In recent years, Margaret Somerville has become a high-profile advocate for the view that same-sex marriage should not be legally sanctioned. She claims that including same-sex relationships within the norms of marriage is unethical because doing so contravenes the institution’s inherently procreative function and thereby undermines the rights and duties that exist between children and their biological parents.Footnote 1
Compared to other attempts to oppose same-sex marriage, Somerville’s argument is distinctive because it allegedly rests on secular assumptions and no moral objection to homosexuality. She specifically notes that opposing same-sex marriage from an interest in denying legitimacy to same-sex couples is unacceptably discriminatory.Footnote 2 She believes same-sex couples deserve protection in their relationship equal to that of opposite-sex couples, and she even claims that society has a responsibility to support and protect same-sex families.Footnote 3 Nevertheless, she maintains that society should not actively create families parented by same-sex partners. Thus, she argues that same-sex marriage should not be legally sanctioned because of the negative impact it has on the procreative role of the institution. If successful, her argument provides unbiased reasons to oppose same-sex marriage despite the potential appearance of a discriminatory stance toward same-sex couples.
In this paper, I provide five reasons for thinking that Somerville’s argument is not successful. I begin by summarizing her argument. I then present five ways in which the argument either begs important questions about what can be assumed in the debate over same-sex marriage or else relies on insufficient evidence to justify excluding a vulnerable minority group from participating in a state-sponsored social institution. I conclude by briefly addressing Somerville’s contention that objections to her argument are grounded in illicit political correctness.
Summary of the Argument
The backbone of Somerville’s argument against same-sex marriage is the human rights of children. This is clearly a weighty moral consideration, so the crux of the argument rests on persuasively connecting the human rights of children to preventing same-sex couples from participating in marriage. The straightforward way of making this connection is to claim that the parenting in same-sex families is harmful and therefore violates the rights of children by directly jeopardizing their well-being.Footnote 4 Somerville, however, makes no such claim. Instead, she claims that marriage is inherently linked to procreation in the sense that it institutionalizes social norms of parenthood — norms that regulate the rights of parents and their children. She then argues that legalizing same-sex marriage removes the presumption of a biological bond between parents and children in the institutionalized norms of marriage. The basis of parenthood in society, she notes, is changed from one of biological parenthood to one of “mere” legal parenthood.Footnote 5 According to Somerville, this is morally objectionable because it normalizes same-sex families in which children are denied fundamental human rights related to their biological origins.
Somerville draws on a broad range of ethical considerations to support her view, but the basic structure of her argument can be summarized as follows:
P1: As a social practice, marriage has an inherently procreative function: it is responsible for institutionalizing parenting norms, i.e., the social norms associated with the rights and duties of parents and their children.
P2: The parenting norms institutionalized by marriage have, until now, been based upon “natural” biological relationships and therefore reflect the fundamental human rights of children that are related to their biological origins.
C1: If marriage is altered to include same-sex couples, the traditional presumption that the parenting norms it institutionalizes are based on biological relationships is annulled, and this, by definition, jeopardizes the fundamental human rights of children that are otherwise protected by society via marriage.
In a sense, the core thesis of Somerville’s argument is at this point complete. However, she adds additional considerations to provide a more concrete articulation of the way in which the rights of children will be violated if same-sex marriage is sanctioned:
P3: Marriage is a compound right in that it is both (a) the right to have one’s relationship publicly validated, and (b) the right to found a family.
P4: If same-sex couples are given the right to found families, this right will be a positive right to be provided with the resources (i.e., reproductive technologies) necessary to enable them to have children.
P5: The fundamental rights of children include rights that are not compatible with the reproductive technologies necessary for same-sex couples to found families, e.g., (i) the right to know their genetic origins, (ii) the right to be conceived with a “natural” biological heritage, (iii) the right to be reared within their own biological families, and (iv) the right for each child to have a parent of each sex.
C2: If marriage is altered to include same-sex couples, the children of such couples will have their fundamental human rights violated because they can be produced only by reproductive technologies that are not compatible with these rights.
C3: If marriage is altered to include same-sex couples, the institution will become further fragmented and give way to parenting norms (previously ruled out by a presumption of biological relationships) that are clearly unethical, e.g., polygamy.
As noted earlier, the argument contains no explicitly religious premises, nor does it make any mention of the moral status of homosexuality. Nowhere does it impugn the ability of same-sex couples to care for children in the sense of being willing to provide them with the love and stability commonly thought necessary in order for children to thrive and live healthy, well-adjusted lives. What the argument alleges is that providing a nurturing environment for the rearing of children, as necessary as it may be, is not sufficient to safeguard their interests, because the human rights of children are violated whenever they are created in circumstances that separate them from their “natural” biological origins. On the premise that marriage is an inherently procreative relationship, same-sex marriage is condemned because no matter how loving and capable (or uninterested in becoming parents) a same-sex couple may be, the couple will not be in a position to exhibit the norms specifying the appropriate rights and duties between parents and their children.
The Social Function of Marriage
The first crucial step in Somerville’s argument is to establish a link between marriage and procreation. If this link is not established, her argument fails to gain any traction because it is unable to make the connection between the social function of marriage and the rights of children. For the most part, however, Somerville simply assumes that the link between marriage and procreation is self-evident. Very little argument is provided to support the assumption (exhibited in P1 and P3 above), and this begs an important question early on for those not already convinced that marriage necessarily has the role of institutionalizing parenting norms in society.Footnote 6 The premise clearly will be adopted by those operating from an understanding of marriage grounded in religious perspectives such as those offered by the Catholic or Mormon Church. However, Somerville’s argument is meant to be convincing for a secular audience, and insufficient support is provided to ensure that a secular citizen would be divested of the opinion that marriage is an institution that primarily functions to publicly validate personal relationships, i.e., that it may be related to procreation but that this role need not be understood as one of its inherent functions.
What support Somerville provides for the link between marriage and procreation comes in two forms. The first is an appeal to tradition. Somerville claims that marriage has “over millennia” institutionalized “natural” parenthood and its corresponding rights and duties.Footnote 7 As a rhetorical move this allusion will surely draw nods of allegiance from those already willing to accept her claim, but appeals to tradition are known as fallacious for a reason: they provide no rational support for their conclusion if one aims to convince those not already converted. The advocate of same-sex marriage is likely well aware of marriage’s institutional history and will see little reason for disputing that it exhibited a procreative function in the past. However, this advocate can argue that the procreative aspects of prior (often religiously influenced) conceptions of marriage are precisely what ought to be amended in a modern, secular implementation of the institution. If this is the position adopted by the advocate of same-sex marriage, an appeal to past millennia will provide her with no good reason to change her mind.
Furthermore, even if one concedes that marriage exhibited a procreative function in the past, one might dispute that this function is still uniquely attached to marriage in a contemporary setting. Couples routinely marry without having children. Persons beyond their “natural” reproductive years are routinely permitted to marry. Persons who have had operations to render themselves infertile are routinely permitted to marry. Couples living in common-law relationships possess the same right to found a family without having to be married, and the law enforces the rights and duties of parenting norms accordingly in cases where these couples do have children. With so many deviations from the standard of marriage serving a uniquely procreative function, it is not obvious that this function is an inherent feature of marriage, much less that no other social institutions are available to institutionalize parenting norms so as to protect the rights of children.
Somerville’s response to this challenge is to claim that deviations like those above are exceptions that do not transgress the general norm, institutionalized by marriage, that opposite-sex couples represent a naturally, inherently procreative relationship.Footnote 8 They are, in effect, acceptable side-effects of an institution that is imperfect but nevertheless vitally necessary to society, whereas allowing same-sex relationships within marriage is no mere exception or alteration of a collateral feature of the institution — it would be to destroy the institution itself by removing one of its inherent features.Footnote 9
One might wonder why marriage is vitally necessary to safeguard the procreative interests of society, given the ways in which parental duties are legally enforced in cases of civil unions, common-law relationships, or even mere proximity that is judged to have created expectations of parental responsibility.Footnote 10 However, on the presumption that we want to preserve marriage as a secular institution, the advocate of same-sex marriage can counter Somerville’s response by challenging her to justify the classification scheme that counts infertile opposite-sex couples as negligible exceptions while same-sex couples are considered radical threats to the institution itself. The justification cannot be merely the epistemic difficulty related to identifying infertile persons, for the normative symbolism Somerville values could be served by requiring affidavits in the acquisition of marriage licences to the effect that couples are, to the best of their knowledge, fertile. This option is never addressed because the difference between infertile and same-sex couples is, for Somerville, one based on principle rather than on the practical convenience of being able to identify couples unable to procreate because they are the same sex. The problem is that she never articulates the justification for this principled difference, and this begs a key question about how human kinds ought to be appropriately sorted. Somerville assumes that the difference between heterosexuals and homosexuals is sufficiently profound that the ethical significance of this classification is self-evident, whereas infertility is merely a trivial type of exception; but for the advocate of same-sex marriage this looks like exactly the kind of moral bias against homosexuality that is not supposed to be operating in her argument. To be persuasive, the argument cannot presuppose opposite-sex relationships as a default so “normal” as to be resilient to various procreative exceptions while same-sex relationships are classified as specially deviant.Footnote 11 This smuggles assumptions into one’s premises that render the argument ineffective for anyone not already convinced of its conclusion.
The second type of support Somerville offers to establish a link between marriage and procreation is an appeal to the protection of international law. She cites Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in support of her claim that marriage is a compound right in the sense of being both a right to have one’s relationship publicly validated and a right to found a family (P3).Footnote 12 Assuming that international law accurately reflects our considered judgments about the functions of institutions like marriage, Somerville is able to rely on a credible source for establishing a link between marriage and human rights that are related to procreation.
Of course, it is not clear why the advocate of same-sex marriage ought to concede the assumption that current international law reflects her considered judgments about the proper functions of marriage, but there is a more basic problem with Somerville’s appeal to the examples she cites from international law. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.” Further, Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.” Somerville interprets these statements as evidence that the right to marry is inherently a right to found a family, i.e., that the right to found a family is a part of the compound right of marriage. This, however, is not the only possible interpretation of the texts. The two statements involve conjunctions, and one can just as easily read them as protecting two separate, though related, rights. There is nothing explicit in the articles themselves that requires readers to understand founding a family to be an inherent part of marriage (let alone that marriage is the only institution capable of protecting the rights associated with founding a family). In fact, it seems likely that the articles were written as conjunctions that specifically include the right to found a family because this right was not necessarily assumed to be included within the prior right to marry. Again, we find that Somerville does not offer sufficient evidence for those not already sympathetic to her conclusions.
Marriage and Reproductive Technology
So far we have seen that the first and third premises of Somerville’s argument, as I have represented it above, are not as persuasive as would be necessary to avoid begging key questions in the debate over same-sex marriage. For the moment, however, let us grant these premises and proceed as if the procreative role of marriage has been successfully established. The next step in Somerville’s argument is to claim that the rights of children implied by biological parenting norms are jeopardized if marriage is altered to include relationships that cannot found families based on biological heritage. She develops this claim by noting that if same-sex couples are given the right to found families, this right will end up being a positive right to be provided with the relevant technology necessary for such couples to have children (P4). If this is permitted, the children in these families will allegedly have their rights violated because they will be raised in circumstances that deprive them of their “natural” genetic origins.
Let us focus on this fourth premise of the argument. Somerville claims the right to found a family is a negative content right — one of noninterference with respect to the bearing of children — as opposed to a positive content right to bear children that would imply a subsequent right to be given access to reproductive technology.Footnote 13 However, she argues that if same-sex couples are granted the right to found a family via marriage, then the only meaningful interpretation of this right will be as a positive right if the right is to have any reality in practice.Footnote 14 She predicts that same-sex couples will argue on grounds of non-discrimination that they ought to be given access to reproductive technology in order to fulfill their right to found a family. Thus, despite the fact that she thinks there are good reasons for considering access to reproductive technology to be a privilege that can be restricted for sufficiently compelling ethical reasons, she suggests that same-sex marriage will make such access inevitable as part of the right to found a family.
It is not clear, though, what makes it so inevitable that the right to found a family will become a positive right to be given access to reproductive technology if the right is granted to same-sex couples. If, as Somerville claims, there is good reason for thinking that the right to found a family is one of noninterference, why must the status of this right change so dramatically? The mere fact that same-sex couples cannot exercise the right without assistance is not a sufficient explanation. If I have very few friends but want to exercise my right to peaceful assembly, my inability to exercise the right does not turn it into a positive right to be provided with compatriots. If I speak only English but have the right to communicate with my government in a second language (e.g., French in the case of Canada), my inability to exercise the right does not turn it into a positive right to be provided with language training. Somerville uses the analogy of a right to health care to argue that attributing the right to found a family via marriage is meaningless without the ability to exercise this right.Footnote 15 But this begs the question of how much accommodation ought to be provided in each instance of an ostensibly positive right.Footnote 16 The right to be provided with health care resources is highly persuasive in a way that the right to access to reproductive technology need not be. There is already considerable debate about the right of infertile opposite-sex couples to be provided with reproductive technology.Footnote 17 It remains unclear why Somerville assumes this debate will be decisively settled if same-sex couples are given the right to found a family via marriage.
In short, it is a viable option for the advocate of same-sex marriage to accept the assumption that marriage implies a right to found a family, yet maintain that this right is not sufficient to guarantee same-sex couples access to reproductive technology. In its weaker version, this position concedes that financial support for reproductive technology need not be offered to same-sex couples; in its stronger version it concedes that it could be permissible to restrict same-sex couples from access to such technology. The stronger version of the position seems unreasonably severe, but only because of the prevalence of reproductive technology and the fact that it would be discriminatory to specially preclude same-sex couples from using technology that is widely available to infertile opposite-sex couples. If this is the source of the inevitability Somerville attributes to same-sex couples being given access to reproductive technology, then her prediction is reasonable but does not advance her argument, for it suggests that she has misconstrued the position of those in favour of giving same-sex couples access to this technology. Instead of being based on a positive right to found a family, the position may be based on the obligation to provide equivalent treatment for same-sex and infertile opposite-sex couples: either neither of the two groups is given access to reproductive technology or both groups are provided with access. If this is the case, the position is plausibly based on a right of nondiscrimination and provides no support for the fourth premise of Somerville’s argument that same-sex marriage changes the nature of the right to found a family.
Anonymity and Reproductive Technology
Let us again proceed by provisionally granting the assumptions that have just been called into doubt. Thus, assume for the time being that marriage is inherently connected to the right to found a family and that this right inevitably will become a positive right to access reproductive technology if same-sex marriage is permitted. The next step in Somerville’s argument is to convince her audience that children born to same-sex couples through the use of reproductive technology will have their fundamental rights violated because some of these rights are incompatible with this technology (P5). Of the examples of rights that are said to be undermined by reproductive technology, the one that is most prominently emphasized is the right of a child to know her genetic origins.Footnote 18 Somerville targets the use of anonymous gamete donation and cites testimonial evidence from adopted children who have been unable to identify their biological parents and therefore feel victimized as adults. She refers to such persons as “genetic orphans” and claims that they have been deeply wronged by those who have brought them into existence without considering the impact of using reproductive technology in ways that prevent children from being able to ascertain their genetic identities.Footnote 19 Permitting same-sex couples to marry, according to Somerville, will only exacerbate this situation by publicly affirming the right to found a family for persons who will increase the existing demand for gamete donation and other forms of anonymous reproductive technology.Footnote 20
There are two problems with this stage of the argument. The first is the nature of the evidence that Somerville cites to support her assertion that the fundamental human rights of persons born without knowledge of their genetic origins have necessarily been violated. The testimonials she presents are compelling, but anecdotal evidence, no matter how passionate, is not sufficient to demonstrate that all, or even most, children produced without knowledge of their genetic origins are harmed grievously enough to support the claim that fundamental human rights are being violated. Clear statistical evidence would be required to settle this point, let alone the looming cause/correlation problem of being certain that the harm at stake is due to the inability to know one’s genetic origins rather than to the social expectations we place on ourselves, and our children, to know our genetic heritage and be able to recite it to others.Footnote 21 Somerville claims that the testimonials she discloses are not anomalous and that surveys of donor-conceived adults reveal the same feelings of outrage and betrayal.Footnote 22 However, the only reference she provides to back up this promissory note is a set of letters published in the newsletter of an on-line infertility network.Footnote 23 This is anecdotal evidence in another form — it is insufficient to establish that most, let alone all, individuals created without the ability to discover their genetic origins are wronged so profoundly that one can convincingly say that their fundamental human rights have been violated.
Of course, to doubt this stage of Somerville’s argument, one need not discount the emotional anguish of those individuals who feel victimized by not having access to their genetic history, nor is it necessary to view the contribution of genetic history as trivial in the formation of an individual’s identity. The opportunity to know one’s genetic history may indeed be a valuable thing for many individuals. The question is how valuable this opportunity is, and for how many individuals. To cast doubt on the fifth premise of her argument, one need only dispute Somerville’s claim that knowing one’s genetic history is so valuable that creating individuals who lack this opportunity is sufficiently unethical as to be described as a violation of a fundamental human right.
One way of disputing this claim is to focus on the apparent corollary of the view that it is morally wrong to create a person who will not know (some part of) her genetic history. It would seem that this view implies that the person who is created is better off not existing, since it was allegedly a morally wrong act to bring her into existence instead of not creating any person at all. This is a counterintuitive result, because those persons who lament their lack of genetic heritage are rarely so distressed by this deficit that they would prefer not to exist.
What we have here is an instance of the infamous non-identity problem that arises when choices that affect the features of future persons also determine their identities.Footnote 24 A choice to create a child who lacks a genetic history, in our example, is a choice that will simultaneously determine whether this particular person exists at all. Thus, it may seem as if Somerville is committed to the drastic conclusion that persons unable to know their genetic heritages are so profoundly harmed that it would have been better had they never been allowed to live. However, the non-identity problem can generate counterintuitive results when hardships for future persons are permitted, because there are often cases in which we want to say both that an avoidable hardship ought to have been prevented and that the resulting person is nevertheless better off existing than not. For example, it is a standard medical recommendation that women do not become pregnant for a month after receiving a rubella vaccination (which can adversely affect a subsequent fetus), but if this recommendation is ignored and a resulting child is born with a hardship that could easily have been avoided, we do not want to say that this particular child would be better off not existing — this despite the fact that we do want to say that it was wrong of her parents to have permitted a hardship that could have been avoided merely by delaying conception by one month.
Consider another example, this one from David Velleman. Even if we think people should not have more children than they can adequately care for, we tend to think that “Loving an individual child and rejoicing in his existence is perfectly consistent with thinking it wrong for parents like his to have had so many children.”Footnote 25 The non-identity problem reveals that this seemingly innocuous judgment is far more complicated than it appears, but Velleman is correct to note that there are at least some cases where common sense is powerful enough to set such complications aside. Thus, one cannot dismiss Somerville’s fifth premise too quickly by attributing to her the view that persons created without the opportunity to know their genetic histories are better off not existing at all.
Yet this stage of her argument remains in jeopardy, because it is also a mistake to ignore the non-identity problem entirely and presume that one ought never to impose any hardships on future persons, no matter what the hardship and the available options of the individuals deciding whether or not to create these persons. Returning to Velleman, who also opposes gamete donation because it deprives children of (some part of) their genetic heritages, we must be careful interpreting his claim that “Much as we love disadvantaged children, we rightly believe that people should not deliberately create children who they already know will be disadvantaged.”Footnote 26 This claim is plausible if we assume an available alternative where the prospective parents can instead choose to create children who will not be disadvantaged, but this is not what is defended by Velleman and Somerville. They claim that one ought not to create a disadvantaged child even if this is the only way for a prospective parent to create a child. This is a much stronger claim — one that is plausible only if the disadvantage at stake is very serious.Footnote 27
So we are brought back to the essential question: how valuable is the opportunity to know one’s genetic heritage? How much of a hardship is it to deprive a child of this opportunity? To support the argument that same-sex marriage is not permissible because it facilitates the violation of a fundamental human right, creating a child deprived of her genetic heritage would have to be considerably more harmful than, say, creating a child who will be brought up in conditions of poverty, for Somerville presumably will not be willing to conclude that economically disadvantaged persons should not be permitted to marry and thus to found a family. Moreover, Somerville is opposed to any form of eugenics that would prevent children with disabilities from being born.Footnote 28 Thus, if her argument is to be successful, the harm of being born without knowing one’s genetic heritage must be substantially, if not categorically, more serious than any other common case in which we think it is permissible for parents to create children with disadvantages because no other available options exist. To back up this assumption, much more evidence and argument is required than what Somerville provides.Footnote 29
The second, far more important, problem with Somerville’s assumption about the right to know one’s genetic origins is that the advocate of same-sex marriage can bypass this stage of the argument entirely by conceding that reproductive technology ought only to be used in such a way that children can discover their genetic origins. As she points out, the United Kingdom recently implemented regulations to this effect.Footnote 30 Why, then, is the right to know one’s genetic identity put forward as a principled obstacle to same-sex marriage if the right to found a family can be applied to same-sex couples in a way that is consistent with full disclosure of the resulting children’s genetic histories? Even if all the passionate testimonial evidence provided by Somerville accurately reflects the anguish of individuals who have been prevented from knowing their genetic origins, this evidence is rendered moot by the possibility of disconnecting same-sex marriage from reproductive technology that fails to offer transparent disclosure of genetic lineage. There will remain some interesting complications about how information about genetic heritage ought to be best provided to children of same-sex couples, but there is no reason to think that these complications cannot be adequately managed.Footnote 31 Thus, a link between same-sex marriage and the rights of children is again severed by the fact that Somerville presents insufficient evidence to support the gravity of her conclusions.
The Right to a “Natural” Family
If we again grant the assumption that marriage is inherently connected to a right to found a family and the further assumption that if same-sex marriage is permitted this right will inevitably become a positive right to reproductive technology, requiring that reproductive technology provide the transparent disclosure of genetic history is not adequate to protect children, according to Somerville, because children will still be denied rights related to a “natural” family, e.g., the right to be conceived with a natural biological heritage, the right to be reared within their biological families, and the right to have parents of each sex. Her position is that these rights are sufficiently weighty that it is unethical to bring a child into existence who will not be in a position to have these rights fulfilled; hence, she maintains that society should not endorse forms of marriage that can achieve the procreative role of the institution only through methods that preclude the fulfillment of such rights.
In fact, Somerville goes so far as to claim that a child’s right to be conceived with a “natural biological heritage” is the most fundamental human right.Footnote 32 This seems highly implausible given the alternatives, e.g., the right not to be tortured, the right to be free from slavery, the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, etc. But even if we set aside the superlative nature of her claim as hyperbole, Somerville provides little support for a less radical claim that is sufficient to support her argument, i.e., that a child’s right to a natural biological heritage is vital enough to outweigh the rights of adults to procreate without undue discrimination. She cites her own work and that of Jürgen Habermas as supporting references.Footnote 33 However, as respected as Habermas is as a political philosopher, his views on reproductive technology and human identity do not reflect the kind of consensus that is required for an argument from authority to be persuasive.Footnote 34 For someone not already convinced that a right to natural biological heritage exists, it remains feasible to deny that the right exists at all, or at least to deny that the right is so significant that it is impermissible for adults faced with no other means of procreation to override the right in favour of their own right to found a family.Footnote 35
There is a similar lack of an argument to support the assertion that children have a sufficiently powerful right to be reared within their biological families that it is morally wrong to bring them into existence to be raised by genetically unrelated parents. At one point, Somerville refers to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to provide support to this claim.Footnote 36 However, the articles of the convention that refer to the right of a child to know and be cared for by her parents (Article 7) or the duty of the state to ensure that a child not be separated from her parents against her will (Article 9) do not directly support Somerville’s assertion. First, at no point do the articles specifically refer to the biological parents of children. Somerville proposes that this is the correct interpretation of “parent,” since it is the usual meaning assigned.Footnote 37 But clearly this begs the question regarding the normative status of genetically unrelated parents. As she points out, the convention was drafted without a distinction between biological and non-biological parents in mind, and rather than this serving as evidence that the articles of the convention would refer to the biological parents of children if only their language were clarified, this ambiguity of the language in the convention reflects the open-ended nature of the debate over the status of genetically unrelated parents. Secondly, it seems clear that the intent of the articles of the convention is to preclude the unjustified seizure of children from their existing families whether the parents of these families are biological or not. Appealing to a protection for children this basic in order to support the much more contentious claim of a right to be reared by specifically biological parents would require considerably more argument than Somerville provides.
Finally, the right to have a parent of each sex is one that would straightforwardly block same-sex couples from founding families without relying on details about the need for reproductive technology. Again, however, Somerville provides insufficient evidence to demonstrate that this right is powerful enough to be decisive. She cites literature that suggests men and women parent differently.Footnote 38 But even if we ignore the problems related to gender roles being separable from sex, this evidence is inadequate to support the more specific claim that parenting differences between men and women generate a variety so valuable that it convincingly establishes a human right for children that is strong enough to trump the interests of same-sex couples to found families. What Somerville needs is evidence convincingly linking very serious harm to children with the lack of a male or female parent. To this end, she refers readers to a scientific paper on the early epigenetic effects of maternal nurturing behaviour in rats.Footnote 39 She claims that this paper shows “that certain genes in young mammals are imprinted (activated) by parental behaviour, but shut down for life if not imprinted within a very limited critical window period.”Footnote 40
There are several problems here. First, she offers no further elaboration to argue for the implied parallel between the nurturing behaviours of rats and humans. Clearly she is not implying that human children are harmed if they are not licked and groomed in the first week of life. Some equivalent form of human nurturing is presumed as analogous behaviour for humans, but this raises the possibility that male parents can successfully provide such behaviour. Somerville cannot argue that a nurturing parent must be female no matter what the analogous behaviour for humans, because the experiment exclusively focused on maternal nurturing. The experiment studied the contrast between genetically related maternal nurturing and genetically unrelated maternal nurturing; it was not set up to demonstrate that male licking and grooming is inadequate. (Such an experiment would be difficult to pull off, because convincing male rats to lick, groom, and offer arched-back nursing with prosthetic nipples would be a considerable challenge.)
Furthermore, if the results of the experiment suggest anything it is the potential for variability in mammalian nurturing roles. The point of the study was to show that the biological offspring of mothers who exhibit low levels of nurturing resemble the normal offspring of mothers who exhibit high levels of nurturing if these offspring are reared by the latter. In other words, one need not be reared by one’s biological mother in order to receive the early imprinting that activates beneficial genes. I am inclined to be wary of drawing conclusions about human nurturing from rat experiments (interesting though they are), but it is curious that Somerville chooses this particular study since its conclusion is antithetical to her broader aims regarding the deep significance of being raised by one’s biological parents.Footnote 41
Let us assume, though, that the evidence cited by Somerville really did establish the existence of a parenting benefit that can be provided only by mothers (and another benefit that can be provided only by fathers, since her argument is against endorsing all same-sex families rather than just those of homosexual men). The key question for her argument is how vital this parenting benefit is compared to other foreseeable benefits for children. Specifically, is the benefit so vital that it is indicative of a right strong enough to outweigh the right of same-sex couples to found families? Somerville claims that the mere suggestion of exclusive parenting roles in rats is enough to trigger a precautionary principle that places a burden of proof against those arguing that same-sex families are ethically permissible. However, the proposed burden of proof must be consistent with the risks we commonly tolerate when opposite-sex couples have children who will face foreseeable challenges. Economically disadvantaged couples are not denied the right to procreate despite considerable evidence that their children are comparatively at risk for diminished educational prospects as well as physical and psychological harm. Thus, is the right of children to be born into economic stability a strong enough prima facie right that it is morally impermissible to allow economically disadvantaged couples to found families? Most would consider this a reductio, yet Somerville is committed to the same reasoning in the case of same-sex couples but with far less empirical evidence to support her conclusion. Similar reductios lurk in the form of parents who are smokers, disabled, or living in conditions of political upheaval. If we look at the evidence objectively, it is highly unlikely that a burden of proof against same-sex families ought to be set so that it denies their right to found families while more thoroughly documented risks to children are tolerated among many other opposite-sex groups in society.Footnote 42
The Fragmentation of Marriage
A final objection remains: Somerville’s claim that if marriage is altered to include same-sex couples, no principled reasons will remain to rule out objectionable parenting norms such as those associated with polygamy. She states:
There has been valid concern that legally recognizing same-sex marriage could open up polygamy, because, unlike opposite-sex marriage, which links marriage to the primary inherently procreative relationship between one man and one woman, there is no inherent reason to limit same-sex marriage to only two people. … Moreover, even when limited to two people, same-sex marriage opens up marriage for redefinition and, therefore, could set a precedent that makes multiple husbands or wives a possibility on the grounds that that is just a further redefinition of marriage.Footnote 43
Somerville’s view is that including same-sex couples within marriage will contribute to the fragmentation the institution and compromise its ability to protect children and the rest of society from pernicious forms of organizing parental relations.
Slippery slope arguments of this kind are not necessarily fallacious, but one must carefully consider the proposed “slope” of the argument to make sure that the connection between the components of the argument is plausible, for very often it is not. In our case, Somerville employs two different strategies to establish a connection between same-sex marriage and practices such as polygamy. The first, as the passage above suggests, is to note that no principled barrier to polygamy remains once the procreative limit that is inherent to opposite-sex marriage is open to revision. This strategy, however, begs the question of whether the prohibition on polygamous marriage can be justified only by the kind of limit Somerville takes to be inherent to opposite-sex marriage. In short, it presumes that there is no way for the advocate of same-sex marriage to offer a compelling reason to prohibit polygamy once recourse to the view of marriage as a relation between one man and one woman is no longer understood as being inherent to the institution. This presumption is contentious for those not already convinced of Somerville’s conclusions, in the same way that “If God is dead, everything is permitted” is contentious for those not convinced of a religious basis for morality.Footnote 44 It ignores the possibility that polygamy (as well as incest and beastiality, to name other perils said to lurk at the bottom of the slope) can be ruled out by supplementary arguments that carry no analogous implications for monogamous same-sex couples.Footnote 45
The other strategy Somerville employs to connect same-sex marriage to polygamy is to document the complicated parental relationships that arise when children are created via the reproductive technology required for same-sex couples to found families.Footnote 46 Cases where the genetic material of three or more parents are combined in a single child make for especially exotic examples, but even comparatively simple cases of gamete donation in which a donor and both members of a same-sex couple want to be recognized as legal parents constitute difficulties for a two-parent system. If same-sex marriage increases the demand for such technology, the result is allegedly a move down the slope toward society’s normalizing polygamous marital relations and their correlative parental norms.
There can be no doubt, I think, that genuine difficulties exist for integrating legal recognition of multiple parents into a system designed for only two official parents. The problem for Somerville, however, is that these difficulties are challenging but not sinister enough to set up the reductio she needs for a slippery slope argument to be effective. For the argument to work, the kind of “polygamous parenting” invited by same-sex marriage must be so clearly unethical that the risk of endorsing it outweighs the benefits of taking the first step down the slope. The argument carries rhetorical force because the kind of polygamy with which readers are most familiar does involve clearly unethical practices, e.g., forced marriage of minors, unchecked patriarchy, restrictions on citizen movements, etc. Yet the polygamous parenting invited by cases where both members of a same-sex couple want to be recognized as parents along with a gamete donor is not so unavoidable and awful that it grounds a slippery slope argument without further elaboration. In fact, the harm to citizens, particularly children, is not obvious for this particular kind of legal recognition of multiple parenting. Further argument is thus required from Somerville to demonstrate that polygamous parenting is both inevitable and grave enough to prevent same-sex couples from exercising a prima facie right to found a family.Footnote 47
Reason to doubt that Somerville can make her case here comes in the form of an analogy with legalizing divorce and remarriage. It is now common for children to grow up with the experience of multiple parents because of the divorces of their original parents and their embracing of subsequent step-parents. In effect, this is polygamous parenting in something like the form forewarned as a consequence of same-sex marriage, but this practice does not harm children in so obvious and decisive a way that prohibiting divorce and remarriage is a prominent topic of controversy. It seems generally accepted that the rights of adults to exit unfulfilling marriages and to enter into subsequent marriages are sufficiently strong that they outweigh the subsequent potential for harm to children. It can certainly create intricate legal challenges, e.g., cases of custody or child support where legal responsibility falls on a biological parent despite a deeper relationship having been established with a step-parent.Footnote 48 And it is tragic that parents do not always make suitable efforts to help children navigate the emotional complications associated with recognizing multiple persons as parents. Nonetheless, advocates of same-sex marriage can point to the existing norms associated with divorce and remarriage in order to defuse fears about polygamous parenting and to establish a nondiscrimination argument that privileges their equivalent rights to marry without interference over the rights of children to be protected from the alleged harm of having multiple legal parents.
Conclusion
In the course of becoming a prominent critic of same-sex marriage, Margaret Somerville has become a target for accusations of promoting hatred against gays and lesbians. She maintains that she is a victim of a political correctness that now dominates academia due to the influences of postmodernism and moral relativism. As she describes it:
Anyone who challenges the politically correct stance is, thereby, automatically labeled as intolerant, a bigot, or hatemonger. The substance of their arguments against a politically correct stance is not addressed; rather people labeled as politically incorrect are, themselves, attached as being intolerant and hateful simply for making those arguments. This derogatorily-label-the-person-and-dismss-them-on-the-basis-of-that-label approach is intentionally used as a strategy to suppress strong arguments against any politically correct stance and, also, to avoid dealing with the substance of these arguments.Footnote 49
I have attempted to show that Somerville’s arguments against same-sex marriage are not strong by directly dealing with the substance of these arguments. I have not appealed to postmodernism, moral relativism, or ad hominem arguments. I conclude that Somerville’s arguments are defective because they either beg fundamental questions about what can be presupposed in advance or else rely on insufficient evidence to justify treating same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples in the application of a secular, state-sponsored social institution. This conclusion is not derived from political correctness; it is derived from examining the merits of Somerville’s arguments using rational tools that any respectable academic ought to employ.
