Over the past two decades, Indonesian society has seen an increase in Islamic conservatism. Beginning with growing expressions of Islamic piety – more Muslim men praying five times a day and more women wearing the Islamic veil (hijab) – this trend is increasingly being expressed in political terms. Such expressions can be seen in the passage of hundreds of new local regulations (perda) that mandate residents to follow certain Islamic principles, and in public protests such as the recent ‘defending Islam’ (Aksi 212) protests of 2016/17 which successfully demanded the prosecution of former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama for allegedly committing an act of blasphemy.
More troubling, however, is the fact that these expressions of growing conservatism are often followed by acts of religious intolerance against minorities – from Muslim sects such as Ahmadi and Shi'a to Christians, Buddhists, and other religious minorities. The Setara Institute has documented a continuous rise in the number of incidents of religious freedom violations in Indonesia over the past few years – from 134 in 2014 and 196 in 2015, to 208 in 2016 (Lesthari Reference Lesthari2017).
The high frequency of these attacks and the inability of governments-both at national and local level-to stop such attacks and bring the perpetrators to justice have left a negative reputation for Indonesia both domestically and internationally. As much of the more violent incidents of religious intolerance (e.g. Muslim-Christian conflicts in Maluku and Poso) occurred during the early years of Reformasi (1998–2001), scholars tended to focus their attention on how to explain ‘large-scale communal violence’ incidences rather than ‘localized communal riots’ that while smaller inscale, these attacks on churches and Ahmadi mosques became more prevalent and pronounced long after these conflicts have subdued.
Works by Bertrand (Reference Bertrand2004), Sidel (Reference Sidel2007), Van Klinken (Reference van Klinken2007), Duncan (Reference Duncan2013) and Tajima (Reference Tajima2014) have analysed these larger conflicts and come with their different conclusions on what causes them that have enriched the literature on ethnic conflict and political violence, not just in Indonesia but also generalized globally. However, none of these works have dealt with smaller, localized communal riots that are often started with exclusionary or intolerant actions against religious minorities. While there is recent research that demonstrate the historical and institutional roots of growing Islamization and how it affects tolerance toward religious minorities in Indonesia both nationally and locally (e.g. Ricklefs Reference Ricklefs2007 and Reference Ricklefs2012; Menchik Reference Menchik2016; Buehler Reference Buehler2016), these works lack the combination of insights that help to put together a puzzle on why religious intolerant actions have become prevalent in contemporary post-Reformasi Indonesia, namely, macro-sociological changes in Indonesian society that result in contemporary intolerant actions against religious minorities, and the micro-level changes in the political structure that provides opportunities for hard-line Islamic groups to initiate intolerant actions against these minorities.
The lack of scholarly attention to smaller-scale incidents of religious intolerance is a major omission in the study of communal violence, and we lack understanding of why incidents of religious intolerance continues to increase, not just in Indonesia, but also in other Muslim-majority countries elsewhere. We also need to understand better what are the political and socio-cultural mechanisms (both at the macro and micro-level) that lead to the occurrence of religious intolerance within a given community. Significantly, there is not enough understanding of why incidents of religious intolerance remains on the rise in countries with a long history of religious pluralism and moderation like Indonesia and what are its implications for the future of Indonesian politics and inter-religious relations in Indonesia.
There is now a plethora of new scholarship on growing Islamic conservatism in Indonesia in general (e.g., van Bruinessen Reference van Bruinessen2013; Madinier and Feillard Reference Madinier and Andree2011; Sebastian and Nubowo Reference Sebastian and Nubowo2019), its political significance, and the Indonesian government's responses (e.g., Mietzner and Muhtadi Reference Mietzner and Burhanuddin2018; Mietzner Reference Mietzner2018,), as well as instances of persecution against minorities such as the Ahmadis (e.g., Menchik Reference Menchik2014, Reference Menchik2016; Schäfer Reference Schäfer2018; Soedirgo Reference Soedirgo2018), Shi'ites (Formichi Reference Formichi2014; Hilmy Reference Hilmy2015), and on both Ahmadi and Shi'a Muslims (Suryana Reference Suryana2019).
While these studies tend to focus on the persecution of minority groups and the responses of political and religious leaders, in this special issue we attempt to cover the micro-societal variables related to the rise of religious intolerance in Indonesia by examining Islamic organizations that are thought to be involved (both directly and indirectly) in promoting acts of religious intolerance in Indonesia – specifically the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI). We will examine how Shi'a Muslims, a religious minority group, have reacted to the acts of persecution, and how increasing religious conservatism and intolerance is related to the fragmentation of Islamic religious authority in Indonesia, including the phenomenon of new Islamic groups and preachers who are gaining larger followings than more mainstream and moderate Islamic groups.
This special issue consists of four articles. The article by Ken Miichi and Yuka Kayane, on Shi'a Muslim organizations in Indonesia, was originally presented at a panel organized by the editors, entitled “Growing Religious Intolerance in Indonesia,” at the Association of Asian Studies (AAS) in Asia conference in Kyoto, Japan, on 25 June 2016. Three additional contributors who spoke about various topics – Alexander Arifianto on the decline of mainstream Islamic authority in Indonesia, Gabriel Facal on FPI, and Syafiq Hasyim on MUI – were later invited by Professor Sebastian to contribute their manuscripts to the special edition due to the relevance of their topics.
In his article, Gabriel Facal discusses the evolution of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) from its origins as an organization of street criminals (preman) who used Islam to justify their agenda, to an influential Islamic power broker that was instrumental in the Defending Islam rallies and the 2019 Indonesian presidential election. Facal argues that this transformation occurred because FPI managed to develop informal networks with senior Indonesian armed forces and police officials over the past two decades, which provided it with both patronage and protection from prosecution whenever it launched attacks on places of ‘perdition’, like bars and nightclubs, or religious minorities, like the Ahmadiyah.
During this time, FPI also managed to develop ties with other Indonesian Islamic organizations such as MUI, as well as ‘new’ Islamic preachers with large social media followings such as Abdullah Gymnastiar, Ary Ginanjar, and Bachtiar Nasir, which provided religious legitimacy for the organization and its missions. Facal argues that FPI's source of power is in its role as a broker between the state's elites and conservative Islamist organizations, making it an influential networking link between political and religious elites; yet, it also considers itself a supporter of Indonesia's nationalist ideology (Pancasila). As Facal states in his conclusion, FPI “encourages radicalism and violent action in the name of Islam…while it is careful to avoid providing direct opposition to the ruling government or to the Constitution” (Facal Reference Facal2020).
Facal contributes new insights to the growing literature on political Islam by explaining why and how FPI has managed to evolve from a criminal organization to a religious organization that could pose a challenge to Indonesia's long-standing consensus on state-religion relations as enshrined in the country's national ideology of Pancasila. Should this consensus be fractured, minority groups could potentially come under threat of even greater persecution. Facal's in-depth analysis of the organization's political evolution is an important and novel contribution to the literature.
In his article on the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), Syafiq Hasyim pushes back against critics who have called the organization inherently undemocratic, based on its edicts (fatwa) which condemn secularism, liberalism, pluralism, and Muslim minorities such as the Ahmadis. Instead, he argues that an MUI fatwa can be either democratic or undemocratic, depending on its historical and socio-cultural context. MUI has declared its acceptance of Indonesia as a non-Islamic state, stating that it aims to promote the implementation of Islamic law (shari'a) without establishing a shari'a state. In Hasyim's analysis, this enables MUI to “use the concept of umma as a tool to criticize the state and ruling regime, but also as a language through which to engage it” (Hasyim Reference Hasyim2020).
However, during the post-Reformasi era, MUI and its fatwa have become more conservative due to several factors: first, its decision to limit the legal foundations of its ruling to a narrow set of texts including the Qur'an, the Hadith, and interpretations of classical-era Islamist jurists; second, its decision to limit the interpretation of ‘public interest’ (maslaha) in order to exclude input from more progressive groups such as the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL) and the Young Muhammadiyah Intellectuals Network (JIMM); and finally, the rise of Ma'ruf Amin (the former MUI chairman recently elected Indonesia's vice president) and the increasing influence of conservative ulama within the organization under the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) administration. The change in the designation of MUI from a ‘guardian of the state’ to the ‘guardian of the Muslim community’ during the SBY presidency signified a shift in the organization's mission toward becoming both a promoter and defender of orthodox Indonesian Muslim umma’s interests and grievances; this has led to more exclusionary rulings on matters pertaining to religious minorities.
Hasyim's article moves away from the depiction of the organization and its fatwas in black or white terms and views MUI from the more nuanced perspective of an insider who has been involved with the organization for more than a decade. He shows that MUI's decisions can be both democratic and undemocratic depending on the context, and also notes the organization's increasing conservative tendencies over the past fifteen years. He recommends that to avoid further conservatism in fatwa-making, the state should seek input from mainstream Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, rather than relying solely on MUI. However, one may question whether this is possible, given the increasingly strong relationship between the state and MUI – as evidenced by Ma'ruf Amin's selection as Jokowi's new vice president. In this environment, it seems plausible that the rights of religious minorities such as Ahmadi and Shi'a Muslims, and others, will continue to be eroded in future fatwas and other decisions issued by MUI.
While mainstream Islamic organizations NU and Muhammadiyah through Islam Nusantara and Islam Berkemajuan have attempted to strengthen local ideas in the face of globalization, socializing these ideas to its younger generation membership base now drawn through the inexorable pull of social media and with it a new generation of charismatic internet savvy Ulama has proved challenging. In his article, Alexander Arifianto explores the overlooked linkages between growing Islamic conservatism in Indonesia and the decline of traditional Islamic religious authorities, represented by NU and Muhammadiyah clerics. This decline has been exacerbated by the creation of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ after Indonesia began transitioning to democracy in 1998.
In this marketplace, new Islamic authorities such as online preachers with popular followings on social media and new Islamic groups such as the Tarbiyah movement and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) have been able to build support by preaching on Internet platforms, and through campus preaching organizations and community-based prayer groups (majelis taklim). In doing so, they have begun to dominate the marketplace of ideas while taking away followers from more mainstream Islamic groups like NU and Muhammadiyah.
Arifianto identifies three mechanisms that explain the relationship between the aforementioned variables. First, the post-Reformasi marketplace of ideas facilitated a breakdown of established Islamic authority. Second, new Islamic authorities began using the marketplace to promote more conservative interpretations of Islam to the general public, and the growing popularity of conservative and hard-line Islamic groups has made them more attractive to established clerics and politicians as potential allies (Arifianto Reference Arifianto2020). Third, Arifianto argues that religious intolerance in Indonesia is increasing due to the growing popularity of these new Islamic authorities and the increasing number of alliances between these authority figures and national and local-level political elites. His careful tracing of the processes linking these three mechanisms, based on qualitative fieldwork, is the main contribution of his article to the literature on the growth of religious intolerance in Indonesia.
Indonesian Shi'a minorities have suffered a series of attacks and persecutions over the past few years. Unique alliances like the National Alliance on Anti-Shia (ANAS, Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah) with its diverse membership that ranges from mainstream organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah to hard-line groups like the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia have been formed to confront the existence of the Shia community in Indonesia. Ken Miichi and Yuka Kayane's article explores the apparent paradox of Indonesian Shi'a minorities: on one hand, they are frequent victims of religious intolerance, and on the other, they appear to command strong political clout nationally. The article highlights Indonesian Shi'a efforts to promote their rights as a religious minority and to assist the Shi'a community in Sampang, Madura Island during an act of mob violence supported by local religious and political elites, which forced them to seek refuge in Sidoarjo, East Java.
Miichi and Kayane's article highlights the high-level lobbying effort of leading Indonesian Shi'a associations such as the Indonesian Council of Ahlu Bayt Associations (IJABI) and Ahlul Bayt Indonesia (ABI) to protect the persecuted Shi'a community in Sampang, including efforts to enlist the support of former president Yudhoyono and current president Joko Widodo. They also discuss how the group leaders used their personal network to win sympathy from conservative Islamic figures such as FPI leader Habib Rizieq Shihab and former Muhammadiyah chairman Din Syamsuddin, resulting in a lack of outright condemnations against Shi'a minorities which possibly prevented further acts of persecution. Emphasizing the importance of these two Shi'a associations, the article makes a significant contribution in the growing literature on Shi'a Muslims and anti-Shi'a persecutions in Indonesia.
Miichi and Kayane also point out that the lobbying of Shi'a groups has its limits, as it failed to convince the East Java provincial and Sampang district governments to allow the return of the Shi'a refugees to their village, nor was it effective in preventing local NU and MUI leaders from issuing edicts condemning Shi'a beliefs as heresy. They note that IJABI and ABI's lobbying efforts tend to focus on the capital city, Jakarta, while the persecution against the Shi'a in Sampang was orchestrated by local clerics and sanctioned by local politicians. This helps explain the limited effect of their efforts, as in a decentralized political system it is often local authorities rather than the national government who shape ground-level policies, especially when they pertain to religious affairs. As intolerance in Indonesia is often perpetrated by local political and religious actors, civil society needs to engage with these actors to prevent future attacks against religious minorities. Miichi and Kayane show in the article that new NGOs like Gusdurian seek to promote religious tolerance and understanding at the local level. However, the effect of these initiatives in preventing future acts of persecution against religious minorities remains to be seen.
The challenges remain significant. Local politicians have displayed an inclination to develop of personality cults and consequently adhere to populist agendas thereby neglecting the issue of intolerance towards minorities. For instance, we observe the situation in Bogor or Sampang in Madura where local political elites from nationalist parties failed to protect their minority constituents. In Bogor, Mayor Arya Bima Sugiarto from the National Mandate Party (PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional) oversaw the prohibition of Yasmin Church's construction and banned the commemoration of Asyura Day. Similarly, the former governor of East Java, Soekarwo, then with the Democrat Party regulated the expulsion of the Shia community from Sampang to Sidoarjo and also issued a decree that formed the basis for legal restrictions for the Ahmadiyah community. There are many more examples of how local elites have played up emotions founded on fear and and feelings of inequality felt by the majority to maintain their power and wealth in the local political arena. Such strategies may also insulate them from public scrutiny especially corruption-related matters and in the process, the ‘intolerant majority’ become beneficiaries of changed local political dynamics. Furthermore, more research is required to understand the local context better. For instance, Sampang and Bondowoso are located in the same province, namely, East Java. Both regencies share similarities like having the same dominant religious group in this regard the NU and are populated by Madurese residents. Yet Sampang is more vulnerable to religious intolerance while Bondowoso is relatively peaceful and the only regency in East Java that rejected the fatwa from MUI, East Java regarding the ban on the Shia community.
We believe that through a focus on specific influential organizations and the changing role of religious authorities in Indonesia, these articles will fill important gaps in the literature on the relationship between the rise of Islamic conservatism and the growth of religious intolerance in Indonesia. These themes will be of special interest to scholars of political science, Islamic studies, and other specialists of Indonesian studies, who together form an inter-disciplinary group of scholars working to study and understand what we argue is one of the most important developments in contemporary Indonesia. We would like to express our thanks to the authors for their contributions to this special issue and to the TRaNS journal editors and anonymous reviewers for their hard work in reviewing these articles and preparing them for publication.
