The interest in the related yet distinct systems for the settlement of international trade and investment disputes has grown in recent years for a diverse set of reasons. In part, the greater interest is undoubtedly attributable to the relative prominence of the two systems over the past three decades, as evidenced by the number of claims brought and the decisions made within these systems. Equally, this greater interest is also due to the many challenges that both systems have had to confront more recently, together with the prolonged debates surrounding possible reforms of the two systems in order to remedy their perceived shortcomings.Footnote 1
International Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement: From Rise to Crisis and Reform, by Giorgio Sacerdoti, an emeritus professor at Bocconi University, and Niall Moran, an assistant professor in Law at Dublin City University, provides a comparative analysis of the origin, features, and evolution of the trade and investment dispute settlement systems, expertly and succinctly identifying key commonalities and differences between the two systems. The authors must be lauded for opting to undertake such a study. Despite being two key components of the international economic legal order, which have been operating on a large scale for at least three decades, it is somewhat surprising that Sacerdoti and Moran’s book is really the first comprehensive analysis of both dispute settlement systems. Of course, when the new dispute settlement system under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the first investor-state disputes brought on the basis of international investment treaties came to life in the latter half of the 1990s, the two legal communities (including scholars and practitioners) linked with international trade law and international investment law existed in relative isolation from one another. However, this has not been the case at least for the last ten or fifteen years, which have witnessed a growing overlap between the two legal communities.Footnote 2 It is not at all surprising then that one of the two authors embarking in the comparative analysis under review is in fact one of the leading jurists in both fields: Professor Sacerdoti’s professional background includes serving as a member and chairman of the Appellate Body of the WTO from 2001 to 2009 and as an arbitrator in numerous investor-state arbitrations under international investment treaties over the last twenty years.Footnote 3
The book is divided into two main parts. The first part, entitled “The Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement Systems from Origins to Success,” describes in detail the key aspects of the two systems over six chapters. This first part includes two chapters focusing on the historical origins and early development (Ch. 1) and the basic features (Ch. 2) of the two dispute settlement systems, as well as four more chapters addressing various aspects of the two systems: “Jurisdiction, Initiating Proceedings, and Applicable Law” (Ch. 3), “Procedural Features and the Final Decision” (Ch. 4), “Reviewing Decisions: Appeal and Annulment” (Ch. 5), and “Compliance and Enforcement” (Ch. 6).
The underlying theme across the first part of the book is to show how from the 1990s both systems went through a clear process of judicialization of international disputes, whereby nations delegate the authority to resolve their conflicts to independent, third-party adjudicatory bodies. According to the authors, “both systems have evolved towards a rule-based system in the interest of security and predictability of relations for the participants and other stakeholders” (p. 29). And in this sense, the various aspects analyzed comparatively in the first part of the book represent the key features of any such adjudicatory system, including the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the selection or appointment of the members of the tribunal, the applicable law, the nature and intensity of the review undertaken by the tribunal of the relevant state conduct, the precedential value of earlier decisions, the grounds for reviewing tribunals’ decisions, and any mechanism to ensure that decisions are enforced.
However, a second key theme stemming from the detailed comparative analysis in the book’s first part is how the two dispute settlement systems differ either in design or in operation when it comes to several of those key features. Chapter 1, for example, which delineates the parallel yet discrete historical trajectories of trade and investment dispute settlement systems, emphasizes how political and economic objectives shaped each system evolution. While the WTO prioritized intergovernmental trade stability, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), including the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ICSID, focused on protecting private investors from host state misconduct. Similarly, in Chapter 2, the authors affirm that the WTO dispute settlement system is the “result of a ‘top-down’ approach, due to its multilateral unitary basis and centralized setting and functioning,” while the ISDS system is ‘bottom-up,’ being the result of a multiplicity of essentially bilateral treaties, characterized by different features in the carrying out of actual disputes” (p. 65).
This basic distinction—trade law revolves around a highly centralized, multilateral regime that governs interstate trade relations, while investment law is a highly decentralized network of thousands of bilateral and regional treaties, and dispute panels that serve on an ad hoc basis—has impacted several aspects of the two systems. For example, the authors emphasize how WTO adjudicators are appointed through “a collective mechanism and are trustees of all the parties of the WTO,” while investment arbitrators “are agents of the parties that appoint them and entrust them with the settlement of a specific dispute between them” (id.). Moreover, in the WTO dispute settlement system, where there is no agreement between the parties, the composition of panels is actively managed by the WTO Secretariat to ensure, besides the acceptance by the parties of prospective panelists, their competence and availability, so that the process may get underway in a speedy manner. On the other hand, the investor-state system follows the traditional commercial arbitration model where each party is free to select an arbitrator of its choice (and the president is selected jointly), while the arbitral institution only steps in at the parties’ request when they are unable to agree (p. 97). In this regard, the authors stress that the “private” selection method in ISDS may have led to a limited diversity of the selected arbitrators (as to cultural background, geographical origin, gender, etc.), which in turn “has been criticized for not reflecting the public nature of investment arbitration, with deals with states’ public interests” (pp. 91–92).
Similarly, the different nature of the two dispute settlement systems has influenced the jurisdictional authority of trade and investment tribunals. In the trade regime, the jurisdiction of panels is institutionalized under WTO membership and covered agreements, while in investment arbitration, jurisdiction depends on the investor’s nationality, the definition of “investment,” and the relevant treaty’s consent clause. Accordingly, while the jurisdictional basis of an ISDS tribunal is a highly controversial issue, WTO panels jurisdictional authority is relatively unproblematic (Ch. 3).
Beyond the differences that were reflected in the very design of the two dispute settlement systems, the comparative analysis also shows various differences stemming from the very operation of the two systems. In Chapter 4, for example, the authors emphasize the role of WTO adjudicators as being a “dominant” one in evidence-gathering: while the type of dispute does not usually involve witness testimony, experts are selected directly by the panels. In investment arbitration, on the other hand, the overwhelming practice is for each party to select and submit the reports of witnesses and experts, who are then cross-examined by the other party in hearings (p. 132). A second difference highlighted in Chapter 4 is the greater role played by the WTO Secretariat, which is “fully involved in all aspects of panel proceedings” including assistance in research and drafting (p. 120). This is in contrast with the more limited administrative role of arbitral institutions in ISDS, albeit more pronounced at ICSID in comparison with private arbitral institutions (pp. 120–21). Thirdly, the authors highlight that in WTO dispute settlement, the organization and unfolding of the proceedings are more predetermined and guided by panels and secretariat, while in the practice of investment arbitration, many aspects of proceedings are left to the agreement of the parties (p. 132).
The authors appear to explain (albeit only implicitly) some of these differences in the different origins of the two dispute settlement systems. While the proceedings under the WTO DSU owe much to the initial investigatory (i.e., inquisitorial) model of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) commission of experts, which features have been carried over into the DSU, investor-state dispute settlement evolved from commercial arbitration, retaining many of its procedural features, including more adversarial ones under ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration (p. 131). An inquisitorial model of adjudication is usually characterized by a greater role played by the tribunal as well as its institutional infrastructure compared to an accusatorial one, where the disputing parties exercise greater control over the conduct of the proceedings and the presentation of the evidence and arguments.
The centralized, intergovernmental nature of the WTO system, on the one hand, and the decentralized, private-rights features of the investment treaty system, on the other, have also influenced the respective review and compliance mechanisms. With regard to post-decision review, Chapter 5 explains the WTO structured appellate review of legal questions based on the permanent Appellate Body (AB) envisioned in order to provide the losing party a chance to have reports re-examined to check correctness of their findings and conclusions. Chapter 5 contrasts the WTO appellate system with the ICSID annulment proceedings based on limited, serious procedural or jurisdictional defects, highlighting the business preference for the “finality” of arbitral decisions. With regard to compliance, Chapter 6 contrasts the WTO’s state-to-state compliance mechanism—emphasizing future conformity and possible retaliation—with the investment regime’s monetary compensation model, enforceable under the ICSID Convention in any contracting state as if the award were a domestic final court judgement or under the New York Convention through domestic courts. The comparative analysis also shows that, while the trade regime ensures prospective compliance through centralized, collective oversight, the investment system relies on decentralized enforcement for retrospective compensation. Despite such diversity and certain challenges (for example, state immunity as an obstacle to enforcement of investment decisions or the limits of the WTO’s surveillance mechanism), the authors argue that “[c]ompliance has tended to be robust across the two systems ever since the two [dispute settlement systems] began operating” (pp. 155, 162–70, 170–71).
Interestingly, the authors appear to praise each system for their distinctive judicialization features. Accordingly, on the one hand, they highlight, in contrast with the ICSID annulment mechanism, the WTO Appellate Body’s role in ensuring consistency in the interpretation of the substantive rules of the WTO for the benefit of all participants (p. 152). On the other hand, they emphasize, in contrast with the WTO system, the compliance system in ISDS (patterned after the methods for enforcement of judicial decisions and commercial awards in domestic law), which is aimed at ensuring full and effective monetary compensation for the injury (damages) caused by the breach (p. 171).
The second part of the book, entitled “From Success through Crisis to Reform,” comprises two chapters that delve into the evolution and challenges faced by the two systems. The first of these is titled “From Success to Crisis” (Ch. 7) and the second chapter is titled “Reforming the Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement Systems: Approaches, Results, and Work in Progress” (Ch. 8). Based on the detailed, comparative analysis of the key features of both dispute settlement systems in the previous chapters, in Part II, the authors move on to assess the shared yet asymmetrical trajectory of WTO dispute settlement and investor-state dispute settlement from their parallel rise in the late 1990s to their current challenges. The underlying theme here is the attempt to understand the causes of the crisis in order to chart possible paths to reforms.
Once again, the analysis in Chapter 7 shows that, while both systems benefitted from the post-Cold War boom in legalization and judicialization, their crises unfolded differently in timing, intensity, and depth. WTO dispute settlement entered an acute institutional crisis in the late 2010s with the paralysis of the Appellate Body, whereas investment arbitration has faced a sustained legitimacy backlash since the early-mid 2000s without experiencing comparable systemic breakdown. As the authors perceptively observe, “the most vocal critics of globalization have shifted their focus from the WTO to the investment regime” (p. 194). Nevertheless, the impact of the crisis appears to have been felt more acutely in the WTO regime, as the filing of new cases has been discouraged by the uncertainty of the proper finalization of disputes. The authors posit that WTO members may be pushed to settle their disputes by negotiation, rather than formal dispute settlement, with the subsequent risk that such settlements are the result of pressure from the stronger party (p. 188). The authors note moreover that moving away from the multilateral trade dispute settlement system may invigorate bilateral/plurilateral dispute settlement under regional trade agreements. However, while this may happen in the long-term, this has not happened yet: since the Appellate Body stopped operating in early 2020, the authors find, thirty-one disputes have been initiated at the WTO by the end of 2023 compared to ten disputes under regional trade agreements during the same period (p. 190).
If one looks at ISDS, despite almost two decades of criticism (which has led to both treaty terminations and reforms), the system has witnessed a continuous increase in the number of arbitral proceedings, reaching by the end of 2025 double the number of disputes brought before WTO dispute settlement in a similar period of time (644 WTO complaints versus more than 1,400 known investment treaty cases). The authors do identify and detail the key strands of criticism that have been voiced against ISDS (including its “unbalanced” and “private justice” nature, the commercial profile and lack of diversity and independence of arbitrators, and the inconsistency of arbitral decisions), but they do not appear to share at least the gravity of many of them (pp. 197–202). To use Professor Roberts’s typology of different sentiments with regard to ISDS reforms, the authors appear to fall under the so called “incrementalist” category, according to whom criticisms of the current investment arbitration are overblown and the current ISDS system should be retained albeit with modest reforms.Footnote 4 Ultimately, the authors argue that if the various criticisms were really accurate, they would be bound to intensify as disputes become more politically charged, financially significant, and intertwined with sovereign regulatory discretion, and technical improvements alone to ISDS would not be able to resolve them (p. 198).
However, this divergence invites a further central question: has ISDS shown to be structurally more resilient and adaptable to stakeholder demands compared to WTO dispute settlement? While not directly addressing this question, the assessment in Chapter 7 invites the reader to resist simplistic answers and provides, instead, useful clues. At one level, the WTO dispute settlement crisis is directly linked with the WTO members’ inability to appoint new members to the Appellate Body. In turn, this has been principally caused to the United States’ blocking single-handedly the required positive consensus to start the appointment process. Thus, the multilateral, centralized, intergovernmental nature of the WTO legal system (including dispute settlement) requiring for most decisions a positive consensus among all members is the immediate cause for the WTO dispute settlement crisis. The bilateral, decentralized nature of the investment regime (including ISDS) would not permit such a drastic result, as one state would at most be able to terminate its investment treaties, without blocking the entire regime.
At a deeper level, the WTO dispute settlement crisis may also be linked with the reasons the United States has identified for its blocking of Appellate Body members appointment over the last ten years. For example, according to the United States, the Appellate Body has improperly engaged in: (1) “judicial activism,” such as by issuing “advisory opinions” and obiter dicta on issues not necessary for its decision; (2) “gap-filling” of provisions left vague by negotiators; and (3) “overreach,” by exercising functions beyond its mandate. The United States has also criticized the Appellate Body for requiring panels to follow the “precedent” set by the Appellate Body “absent cogent reasons” (pp. 182–83). One could argue that the very existence of a permanent appellate mechanism aimed at ensuring correctness of decisions, consistent interpretation and predictability of WTO members’ rights and obligations has ultimately contributed to the demise of the entire, judicialized dispute settlement system in the WTO. On the other hand, given its more flexible, decentralized, ad hoc nature, investor-state dispute settlement has at least so far escaped such a similar, drastic demise. Investment arbitration, including investment arbitrators, may be better equipped in preserving the necessary buy-in from disputing parties (at least the key ones). One fact often repeated in this context is the perfect success record of the United States in defending ISDS claims brought against them.
One of the book’s most original contributions is Chapter 8, which turns from diagnosis to reform. On the trade side, the authors highlight the tensions between WTO members’ key priorities in terms of trade policy, on one hand, and dispute settlement reforms, on the other. First, the authors note how several WTO members (including major economies) are pursuing “‘strategic autonomy’ through unilateral trade and industrial policy measures in key advanced sectors and more generally ‘economic security’” (p. 213). Crucially, these policies are being pursued without much attention to WTO commitments and the lack of a fully functioning dispute settlement system may accommodate members that enact measures of dubious compatibility with their WTO obligations. Accordingly, while no member has yet expressed a desire to leave the WTO, these developments appear to weaken the entire multilateral trade regime (p. 214).
In contrast to this kind of “soft exit,” the chapter also shows how WTO members have not given up on a functioning multilateral dispute settlement system and have undertaken instead various strategies in order to address the dispute settlement crisis within the WTO. Chapter 8 focuses in particular, on the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration (MPIA) recreating for a subset of WTO members a structure similar to the appellate mechanism, the “Molina Proposal” featuring several structural changes designed to speed up panel decisions and limit overreach, and the post-MC13 reform process on appellate review. However, in their overall assessment of these various reform efforts, the authors emphasize their fear that the direction of travel is toward a weakening of the current appeal system: “the Appellate Body may be replaced by a ‘super-panel’ patterned after the MPIA arbitrators, with less authority and less of a guarantee of consistency in its case law, thus providing less security and predictability and less of a guarantee of equal treatment for all Members in disputes” (p. 228). The authors recommend instead for negotiators to focus on revitalizing the existing system (including the appeal stage as devised during the Uruguay Round) and addressing any perceived shortcomings, taking into account the experience of the many courts and tribunals currently operating internationally (id.). In their view, reverting to a system akin to that of the GATT, that is a “transactional” approach to dispute settlement (whereby the losing party is free to block the adoption of the panel’s decision), is at odds with the spirit and rules underpinning the current multilateral rule-based system based on non-discrimination (p. 230). While the book has been written mostly before the second Trump presidency, developments since 2025 appear to make the authors’ fear even more real.
On the investment side, while acknowledging persistent concerns about arbitrator selection, independence, and impartiality, the authors note that accusations of bias often sit uneasily with the scarcity of upheld challenges and the generally high quality and authority of awards. In this respect, the endorsement of a binding code of conduct for arbitrators and adjudicators, as developed within UNCITRAL Working Group III, emerges as a pragmatic response to politicization rather than a concession to it. The discussion of inconsistency and the lack of appeal mechanism is particularly incisive: the authors argue that appellate review, if properly designed, could enhance both coherence and judicial economy, especially if empowered to decide the merits when setting aside awards (p. 254). The authors’ suggestion appears to basically replicate, for investor-state disputes, the two-tier hybrid structured envisioned in the WTO DSU: thus, next to existing ad hoc arbitral tribunals, one would add a standing appellate review mechanism. At the time of writing, this seems to reflect a possible compromise position between those that generally support the current system of ad hoc arbitration and those that would prefer a more radical improvement of ISDS, in particular through the establishment of a permanent court or tribunal. In any event, the authors clearly share—and explicitly defend—the view that investor-state dispute settlement’s shortcomings are “curable through appropriate reforms,” including the clarification and narrowing of substantive investment protection standards and the refinement of procedural safeguards increasingly reflected in recent international investment agreements (p. 203).
The comparative analysis in Chapter 8 is especially illuminating. The authors highlight several commonalities in terms of reform efforts in particular within the WTO and UNICTRAL Working Group III. For example, both multilateral efforts seem to have focused on procedural features of the dispute settlement system and are aimed at preserving a rule-based binding adjudication of disputes between the participants in the two regimes (p. 254). In terms of differences, whereas WTO dispute settlement has attracted criticism largely from within (and in particular from a major participant, the United States) and now faces proposals to curtail or even abandon appellate review, ISDS criticism has “mostly originated from outside” and reform moves somewhat paradoxically in the opposite direction, borrowing institutional ideas from the stumbling WTO model (pp. 208, 256). In other words, while the thrust of WTO reform is to make the system less judicialized and insert a greater degree of party control, the thrust of ISDS reform is to make the system more judicialized and reduce the level of party control. Whether the two reform processes will lead to converging or diverging dispute settlement systems is hard to predict at this point. Certainly, institutional design and the greater/lesser level of “judicialization” will be crucial in any attempt at reforming the trade and investment dispute settlement systems.Footnote 5
Overall, the book masterfully describes and compares the two dispute settlement systems as they have developed in the last three decades, detailing their key features as well as analyzing both systems’ criticisms and reform efforts. The book stands out for its comparative depth and analytical balance. The comparative analysis is particularly effective as it is based on, and carried out through, the selection of several key aspects. Moreover, rather than simply lamenting the state of crisis, the book offers a compelling account of adjudication under strain and of reform as an exercise in institutional recalibration rather than abandonment.
One difficulty, which the book implicitly raises but does not fully resolve, concerns the extent to which reform of dispute settlement mechanisms can realistically be pursued in isolation from reform of the substantive rules underpinning the trade and investment regimes. While much of the recent reform agenda—both at the WTO and within UNCITRAL Working Group III—has focused principally on procedural issues (including the overall institutional architecture, adjudicator conduct, and review mechanisms), the authors themselves acknowledge that many of the most acute legitimacy concerns ultimately stem from the content and scope of substantive obligations. Questions surrounding regulatory autonomy, national security, and the distributional consequences of trade liberalization and investment protection cannot be entirely insulated from the design and operation of dispute settlement. In this sense, the book invites reflection on whether procedural reform alone can restore confidence in international adjudication, or whether more fundamental recalibration of substantive commitments is unavoidable if dispute settlement systems are to remain both legitimate and effective.
At the same time, and notwithstanding their careful description of the backlash against globalization and the rise of protectionist and unilateralist policies, Sacerdoti and Moran articulate a clear normative commitment to a rule–based international economic order. In their view, binding dispute settlement remains indispensable to ensuring consistency, predictability, and relative equality among states in the application of international economic law. The authors’ principled faith in the value of a legalized, rule-based system of dispute settlement persists even in the face of its current paralysis and mounting skepticism, that would seem to prefer a return to a power–based model of economic relations. While their views may today appear to some (many?) to be out of touch with reality or overly optimistic, one can appreciate that their position transcends today’s political context and speaks in favor of the rule-based system for the longer term.
Moreover, the book’s comparative analysis resonates beyond its immediate subject matter, engaging with broader themes that increasingly define the field: the legitimacy and effectiveness of international adjudication in an era of geopolitical fragmentation; the enduring tension between national priorities and the objectives of trade liberalization and investment protection; and the challenge of achieving greater coherence between trade and investment dispute regimes within the wider architecture of global economic governance. By framing these issues comparatively and institutionally, the book makes a timely and significant contribution to ongoing debates about the future of international economic law and its adjudicatory functions.
