Del Sarto's study focuses on the southern Mediterranean states and their partnerships with European Union (EU) member states for development and cooperation. It concerns the domestic constraints on efforts of regional security—namely, how the unsettled state identities of southern Mediterranean actors impact the formulation and implementation of regional security policies.
The European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, also referred to as the Barcelona Process) was launched in Barcelona in 1995. Its aim was to create a “security region” that included the then “EU15” and twelve “southern” states. The EMP was innovative in that it attempted to establish a culture of security and cooperation. However, it did so in a region where most states' identities are challenged by their very domestic events: Westernization versus Pan-Arabism in the Arab countries, religion in Turkey and Israel, and of course the speed of economic and cultural globalization, which puts pressure on all. Del Sarto's argument is that the domestic fragmentation of the states' identities is not conducive to an effective materialization of the EMP.
In the first chapter, Del Sarto explains how a Mediterranean region was “constructed” in order for the alliance of the twenty-seven states to take place and how the process was infused with the EU's ideals of an active civic society. Indeed, the EU redefined the meaning of security in the post Cold War world by transforming itself into a community of states that shared common values and ideals, but the Barcelona Process was looser, as the word “region” (instead of “community”) and the practice of acting in a multilateral as well as a bilateral framework denote. Demands on the realignment and redesign of identities of states that are domestically fragmented proved trickier than originally envisaged. There was little progress on “hard security” affairs as well as issues of democratization and human rights. In economic terms, the EU's agricultural protectionism and scarce investment in the South on the one hand, and limited South–South trade on the other, meant that the process could not adopt the necessary momentum to generate reforms. EMP partners did not form a community of their own vis-à-vis that of the EU. However, as Del Sarto argues, lack of progress among the partners is not the only reason for the destabilization of the process. Del Sarto believes it might also be attributed to the domestic fragmentation of the southern EMP partner states that resisted political and ideological reform.
In Chapter 2 she analyzes the theoretical framework she employs to test her hypothesis. She recognizes the difficulty that concepts like “state identity” or “national identity” present. This conceptual fluidity leads the author to adopt a constructivist approach, which is not without its faults because it considers state identity to be unitary, not taking into account domestic clashes of various identities and their impact on the formation of foreign policy. Because any analysis of the role of contested identities in foreign policy needs a bottom-up approach, Del Sarto bases her approach on the liberal theories that focus on the domestic politics and preferences of the states as primary factors in the shaping of the latter's foreign policy. On a methodological level, the problem lies in the coexistence of both the state and the domestic levels of analysis, but the author argues that findings obtained from both can be integrated.
In Chapter 3 Del Sarto gives a historical account of Euro–Mediterranean relations during the Cold War and how the dynamics of the bipolar system affected them. During the post Cold War era, she describes the three-dimensional nature of these relationships (among the southern partners, among the EMP members, and, finally, among the EMP and the EU). Del Sarto argues that—despite the difficulties and the misunderstandings, the Arab–Israeli conflict, and the “re-emergence of traditional fault lines” (p. 71)—within the states were the factors that put the greater strain on the Barcelona Process. At the same time, “9/11 and its aftermath reinforced the patterns of Euro-Mediterranean disagreements that already emerged after the collapse of the peace process” (p. 72). Del Sarto brings forward the fact that most southern Mediterranean states operate along tribal and/or ethnic lines. Although Turkey and Israel are the only democracies in the region, they too are affected by domestic cleavages that, in turn, affect their relations with the EU and the EMP as a whole. Before presenting an analysis of her case studies, the author argues that her preliminary findings clearly show that any definition the state creates for itself cannot escape the contradicting identities that clash domestically, be it of religious or political origins.
The second part of Del Sarto's study involves the analysis of three case studies: Israel, Egypt, and Morocco. The author devotes a chapter to each. Following an insight into the way(s) these states defined their state identity, Del Sarto investigates whether said identities clash with domestic divisions that favor a different definition of the state as a whole. Finally, Del Sarto examines the relationship of the cases with the EU since the launching of the EMP, as well as the states' participation in the partnership, attempting to highlight those instances where the state's definition and its internal discords have put a strain on the effectiveness of the EMP and the desired goal of the transformation of the Mediterranean into a community of states.
In the case of Israel (Chapter 4), its nationalist and religious identity themes “are a somewhat negative precondition for region-building ventures in general” (p. 128). Certain attempts to change Israel's self-perception (for example, the Oslo process) have failed due to the resistance mounted by large domestic groups. The EMP's design to change the national identities of the southern states in order to promote cooperation and concord in the region has been undermined, in Israel's case, by these very groups, as well as by changes in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that were perceived as dangerous for the national cohesion and security of Israel.
In a similar vein, Egypt's multiple and crossing identity fault lines prohibit it from formulating a foreign policy that would enhance the Barcelona Process in a regional, rather than bilateral, level (Chapter 5). Moreover, the author argues it would be difficult for a state like Egypt to integrate the EMP's aims, considering its definition in primarily Pan-Arab and Islamic terms, its socialist and liberal economic order, its suspicion toward the Europeans, and its perception as the center of a predominantly “Arab world” (p. 174).
Morocco's case (Chapter 6) is the only case of an active partner in the EMP process. Moroccan state identity is defined as multiple and inclusive, and as such it favored the state's acculturation to the EMP's goals. Del Sarto believes that the EU's reluctance over Morocco's willingness and aspirations was as much a hindrance to the process as the domestic preferences split between Islamic and Western values. Furthermore, the ties of large segments of the population to traditional values also sabotaged the speed, as well as the planning, of the royal reforms. The positive image that Morocco projects, the author concludes, is very much based on the royal control exerted on virtually every aspect of life.
Del Sarto's study follows a very clear structure that employs simple terms to explain its hypothesis and findings. The central objective of this book never evades the reader, and Del Sarto's findings come almost as a natural conclusion. Readers of this study include specialists on Arab and European politics alike, who will find it gives a very useful insight into the design of regional politics and its implementation. Students of nationalism might also find this book interesting, considering its theme of contested identities and their relationship to the formulation and execution of policy by the central core. Del Sarto's book exhibits a balanced approach in a conceptually and notionally difficult question. I recommend it to students interested in exploring the political situation, and the changes it undergoes from within, in the Mediterranean as a region.
