating one's political rivals would maximize one's net honor. According to the present proposal, this would be the action to choose in order to act rightly towards honor and dishonor (and it would be what the megalopsychos would do). But it would not be virtuous. So this cannot be ‘acting rightly’ towards honor and dishonor. This problem, too, can be avoided if we revise the account of acting rightly towards honor and dishonor, this time by taking a cue from Aristotle himself.

Aristotle says repeatedly that the megalopsychos has the other virtues. For instance: ‘greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a proud man [a megalopsychos]’ (1123b30). So the megalopsychos would presumably not do just whatever maximizes the amount of net honor he possesses, but rather, in acting rightly towards honor and dishonor, he would do what without being vicious would maximize his net honor. So to avoid the present problem, we should revise the account of acting rightly towards honor and dishonor so that now it consists in doing what, within the limits of what virtue in general permits, maximizes the amount of net honor one possesses. More specifically, the proposal on the table is this. In order to figure out which of your alternatives constitutes ‘acting rightly’ towards honor and dishonor, you should follow this procedure: 1) start by ruling out all the alternatives that are vicious, and then 2) of all the remaining alternatives, find the one, A, such that none of the other remaining alternatives would result in your possessing a greater amount of net honor than doing A would result in. This action maximizes the amount of net honor you possess (note there may be ties for first place) and it would constitute ‘acting rightly’ towards honor and dishonor. This is the most plausible rendering I can give of Cordner's sketchy claims about what ‘acting rightly’ towards honor and dishonor consists in. One must, I take it, have a firm and settled disposition to act in this way in order to fulfill the second condition in Megalopsychia 1.

If Megalopsychia 1 is the correct interpretation of Aristotle, he clearly would be committed to VM and VA. For one thing, having megalopsychia requires having the right attitudes towards honor and dishonor. This involves, among other things, being motivated by a desire to obtain honor and avoid dishonor. Accordingly, since the virtuous person has the virtue of megalopsychia, his motivation would necessarily include a desire for honor – just as VM states. Furthermore, the second condition of Megalopsychia 1 requires that one be disposed to act rightly towards honor and dishonor. Thus the virtuous person, having megalopsychia, would necessarily engage in honor-procuring behavior – just as VA states.

3. Crisp's Account of Megalopsychia

If Cordner's account of megalopsychia is correct, Aristotle would be committed to two claims, VM and VA, which modern readers might find problematic. However, Roger Crisp suggests an interpretation of megalopsychia according to which Aristotle would not be committed to the claims VM and VA. Whereas Cordner thinks the subject matter of megalopsychia is honor, Crisp claims that the subject matter of megalopsychia is ‘thinking oneself worthy of great honor.’Footnote ¹⁴ Thus Crisp takes the megalopsychos to be the one who ‘think[s] himself worthy of great honor at the right times, for the right reasons, and so on …’Footnote ¹⁵ As Crisp subsequently makes clear, in order to think oneself worthy of great honors for the right reasons (and thus have megalopsychia), one must in fact really be worthy of great honors. Thus we can state Crisp's account of megalopsychia as follows:

This account will not be complete without an explanation of what it means to be worthy of great honor. Crisp does not explicitly address this question, but several of his comments reveal that he thinks that possessing and exercising virtue, for Aristotle, is what makes one worthy of honor. To take just one example, Crisp appeals to the following claim as a premise in one of his arguments: ‘honor is the reward for exercising virtue, so that smaller honor must be the reward for a lesser exercise of the virtues.’Footnote ¹⁶ This shows that Crisp thinks that the amount of honor one deserves is directly proportionate to the degree to which one possesses and exercises virtue. Being worthy of great honor would thus require being exceptionally virtuous.

Now it should be clear what Crisp's account of megalopsychia comes to. One possesses this virtue just in case one is exceptionally virtuous (viz. condition 2) and has enough self-understanding to be aware of this fact about oneself (viz. condition 1).Footnote ¹⁷ Notice that this account of Crisp's is very close to Aristotle's description of the megalopsychos in what I called Passage A: ‘The man is thought to be proud [megalopsychos] who thinks himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them’ (1123b1). Cordner's account, by contrast, according to which megalopsychia requires having the right attitudes and acting in the right ways with regard to one's honor, bears more resemblance to what Aristotle says in Passage B: ‘Honours and dishonours, then, are the objects with respect to which the proud man [the megalopsychos] is as he should be’ (1123b25). I suspect that the differences between Crisp's and Cordner's accounts of Aristotelian megalopsychia have resulted from Crisp focusing on Passage A and Cordner focusing on Passage B.

For our purposes, the most important difference between the two accounts of megalopsychia is that on Crisp's account, Aristotle is not committed to either VM or VA. On Crisp's account, to be megalopsychos is to be virtuous and know that this makes one worthy of honor. All that seems to follow from being megalopsychos in this sense when it comes to motivation is that one will have the desire to do virtuous things. For this just follows from being virtuous in general. Of course, Crisp's account does not rule out the possibility that the megalopsychos will be motivated to obtain honor and avoid dishonor. But if he is so motivated, this would, in Cordner's terminology, be ‘external to his virtue’ – i.e. not something that is implied by that person's being megalopsychos. Thus on Crisp's account of megalopsychia, Aristotle would not be committed to VM.

When it comes to action, all that seems to follow from having Crisp's kind of megalopsychia is that, being a virtuous person, one will do virtuous things. The megalopsychos might be fortunate enough to win honor through his virtuous actions if they became widely known and celebrated, but he would not necessarily take any steps to ensure this result. If the actions of Crisp's megalopsychos do end up winning him honor, this would merely be a lucky accident, something external to the virtuousness of his actions. Accordingly, Crisp's megalopsychos does not necessarily engage in honor-procuring behavior, and so Aristotle would not be committed to VA either on Crisp's account.

In light of the fact that Crisp's interpretation of megalopsychia does not commit Aristotle to VM and VA, this interpretation might seem to be preferable to modern readers. However, as I will go on to argue, there are good reasons to doubt that Crisp's account is the correct interpretation of Aristotle.

4. Which Account is the Better Interpretation?

Cordner's account, as an interpretation of Aristotle, faces an important objection. The problem is that although it captures what I have called Passage B, it is not clear that Cordner's account captures Aristotle's claims in Passage A. There Aristotle states that ‘The man is thought to be proud [megalopsychos] who thinks himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them’ (1123b1). How could Cordner's account of the megalopsychos as the one who has the right attitudes and acts the right way towards honor and dishonor capture this claim of Aristotle's?

Cordner should respond to the worry by pointing out that one of the ‘right attitudes towards honor and dishonor’ would be a correct belief about how much honor one deserves. In order to have all the right attitudes towards honor and dishonor, not only must one have a desire (of the right strength) to obtain the former and avoid the latter, but one must also have a true belief that one is worthy of great honor. If such a true belief is one of the attitudes that one must have in order to fulfill the first condition in Megalopsychia 1, then Cordner's account would capture Aristotle's claim in Passage A. It would guarantee both that the megalopsychos is worthy of great honor (i.e. is exceptionally virtuous) and that he knows it.

Whereas this problem for Cordner's account of megalopsychia does not pose a real threat, Crisp's account faces three problems that do indeed undermine its plausibility as an interpretation of Aristotle. First of all, there are several passages in Aristotle that seem to indicate that the megalopsychos both desires honor and actively seeks to obtain it. This would be a problem for Crisp's account, since (as we saw) his account does not capture these aspects of megalopsychia. According to Crisp's account, the megalopsychos just is someone who believes that his virtue makes him worthy of great honor, and who, moreover, is correct in this belief. There seems to be nothing in this account that implies that the megalopsychos desires the great honor he deserves or actively seeks to obtain it. After all, a person might know that he deserves honor, while at the same time not desiring it in the least or doing anything to obtain it. His otherwise virtuous actions might happen to bring him honor, but there is nothing in Crisp's account of megalopsychia to guarantee that the person with this virtue will either desire or actively seek honor.

There are, however, passages in Aristotle that suggest that the megalopsychos is indeed guaranteed, because of how he behaves qua megalopsychos, both to desire and to actively seek out the honor he deserves. Consider the following passage:

Aristotle here asserts that the unduly humble man has something wrong with him, since he fails to desire the good things he deserves, such as honor, and thus ‘robs’ himself of them. Accordingly, we may infer that the megalopsychos, since he is not unduly humble, would indeed desire the great honor of which he is worthy. This by itself is a problem for Crisp's account. What's more, it is also plausible that the passage supports the claim that the megalopsychos actively seeks honor. The fact that the megalopsychos does not ‘rob’ himself of the goods he deserves suggests that he would act so as to obtain them (at least under normal circumstances).Footnote ¹⁸

The claim that the megalopsychos actively seeks honor receives further support from the following passage:

Aristotle is claiming here that the megalopsychos tends to be moved to perform a given act only when it is one whose performance would increase the amount of honor he possesses. This suggests that the megalopsychos actively seeks honor.

Perhaps, however, Aristotle here is merely claiming that the megalopsychos will concentrate on performing great works, which, being great, are deserving of honor. On this reading of the passage at 1124b25, Aristotle is not claiming that the megalopsychos concentrates on doing great deeds because he desires honor. Nonetheless, this interpretation is not very plausible. We know from the other passage just discussed (1125a22) that the megalopsychos desires the honor he deserves. But suppose we now find out that 1) the megalopsychos tends to perform only those actions that will win him honor, and 2) he insists that the reason he performs only honor-enhancing actions has got nothing to do with his desire for honor. It would then be tempting to say that he is simply being dishonest with himself. After all, our desires exert an influence (perhaps merely unconsciously) on our decisions. As a result, it is implausible to suppose that the megalopsychos' desire for honor would be no part of the reason why he tends to perform only deeds that increase his honor. So the most plausible interpretation of this passage is not that the megalopsychos just happens to concentrate on performing honor-enhancing deeds, but rather that he does so because he desires honor. And if the megalopsychos tends to perform only those actions that would be beneficial to his honor because he desires honor, it is fair to say that the megalopsychos actively pursues honor.

Given these two passages, it seems warranted to attribute to Aristotle the view that the megalopsychos both desires and actively seeks to obtain honor.Footnote ¹⁹ But this would be a problem for Crisp's account of megalopsychia, since (as noted above) it does not imply that the megalopsychos will either desire or actively seek out the great honor he deserves. Cordner's account of megalopsychia clearly gets this right, however, and therefore seems preferable to Crisp's account on this score.

There are further problems for Crisp's interpretation lurking in other passages. One is that Crisp's interpretation seems unable to explain why the possession of megalopsychia would make the virtuous person's virtue even greater, as Aristotle says it does at 1124a23: megalopsychia ‘is a sort of crown of the virtues: for it makes them greater and is not found without them’. Crisp tries to explain the fact that the possession of megalopsychia enhances a virtuous person's virtue by arguing that megalopsychia, in his sense of knowing that one is virtuous, ‘could make virtues already great even greater, by spurring its possessor into action in situations where the timid will stand back.’Footnote ²⁰ The problem here is that it is difficult to see why the virtuous person, already having courage, would require any extra spurring on at all. Accordingly, it is not clear what reason there could be for supposing that having megalopsychia in Crisp's sense would make the virtuous person's virtue greater.Footnote ²¹

By contrast, Cordner's interpretation of megalopsychia makes it clear why the addition of megalopsychia would increase the amount of virtue one already possesses. Megalopsychia, on his view, is the disposition to have the right attitudes towards honor (e.g. a desire of the appropriate strength to obtain it) and to act in ways that will help one actually obtain it. Thus possessing megalopsychia is necessarily going to help one obtain honor, high standing and the respect of one's peers, which is, according to Aristotle, at least one of the important external goods.Footnote ²² Thus the addition of megalopsychia will make the already virtuous person more virtuous because having this virtue guarantees that one will be excellent at something that the other virtues (e.g. justice, temperance, courage) by themselves do not guarantee one's excellence at – namely acquiring honor, high stature and the respect of one's peers (and avoiding the loss of these). So the addition of megalopsychia in Cordner's sense would indeed make the already virtuous person more excellent. Cordner's account of megalopsychia thus seems preferable to Crisp's on this score as well.Footnote ²³

The third problem with Crisp's account is that, if it were correct, there would be no apparent way to explain why Aristotle provides the particular details about the megalopsychos' behavior that he does. Consider these five claims of Aristotle's about how the megalopsychos behaves: i) the megalopsychos only accepts the praise of his peers, while disdaining the honor and praise given to him by the low (1124a5), ii) he is rather indifferent towards both good and ill fortune and is not over-joyed by the former nor over-pained by the latter (1124a15), iii) he gladly confers benefits, but is loathe to accept favors (1124b5), iv) he is haughty and lofty towards those of high status, but unassuming towards those of the middle class (1124b20), and v) he does not have ‘a long memory’ for wrongs, but tends to overlook them (1125a3). If Crisp is right that the megalopsychos is essentially the individual who correctly believes that his great virtue makes him worthy of great honor, why would Aristotle also attribute these five traits to the megalopsychos? What connection is there between correctly thinking oneself worthy of great honor and, for example, accepting only the praise of one's peers, while disdaining that of one's inferiors? None, it seems. The same goes for the other four claims. Thus if Crisp's account is correct, these five additional claims describing the megalopsychos would be mysterious.

Not so if Cordner's account is correct, however. Cordner's account states that the megalopsychos is, essentially, the individual who wants honor and is good at getting it. If this is the correct interpretation of how Aristotle conceives of the megalopsychos, then we would expect Aristotle to say something concrete and non-schematic about what attitudes and behaviors in particular tend to help one obtain honor and avoid its loss. And the five claims mentioned above seem to convey information of just this sort. As I'll go on to argue, each claim recommends a type of behavior that, generally, it is prudent to adopt in order to achieve honor and avoid dishonor. Thus it is no mystery that Aristotle would use these five claims to describe the megalopsychos, if Cordner's account of megalopsychia is correct.

Each of Aristotle's five claims recommends a good rule of thumb to follow in order to obtain honor and avoid dishonor. When it comes to the first, while it is clear that accepting the praise of one's peers will typically reflect well on one, accepting the praise of those whose stature is much lower than one's own could easily prove to diminish one's stature. For instance, consider the likely effect of a professor allowing his Introduction to Philosophy students to openly praise him in class as one of the most talented philosophers living today. Clearly the professor would lose face by allowing his students to pass judgment – even a positive one – on his philosophical ability, since they, as novices, are in no position to make this sort of call. If a student makes such a comment in class, the professor should respond with a certain amount of disdain in order to avoid losing face. This analogy illustrates the insight that Aristotle has latched on to when describing the megalopsychos as disdainful of the praise and honors offered by those with a much lower stature. To obtain honor and avoid dishonor, it seems prudent to follow the megalopsychos' example in this regard.

The same is true of Aristotle's second claim about the megalopsychos. In order to give the impression that one is formidable and worthy of respect, it is a bad idea to let oneself be seen either as eager and excited about a particular windfall or as upset and dejected about a given misfortune. To remain cool both in the face of good and ill fortune gives the impression that most gains and losses are of relatively small consequence to one. This again shows one to be a grand and estimable individual whose position cannot easily be affected by gains or losses. By the same token, one might outright dishonor oneself – i.e. lower the degree to which one is respected – by getting very upset about a less-than-earth-shattering loss. For this gives the impression that one cannot withstand the loss in question and that one thus is not so estimable after all. As a result, to behave in accordance with Aristotle's second claim about the megalopsychos seems to be a good rule of thumb to follow in order to obtain honor and avoid dishonor.

It also seems to be prudent, with an eye to one's honor, to comport oneself in accordance with Aristotle's third claim about the megalopsychos. This is because of the commonplace that conferring a gift tends to have the psychological effect of placing the recipient in the giver's debt and thus in a position of inferiority.Footnote ²⁴ If this is correct, then it is to be expected that someone who desires honor and excels at obtaining it would gladly give gifts and do favors (since this would place him in a position of superiority relative to the recipient), but would not want to receive them (since this would place him in a position of inferiority relative to the giver).

Being haughty towards peers, but unassuming towards inferiors is another good rule of thumb to follow to obtain honor and avoid its loss. There is respect and status to be won by being proud and challenging towards peers or superiors, whereas this is not the case when it comes to inferiors. As Aristotle puts the point, ‘it is a difficult and lofty thing to be superior to the former [i.e. people who enjoy high position], but easy to be so to the latter [i.e. those of the middle class]’ (1124b20). What's more, challenging inferiors could be quite risky business, since one only stands to humiliate oneself and lose status in the event that the inferior should unexpectedly win the challenge. On the other hand, being bested by a superior would not significantly lessen one's status. Thus haughty and challenging behavior towards superiors is prudent with an eye to honor because of the potential for large gains and the relatively small risks it involves. By contrast, such behavior towards inferiors is unwise because of the small potential for gain and the significant risks it involves.

Finally, when it comes to Aristotle's fifth claim about the megalopsychos, namely that he does not have ‘a long memory’ for wrongs, but rather tends to overlook them, it seems prudent to emulate the megalopsychos in this regard as well. As with Aristotle's second claim, the reasoning here is that all but the most extreme injuries would be inconsequential to individuals who are grand and estimable. Such an individual can effortlessly overlook and forgive all but the most extreme injuries done to him. Accordingly, one may advertise that one is a grand and impressive individual by overlooking and forgiving the wrongs done to one. Because such behavior tends to send the signal that one is estimable, to behave this way is prudent for the purpose of obtaining honor.

We have now seen that, for each of these five claims that Aristotle makes about the megalopsychos, bearing oneself in the recommended way is a good rule of thumb to follow in order to obtain honor and avoid dishonor. Accordingly, it is in no way mysterious, if Cordner's account of megalopsychia is correct, that Aristotle should have used these particular details to describe the megalopsychos. For on his account, the megalopsychos will necessarily behave in ways that are beneficial to his honor.Footnote ²⁵ By contrast, Crisp's account does not provide any such neat explanation of why Aristotle would have picked these five behaviors, as opposed to others, to describe the megalopsychos. This counts strongly in favor of Cordner's account being the correct interpretation of Aristotle.

Thus Cordner's interpretation of Aristotle's view of megalopsychia seems to have three major advantages over Crisp's interpretation. Unlike Crisp's account, Cordner's account 1) captures Aristotle's view that the megalopsychos both desires and actively seeks honor, 2) explains Aristotle's view that megalopsychia is ‘the crown of the virtues,’ and 3) explains why Aristotle picked the five behaviors mentioned above, as opposed to others, to describe the megalopsychos. However, if Cordner's account is the correct interpretation of Aristotle, that would mean Aristotle is committed to the perhaps troubling claims VM and VA. So in the final section of this paper, I want to investigate why modern readers might be inclined to reject VM and VA and ask whether this inclination is justified.

5. What's Wrong with VM and VA?

There seem to be five main ways in which a modern reader might find VM and VA problematic. The first problem, which concerns just VA, is noticed by Cordner: ‘Suppose on an occasion virtue demands of a person that he sacrifice his life, and he reckons it overwhelmingly likely that if he does so he will be maliciously and falsely branded a coward, whereas if he runs away he can escape all calumny.’Footnote ²⁶ VA states that an essential part of being virtuous is to engage in honor-procuring behavior. So in the case Cordner describes, VA might seem to imply that acting virtuously would require that one run away, since this is the only way to obtain honor and avoid dishonor. But running away cannot be what acting virtuously requires, since it is a cowardly act and obviously not virtuous at all. So VA seems to be false. Such a case might seem to show that engaging in honor-procuring behavior cannot be an essential part of acting virtuously.

However, this objection reflects an uncharitable understanding of the claim Aristotle is committed to. VA would imply that being virtuous requires running away in the present case only if ‘honor-procuring behavior’ here is understood as doing whatever would allow one to obtain honor and avoid dishonor. So instead VA should be understood as the claim that acting virtuously essentially involves doing that which, of the set of actions that virtue in general renders permissible, would help one obtain honor and avoid dishonor (if there are any). If VA is understood in this way, the above objection does not threaten. Since running away in Cordner's case is not among the set of morally permissible alternatives, VA, properly understood, would not imply that being virtuous requires running away. This is simply a case where none of the alternatives permitted by virtue would help one obtain honor or avoid dishonor.

Notice that this proper understanding of VA is precisely what Cordner's account of megalopsychia implies about the virtuous person's actions. After all, being megalopsychos in Cordner's sense involves performing whichever of one's virtuous alternatives would maximize the net amount of honor one possesses. So if Cordner's account of megalopsychia is correct, Aristotle need not admit that there can be situations in which acting as would the megalopsychos conflicts with what virtue in general requires.

The second problem, which concerns just VM, is similar in many respects to the previous problem. The idea here is that if VM is true, the virtuous person's desires are guaranteed to conflict under certain circumstances, which is a contingency that Aristotle admits should not be possible (cf. NE VII.1).Footnote ²⁷ Consider a situation where the virtuous person stands to gain a large amount of honor from the performance of some immoral action. VM would seem to imply that the virtuous person, in such a situation, will necessarily have a desire to do the action that will bring him honor. But since he is virtuous, he will of course also desire not to do something that is immoral. And even if the virtuous person, whenever he faces a conflict of this sort, would in fact always act on the latter desire, he would still be subject to a conflict of desires of the sort that Aristotle rules out in NE VII.1. Thus, it might seem, Aristotle cannot hold VM.

This objection may be deflected in the same way as the previous objection was. VM is not to be understood as the claim that being virtuous essentially involves the desire to obtain honor by any means at all. Rather, it should be understood as the much more reasonable claim that being virtuous essentially involves a desire to obtain honor only by means that are not morally impermissible. If VM is understood in this way, it will not imply that the virtuous person would desire to increase his honor by performing immoral actions. Accordingly, his attitudes would not conflict in cases like this one.

Again, notice that the second, more reasonable understanding of VM is precisely what Cordner's account of megalopsychia entails. We saw that megalopsychia, on his account, involves a desire for honor that is neither too strong nor too weak. But if a person desired to obtain honor by any means at all, then his desire would clearly be too strong. So what seems to follow from Cordner's account is just that being virtuous essentially involves a desire to obtain honor by morally permissible means only. Accordingly, if Cordner's account is correct, Aristotle would not have to admit that there can be situations in which the virtuous person's desire for honor conflicts with his other desires.Footnote ²⁸

Howard Cruzer explains the idea behind the third objection as follows:

The worry I take Cruzer to be pointing out here is that there seems to be some tension between the idea that people are in some sense ‘equally valuable’, on the one hand, and the pursuit of things like honor, status and superiority, on the other. The idea, more precisely, is this.

I take it that to honor someone is to respect him, to acknowledge his superiority and to show deference to him.Footnote ³⁰ Thus to possess honor is to possess a superior social standing and to be accorded the respect and deference that such standing warrants. This, then, is what the virtuous person desires and acts in pursuit of, according to VM and VA. However, this might seem to conflict with a commitment to egalitarianism. The basic idea behind egalitarianism is that everyone is in some sense ‘equally valuable,’ that everyone is equally important from the moral point of view. So if some version of this egalitarian idea is true (which, as Cruzer points out, many modern readers take to be the case), then it might seem that the honor-related goals of the virtuous person – namely superior standing, being respected and being shown deference – are illegitimate.

Explicitly stated, the argument is this: 1) Suppose egalitarianism is true. 2) If, as egalitarianism maintains, everyone is ‘equally valuable,’ then no one should be superior to anyone else or should be shown more respect or deference than anyone else. 3) If nobody should have a superior social standing or be shown more respect and deference than anybody else, then one should not desire and act in pursuit of superior social standing, respect and deference. 4) However, if VM and VA are true, then the virtuous person does desire and act in pursuit of superior social standing, respect and deference (i.e. since he desires and pursues honor). 5) Therefore, if VM and VA are true, the virtuous person desires and acts in pursuit of something he should not. 6) But this is absurd. It cannot be the case that the virtuous person desires or acts in pursuit of something he should not. 7) Therefore, VM and VA must be false.

There are several ways in which one might respond to this argument. One way would be to deny the assumption that seeking honor is to seek superior social standing, respect and deference. In that case, one might propose a more innocuous construal of what the virtuous person desires and acts in pursuit of, according to VM and VA. Another way to respond to the argument would be to deny egalitarianism altogether. However, I will take a different tack. I do not want to deny the above conception of what it is to seek honor, nor do I want to dismiss egalitarianism altogether. Instead, I will argue that the argument rests on a confusion. On any plausible version of egalitarianism, premise 2) in the argument is false.

The egalitarian idea that everyone is equally valuable might be understood in one of two ways. On the one hand, egalitarianism might be the view that everyone is equal when it comes to that which makes people deserve respect and deference. Perhaps this is moral worth, which is directly proportionate to how morally good one is. Perhaps some other, more general kind of excellence or non-moral superiority is also involved (like intelligence, wit, musical or athletic ability, leadership skills, physical strength, political influence, etc.). Egalitarianism, on this understanding, is the claim that everyone deserves the same amount of respect because everyone has the same amount of this thing (whatever it is) in virtue of which people deserve respect. On the other hand, egalitarianism might be the view that everyone is equal with respect to moral considerability. When a creature has moral considerability, it means that one must take into consideration how one's behavior will impact the welfare of that creature. So on this understanding, egalitarianism is the view that the impact of one's behavior on any given person must be taken into consideration to just the same degree as the impact of one's behavior on any other person. Everyone, in other words, counts for the same amount from the moral point of view.

If egalitarianism is understood in the first way, then premise 2) in the argument would indeed be true. From the fact that everyone is equally deserving of respect, it would indeed follow that no one should be shown more respect or deference than anyone else or should be in a position of superiority relative to anyone else. The problem is that egalitarianism in this sense has no plausibility whatsoever. That there exist differences with regard to that in virtue of which people deserve respect and deference – whether this be moral worth, or general non-moral excellence – seems to be an unavoidable and unobjectionable fact. If it were the case that such differences should not exist, then it would mean that there should be no boss of the company, no concertmaster of the symphony, no mayor of the city, no commander of the military battalion, no one who leads the football team, no one whose job entails having more responsibility, authority and decision-making power than others, and no moral leaders or reformers. This would be as absurd as it is impractical. Accordingly, egalitarianism understood in the first way is entirely implausible.

By contrast, egalitarianism understood in the second way has a great deal of plausibility. I know of no good reason to deny that everyone is equal with respect to moral considerability. However, if egalitarianism is understood in this more plausible way, premise 2) in the argument against VM and VA comes out false. From the truth of egalitarianism thus understood, it would not follow that nobody should be in a position of superiority or be shown more respect or deference than anybody else. The claim that everyone is equal with respect to moral considerability is compatible with its being right for some people to be in a position of superiority and for some people to be shown more respect and deference than others.

To see this, first consider superiority. If one person is in a position of superiority relative to another, this does not require any difference between the two people in moral considerability. It merely requires a difference between the two in skill, or ability, or power, or fame, or reputation, or moral goodness, or whatever the relevant domain is. Next, consider respect and deference. While it is plausible to suppose that everyone's being equal with respect to moral considerability implies that everyone should be shown at least a certain minimum amount of respect, it clearly does not imply that nobody is ever entitled to more than that minimum. Even if everyone is equal with respect to moral considerability, it might still be appropriate to treat some people, because of their exceptional abilities or political power or what have you, with more respect and deference than this minimum amount.

Thus egalitarianism, on the only plausible understanding of it, is clearly compatible with its being right for some people to be in a position of superiority and for some people to be shown more respect and deference than others. Accordingly, on the only plausible understanding of egalitarianism, premise 2) in the argument against VM and VA is false. The argument fails because its second premise is true only if egalitarianism is understood in a way that makes egalitarianism obviously false.

The fourth problem modern readers might have with VM and VA is that these claims conflict with the ideal of humility. Terrance Irwin raises this issue in his commentary to NE IV.3, where he says: ‘Aristotle's virtue of magnanimity [i.e. megalopsychia] is often taken to be opposed to the Christian virtue of humility.’Footnote ³¹ Given the conception of honor suggested while discussing the previous objection, it is easy to see why this conflict arises. VM and VA have the virtuous person desiring and acting in pursuit of superior social standing, respect and deference. Thus a certain amount of worldly self-assertion is characteristic of the virtuous person, if VM and VA are true. However, what seems to be characteristic of the humble person is precisely that he abstains from such worldly self-assertion. Thus there is a conflict between the characteristics of the humble person and the characteristics that the virtuous person has, according to VM and VA.

Only those who regard humility as a genuine virtue need to view the present objection to VM and VA as a genuine threat. And some philosophers, Cordner among them,Footnote ³² suggest that Aristotle does not regard humility as a virtue. In that case, Aristotle would not feel the force of the present objection. Of course, for modern readers who are committed to the idea that humility is a virtue, the fact that Aristotle was not does nothing to defuse the objection as far as they are concerned.Footnote ³³

The fifth problem that modern readers might raise is that if VM and VA are true, then something would be essential to virtue that in fact has got nothing to do with virtue. More specifically, if VM and VA are true, it would be essential to virtue to desire honor and engage in honor-procuring behavior. But it seems to be a conceptual truth about morality that desiring and acting so as to procure honor – i.e. superior social standing, respect and deference – has little to do with being moral. Thus neither a desire for honor nor honor-procuring behavior would be part of virtue. Accordingly, VM and VA must be false.

This objection has intuitive appeal, but it still allows of some response. I accept that desiring and procuring honor is no part of being morally virtuous. However, I suggest that it could indeed be a central part of virtue in the wider sense that Aristotle seems to be chiefly concerned with. In the Nicomachean Ethics in general, Aristotle appears to be explaining what it takes to be virtuous in the broad sense of having personal excellence and being a flourishing, successful individual. Being virtuous in this broad sense obviously requires being virtuous in the narrower moral sense, but it also involves more than that. This is clear from the fact that Aristotle regards excellences like wittiness and intelligence as virtues, even though they clearly are not moral virtues. So for Aristotle the claim that some trait, T, is an essential part of being virtuous should not be taken to mean that T is required for moral virtue; rather it should be taken to mean that T is required for virtue in the broad sense. Accordingly, although it might be correct that desiring and procuring honor is external to moral virtue, it is quite plausibly internal to virtue in the broad sense. As long as we are clear that VM and VA are claims about what is essential to virtue in the broad sense, the fact that desiring and procuring honor is no part of moral virtue does not pose any threat to the truth of VM and VA.

The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that the modern reader's inclination to regard VM and VA as objectionable implications of Aristotle's views about megalopsychia is largely unfounded. If Aristotle indeed is committed to the truth of VM and VA, as Cordner's account of megalopsychia implies, this need not be a mistake on Aristotle's part. All five objections to VM and VA seem to allow of some answer. Accordingly, modern readers – with the possible exception of those who are committed to the idea that humility is a genuine virtue – should not regard Aristotle's views about megalopsychia as objectionable.