In his excellent book, Leibniz, God and Necessity, Michael V. Griffin covers a vast number of philosophical and interpretive issues surrounding the work of Leibniz. Topics surveyed include the ontological argument, necessitarianism, possible world semantics, modal logic, and divine foreknowledge. Despite the broad scope of his book, Griffin helpfully separates his scholarship into seven chapters which are further subdivided into subsections. The sections are manageable and come with concise introductions and conclusions, though it would have been beneficial to label them with headings to further guide the reader. In this review, I’ll highlight some of the main ideas.
Griffin examines Descartes’ ontological argument as an introduction to his discussion of Leibniz. The key to Descartes’ argument is that the very concept of God contains necessary existence (16). Descartes’ argument can be understood in different ways. Perhaps we should focus on the nature of a perfect being. Existence is part of perfection, so, as a perfect being it must be part of God’s nature to exist (23). Griffin claims that Leibniz takes Descartes’ concept of existence and argues that possibles necessarily strive for existence. It is this concept of striving for existence that Leibniz uses to formulate his own version of the ontological argument (33).
According to Griffin, Leibniz’s ontological argument should not be understood as a modal argument. This conclusion is surprising as it represents a clear move away from the mainstream scholarship on Leibniz’s argument. Griffin believes that modal interpretations fail to distinguish between Descartes’ and Leibniz’s versions of the ontological argument (46). Leibniz understood Descartes’ argument to demonstrate only that, if God were to exist, God would exist necessarily (46). Griffin also claims that possible world semantics fail to account for Leibniz’s notion of “necessary,” “possible,” and “essence” (47-49). Leibniz really intends these terms to be ontological or metaphysical, rather than modal. For example, “possible” is meant to refer to concrete, not abstract, possibilities (50). Instead, we should focus on the connection between the ontological argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason which, if true, demands an explanation for the existence of God. For Leibniz, the reason for God’s existence is contained within himself. Griffin’s novel approach to Leibniz’s ontological argument certainly deserves our attention.
Griffin believes that both Leibniz and Spinoza were committed to necessitarianism, which is the idea that “everything actual is metaphysically necessary and that everything metaphysically possible is actual” (58). As a necessary and perfect being, Leibniz claims that God necessarily actualized the best possible world. There must be a plurality of possible worlds in order for God to assess and then make actual the best one (82). Both Leibniz and Spinoza were committed to the idea that everything other than God is extrinsically necessary (58). Griffin believes that necessitarianism is not as implausible a view to ascribe to Leibniz as many philosophers suggest because Leibniz did not believe that all non-actual things are possible. While any non-actual thing is conceivable and hence intrinsically possible, it does not follow that it is metaphysically possible (81).
Griffin seeks to understand how necessitarianism might be compatible with Leibniz’s belief in a plurality of possible worlds. He believes that this is possible if we understand Leibniz’s possible world semantics as a metaphysics of creation (111). Griffin holds that Leibniz was committed to the very strong claim that anything metaphysically possible is necessary (83). He argues that, for Leibniz, all possibles strive to exist and will only fail to exist if they are incompossible with something else which exists. Thus, every possible necessarily exists if it is compossible with everything else (84). For Leibinz, a possible world is simply a collection of possibles that are compossible with one another (86). Thus, possible worlds are maximal collections of harmonious substances. God conceives of these various worlds and actualizes the best, as determined by his wisdom and goodness (111).
The remainder of Griffin’s book contains different ideas on God’s foreknowledge. Griffin outlines the Molinist position on God’s foreknowledge because Leibniz’s work interacted with it. Molina held that God had knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom. Counterfactuals are what free creatures would do in different possible states of affairs. For Molina, God needs this knowledge to maintain control over creation (115). According to Griffin, Leibniz contested Molina’s account because a counterfactual is a conditional. And conditionals are not true or false propositions; they are indifferent propositions. Thus, Molina’s account is unacceptable for Leibniz because it violates the Principle of Sufficient Reason (160). Rather, Leibniz understands God’s foreknowledge as a result of knowing the “consequences of possible world-actualizing decrees” (164). Griffin concludes that Leibniz believes that “God’s knowledge of counterfactuals is just his conceptual knowledge of the consequences of his possible world-actualizing decrees coupled with his resolution to always act in the best possible way” (184).
As a scholar of mostly contemporary philosophy of religion and metaphysics, I found this book extremely helpful. Griffin focuses on the historical context and interpretive issues surrounding important areas of Leibniz’s philosophy. This is helpful for at least two reasons. First, much of Leibniz’s work anticipates contemporary philosophy of religion and it is very interesting to discover the context in which various arguments in philosophy or religion arose, particularly those that utilize possible world semantics. Second, Griffin reminds us that, while the arguments are interesting in themselves, understanding the historical context of Leibniz helps us interpret his work more accurately. Thus, the description found on the dust jacket that claims that it “will appeal to scholars of early modern philosophy and philosophers interested in modal metaphysics and the philosophy of religion” is indeed true.
