Portuguese motives for seeking EEC associate membership

Portugal was ruled by the dictator António Oliveira Salazar from 1932 to 1968. The Salazar regime was an archetypal Catholic and nationalist right-wing dictatorship with certain affinities with fascism, like other south and east European regimes of the interwar period, though it survived until 1974, in the process becoming the longest-lasting dictatorship in Europe. In 1950 Salazar delegated European trade policy, although major decisions were taken at foreign trade cabinet meetings over which he still presided. Consequently Salazar could concentrate on the main political and colonial issues while continuing to have the final say on the European front. José Gonçalo Corrêa d'Oliveira was directly responsible for trade policy from 1955 to 1969, including the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) Free Trade Area (1956–8) and EFTA (1959–60) negotiations. Previously a senior trade official, Corrêa d'Oliveira believed that isolation from developments in Europe would have disastrous economic consequences for Portugal. As with the above negotiations, Salazar would take a discreet but decisive role, presiding over the crucial May 1962 cabinet meeting that decided the European policy option to be adopted by Portugal during this first attempt to enlarge the EEC. Contrary to his negative views on political integration, Salazar was in practice remarkably flexible in European negotiations in order to safeguard Portuguese interests.Footnote ²

One of the objectives of EFTA was to negotiate as a block with the Common Market. Following the lack of response of the Common Market to EFTA's initiative, from autumn 1960 onwards Britain let its EFTA partners know that it would be seeking Common Market membership through direct negotiations with the Six. Portugal's total exports and imports from the Common Market for 1957–8 were more than 32 per cent and 44 per cent respectively of foreign trade. With the entry of Britain, these figures would rise to more than 49 per cent and 68 per cent respectively. According to these official figures, imports and exports from the other EFTA countries were not significant.Footnote ³ Along with the other members of EFTA, Portugal's future was very much at stake with Britain's change of European policy. All would have to negotiate agreements with the Common Market due to the importance of the combined EEC/UK market.

Prior to its 11 August 1961 request for negotiations with the Common Market, Britain asked the other EFTA members to make clear their views on the Community. The Portuguese position was made known prior to the June 1961 EFTA Council meeting in London. Corrêa d'Oliveira informed the other members that Portugal would not be seeking EEC membership because (since the Portuguese constitution decreed that Portugal and its colonies were a single nation state) the ‘multi-continental structure of Portugal, and the national guidelines behind the constitution and the administration made it difficult for the country to enter a supranational organisation’. In economic terms, Corrêa d'Oliveira considered that even if favourable EFTA concessions were maintained, EEC social policy would have more negative effects on the Portuguese economy than if the country remained outside the customs union. Despite these objections, Corrêa d'Oliveira accepted that an agreement between Portugal and the EEC needed to be negotiated and the Portuguese government was prepared to compromise on common tariffs, specific harmonisation policies and the acceptance of majority decisions in areas where ‘national interest and (sovereign) rights’ were not involved. The objective of the memorandum is clearly spelt out at the end – ‘the Portuguese Government is convinced the negotiation between the two blocks is a path that we cannot abandon’ – because Lisbon was fearful of its weak bilateral negotiating power with the Common Market.Footnote ⁴

At the EFTA Council meeting in London, the newly promoted presidency minister,Footnote ⁵ Corrêa d'Oliveira, alongside the Swedes and the Swiss once again attempted to defend block negotiations between EFTA and the Common Market. Failing to convince the British to do so, these countries accepted the compromise that none of the EFTA members would sign an agreement before making sure that its free trade area partners were also in a position to do so. The so called ‘London compromise’ agreed that ‘the members of EFTA should co-ordinate their activities and should remain united during the negotiations . . . until satisfactory arrangements have been worked out . . . to meet the various legitimate interests of all members of EFTA, and thus enable them all to participate from the same date in an integrated European market’.Footnote ⁶

On 4 August 1961, less than two months after the EFTA meeting in London, the presidency minister publicly acknowledged that, to guarantee its economic development, Portugal could not afford to remain isolated from developments in Europe and was ready to join or become an associate member of the Common Market.Footnote ⁷ Corrêa d'Oliveira justified the change of policy by considering that the prestige of a government was not the result of persisting with policies that were patently wrong, but by its capacity to correct them, giving as an example Britain's decision to negotiate with the Common Market when the same British government had refused the same policy option three years previously. Corrêa d'Oliveira repeated that in political terms Portugal faced two particular difficulties – the colonial empire and the Portuguese non-democratic constitution – making it more difficult for Portugal to accept a supranational organisation compared with other European countries. The Portuguese government was analysing a solution to these problems, but already envisaged that entry would be restricted to Portugal, although the colonies had to be taken into account. In economic terms, Portugal had to guarantee a specific regime to safeguard its economic development. The swift somersault executed by the Portuguese government in relation to Common Market entry resulted from the fact that, despite the misgivings so vehemently expressed in June, it had no alternative European policy option other than following the British lead. On 12 September 1961, the economy minister Ferreira Dias echoed Corrêa d'Oliveira in considering that Portugal would probably have to follow the British lead and seek Common Market membership.Footnote ⁸ At the November 1961 EFTA Council meeting in Geneva, Corrêa d'Oliveira repeated to his colleagues that, although the foreign trade cabinet had not taken a definite position on the Common Market, his prediction was that the main line of Portuguese policy would be full membership of the Common Market, accepting the tenets and obligations of the Treaty of Rome.Footnote ⁹

The Portuguese foreign trade cabinet based its Common Market policy on a government report that was ready by the end of March 1962. Corrêa d'Oliveira charged a senior trade expert, José da Silva Lopes,Footnote ¹⁰ with writing the report. With the help of a former economics student of his, José Manuel Passeiro, Lopes completed the report in six months (October 1961–March 1962).Footnote ¹¹ The report was in favour of seeking a treaty of association, as it was already the privileged policy of the government, the best policy option for Portugal and the best negotiating option. The major conclusion of the report backed Corrêa Oliveira: reaching an agreement with the Common Market was a sine qua non condition for Portuguese economic development, even if a heavy price had to be paid, as Portugal could not afford to be economically isolated. Repeating the warning of previous government reports on Europe, the 1962 edition reiterated that the Portuguese economy relied heavily on foreign trade, Portuguese exports were dependent on the European markets and an enlarged Common Market would have negative effects on Portuguese exports.Footnote ¹² Given the less developed state of the Portuguese economy, the report concluded that association was the best policy option for Portugal.Footnote ¹³

The report argued that seeking association rather than entry would lead the Common Market to accept a ‘partial European state’, that is the report considered that a request for entry would be difficult because of the European geographical requirement, but that this problem did not occur with a request for association. Similarly, as the political criteria were less defined in relation to association than to entry, Portugal (although a dictatorship), by declaring that it accepted the political principles of the Common Market, stood a better chance of negotiating association than the neutral EFTA member countries because it was a member of NATO. The report acknowledged that association was a transitory step prior to full membership. The final advantage for Portugal in seeking association rather than entry into the Common Market was that this policy option did not require formal consultation with the EEC associated countries (i.e. the former colonies of the Six) – thereby avoiding their opposition to Portuguese colonial policy.Footnote ¹⁴

The 1962 government report considered that the nature of negotiations with the Common Market was conditioned by the specific regime Portugal had negotiated under Annex G of the EFTA convention, by the conditions negotiated by Greece and by the eventual negotiations with Spain and, above all, by the London Compromise. In line with previous thinking, both within the government and within the industrial associations, the report concluded that Portugal had weak bilateral negotiating power; therefore the best trump card was the London Compromise.Footnote ¹⁵

In May 1962, the Portuguese foreign trade cabinet accepted the conclusion of the government report. The ministers agreed that full entry was not politically and economically feasible and that a trade agreement, under Article 111 of the Treaty of Rome, would not adequately protect Portuguese interests. Consequently the Portuguese cabinet decided to negotiate EEC association, under Article 238, and future membership after a transition period that could last as long as fifteen years.Footnote ¹⁶ Worried that the EEC faced difficulties in negotiating successfully with Portugal – given the authoritarian nature of the latter's government and its colonial policy – the Portuguese cabinet determined, according to Corrêa d'Oliveira, that the 1961 Greek Association Agreement ‘offered a suitable basis [for negotiation], but Portugal would be asking less’, and therefore did not seek any financial aid.Footnote ¹⁷ Furthermore, the Portuguese government would attempt to negotiate an agreement that would only cover Portugal during the proposed transition period, after which the initial exclusion of the colonies was to be reviewed. During the interim period, the Portuguese government sought a waiver in order to avoid the application of the common external tariff to the colonies.Footnote ¹⁸

By postponing the colonial issue for up to fifteen years, the Portuguese government satisfied the Portuguese constitution, allowed for the maintenance of the colonial trade preferences (if the waiver in applying the common external tariff to the colonies was accepted) and sought to make unnecessary any formal consultation between the EEC and its African associates. A further major advantage of postponing the issue for so long was that probably by then circumstances within the Common Market or in Portugal would be different. Corrêa d'Oliveira believed that after the transition period the EEC would accept either that the Portuguese colonies, alongside Portugal, could become a full member ‘or the problem [would have] ceased to exist’ (i.e. decolonisation would have occurred), an implication of which Corrêa d'Oliveira was certainly aware. It should be emphasised that Corrêa d'Oliveira sought to maximise Portugal's chances of successfully negotiating with the Common Market, leaving the colonial issue to a future date when in all probability circumstances, not necessarily positive for the regime, would be different.

Even within an overall timeframe of fifteen years, the entry of the Portuguese colonies with Portugal as a full member of the Common Market was highly implausible.Footnote ¹⁹ Either Corrêa d'Oliveira sincerely believed that circumstances could change radically within the EEC, which was unlikely, or, more probably, that he would have to defend the future entry of the colonies into the Common Market to uphold the constitutional unity between Portugal and its colonies.Footnote ²⁰ In fact, the problem ceased to exist within the overall timeframe of the proposal: in 1968, the Portuguese dictator, Salazar, was forced to step down because of illness; in 1975 the Portuguese colonies became independent after the democratic revolution of the previous year; and in 1977 Portugal applied to become a full member of the EEC.

In seeking associate membership of the Common Market, Portugal was looking to achieve three important objectives: guaranteeing economic development, satisfying domestic public opinion and obtaining foreign policy benefits. Throughout the period, government, industrial associations and independent analysts came to the conclusion that economic development was linked to Europe – leading the Portuguese government, when forced to choose between taking part in developments in Europe and standing aloof, backed by the colonies, to choose with due consideration the European option. This policy option had already been adopted during the 1956–8 Free Trade Area negotiations and the 1959 EFTA negotiations, and would be repeated in 1962, with the adoption of the policy decision in favour of associate membership of the Common Market – each time excluding the colonies from this option. The reason why the Portuguese government so eagerly sought to guarantee economic development, even at the cost of sacrificing hitherto sacrosanct political principles, was to improve the standard of living and thereby increase social stability and the likelihood of the survival of the Salazar dictatorship.Footnote ²¹

The Salazar diagnosis leads us to the second objective of the Portuguese government in seeking an agreement with the Common Market: the need to satisfy Portuguese public opinion. The Salazar regime was noticeably weaker, having faced widespread opposition during the 1958 presidential campaign and an attempted military coup in 1961 by the defence minister, Botelho Moniz. Although an authoritarian ruler, Salazar was an able politician seeking to maintain his power base. In early May 1961, the head of the Lisbon Trade Association, Conde de Caria, considered that Portuguese public opinion was in favour of European integration and, probably more relevantly, that there ‘was great interest in (influential) private circles in his country’ in reaching an agreement with the Common Market and adopting a pragmatic approach to the supranational issue.Footnote ²² On 19 April 1962, Salazar himself recognised that Portugal had to apply for negotiations with the Common Market, even at the risk of a negative reply, or the ‘Portuguese Government places itself in a very difficult position in relation to the public opinion of the country’.Footnote ²³ Certainly, the non-communist opposition to the autocratic regime of Salazar appeared to be in favour of Common Market membership as a means of forcing the democratisation of the country.Footnote ²⁴

Although the most important reasons for seeking associate membership were internal – economic development and public opinion, accepting the constraints on the latter within the dictatorship – the external political objectives were also relevant. As with EFTA, associate membership of the Common Market would mean that Portugal would be tied to an organisation of industrially advanced countries, and so the country could justify its role in relation to its colonies as seeking to develop them. By the time of the Common Market negotiations this objective was even more important, for it ruptured the international isolation Portugal increasingly suffered after the outbreak of war in Angola in 1961. Furthermore, Lisbon would certainly try to claim that associate membership represented acceptance by the Common Market of the Portuguese colonial policy, as it construed entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as representing international recognition of the political unity of Portugal and its colonies.Footnote ²⁵ The second major political advantage of the Common Market was that Lisbon, and indeed the other members of the Seven, hoped that the entry of EFTA members would lead the Common Market in the direction of de Gaulle's concept of a ‘Europe des patries’, that is the Community would in practice become an intergovernmental organisation. The third major political advantage of membership of the Common Market was probably the most important of all, and still applies today. Even if a ‘Europe des patries’ was not to come about, in the light of Portuguese foreign trade dependence on the enlarged Community, it was a better policy option to be a minor member of the supranational Common Market than to remain outside and be subject to the organisation's decisions.

The attitudes of EEC members and Portugal's EFTA partners

Portugal was in a delicate international position. In January 1961, the hijack of the Portuguese liner Santa Maria by a joint Spanish–Portuguese opposition group had drawn attention to the authoritarian nature of the Iberian governments. On 4 February the same year, war broke out in Angola. On 17 December, India invaded the Portuguese colonies on the subcontinent. Portugal's colonial policy was very exposed, and the authoritarian nature of its regime was further highlighted by Spain's request for negotiations with the Common Market on 9 February 1962; the attention drawn to Franco's regime within the Six reflected unfavourably on the Salazar regime next door.

Diplomatic circles in Brussels attributed the delay in the Portuguese request for negotiations (4 June 1962) to the furore caused by the Spanish request for talks (9 February 1962) reflecting negatively on the Portuguese negotiating position. Unquestionably the Spanish request for negotiations had embarrassed the Portuguese since it indirectly drew attention to the fact that Portugal was also a dictatorship, when international attention was already focused on the country after the outbreak of war in the colonies. Moreover, the economies were similar, as was the level of economic development, further linking the position of both countries in future negotiations with the EEC, at a time when Portugal was seeking to benefit from the London Compromise and be a part of the EFTA wave of negotiations. There was a perception both among the Six and in Lisbon that Spain sought to obviate its own negotiating difficulties by demanding similar treatment to Portugal.

However, Portugal had different reasons for being the next to last EFTA country to apply for negotiations with the Common Market (Norway handed in its request ten days later, on 14 June 1962).Footnote ²⁶ First, the Portuguese cabinet was concerned with the outbreak of the colonial war in Angola and with the loss of Goa to India, leaving little opportunity to discuss Portugal vis-à-vis the Common Market. Second, the slowness, disorganisation, in-fighting and lack of resources of the government and of the bureaucracy were a serious problem. Corrêa d'Oliveira was responsible not only for Common Market negotiations but also for the implementation of a free trade area between Portugal and its colonies (known as the Portuguese single market), and was simultaneously negotiating entry into GATT. On the other hand, the inefficiency of the government bureaucracy resulted, for example, in Portugal only having a diplomatic representative to the Common Market from 1 June 1962, three days prior to the request for negotiations and almost a year after the British request for negotiations. The Portuguese ambassador was Calvet Magalhães, who also continued to be the Portuguese OEEC delegate in Paris. This inefficiency was compounded by the fact that until January 1962, Portugal did not have diplomatic staff in Brussels dealing exclusively with the negotiations. From that date onwards, until the end of the negotiations, there was only one full-time diplomat in Belgium dedicated to this task, initially without any expertise on the Common Market.Footnote ²⁷ Third, the Portuguese request for negotiations was delayed by the implementation of the Portuguese single market on 1 January 1962 and the accession to GATT on 6 May 1962. By setting up a free trade area with the colonies and being accepted as a member of GATT, Portugal thought that it would be able to maintain its colonial trade preferences without the Common Market (and indeed any other member of the Agreement) seeking to demand similar concessions. In propaganda terms, Lisbon argued that the implementation of the Portuguese single market – planned to take place within ten years – meant that the Portuguese colonies would eventually be economically placed to become part of the Common Market.Footnote ²⁸ Portugal was also aware that membership of GATT would protect it from Common Market pressure to negotiate excessive concessions bilaterally. On the other hand, membership was also considered to facilitate negotiations, and indeed had been demanded by the other EFTA members, since they wanted the Stockholm convention to be recognised by GATT.Footnote ²⁹

In contrast to the other EFTA members, who were invited to make their opening statements, the Portuguese request for negotiations received only a formal acknowledgement. The cool reception from the Commission and the majority of foreign ministers of the Six stemmed from the recent outbreak of war in the colonies rather than from Portugal's non-democratic regime. In fact, when visiting the capitals of the Six in October and November 1962 to counter this negative reaction, Corrêa d'Oliveira was warned by the head of the Commission, Walter Hallstein, and individual governments of the Six to avoid any reference to the colonies in future talks.Footnote ³⁰ On 19 December 1962 the Common Market ministers agreed to an exploratory meeting with Portugal on 11 February 1963, although they made it clear that the meeting would not constitute the start of negotiations. The opening statements by Norway and the EFTA neutral states had taken place by September 1962 (reinforcing the conclusion that the Common Market was distinctly cool towards Portugal).Footnote ³¹ The meeting with Portugal was postponed after President de Gaulle, fearful of losing the overriding influence of France within the Common Market, vetoed British membership, leading to the collapse of all other flanking applications.

In January 1962 the Common Market parliamentary assembly laid down the conditions for membership for a candidate country: to be geographically part of Europe; a minimum degree of industrialisation; political guarantees including democracy and participation within Western defensive organisations; and acceptance of the Treaty of Rome. In particular, the majority of parliamentarians were vehemently opposed to association with countries unwilling to share the political ideas inspiring the Rome Treaty. Portugal presented problems virtually on all fronts, its continuing colonial policy in particular becoming increasingly unpopular with public opinion in general and the socialist parties of the Six.Footnote ³² On the positive side, the developing Portuguese economy could be adequately protected by seeking an association treaty similar to that of Greece, Portugal was a member of NATO, the Portuguese government was prepared to accept fully all the obligations of the Treaty of RomeFootnote ³³ and the London compromise meant that the other EFTA members, in particular Britain, were morally bound to ensure that adequate terms were negotiated with Portugal.

Hallstein believed that the Six were unable to ignore the opposition from important sectors of public opinion – and that the outbreak of the colonial war, in particular, was prejudicial to Portugal. This sceptical attitude was matched by other sources within the Commission, who pointed to the authoritarian regime and the continued colonial policy. The Community would not accept that after a transition period the Portuguese colonies accede to the Treaty of Rome. Near the end of the negotiations, on 11 December 1962, the ministers of the Six considered that prospects were good for Denmark and Norway if negotiations with Britain were successful, but that the neutrals and Portugal faced considerable difficulties.Footnote ³⁴

Opposition to Portugal and Spain arose mainly from among the socialist and communist parties and trade unions, in particular in the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, with an attempt by April 1962 to organise a common front against Iberian membership. That same month Salazar agreed that the main opposition came from these quarters. In July 1962 the executive committee of the European Trade Unions was also opposed to establishing any negotiations with Spain and Portugal.Footnote ³⁵

In the Netherlands, overwhelming opinion within parliament, the trade unions and the press was opposed to any agreement with Spain and Portugal. During a debate in the lower house on 13 and 14 June 1962, a socialist motion calling on the Dutch government to consider democracy to be a precondition of membership was resoundingly approved. During the debate, the Dutch foreign minister, Joseph Luns, admitted only that he was conscious of the difficulties posed by the candidatures of Spain and Portugal, although he was privately in favour of negotiations. British diplomatic sources believed that the Dutch government was not opposed to reaching an agreement with the Portuguese. On the economic front, the Central Body of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries (representing the trade and industry, agriculture, banking and transport sectors) on 15 November 1962 welcomed Spain's request for association with the Common Market, following intense pressure from Spanish authorities (who threatened, for example, to pull the plug on profitable Dutch investments in Spain, in particular against Philips).Footnote ³⁶

Although the Belgian foreign minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, was also privately in favour of negotiating a treaty of association, by June 1962 there was obdurate opposition within parliament, both from the Christian Democrats and the Socialists, as well as opposition from the Catholic and the socialist trade unions. According to British sources the socialist members of the Belgian coalition government found it difficult to support the entry of or association with the Iberian countries. Luxembourg gave little or no consideration to the issue of Iberian membership; British officials judged that it was opposed to membership but might be prepared to accept associate membership.Footnote ³⁷

The prevailing mood in Italy was opposed to Portugal's application, demonstrations against membership taking place in front of the Portuguese embassy. Within the government the foreign trade minister, Luigi Pretti, and the budget under-secretary were firmly opposed to peninsular membership on political grounds. The Italian government also appeared to oppose membership on economic grounds, as Portugal and, in particular, Spain represented serious rivals in terms of agricultural produce. Rome also sought by means of its opposition to reap economic benefits in Africa and within the Third World in general. In the Italian parliament, the left was firmly opposed while the prevailing mood among the Christian Democrats was also negative. However, EFTA diplomats in Rome believed that the Italian government's final attitude would depend on the position adopted by France and West Germany.Footnote ³⁸ Throughout the negotiations, the threat of African countries pressuring the Six against Portugal was also a distinct possibility. Spaak warned the Portuguese that the African countries could threaten economic sanctions against European investment, although this was unlikely, since these countries were dependent on external investment to develop their economies.Footnote ³⁹

Within the Common Market the main support for Portugal and Spain came from France and West Germany. In 1957 the head of the European integration policy section of the West German foreign ministry, Hartlieb, promised full West German support were Portugal to seek to join the Common Market.Footnote ⁴⁰ During the 1961–3 negotiations West German support was reiterated. In July 1962 the West German finance minister, Ludwig Erhard, publicly backed the entry of all West European countries into the Common Market, including Spain and Portugal: ‘I am convinced that these countries should be included in the EEC.’Footnote ⁴¹ From the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the West German government was in favour of including within the Common Market the countries of Western Europe even in the face of political or economic difficulties. Although there were altruistic motives behind this policy and also an attempt to seek redemption for the Second World War, it was also the case that the West Germans believed that, in political terms, Western unity was the best policy in the face of the Soviet threat, and in economic terms that their economy could benefit from an expanded Common Market. In the case of the Iberian countries, the West Germans thought that Common Market membership would inevitably result in the liberalisation of their authoritarian regimes. The West Germans were clearly and unequivocally in favour of Spanish and Portuguese membership, although warning the Portuguese in January 1962 that Common Market membership was not open to the Portuguese colonies.Footnote ⁴² In fact, West German policy in favour of Portugal becoming a Common Market member changed only during the second half of the 1960s, with Erhard, by then West German chancellor, considering by August 1966 that Common Market membership was impossible for Portugal due to its continued colonial policy.Footnote ⁴³

The French also appeared to support Portugal. On 6 May 1961, the French foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, informed Salazar that, if Portugal were not successful in Africa, that country could count on French backing in favour of a European policy option. That same month, the director for economic and financial affairs in the French foreign ministry, Olivier Wormser, claimed that Portugal did not face any particular difficulty, although some special arrangements might be necessary on the lines of the Stockholm Convention. Couve de Murville informed Corrêa d'Oliveira in May 1962 that he did not predict particular negotiating difficulties for Portugal, and in June, as president of the Common Market Council, he was favourable to the Portuguese request for negotiations. In November, the French also urged that the Portuguese request for a meeting should be accepted and equally pressed for the Spanish to be heard. Despite this apparently favourable attitude, the French would only take a definitive position in relation to the Iberian countries once the negotiations with Britain had been settled.Footnote ⁴⁴ On the other hand, after de Gaulle's veto of British entry there appeared to be a French drive for Spanish and Portuguese friendship and military co-operation.Footnote ⁴⁵

Within EFTA the Norwegian government had initially believed that it faced no domestic problems in accepting Portugal as a member or associate of the Common Market and that the London Compromise covered the country. Public opinion in Norway was opposed to Spanish membership of the Common Market and, from May 1962 onwards, following the signs of internal opposition in Portugal, also turned against membership for the smaller Iberian country, leading the Norwegian government to reserve its position on the issue. The Norwegian left-wing parties believed, in contrast to the attitude adopted by West Germany, that by refusing Iberian membership they pressured the authoritarian regimes to liberalise. According to its foreign minister, Bruno Kreisky, Austria did not take sides in relation to the issue of Portuguese membership. For Denmark and Sweden the Portuguese application did not create any problems, senior officials from the foreign ministries considering respectively that membership of NATO and the London Compromise justified their favourable attitude.Footnote ⁴⁶

The main support for Portugal within EFTA came from Britain and Switzerland. Throughout the negotiations with the Common Market the Swiss were prepared to help the Portuguese, as they had previously done during the 1959 EFTA negotiations in Stockholm. The Swiss foreign minister, Traugott Wahlen, believed that the problem of Swiss neutrality posed greater negotiating problems than the Portuguese colonies, although he also believed that the latter would become a serious problem for Portugal.Footnote ⁴⁷

Britain abided by the London compromise throughout the negotiations. The British promise not to reach an agreement with the Common Market without the other EFTA members reaching suitable arrangements was maintained throughout the negotiations. The lord privy seal, Edward Heath, would reiterate this compromise on 11 December 1962.Footnote ⁴⁸ The British acknowledged that it was to the advantage of the Portuguese to be treated as a member of EFTA because of the London Compromise.Footnote ⁴⁹ Like other EFTA members, Portugal was kept fully informed of the progress of British negotiations. Corrêa d'Oliveira sought the help of the British in the negotiations and received in turn the offer of technical advice from Heath. The Portuguese presentation to the Common Market on 11 February 1963 was to be discussed in detail with senior British officials.Footnote ⁵⁰ The British were concerned with making the detailed Portuguese negotiating position as realistic as possible – given the country's weak political and economic position – in order to avoid delay in the British negotiations. According to the foreign office, ‘the problem so far as metropolitan Portugal is concerned becomes one of cutting the Greek-type agreement down to make it negotiable within a matter of a very few months’ – namely in relation to the transition period, agriculture, industry and the movement of labour. The British believed that the Portuguese would be unable to negotiate a tariff waiver for their colonial goods and, like Greece, would have to accept the common external tariff.Footnote ⁵¹ The British were satisfied that the Portuguese were pursuing the correct negotiating tactics by not seeking as many concessions as the Greeks – in particular financial assistance to develop the economy – since the Six, and indeed most of the OEEC countries, considered that Greece had obtained over-generous conditions.Footnote ⁵²

Two strands of British thinking on Portugal's chances of negotiating successfully with the Common Market can be found. On 10 April 1962 Sir Patrick Reilly of the Foreign Office reported that ‘the Six are likely to view Portugal's application favourably as far as metropolitan Portugal is concerned. As a member of NATO and various European organisations, the Six are already closely associated with her and the economic grounds for her inclusion are strong.’Footnote ⁵³ Heath told the House of Commons on 23 July 1962 that he did not expect major difficulties in the entry negotiations of Portugal, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, although political difficulties were to be expected for Austria and Switzerland. The EFTA Secretary-General, Sir Frank Figgures, reflected Heath's optimism, although judging on 19 September 1962 that Portugal did face difficulties in reaching an agreement similar to that of Greece and that the Portuguese single market with the colonies could also create difficulties.Footnote ⁵⁴

However, other senior British officials were sceptical, given Portugal's authoritarian regime and colonial policy. In fact, the view from the British negotiating delegation in Brussels was that negotiations with Portugal would be more difficult than those between the Common Market and the EFTA neutrals. The British delegates considered that it was highly improbable that the Community would accept the terms put forward by Corrêa d'Oliveira. The problem was worsened by the fact that Corrêa d'Oliveira had publicly stated that his government would not accept less favourable terms than the other EFTA members (Britain, Norway and Denmark were seeking full membership, while the EFTA neutrals were, like Portugal, seeking associate membership).Footnote ⁵⁵

President de Gaulle's veto on 14 January 1963 on British accession to the EEC led to the collapse of the attempt by EFTA members to reach an overall agreement with the Common Market. However, even the veto did not conceal the fact that British policy remained that of Common Market membership, and when London was successful in attaining this objective, Portugal and other EFTA members inevitably had to reach an agreement with the Community.

Conclusion

Throughout the 1961–3 Common Market enlargement negotiations, Corrêa d'Oliveira was noticeably upbeat with his EFTA counterparts, in particular the British, on the chances of Portugal being able to negotiate a treaty of association with the Common Market. In public, Lisbon argued that GATT had gone along with the Portuguese single market, the London compromise safeguarded negotiations with the Common Market and membership of NATO weighed significantly in favour of Portugal. Furthermore, certain diplomatic sources within the Six appeared to indicate that seeking an association agreement was a realistic option. In private, both Corrêa d'Oliveira and the Portuguese government as a whole were deeply pessimistic. Oliveira believed that Portugal would be unable to sign an association agreement and had to be prepared to accept any agreement the Common Market was prepared to offer. Meeting in May 1962 the Portuguese cabinet concurred with Corrêa d'Oliveira that the Portuguese request for negotiations had to be deliberately vague – for if the objective of associate membership were made clear, the Common Market would reply negatively.Footnote ⁵⁶

Moreover, negotiations were extremely complex. As the British were to find out, six favourable answers given individually by each government did not necessarily result in an EEC yes – as the Six meeting among themselves did not have to obey diplomatic niceties. Second, the Portuguese request for negotiations on 4 June 1962 was not fully analysed by any of the Six since they were concentrating on the negotiations with Britain. In fact, in December 1962 Couve de Murville warned that there was no agreement ‘that all these countries [the three neutrals – Austria, Sweden, Switzerland – and Portugal] should take part in an integrated European market . . . The Six had not discussed this among themselves and did not know what solution they would propose, whether a customs union or trade agreement or something in between.’Footnote ⁵⁷ Although in private Spaak was optimistic in relation to Portugal, it appears reasonable to argue that his views on negotiations with the EFTA neutrals (shared by the French, the United States, the Commission and Jean Monnet) – ‘complex, lengthy and not guaranteed to end in success’Footnote ⁵⁸ – also applied.

Third, whatever the preliminary analysis undertaken by the Six, the decisive factor was ratification by their respective parliaments – the lack of ratification by a single legislative body spelt doom for the Portuguese request. The evidence suggests that the Common Market parliamentary assembly, although only an advisory body at the time, and the Dutch and Belgian parliaments opposed associate membership, and probably the Italian parliament did too. Further, despite the London compromise, opposition from Norway might emerge, as all the evidence seemed to indicate that it would enter the Common Market prior to Portugal. Finally, both Spain in 1970 and the EFTA neutrals plus Portugal in 1972 in fact signed trade and not association agreements – in the case of Portugal after again trying to sign an association agreement. Therefore it seems conclusive that, had the first attempt to enlarge the Common Market not failed, Portugal would have ended up by signing a trade agreement. The only problem with this option was that the Treaty of Rome stipulated that a trade agreement could only be signed after the Common Market transition phase had ended – planned for 1 January 1970 but in practice brought forward to 1 July 1968. Therefore a provisional agreement was probably the solution to the conundrum.