Some critics argue that Karl Barth offers an inadequate account of theological rationality. His insights do not count as true knowledge because he operates within the parameters of revealed principles which cannot be verified. This positivism results in subjectivism, because the theologian's faith serves as the ground from which these principles gain authority. Barth thus offers little more than a self-guaranteeing, anti-rational theology that speaks only to those already convinced.
Martin Westerholm addresses these criticisms by showing that Barth's account of theological rationality is cogent, consistent and worthy of engagement. Making this case also leads Westerholm to raise questions about whether key debates that have shaped Barth scholarship for decades – particularly those that stem from the differences between realist and critically realist interpretations of Barth – stem from unfortunate misreadings of Barth's theology. If successful on both fronts, Westerholm's argument not only establishes Barth as a viable conversation partner in discussions about theological rationality, but it also rehabilitates Barth studies by pointing the way beyond present entrenchments.
Westerholm develops his case over five chapters framed by an introduction and conclusion. The first chapter argues that Barth reframed the questions of reason and truth in light of commitments drawn from Paul and Anselm. Of course, the years between Barth's early work on Paul and his 1931 book on Anselm have been the subject of intense research by scholars theorising about Barth's development. Yet Westerholm sidesteps these diachronic readings by taking a ‘half-turn toward the synchronic’ to focus on key commitments that emerge in Barth's theology during this period (p. 12). He unveils these commitments in a two-part, four-chapter narrative that suggests a ‘straightforward continuity’ between Barth's Pauline notion of faith and his Anselmian account of understanding (p. 141). Barth's merger of these two notions is the key to grasping his account of theological rationality.
Westerholm's reconstruction of this account forms the bulk of the remaining chapters. Briefly: Paul taught Barth that theological rationality properly begins with the resurrection. Since this event reveals a truth qualitatively distinct from the truth of other historical events, it must be acknowledged rather than substantiated. The resurrection ‘hovers over each moment in time’ in the sense that everything should be considered in light of the promise it entails (p. 97). As a result, the thinker must move ‘from the standpoint of an empirical subject to the standpoint of an eschatological subject who is found in Christ’ (p. 116). Well-ordered thinking is normed by Christ himself, since his life serves as the ‘fixed point in relation to which believers are to orient themselves’ as they look to their promised future (p. 125). This orientation places the focus, not on the experience of thinker, but on the ‘constancy of the giver of the promise’ (p. 188). Barth learned from Anselm that the thinker must ask how far we can know about God by determining what must be true about God's being in light of God's actions to secure the promise. Barth thus ‘understands the movement from faith to understanding as a movement from faith's assent to the factual truth of Christian teaching to a grasp in understanding the necessity of this truth’ (p. 180). Christian thinking allows this divine necessity to shape its freedom, such that it is marked by an ‘ordering of the activities of thought in correspondence to the activity of God’ (p. 226).
The book's many virtues mark it as an important contribution. While the early Barth often is seen in terms of what he opposes, Westerholm helpfully highlights Barth's positive claims as well as his conviction that theology is moral enterprise. There also is much to learn from Westerholm's tracing of the line between Paul and Anselm. But at times he may draw this line a bit too neatly, as if Barth was calmly unfolding his conceptual commitments in an orderly way during this period. The reality may not be so tidy. Barth gained clarity about his views gradually as he revised them in light of ongoing conversations and criticism. The same texts Westerholm uses to trace his line also contain some of Barth's false starts, many of which have prompted important questions and debates. At times, Westerholm gives the impression that nearly everyone in Barth studies, including most of the major scholars, have overlooked the ‘straightforward’ line he has traced out so beautifully. But it may be that this line can be seen clearly now only because these same scholars invested decades of work in clearing away the chaff.
