Byrne's version of religious pluralism

Byrne's religious pluralism is committed to three basic claims, which are formulated in three theses (Byrne (Reference Byrne1995), 12, 57, and 191):

1. 1. All major religious traditions are equal in respect of making common reference to a single transcendent, sacred reality.

2. 2. All major religious traditions are likewise equal in respect of offering some means or other to human salvation.

3. 3. All traditions are to be seen as containing revisable, limited, accounts of the nature of the sacred; none is certain enough in its particular dogmatic formulations to provide the norm for interpreting the others.

The first thesis implies the existence of one transcendent, sacred reality and asserts that all major religions are more or less equally successful in making cognitive contact with that reality in so far as their various descriptions of it succeed in making reference to it (if not, as we shall see, in accurately describing it). The core of Byrne's pluralism is the idea that all major religious traditions succeed equally well in referring to a common sacred, transcendent reality, but because we have no objective way to reconcile differences in the specific claims that religions make about that reality or the nature of and means of attaining a salvific relation to that reality, no one religion is justified in claiming cognitive or salvific superiority over any others. Byrne rejects religious essentialism, the idea that religion has an essential core that all particular religions share in common. His pluralism does not hold that all religions agree on some common set of core beliefs, but does hold that the great religions do all have some idea of a sacred, transcendent reality and some notion that the ultimate end of human endeavour involves the attainment of an appropriate relation to that reality. This latter feature of religions is characterized differently by different religions, but Byrne uses the term ‘salvation’ to cover the wide range of conceptions of the relation between human beings and the sacred, transcendent reality and how the relation is attained.

Religions diagnose and respond to the basic deficiencies of human life stemming from our finitude and contingency, such as ‘the fact of death and the fact of frustration of our aims and projects’ (ibid., 99). The human quest for salvation is the quest for self-transcendence in order to ameliorate the fundamental deficiencies of our existence. Participation in

This rather generic notion of salvation does not necessarily involve the belief in an afterlife, but Byrne acknowledges that belief in an afterlife would support the possibility of the attainment of a perfected relation to the transcendent. His general agnosticism about doctrinal details of specific religions extends to the question of an afterlife. Byrne's notion of salvation as the attainment of a relation to the transcendent does not depend on either a description of the transcendent realty that is known to be true or a definitely attainable eternal life in perfect relation to the transcendent. The aspect of salvation that we can be more confident in affirming is the moral transformation that constitutes self-transcendence. Byrne suggests that in order to avoid conceiving salvation in a way that is too thin ‘we must hold out for the idea that salvation finally consists in a perfected relationship to the sacred and transcendent’ (ibid., 101). Whether or not there is agreement among diverse religions about the nature of an afterlife, or even whether an afterlife is possible, religious practice and morally virtuous action fostered by religion constitute a kind of self-transcendence that is constitutive of salvation. ‘An afterlife might be seen as making possible a more perfect relation to the transcendent, but the engagement in appropriate practices with heart and mind of itself effects the decisive self-transformation’ (ibid., 102). Byrne states that ‘virtuous actions are capable of becoming ends in themselves because the practice of the virtues is a means of having one's life informed by goods which lend value to the very business of their pursuit’ (ibid., 100). Religious practices constitute being related to ‘values that have worth which transcends contingency’ and are ‘such as to enable human life to transcend the temporal’ (ibid., 100–101). Byrne acknowledges that a ‘perfected relationship to the sacred and transcendent … may indeed only be possible if a true set of beliefs about its object is present and if perhaps we enjoy an existence where an undiluted, undistracted concentration upon it is feasible’ (ibid., 102), but his pluralism entails that all actual religions are partial failures as the means of constituting such a relationship, not least because ‘none will have the complete truth about the transcendent’ (ibid.). Thus no one religion can claim cognitive or soteriological superiority over the others or sufficient certainty in its doctrinal claims to provide the norm for interpreting the others.

Nevertheless, the ubiquity of religion and the partial success religions enjoy in providing means of attaining salvation (as evidenced by the apparent ethical efficacy of religion) make plausible the affirmation of the existence of a sacred, transcendent reality to which all the great religions refer. Thus it is plausible to reject naturalism, the view that there is no transcendent reality and that all religious claims about such a reality are false. The ubiquity of religion in cultures throughout the world and throughout history and the positive contribution to human progress made by religions justify belief that they enjoy at least some degree of cognitive success in referring to a sacred, transcendent reality, and that this success should be realistically construed. While no one religion enjoys sufficient cognitive success to justify belief that its specific doctrinal claims are true, the broad agreement among the many diverse religions about the existence of the transcendent and the central importance of love and social justice, and their relative success in enabling persons to live more ethical lives, suggests that they enjoy some degree of cognitive success as responses to the sacred. We are justified in believing that there exists a sacred, transcendent reality which makes some contribution to the social, cultural, and experiential processes that produce religions. Byrne is a moderate realist about religion, but he is agnostic about the detailed doctrinal claims of specific religions.

If the ubiquity of religion makes plausible belief in the possibility that religion may succeed to some degree in making cognitive contact with the transcendent, the diversity of religions and specific beliefs about it, and the lack of objective, neutral criteria for assessing religious beliefs prevent us, at least at this point in the history of religious development, from awarding any one religious tradition more success than others in describing the transcendent or in characterizing the path to salvation. Byrne accepts the anthropological approach to the study of religion and sees it as establishing that the diverse religions of the world are, to a large extent, human cultural creations. The diverse cultural forms that religions take and the variety of religious experiences enjoyed by religious adherents are evidence that religions are largely cultural artefacts. But they are not entirely so. Byrne resists an entirely naturalistic, anthropological interpretation of religion because the ubiquity of belief in a mind-independent transcendent reality makes plausible the view that the transcendent exists and contributes causally to the formation of religions. Byrne attempts to strike a delicate balance between the realist and agnostic aspects of his theory. The diversity of religions and the intractable doctrinal disagreements between them lead to a severe agnosticism about the detailed descriptions of the sacred. If this tendency towards agnosticism were not restrained, Byrne's position would be forced to become sheer religious scepticism and metaphysical naturalism. Byrne resists naturalism and religious scepticism because of the ubiquity of religion, the universality among diverse religious traditions of belief in the existence a transcendent reality, and the obvious ethical and spiritual fruitfulness of religion. Hence pluralism is more plausible than either naturalism or adherence to a particular religion.

Byrne shares John Hick's view that the great religions of the world (with the possible exception of some forms of Buddhism) are united in their belief that there is an ultimate, sacred, transcendent reality and that the ultimate purpose of human existence is to attain a proper relation to that reality (Hick (Reference Hick1989), 210–230). He also agrees that ethical criteria (ibid., 316–342) are important for justifying the claim that the great world religions are more or less equally successful in fostering the main purpose of religion – the spiritual and moral transformation of human beings. Byrne agrees that the various names for this reality – God, Allah, Brahman, Nirvana, the Tao, etc. – are authentic cultural references to, expressions of, and responses to that reality, which are associated with detailed accounts of how to reorient one's life, individually and corporately, to it. However, Byrne's theory rejects the neo-Kantian epistemological framework that leads to some of the problems with Hick's version of religious pluralism. The neo-Kantian distinction that Hick draws between the unknowable Real an sich and the particular cultural expressions of the ultimate reality (ibid., 241–251), which are affirmed by the various religions, is what allows all religions to be equally true and in fundamental agreement, in so far as they are all equally valid responses to the ultimate reality, in spite of the obvious apparent differences in their various cultural interpretations and detailed descriptions of that reality. But the extreme ineffability of the Real implied by Hick's version of pluralism leads to difficulties that Byrne's version of pluralism seeks to avoid. The equal success of the many religions as meaningful responses to the Real is attained in Hick's pluralism by denying that we have cognitive access to the Real. The Real an sich is beyond human conceptualization. For Byrne this view is too extreme and is tantamount to idealism. Byrne replaces Hick's neo-Kantian epistemology with his carefully balanced combination of realism and agnosticism. Whereas Hick is able to ascribe equality to all the great religions by denying literal truth to any of their doctrinal claims, Byrne leaves open the possibility that religions may make literally true claims about the transcendent. The equality of religions demanded by pluralism consists in the fact that all religions lack certainty that they are more successful than others in describing the transcendent or characterizing the means of attaining a saving relation to the transcendent. It is an equality that in principle could change if in the future one religion is able to justify its doctrines as more true than those of other religions.

Byrne situates religious pluralism between naturalism, which holds that all religions are false, and confessionalism, which holds that one religion is true and all others are false. Confessionalism can be divided into exclusivism and inclusivism, both of which insist that one religion is superior to the others in its cognitive and soteriological success. The exclusivist and inclusivist both claim, contrary to Byrne's third thesis, that one religion, namely one's own, is ‘certain enough in its particular dogmatic formulations to provide the norm for interpreting the others’ (Byrne (Reference Byrne1995), 12). The exclusivist claims that salvation is only available to adherents of the one true religion. Inclusivism is essentially the same as exclusivism with respect to its position about the truth of its claims concerning the transcendent. It differs from exclusivism in allowing that salvation is available to adherents of other religions. Typically the inclusivist holds that the home religion has the correct account of how salvation is attained and provides the best means of attaining salvation, but allows the possibility that adherents of other religions may attain salvation through the means described by the home religion, even though the persons thus attaining salvation are not aware that they are being saved by that means. They may be saved even if they do not know that or how they are saved. An example of Christian inclusivism is the view that salvation is possible only through Christ, but that persons of other religions who do not believe in Christ may be saved by means of the sacrificial death of Christ, even though they do not realize consciously that Christ is responsible for their salvation (Rahner (Reference Rahner and McCool1975), 211–214). Byrne finds pluralism more plausible than either form of confessionalism because of religious diversity and the lack of any means of adjudicating conflicting claims between different religions. But the ubiquity and ethical efficacy of religion make pluralism more plausible than naturalism.

In order to account for the possibility of successful reference to the transcendent while maintaining agnosticism about specific descriptions of it, Byrne rejects descriptive theories of reference, according to which successful reference of terms depends on at least some true descriptions of the object referred to. Byrne's agnosticism makes unavailable knowledge of true descriptions of the sacred, which the descriptive theory of reference would require for successful reference to it. He defends a causal theory of reference, which requires only that there be an appropriate causal connection between the object referred to and the referring term. In order for the words ‘God’ and ‘Brahman’ to refer to the sacred, transcendent reality, the descriptive theory of reference requires that we have true descriptions of that object, such as ‘God is an omnipotent, omniscient personal being’ or ‘Brahman is without properties and identical with all that exists.’ It is clear that the descriptive theory is not going to make it easy to see how ‘God’ and ‘Brahman’ could both equally well refer to the same sacred, transcendent reality, which is what Byrne's pluralism requires. The two descriptive statements of the transcendent reality just cited are clearly incompatible with each other. But according to the causal theory, reference does not require true descriptions of the object referred to. For example, in order for the term ‘atom’, which etymologically means ‘simple particle’, to refer to atoms it does not matter whether we know whether or not atoms are indivisible. Beliefs about the atom have evolved as science progressed, but despite disagreement about the nature of the atom, the persons who thought that it was a simple and indivisible particle of matter and those who think it is an energy wave packet are referring to the same thing, because whatever the atom is really like, there is an appropriate causal connection between atoms and the word. Similarly, the lack of agreement about descriptions of the sacred, transcendent reality, whether it is a personal being, whether it has properties or not, or whether it is really distinct from the physical universe, for example, does not prevent successful reference of religious terms to that reality. It is sufficient that there be the right sort of causal connection between the transcendent, sacred reality and the terms that diverse religions use to refer to it. If there is a transcendent, sacred reality that plays the right sort of role in causing persons to believe that it exists, or to believe that they have experienced it, and to have various beliefs about it (whether true or false), then the persons who have those beliefs succeed in referring to that reality, even though they lack detailed true descriptions of it. The lack of true descriptions of the transcendent, sacred reality does not prevent reference to it, and so realism survives, but Byrne holds that the lack of true descriptions does support a moderate agnosticism about the nature of the transcendent.

Byrne supposes his agnosticism not so severe that it rules out the possibility of correction of error in religion. Religions are dynamic, self-critical, and engaged in dialogue with opponents. Byrne affirms not only the fallibility of religious belief, but also the possibility of critique and revision. Religious discourse and dialogue can over time result in progress towards more adequate religious understandings. Although religions are limited in so far as they are largely socio-cultural artefacts and products of history, pluralism recognizes

But in spite of this somewhat optimistic picture of the prospect for progress in religious understanding, Byrne's agnosticism does not recognize sufficient grounds for finally judging any one religion to be superior to the others. Hence his position remains pluralist, in the sense that it regards no one religion as superior to the others or able to provide the basis for the interpretation of other religions. Byrne does not hold that beliefs of different religions that contradict each other can be equally true. He is saying rather that we lack sufficient grounds for saying that the beliefs of one religion enjoy more cognitive or salvific success than beliefs of other religions. We are not justified in believing that one or some religions have a more accurate understanding of the sacred transcendent reality or that any are more successful than others in fostering success in the attainment of salvation. This later point leads to Byrne's second thesis, that all major religions are equal with respect to their offering the means to attaining salvation. And given the equality of the cognitive and soteriological success of all major religions we are led to the second half of Byrne's third thesis, that no one religion provides the basis for interpreting any of the other religions. The realist bent of Byrne's version of pluralism and the moderateness of his agnosticism supports the first part of the third thesis, that religious traditions contain revisable, limited, accounts of the nature of the sacred.

Critique of Byrne's first and third theses

Byrne's theory goes some way towards articulating a version of pluralism that avoids some of the difficulties encountered by Hick. From Byrne's point of view, Hick's notion of the Real an sich does not permit a sufficiently realist understanding of religious truth. Byrne avoids the problems resulting from Hick's removal of all cognitive content from discourse about the Real and his characterization of the Real as radically ineffable (Hick (Reference Hick1989), 236–240). This move renders unintelligible how religions can be cognitively and ethically informed by their responses to the Real, so that some form is given to the notion of transformation from self-centredness to reality-centredness. Without some cognitive grasp of the Real, how can we make sense of the relation between salvation construed as reality-centredness and the concrete moral life recommended by the great religions? If our response to the Real is devoid of cognitive significance, how can we know what forms of life would exemplify reality-centredness? For Hick the truth of the beliefs of particular religions is analysed pragmatically, ethically, and soteriologically (ibid., 229–242). Religious beliefs are true in so far as they are authentic responses to the Real, which promote salvation (the transformation from self-centredness to reality-centredness), as measured by the tendency to produce moral saintliness in persons. The descriptive content of belief is interpreted as metaphor and myth (ibid., 349–359). Byrne allows for the possibility of religious belief rising beyond metaphor and myth, thus giving more significance than does Hick to the cognitive dimension of religious belief, even though his agnosticism prevents affirmation of one religion being more successful in this regard than others. It is a strength of Byrne's pluralism that it does not achieve the equality of all religions at the expense of giving up all cognitive significance of their truth claims. Byrne's pluralism does not, as Hick's theory seems to do, diminish the importance of the diverse specific doctrines of particular religions and the fruitfulness of interfaith dialogue. Byrne affirms the corrigibility of particular religious traditions, the value of inter-religious dialogue, and the openness of religions to the possibility of critique and refinement over time.

Despite the considerable advantages of Byrne's religious pluralism over Hick's, it still faces some serious problems. One problem is that the first thesis seems at odds with the third, the first part of which says that religious traditions contain revisable accounts of the sacred, transcendent reality. On Byrne's view, there does not seem to be much need for progress in our ability to affirm the existence of a sacred, transcendent reality. If religious traditions are already equally successful in their ability to refer to the transcendent, it is only with respect to their detailed descriptions of the transcendent that there could be need for revision and further progress. However, it is hard to see how progress could be forthcoming, given religious pluralism's agnosticism at the level of specific descriptions of the sacred and its insistence on a lack of criteria for resolving disagreements between different descriptions.

Byrne says very little specifically about how he thinks religious beliefs are revisable. How can religious beliefs be revisable if there are no rational, objective means of adjudicating disagreements between different religions about the nature of the sacred? Byrne's agnosticism about the detailed descriptions of the transcendent reality militates against the prospects for successful revision of religious doctrine towards improved understanding of the sacred. According to Byrne, ‘the very fact of religious diversity in respect of cognitive claims’, and the high degree to which religions are the product of socio-cultural factors, ‘tell against confessionalism’ (Byrne (Reference Byrne1995), 193). If progress towards greater religious knowledge is possible, it would seem that at least some of it must occur at the level of first-order religious beliefs. It is in the detailed descriptions of the sacred that religions disagree, but Byrne claims that at that level of specificity there are no criteria for resolving the disagreements. So how is revision possible? How is progress possible? If revision is possible, doesn't that require that there be some means of adjudicating disagreements between different religions? When Byrne is emphasizing his agnosticism about the specific detailed descriptions of the transcendent that are affirmed by different religions, his view seems very pessimistic about the prospects for progress beyond the deadlock between different religions. And yet the third thesis explicitly affirms as essential for this version of pluralism the proposition that the accounts of the sacred and of salvation offered by different religious traditions are revisable. This possibility would seem to entail that there must be some prospect for genuine revision in the sense of progress towards the truth of some of the competing religious claims.

Furthermore, if we take seriously the first part of Byrne's third thesis, and progress towards religious truth is indeed possible, we cannot be sure that the cognitive success of all religions will remain equal as religious traditions undergo continued revision. We should see Byrne's pluralism as a provisional position that we may expect will eventually give way as greater certainty at the level of first-order religious beliefs is attained. As it stands, pluralism's insistence on the equality of all religions seems in conflict with the thesis that religions are revisable.

The tension between Byrne's first and third theses exposes a tension between his realism and agnosticism. Byrne acknowledges that ‘there are points at which pluralism is vulnerable to refutation … [and] is under some internal strain, for its heavy agnosticism is combined with a form of realism and an acceptance of salvific success in the religions’ (ibid., 195). Pluralism acknowledges the indispensability of commitment to first-order religious belief in order to make cognitive contact with the sacred. So the philosophy of religion and religious pluralism is no substitute for first-order religious belief and practice. But at the same time, pluralism asserts that the doctrinal claims of religions are deeply flawed. The philosopher of religion reflecting on the diversity of religious traditions can have reasonable belief that particular religions are making contact with the transcendent sacred and that this contact results in salvation for their practitioners. But none of the actual practitioners of those religions can know that their beliefs about the sacred are true. This might make it seem as though it is the philosopher of religion who has some religious knowledge, while religious believers, operating at the level of first-order belief and practice, lack religious knowledge. But Byrne insists that his

Here Byrne comments on the paradox:

This is a very revealing passage. It acknowledges that the success of persons in making contact with the sacred requires that they participate experientially and practically within a specific religious tradition. Being religious, then, requires participation in a particular religious tradition. All such traditions have their ‘doctrinally loaded accounts of the nature of transcendent reality and of salvation’. Byrne admits that some religious beliefs may be true and that the pluralist cannot know that any are false. He admits that the pluralist ‘can accept that it is logically possible for religious reality to be just as one of the traditions claims it to be’ (ibid., 202). But the pluralist holds that although all religions are successful in referring to the transcendent and offering a path to salvation, they are still ‘deeply flawed and radically uncertain’. None of the religious traditions can claim strict truth with any certainty. Pluralism acknowledges the necessity of first-order religious belief, practice, and experience in order for religion to attain its cognitive and salvific success. But in so far as pluralism entails agnosticism about first-order religious beliefs that are foundational to religious practice, pluralism seems finally to cut itself off from the possibility of authentic participation in the religious life that is supposed to be capable of enjoying that success. Authentic participation in a religious tradition's rituals and practices would seem to require faithful affirmation that the foundational beliefs of that tradition are true. So not only does religious pluralism not provide a superior form of religious knowledge, it threatens to alienate persons from the possibility of religious belief and practice. Pluralism seems simultaneously to affirm the cognitive success of religious traditions and to undermine the possibility of authentic participation in them.

Byrne's struggle with the tension between his realism and his agnosticism is due to the implications he draws about religious truth from the uncertainty of religious belief. The uncertainty of religious doctrinal claims seems consistent with their being true in the sense of corresponding to reality, which is what realism would entail. What does Byrne mean by the presumption that religious doctrines cannot claim ‘strict truth’? If he means to deny that religious doctrines can claim truth in the sense of corresponding to reality, then he is backing off from the realism that was advertised as a component of pluralism. Byrne admits that ‘it is logically possible for religious reality to be just as one of the traditions claims it to be’, and that the Christian who believes that Jesus is the son of God might be right. At least ‘pluralism does not affirm that an affirmation such as “Jesus is the son of God” is proved false’ (ibid.). This sounds very straightforwardly realist. But pluralism also asserts

The paradoxical position to which pluralism has led seems in part due to confusion between the lack of certainty and the lack of ‘strict truth’. Byrne says that no one can describe religious ‘reality truly, in detail, and with certainty’, and for this reason, pluralism presumes that doctrinal statements do not do this. For descriptions of reality to get all three – detail, truth, and certainty – is a tall order, and would be hard to achieve in any field, not just religion. But the inevitable uncertainty in religion should not be thought to undermine the possibility of attaining some approximation of truth, realistically construed. Many theistic believers are quite willing to admit that they cannot describe God truly, in detail, and with certainty, but they nevertheless may believe that the doctrines they affirm are true in a realist sense. In the last sentence of the quoted passage, Byrne seems to be saying that the deep and inevitable flaw in religious claims is not merely the lack of certainty but also the impossibility of their corresponding to reality. Byrne says that ‘I believe’ means something different when the belief is about Jesus than when the belief is about grass. No doubt there are big differences between believing in Jesus and believing that grass is green, but at least part of what the Christian who believes that Jesus is the son of God might mean is that the statement ‘Jesus is the son of God’ corresponds to reality. Again, Byrne admits that the pluralist ‘can accept that it is logically possible for religious reality to be just as one of the traditions claims it to be’ (ibid.), but then in the next paragraph he says that pluralism presumes that doctrinal statements do not describe religious reality truly. Does this mean merely that no one can be certain that religious beliefs correspond to reality, or does it mean that they do not correspond to reality? The latter interpretation contradicts the statement that ‘it is logically possible for religious reality to be just as one of the traditions claims it to be’. It undermines Byrne's first thesis and undermines the thesis about the revisability of religions. So it seems we must accept the first interpretation – that no one can know with certainty that his or her religious beliefs correspond to reality, but that it is possible for some of them to be true in that sense. This is consistent with the idea that religious doctrines are finally matters of faith, not rational proof, but that they can correspond to reality.

The uncertainty of religious belief alone does not support the pluralist's presumption that religious doctrinal statements do not ‘describe reality truly’. Many religious believers acknowledge the lack of objective certainty about religious doctrinal claims (Kierkegaard regarded it as essential to them), but as they regard the truth of those doctrinal claims essential to their religious faith and practice, they may insist that the doctrinal claims correspond to reality despite their uncertainty. But it is not just uncertainty that leads Byrne to the pluralist presumption against affirming religious truth claims, but also ‘the very fact of religious diversity in respect of cognitive claims’, and the high degree to which religions are the product of socio-cultural factors (ibid., 193). But diversity of belief does not entail the pluralist's presumption, nor does the lack of criteria for resolving disagreement, unless it is taken to be in principle incurable. But if the lack of criteria is permanent and incurable, then the revisability thesis is undermined. Byrne also thinks that the pluralist's presumption is supported by ‘the socio-cultural basis of thought’ that ‘ties in with the cultural-linguistic view of religious discourse’, which ‘entails a modest constructivism in the interpretation of religious experience’ (ibid., 199). Byrne does not work out these ideas in detail. The socio-cultural basis of thought would pertain to all thought, including scientific thought, which is obviously also a cultural artefact, but is also generally regarded as trafficking in objective truth. Byrne does not explain in detail the modesty of the constructivism in religion, but to the extent that it is a consequence of the socio-cultural basis of all human thought, it is not the source of a flaw in religious doctrinal claims that is more severe than that of other forms of thought. The cultural-linguistic view of religious discourse entails that religion is to a large degree a cultural artefact, and thus supports a ‘modest constructivism’, but again, the constructivism is apparently modest enough for pluralism to allow that ‘it is logically possible for religious reality to be just as one of the traditions claims it to be’. Unless the uncertainty of religious doctrinal claims and the modest constructivism implied by the ‘cultural-linguistic view of religious discourse’ entail a flaw serious enough to undermine Byrne's commitment to religious realism, the presumption of his pluralism that religious doctrinal statements do not ‘describe reality truly’ is unwarranted. In order to maintain the realist component of pluralism, the agnostic component must be less severe than Byrne has characterized it to be.

If we take seriously the revisability thesis and hold that it is in principle possible for some doctrinal statements to be true, then the lack of certainty about them should not be taken as permanent, insurmountable, or a barrier to religious faith and practice. Nor should it be taken as support for religious pluralism rather than confessionalism, some forms of which freely admit and even seem to relish the rational uncertainty of religious belief and insist that faith is quite consistent with uncertainty. Since Byrne admits the possibility of progress in religion, we should hope that that progress could include getting truer descriptions of the transcendent. We should be open to the possibility that eventually one or more religions may emerge as superior to others. If it is an a priori assumption that we must at all costs avoid religious exclusivism and make sure all religions enjoy equal cognitive and soteriological success, then we cannot expect movement towards one religion ever emerging as superior to the others. Of course Byrne is concerned to articulate a plausible version of pluralism, but he should not, given his insistence on the revisability of religious belief, rule out the possibility that rational ways of adjudicating disagreements among religions may emerge, or even that one religion might eventually emerge as ultimately superior to others. So, at most, pluralism should be a tentative, provisional thesis, and Byrne should be open to the possibility that the religious dialogue, which he acknowledges to be valuable, could lead to progress towards the emergence of the plausibility of not just the general thesis of the reality of the sacred transcendent but also of the superiority of one religion's detailed descriptions of it. If this possibility is not acknowledged, given the depth of the differences between the claims of diverse religions, Byrne's agnosticism seems to become terminal, and the realism is overwhelmed.

Critique of Byrne's second thesis

If Byrne's second thesis means merely that all religions are equal in so far as they all have some notion of salvation, then it is relatively unproblematic but trivially true, in so far as it is arguably part of the definition of religion that it involves a notion of salvation. In order for the second thesis to be philosophically interesting, it must involve a substantive claim about what different religions teach about salvation and the success of religions in fostering salvation. A problem with this pluralist account of salvation is that it implies more than a second-order philosophical reflection on religious diversity should claim. Byrne's agnosticism about the details of the doctrines of particular religions should cause reluctance to make any claims about the truth of what really constitutes salvation. He admits the possibility that one religion might be true, or closer to the truth than the others. Suppose for the sake of argument that the Christian idea of salvation is true (an analogous argument could be make for the assumption of the conception of salvation of other religions). Suppose it is true that all human beings are, prior to salvation, estranged from a personal God. Suppose that prior to the kind of ethical transformation with which Hick is concerned human beings need to be redeemed by God. Suppose it is true that all human moral virtue falls short of God's moral standards. I am not assuming that this Christian view of salvation is correct. But Byrne claims that he is not ruling out the possibility that it is correct, and if it is correct then the kind of moral transformation that Byrne says constitutes salvation would not be attainable except through Christ. The kind of moral virtue which Byrne rightly identifies as an end in itself and a mark of a kind of transcendence of self-centredness would fall short of the redemption that Christianity says constitutes salvation in the fullest sense. A central teaching of Christianity is that all have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God. It seems that Byrne's pluralist view of salvation entails that this Christian view is not merely uncertain, but false. More than agnosticism is required in order to justify the claim that this Christian view of salvation is false. Byrne would need more certainty about a particular claim of a specific religion than his official pluralistic position allows.

As is widely noted in discussions of religious diversity and as Byrne himself admits, despite the fact that specific religions offer similar descriptions of the personal qualities and virtues that indicate salvation, they differ widely in their conceptions of the nature of the transcendent reality and the way to attain the kind of relation to it that constitutes salvation. Byrne rightly notes that there is a great deal of agreement among religions about the importance of love and compassion for attaining salvation. But it is also true, as T. J. Mawson (Reference Mawson2005) notes, that some forms of Christianity emphasize the impossibility of attaining salvation through ethical behaviour or ‘good works’. Keith Yandell (Reference Yandell, Peterson and VanArragon2004) emphasizes the fact that not only do religions disagree strongly on the way of attaining salvation, but one point on which most religions agree is that salvation is only attainable by following the path laid out by one specific religion, with each religion, of course, insisting that its own teachings concerning the path to salvation is the correct one. If the fact of agreement between religions about the reality of the transcendent is support for religious realism, then it would seem that the virtually universal agreement among religions in thinking that there is one preferred path to salvation would be a good reason to take that belief seriously. Although religions differ in their accounts of salvation, with few exceptions each religion holds that there is one true (or preferred, or best) path to salvation, and each thinks that its way is that one true way. So it would seem that Byrne's emphasis on the fact that all religions agree about the existence of the transcendent as support for his religious realism would also demand appreciation of a feature that is perhaps nearly as ubiquitous among religions – that they hold that salvation is a difficult thing to attain and requires utmost adherence to the right way of attaining it, with each religion holding that its way is the only correct one. ‘God is in the details’, as they say. Of course, the religions that claim this might be wrong, and it might be that salvation is readily available to devotees of any religion. But in order to know the truth about this issue, it would seem that we would need more than Byrne's agnosticism concerning specific religious doctrines permits. In the absence of knowledge of the truth or falsity of specific claims that different religions make about salvation, the nature of the sacred, transcendent reality, the kind of relation to it that constitutes salvation, and the way to attain that kind of relation, we cannot know whether they are all equally successful in their prescriptions for the attainment of salvation. Of course, the pluralist may say that those disagreements about details don't matter; what matters is the broad agreement about the moral and spiritual transformation of human persons from self-centredness to a life of love and compassion. But most specific religions do not agree that such a broad description captures the essence of salvation, and they do not agree that their disagreements with the accounts of salvation offered by other religions do not matter. If the lack of neutral, objective, rational criteria for adjudicating disagreement between religions about salvation entailed that none of them can be true, then we might have some reason to say that they are all equal in their salvific success. But Byrne admits that it might be the case that one religion is truer than others about the nature of the sacred, transcendent reality and about salvation. Therefore, the lack of knowledge of the truth of specific claims that diverse religions make about salvation, and Byrne's acknowledgement of the possibility in principle of future religious progress, should lead us to leave open the question of the parity of all religions on the issue of salvation.

I conclude that Byrne has not proposed a version of religious pluralism that is rationally defensible and that serves as a stimulant to fruitful religious dialogue. The agnosticism is too severe and tends to undermine the realism, and the realism is too weak to provide a basis for fruitful religious dialogue and progress in religious understanding.Footnote ¹