Between 1931 and 1932, as the Depression took hold, gendarmes in Czechoslovakia opened fire on crowds of demonstrators with almost monthly regularity. From the Slovak village of Kosút/Košúty to the streets of Radotín near Prague, from the German-speaking borderland to Czech industrial towns in the interior, this wave of lethal force cut across the republic’s ethnic and regional divisions.Footnote 1 It claimed roughly three dozen lives and left more than a hundred seriously wounded – a level of state violence that, in its intensity, surpassed anything seen in pre-war Habsburg Austria.Footnote 2 Adolescents were repeatedly found among the dead, a fact that fuelled domestic public outrage and prompted the French writer Romain Rolland to compare the Czechoslovak authorities to colonial oppressors.Footnote 3
Almost all these confrontations grew out of the same form of protest: hunger marches. The unemployed movements behind them were not confined to Czechoslovakia; they emerged across Europe and North America in the early 1930s, reaching considerable size in Germany and the United Kingdom. The Depression pushed significant numbers of workers out of their jobs, and it was these unemployed whom the communist parties sought to bring into the streets. The level of communist party involvement varied from country to country. In the United Kingdom, for example, communists led the unemployed movement but did not monopolise it, whereas in Czechoslovakia, it was almost exclusively organised by the Communist Party (Komunistická strana Československa; KSČ).Footnote 4 What also set the Czechoslovak movement apart was its nationwide reach. This nationwide dispersal had consequences for the size of the marches, which in the regions outside the major industrial centres seldom drew more than a few hundred people.Footnote 5 Even against crowds of that size, the state repeatedly opened fire.
The fact that a democratic Czechoslovakia that was grounded in the administrative traditions of Cisleithania – a ‘full-fledged Rechtsstaat, that is, a state that functions according to the rule of law’ – could produce such a record of violence demands explanation.Footnote 6 This article focuses on one episode that occurred during the economic crisis. In November 1931, two hunger marches were organised in a fifteen-day period in the Silesian town of Freiwaldau/Frývaldov, a German-speaking district centre in the lime quarrying borderland region. The first march ended peacefully, but the second left eight dead. The same district governor, who was responsible for maintaining public order in the area under his authority, represented the state on the ground. He had the same gendarmes at his disposal and the same legal framework behind him. So, what changed?
The existing detailed reconstructions of these events have examined who bore responsibility for the violence and debated whether communist agitators drove crowds onto bayonets or whether the security forces resorted to excessive brutality.Footnote 7 This search for culprits, conducted case by case, provides a timeline, but as Matteo Tiratelli argues, isolating the trigger of a violent confrontation tells us how it began, not why it recurs.Footnote 8 The scholarship on militant democracy offers the most systematic attempt at a broader explanation. Coined by the lawyer Karl Loewenstein in the 1930s, the concept emerged as a widespread response to the crisis of liberal governance across interwar Europe, premised on the conviction that a democratic order cannot survive unlimited tolerance of its enemies. Building on this premise, contemporary scholarship asks whether interwar repression constituted a necessary defence against extremism or a betrayal of the republic’s liberal constitution.Footnote 9
While research on militant democracy focuses primarily on the legal architecture of democratic self-defence, and existing historiography of the labour movement has illuminated the ideological framework of state repression, this article examines the administrative mechanisms through which the state’s security apparatus managed volatile situations on the ground.Footnote 10 These mechanisms repeatedly generated a loss of situational control with fatal consequences. Among the dead in Freiwaldau were Anna Lux, a fourteen-year-old girl, and Rudolf Hauke, an unemployed eighteen-year-old Social Democratic trade unionist who supported a party loyal to the republic. Neither represented any existential threat to the state. A system designed to defend democracy had killed those that democracy was meant to protect.
The repeated failure of these administrative mechanisms is fundamentally a crisis of state communication. This article argues that the Freiwaldau shooting was not the product of authoritarian intent but of administrative silence: the systematic suppression of the communication channels required to manage conflict. While blanket prohibitions on hunger marches may have satisfied the theoretical logic of democratic defence, in practice they dismantled the state’s dialogic capacity and eliminated the space for negotiation. Tracing the flow of information between the Ministry of the Interior, district offices and the public, the article identifies three core dimensions of this silence: the imposition of context-blind central directives, the application of vague legal provisions and the systematic withholding of public explanation. Official silence is never neutral: it degrades institutional trust and surrenders the narrative to actors with no interest in resolution.Footnote 11 In Freiwaldau, this silence was not an administrative anomaly but a pattern so embedded in administrative practice that it systematically eliminated the alternatives through which violence could have been averted.
This silence had structural roots. While the new republic retained the imperial mechanisms for policing protest, it progressively dismantled the specific feature that had made them effective: local mediation. Pieter Judson has described the Habsburg Empire as a negotiated order sustained by administrative flexibility and the willingness of state representatives to mediate. As John Deak has shown, this mediatory capacity was embedded in the design of the bureaucracy itself, which positioned local officials as brokers between state authority and civil society. Tracing this role into the post-imperial transition of 1918, Martin Klečacký has demonstrated that the Czechoslovak central government trusted its local representatives significantly less than the imperial power that preceded it.Footnote 12
This centralisation was driven by the existential logic of a young, heterogeneous state that perceived centrifugal forces as a permanent threat.Footnote 13 Over the following decade, this logic hardened into administrative habit: local discretion gave way to standardised directives, and negotiation gave way to prohibition. By the time the Great Depression brought mass unemployment and social unrest to the environs of Freiwaldau, the institutional space for conflict management had already been systematically narrowed. By imposing blanket bans on hunger marches, the Czechoslovak authorities transformed a labour dispute into a direct confrontation with the state – although the state had not originally been a party to the dispute.
The article moves from the district governor charged with maintaining public order in his district, through the state’s management of freedom of expression, to the streets of Freiwaldau on 25 November 1931, before turning to the aftermath and its longer consequences. It traces how administrative silence, once established as a structural feature of governance, made lethal outcomes not merely possible, but probable.
The District Governor Trapped
In late September 1931, the collective bargaining agreement came to an end at the lime quarry centre in Setzdorf/Vápenná, which was situated in the German-speaking settlement area of the Jeseník region and an organisational hub of the stonemasons’ unions. When management announced a 10 per cent wage reduction on 5–6 November, the union leadership mobilised quarrymen from Setzdorf, Friedberg/Frýdberk and surrounding sites for a protest on 10 November. Although central authorities compelled the district governor to officially prohibit the gathering, the gendarmes he dispatched to the scene did not intervene as the demonstrators marched towards Friedberg. After briefly negotiating with the procession at the town’s entrance, they accompanied the workers to the square with the district governor’s consent, where nearly 700 assembled. Communist Deputy Kurt Babel addressed the crowd in violation of the ban, but after negotiating with the gendarme commander, he urged a peaceful dispersal. The entire event unfolded without incident.Footnote 14
The district governor at Freiwaldau was Walter Jakubowski. Before 1918, still bearing the noble predicate von Toporczyk, he had headed the presidial office of the provincial government in Troppau, a senior post in the Austrian Silesian administration.Footnote 15 He was appointed to Freiwaldau immediately after Czechoslovak troops occupied the district in January 1919. Because his posting was to an exposed and uncertain German-speaking borderland, he must have already enjoyed the confidence of the new government before he took it up. His accumulated experience explains the restraint he showed on 10 November 1931. Czechoslovakia had inherited from Habsburg administrative traditions a system in which local officials were expected to judge a situation for themselves, and this discretion was what he exercised. This autonomous role had never been comfortable: in the Austrian half of the empire, district officials routinely faced criticism from both sides of labour conflicts, as workers denounced their bias towards employers, whereas employers complained about their insufficient protection. Yet impartiality remained essential to district governors’ legitimacy as mediators, and they could achieve results only if both parties trusted them.Footnote 16
On 10 November 1931, the district governor acted squarely within this tradition. Yet his success in defusing the confrontation generated no praise. Instead, his superiors reprimanded him for his tolerant approach and compelled him to adopt the Ministry of the Interior’s blanket security strategy, which from January 1931 banned all so-called hunger marches and gatherings.Footnote 17 In November 1931, the Ministry reaffirmed this nationwide ban in its internal communications with district governors. This ban was justified on the basis of intelligence reports claiming that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which the Third International had criticised for its overly passive protests, intended to exploit worker layoffs and, under the command of ‘foreign agents’, transition towards ‘street demonstrations aimed at looting factories … and direct attacks on citizens’ property’.Footnote 18
This framing from the centre bore little relation to the situation on the ground, a reality the district governor knew first hand. What was happening at Freiwaldau did not match the description in these ministerial circulars. This had not begun as an action of the unemployed movement: the protest had grown out of a wage dispute and was led by the stonemasons’ unions, with communists making up only a small proportion of the participants. The documentary evidence reveals Jakubowski’s quiet resistance directly: in the draft of his report, he crossed out the formulation ‘I prohibited the assembly’ and replaced it with the passive construction ‘it was prohibited’, a linguistic manoeuvre with which he sought to distance himself from the ban.Footnote 19 The tension between local judgement and the Ministry of the Interior’s institutional pressure came to a head in the contrast between the events on 10 November and 25 November. The same gendarmes who had shown restraint during the first demonstration now received orders to disperse the crowd and left eight people dead.
The tragedy of the Freiwaldau shooting did not stem from a sudden and unforeseeable breakdown. Central authorities had lost control on the ground through a prolonged surrender of communicative capacity. By compelling their local representatives to abandon negotiation in favour of rigid prohibition, they eliminated the very partners who could manage conflict. Donatella della Porta identifies this shift as the move from ‘negotiated management’ to ‘escalated force’. Negotiated settlements do more than prevent violence: they build the trust upon which state authority rests.Footnote 20
As Waddington has shown, repression in democratic states is non-linear and context-dependent, therefore it varies depending on what the state perceives as a threat to its core functions.Footnote 21 Interwar Czechoslovakia fits this pattern. Hunger protests were sometimes permitted, as in 1928 during a period of relative stability, but then strictly prohibited during the Depression when authorities feared that mass strikes could link factories across regions.Footnote 22 Beneath this surface variability, however, lay a decisive linear pattern: the progressive curtailment of the negotiating authority of district governors.Footnote 23 This grew out of the way in which the governments in Prague regarded the country that they administered: a fragile successor state in which any centrifugal force represented a permanent threat. Across the decade following the state’s foundation, the Ministry of the Interior moved towards a unified, centralised system of protest management across the country. This trend, which was exemplified by tighter control over district governors in the field, consolidated into a blanket strategy. The decisive impulse came from the suppression of the 1920 December strike, which the communist faction within the Social Democratic Party had violently instigated.Footnote 24 From that point on, the Ministry of the Interior regularly updated strictly unified instructions on prohibited forms of public expression and demanded rigorous enforcement from district officials. The Habsburg tradition of local administrative discretion gave way to blanket orders that ignored actual threat levels on the ground.Footnote 25
The blanket regulation of freedom of expression at public assemblies produced a presumably unintended consequence: it affected not only the state’s approach to radical, anti-system movements but also to those that supported the democratic order. If militant democracy aimed to restrict anti-democratic movements, its uniform administrative application ended up silencing the defenders of democracy as well. Cases from the early 1930s illustrate this dynamic, when the Ministry of the Interior imposed strict censorship of speeches at public assemblies that evaluated conditions abroad. When local officials permitted ethnic German citizens of Czechoslovakia to display banners expressing sympathy with opponents of Nazism in Germany or Austria, the central authorities severely reprimanded these district governors for their tolerance. The Ministry even compelled them to retroactively penalise speakers at demonstrations who had criticised authoritarian leaders in neighbouring countries and thereby voiced pro-democratic sentiments.Footnote 26
Yet centralised directives did more than strip district governors of discretion; they also made officials personally bear the costs of policies that they had no hand in shaping. District governors had to sign all prohibitions in their own name using standardised templates from the Ministry of the Interior. When organisers of the protests demanded concrete legal justification for interventions beyond vague references to ‘public order’, the Ministry explicitly forbade the district governor from citing the specific internal directives he had received or their institutional source. As the Ministry of the Interior instructed: ‘In your measures, do not invoke higher instructions, but always refer generally to valid legal regulations’.Footnote 27 Public anger thus inevitably turned against the one person responsible for managing the situation on the ground – the district governor. Yet he had to remain silent about the circumstances of state policy.
In resolving social conflicts and maintaining ‘public order’, the state began prioritising swift police efficiency over time-consuming, albeit transparent, communication regarding the legal basis for interventions. As case law simultaneously inclined towards a strict approach against demonstrators, district governors found themselves caught in a pincer movement: the Ministry of the Interior’s central directives pressured them from one side, while the prevailing judicial tendency towards strict statutory interpretation constrained them from the other. They could overlook no infraction and show no leniency.Footnote 28
Censoring Hunger
Waddington and della Porta distinguish between institutionalised protesters – organised, experienced actors willing to negotiate with the police – and those operating outside such frameworks, whose exclusion from negotiation channels makes escalation structurally more likely.Footnote 29 Applied to the Czechoslovak economic crisis, this distinction yields a troubling inversion. Rather than managing these two categories separately, the state actively pushed ‘good’ demonstrators into the ‘bad’ category. It achieved this through blanket bans and, crucially, by reclassifying expressions of material hardship as a threat to public order before any negotiation could take place.
This preventive reclassification did not stop at banning marches – it reached into the very language in which the crisis could be discussed. By early 1931, the Ministry of the Interior began imposing blanket bans on ‘hunger marches’ because it claimed they threatened to escalate the situation to a ‘dangerously revolutionary character’.Footnote 30 Moreover, state authorities came to perceive the word ‘hunger’ itself, evoking scarcity and suffering, as an equally serious threat to state authority. When unemployed workers chanted ‘We want bread!’ and ‘We are hungry!’, they were not merely expressing physical need, but instead they were allegedly challenging the state’s carefully constructed narrative about the economic crisis.
The Ministry of the Interior’s concerns became visible in concrete acts of censorship that reached beyond demonstrations themselves. Among the plays staged by workers’ amateur theatre groups during the Depression, Marie Čebišová’s The One (Jeden) included a sentence that was removed from the script by state censors: ‘If only, instead of goal, all the fans would shout: “We are hungry!”’ The censored line captured precisely what the state feared – that the language of material deprivation, once released into a setting as uncontrollable as a stadium crowd of tens of thousands, would acquire a reach that no blanket ban could contain.Footnote 31
The technical means by which the state could moderate all public expression and printed materials were a legacy of Cisleithania. From its inception, Czechoslovakia retained the Austrian system of censorship, which created a comprehensive sieve through which information entered the public sphere.Footnote 32 Already in 1919, Jan Kosina, head of the regional political administration in Prague, summarised the ethos of this system to district governors with the Latin maxim ‘principiis obsta, sero medicina paratur’ – ‘Resist at the beginning; it is too late to treat the consequences’.Footnote 33 This ‘control gate’ relied on district officials to whom organisers of public assemblies were required to submit the exact content of planned public speeches in advance. These officials then marked problematic passages. If the assembly deviated from the approved content, the organiser faced administrative penalties or, in more serious cases, criminal prosecution.Footnote 34
In the early years of the republic, instructions to district governors still carried explicit legal justification. Censorship targeted attacks on the state’s ‘origin, independence, or democratic-republican character’ – banners declaring ‘Long live the Czechoslovak Soviet Republic!’ or ‘Long live world revolution!’ formed the core of what officials were told to prohibit.Footnote 35 The Law for the Protection of the Republic of 1923 codified this approach, drawing inspiration from Germany’s Republikschutzgesetz and placing Czechoslovakia within a broader interwar European movement towards militant democracy.Footnote 36 Yet while the 1923 law defended the state against direct ideological attacks, its complex court procedures proved impractical for the day-to-day regulation of public assemblies.Footnote 37
A far more effective instrument prevailed: the ‘petty’ administrative repression enabled by the 1927 Organisation Act. The act incorporated the Habsburg practice whereby district governors could punish disturbances of ‘public order’ extra-judicially through fines or short-term imprisonment, yet it also marked a qualitative shift. Prohibitions now rested primarily on concerns about ‘improper conduct’, a purposefully vague clause embedded within the organisational statute itself. The change reflected a broader Central European trend towards an expanded administrative state (Verwaltungsstaat), within which the administrative centre, the Ministry of the Interior, was granted unprecedented latitude in deciding what would be permitted and what would not.Footnote 38
The contrast with the imperial past is not one of severity but of how specific the legal grounds for intervention had to be. Czechoslovakia inherited Austrian administrative and criminal law, some of which dated from the neo-absolutist decade, together with its coercive powers. The best-known example was imperial decree no. 96/1854, the Prügelpatent or ‘beating patent’, which governed the enforcement of official orders. Its central clause punished any demonstrative act expressing dislike of the government or contempt for its orders. The wording was no less vague than that of the Organisation Act of 1927, but the patent supplied the penalty for defiance, not the power to issue the ban.Footnote 39 Prevention and punishment were dispersed across separate laws (the assembly law, the press law, the penal code), and a Cisleithanian official had to find the provision that fitted the case. After 1927, the official no longer had to do this. The vague definition of ‘improper conduct’ under the Organisation Act was both the grounds for the ban itself and the administrative offence committed by defying it. Under the Ministry of the Interior’s instructions, the Czechoslovak official was to cite that clause alone and had nothing further to explain.
In practice, the line between what the law protected and what it punished had become easier for the Ministry of the Interior to move. As late as the early post-war years (1918–22), when the state operated a rationing system, officials treated citizens’ expressions of hunger as legitimate requests for assistance. Prosecution followed only when such expressions met specific elements of criminal law – for instance, the dissemination of alarming news, such as claims that the government would run out of food within two months and that ‘famine will ensue’.Footnote 40 During the Depression, however, the same cry – ‘We are hungry!’ – fell under the 1927 Act not as a social grievance but as ‘improper conduct’ that challenged state authority.
Past security crises shaped the state’s sensitivity to hunger-related communications. The Ministry of the Interior, which was under the almost uninterrupted control of the Agrarian Party, retained a vivid institutional memory. In the early post-war years, the ability to secure food supplies had been the measure by which the new state’s competence was judged, and its failures were answered on the street when crowds plundered shops and forced suspected profiteers to open their warehouses and sell at ‘peacetime’ prices.Footnote 41 The authorities negotiated, conceded and promised redress. What distinguishes the 1930s is not that hunger had ceased to be a political language, but that the state had changed its response. Treating expressions of material need as seditious, however, proved strategically short-sighted. By strictly regulating how distress could be voiced, the state established a mechanism of procedural exclusion that filtered critical social signals out of administrative decision-making. Therefore, the march in Freiwaldau, which was categorised strictly as ‘improper conduct’, registered at the centre not as a legitimate grievance but merely as a security incident.Footnote 42
The district governor retained the duty to monitor and report on conditions within his district, and he did so for the tensions mounting in the Freiwaldau district in November 1931. Yet a framing that drew no distinction between genuine revolutionary threats and legitimate social distress inevitably shaped the very language of the feedback the centre received. In a classic dynamic described by James C. Scott, the state imposed a rigid administrative simplification upon a complex social reality in order to make the crisis bureaucratically ‘legible’.Footnote 43 The transformation of ‘We are hungry!’ from a plea for help into a punishable administrative offence created a self-reinforcing illusion of stability – one that left authorities unprepared for the moment when discontent that had been excluded from official channels erupted.
The contrast with Britain is instructive above all as an illustration of this mechanism. Examining industrial policing during the Great Depression, Roger Geary demonstrates that the decisive variable in the decline of protest violence was not ideological moderation but institutional differentiation. Once the Trades Union Congress was incorporated within the framework of parliamentary politics, the state acquired the capacity to distinguish between legitimate labour grievance and revolutionary agitation, and the police could leverage this institutionalisation to manage protests.Footnote 44 Czechoslovakia was not lacking in organised labour movements that were capable of channelling grievance through legitimate means, but the Ministry of the Interior’s blanket prohibition strategy foreclosed this differentiation precisely. In processing trade union protests through the same repressive machinery as communist agitation, legitimate grievance was driven into channels that were increasingly beyond the state’s reach.
Going Underground
On 8 April 1932, amid the same wave of Depression-era protests that had produced the Freiwaldau shooting, the district governor in Komotau/Chomutov, a mining centre in north-western Bohemia, published a proclamation:
Cyclists are forming relay chains and conducting secret intelligence gathering. Loitering on roads and streets is prohibited under penalty of up to 10,000 crowns or imprisonment. Security organs have orders to stop cyclists, identify them and deliver them to the nearest gendarmerie or police station. When delivery is not possible, they are to slash the tyres on the bicycles and make further riding impossible.Footnote 45
When the proclamation reached Prague, the Ministry of the Interior initially wanted to reprimand the district governor for what it considered to be an inappropriate form of public communication. After a brief consultation within its praesidium, however, the Ministry ordered that the proclamation remain in effect with only the last sentence removed and recommended that other district governors apply the same procedure against the dissemination of information, including the slashing of tyres.Footnote 46
These very interventions triggered a Hydra effect. By severing the visible arteries of communication, the state did not eliminate dissent but rather spurred the rapid growth of multiple, regenerative underground networks. Together with the confiscation of primarily communist printed materials, these measures were indeed destroying the legal information infrastructure (advertising revenue, subscription networks and journalistic standards), yet at the same time they were forcing parallel structures to emerge beyond the state’s supervisory reach.Footnote 47 Where print failed, information travelled by word of mouth, ‘from man to man’ – and soon enough through far more sophisticated channels.Footnote 48 In mining districts, information went literally underground. Strike initiators kept their intentions secret until they descended into the mines, where they first fulfilled their work obligation and then refused to ascend in protest. Police seriously considered intervening below the surface but found it impossible to disperse a protest that took place underground.Footnote 49
Above ground, a sophisticated conspiratorial apparatus developed in parallel. Instructions from the Communist Party headquarters in Prague reached organisers through coded telephone calls or sympathetic bus drivers. Trusted agents then left conspiratorial apartments – ideally situated outside workers’ colonies – carrying mimeograph machines to distribute leaflets with times and locations only shortly before the action.Footnote 50 During hunger marches, organisers repeatedly cut telegraph and cable connections, leaving state authorities without communication.Footnote 51 The state’s rigid approach to freedom of expression thus did not silence dissent, but rather fostered a communication environment that the state could no longer control.
The Ministry of the Interior ordered comprehensive preventive measures, such as paid informants, house searches and the arrest of organisers, and instructed district governors to proceed ‘with the utmost consistency and rigor’.Footnote 52 Yet this repression carried an unintended communicative consequence: rather than deterring dissent, arrests conferred status. As Jakub Rákosník has shown, this broad persecutory approach produced an initiatory effect within the movement. Communist functionary Vilém Nový recalled: ‘Police persecution brought us closer together … the feeling of solidarity among us was absolute’. His comrade Fritz Beer was more explicit:
Police punishment was naturally a trifle that wasn’t worth mentioning in our great struggle full of sacrifices, but I, the youngest and most inexperienced, had passed through baptism by fire. Suddenly they took me seriously, I was no longer a pup … And Mirka never called me a bourgeois again.Footnote 53
The suppression of legal information channels had a further, decisive consequence for protest dynamics. By blocking normal communication flows, the state inadvertently concentrated informational power in the hands of those it could not silence: parliamentary representatives whose speeches enjoyed partial protection from censorship.Footnote 54 These leaders – communist senators and deputies in particular – carried uncensored information from Prague to the regions, becoming the sole conduit between workers’ grievances and any authority capable of addressing them. Their parliamentary immunity functioned as what James George Frazer termed the ‘golden bough’ – not merely a safe-conduct into forbidden realms, but a source of quasi-sacral authority.Footnote 55 In a communicative landscape where the state withheld explanation, these leaders cultivated an illusion of privileged access by carrying what workers perceived as suppressed truths and maintaining connections to those in power who could address their grievances. The result was a profound asymmetry: the state had rendered its own decision-making opaque, while communist leaders monopolised the only remaining channel of uncensored communication. This gave their words an authority that no party membership card could have conferred.
Filling the Void
On 24 November 1931, the day before the gendarmerie shooting into the crowd near Freiwaldau, Communist Senator Robert Langer stepped off the train at Setzdorf station at 4 p.m. A gendarme observed him carrying a briefcase in one hand and a bundle in the other, its weight visibly hampering his movement. Once he had hauled the bundle into the local inn, a steady stream of visitors began cycling through the private back room. The next morning, in the early hours before work began at all the local quarries and lime kilns, someone scattered leaflets with information about the hunger march planned for that day. Although the gendarme suspected that the senator was carrying illegal leaflets in the bundle, he did not conduct a search precisely ‘in light of his immunity’.Footnote 56 Why the officer failed to search at least those without immunity remains unclear. Perhaps he misjudged the context, or perhaps he assessed his forces as insufficient to control the situation. Because factors like an officer’s momentary misjudgement entered the equation, Communist Senator Langer wielded the ‘golden bough’ – a power derived from the parliamentary immunity that granted him privileged access to spaces of agitation.Footnote 57
With district governors barred by central directives from negotiating with trade union leaders over the form and substance of protests, power lay in the streets for the taking. It was the communist leaders who seized it, dictating the venue and timing of protests while leveraging their monopoly on uncensored information. By controlling information flows and framing demands as non-negotiable, these professional leaders transformed what had been a space for mediation into a stage for demonstrating state intransigence.Footnote 58
Until the communist-led strike of late 1920, district governors had remained integral to problem-solving, guaranteeing basic food rations and arbitrating between the state rationing apparatus and the civic economic councils who oversaw food supply.Footnote 59 During the 1930s economic crisis, however, they could intervene in union-management negotiations only through intercession at best.Footnote 60 When workers sent delegations according to old Austrian tradition, district governors could provide no concrete justification for assembly bans, offering only inadequate substitutes such as children’s feeding programmes, collections for the unemployed, or public works projects like the road from Freiwaldau to Gräfenberg.Footnote 61
The only communication tool remaining for security organs was the placard. These proclamations followed a unified, centralised template containing the terse warning that any attempt at gathering would be ‘met with the most decisive action, by all means necessary’ [emphasis in original]. Notably, the text referenced neither assembly law nor the precise formulations of the Law for the Protection of the Republic, but again relied on the vague provision of the 1927 Organisation Act concerning ‘improper conduct’.Footnote 62 On the morning of 25 November the final means of state communication on the ground had devolved to commanders’ orders to disperse and, ultimately, to the use of coercive force. This trajectory illustrates the complete collapse of state discourse: from legal precision to administrative vagueness, and finally, to violence as a form of communication.
The position of communist leaders was significant precisely in how they sought to influence crowd behaviour under the given conditions. Ministry of the Interior archives contain several independent reports from the turn of 1931 and 1932 from Slovakia, where communist leaders at meetings instructed participants in planned hunger marches not to respect gendarmes’ orders to disperse and to continue marching against the security cordon, arguing that the gendarmes were their neighbours who would not dare shoot at their acquaintances. They similarly advanced this argument on the basis of their numbers, claiming that ‘the mass of people and energetic action will intimidate them’ and that the gendarmes would not shoot.Footnote 63
Investigations of shooting incidents into crowds at Radotín, Dux/Duchcov or Kosút then reconstructed and identified the same pattern, where communist leaders – often deputies and senators – urged the crowd on site to move against the police, which, in combination with groups of party provocateurs in the crowd attacking gendarmes with various objects, had tragic consequences. These leaders exploited the extraordinary authority that their exclusive position had conferred. The Freiwaldau case exemplifies this pattern: a communist deputy, positioned safely behind the security cordon, urged the crowd to advance against the gendarmes.Footnote 64
At the moment the crowd surged forward, coercive force remained the only language the state had left. This consisted of batons and carbines. Contemporary police expertise favoured batons, as tear gas was viewed with scepticism due to its association with First World War trenches, while armoured vehicles were impractical on rural terrain. Horses were deemed suitable only for monitoring peaceful demonstrators and not for violent clashes. Thus, the gendarmerie relied primarily on the baton, guided by the cold logic of expert analysis: ‘a person struck with a baton appears ridiculous, whereas a person bayoneted or shot evokes sympathy’.Footnote 65
Thanks to his informants, the district governor knew in advance that the hunger march would take place on 25 November. He summoned gendarmerie reinforcements to the district, bringing the total security force to eighty-five men, forty of whom were assigned to guard the district town itself while the remainder operated in the surrounding areas. Against an estimated 1,000 demonstrators, increased manpower could not substitute for lost communicative capacity. Because the district governor was prohibited from negotiating over the assembly itself, he lost all leverage over the routes the marchers would take. Furthermore, bound by central directives that forbade dialogue in favour of immediate dispersal, dispatching a ‘political official’ – a figure who had functioned as negotiator in the inherited Habsburg administrative tradition – made no administrative sense. Even if he had attempted to do so, the lack of pre-negotiated routes meant such an official would have been practically unable to locate and communicate with the fragmented, converging streams of the march.Footnote 66
On 25 November 1931, these improvised deployments resulted in a gendarmerie cordon of merely fifteen men facing a crowd of 600–700 at an intersection west of the district town entrance.Footnote 67 Prague directed the situation from both sides. The Ministry of the Interior ordered uncompromising intervention; communist leaders mobilised demonstrators against police cordons. Both knew what means remained available if batons failed, particularly after the shootings at Radotín, Dux and Kosút. Communist Deputy Alfred Hadek, who had arrived at the scene by motorcycle shortly before the clash, urged the crowd forward from behind the cordon. Demonstrators seeking to enter the town attacked the gendarmerie cordon at close range with a mixture of salt and pepper, stones and metre-and-a-half-long poles. Batons proved ineffective. As demonstrators seriously wounded several gendarmes, including the commander himself, who briefly lost consciousness, and as the crowd threatened to surround the cordon through nearby hedges, the gendarmes opened fire. Although the shaken commander immediately stopped the shooting with a wave of his sabre, eight people lay dead on the ground, including fourteen-year-old Anna Lux.Footnote 68
After the Shooting
The communist narrative of the state’s fascisation came from party headquarters in Prague. From the opposite end of the capital came the minister of the interior’s declaration that he would ‘not permit Kerenskyism’, a byword for taking a weak stance against the Bolsheviks that refers to Alexander Kerensky’s government in Russia in 1917.Footnote 69 These conflicting narratives met on the ground, between neighbours: some of the gendarmes who opened fire were themselves local men.
The mass funeral became a rare uncensored forum. Under the Habsburg monarchy, the Prague Lieutenancy had typically forced funerals for victims of state violence into the early hours of the morning, thereby limiting attendance to immediate family.Footnote 70 The Czechoslovak government, however, permitted public funerals. Archival records do not explain why the state allowed these gatherings amid a blanket ban on assemblies, but the concession exposed how participants assigned culpability for the bloodshed while navigating a strictly regulated information environment. On 28 November 1931, in Setzdorf, the parish priest spoke first after the coffins were laid in the grave. He noted that the cemetery was not a place for political discourse and urged the mourners to pray sincerely for the dead. After a brief prayer, he withdrew. The moment he left, speakers began taking turns to speak at the graveside. Communist Deputy Klement Gottwald, chairman of the party, spoke first but he had a cold and was barely audible, especially once the church bells began pealing. The priest had apparently set them ringing as an acoustic intervention.Footnote 71
The communist deputies who followed exploited the authority their parliamentary immunity conferred. Alfred Hadek cast the dead as destitute workers cut down by the state for voicing their need: ‘the corpses being buried are those of workers who went searching for bread but were attacked by Czechoslovak soldiery’. Anežka Hodinová-Spurná vowed that revenge for the victims’ blood ‘will be carried out’ (a motif repeated in every subsequent speech) and shouted ‘Down with the murderers!’ (Nieder mit den Mördern!) and ‘Shame!’ (Pfui!) followed each mention of state representatives, including the district governor, the official who had no hand in shaping the policy he was compelled to enforce.Footnote 72
The original dispute had been a labour conflict between company management and the unions over wages. At the graveside, the state was the target. Three days before the shooting, at a meeting in the Freiwaldau People’s House that was attended by representatives of work councils and trade unions, the discourse had typically been directed against third parties such as strike breakers, mine owners and capitalists; and the communist Red Trade Unions were far from the dominant force in the region.Footnote 73 For any state’s risk communication, the worst outcome is to redirect public anger towards itself. Official silence is never neutral: as W. Timothy Coombs has demonstrated, withholding explanation during a crisis amplifies rather than contains reputational damage. Anti-system politicians could frame the Czechoslovak authorities’ systematic silence in the worst possible terms – as arrogance, indifference or tacit admission of guilt. By creating this information vacuum, the state allowed radical actors to reframe the conflict, eroding the trust on which its authority depended.Footnote 74
The question remains as to whether contemporary observers recognised the communicative nature of the problem. Press coverage of the recurring shootings focused on who had provoked each confrontation, on intervention procedures and on alternative equipment for security forces. Only isolated voices treated the events as a communication failure, and none of them set off a wider debate.Footnote 75 Those that did came from Social Democratic circles. On 28 November, at the cemetery in Nieder Lindewiese/Lipová-lázně, 1,500 mourners gathered to bury the eighth victim of the shooting – a Social Democrat. Deputy Heeger read from three small slips of paper, illuminating them with a flashlight in the gloomy weather, and insisted it was precisely through ‘mutual good-faith dialogue that agreement might have been found and the tragedy avoided’.Footnote 76 Along similar lines, an article in the Social Democratic press identified the core structural deficit:
Above all, it is a mistake that at decisive moments no responsible and prudent representative of the political office is present, who through timely and appropriate intervention could often mitigate general tension and nervousness… . The gendarmerie receives orders from superior offices and cannot, as a subordinate organ, deviate from the given order to its own detriment. If it dares to do so, it is severely punished.Footnote 77
Yet the Social Democratic diagnosis did not resonate, and the Ministry of the Interior made no move to rethink the communicative structure. But even if these voices had carried further, the Ministry had no intention of reversing the centralisation of decision-making in the field.Footnote 78 Unfolding within the transition from empire to nation-state, this centralisation drew on the logic of democratic self-defence, but rested more on the securitisation logic of a successor state that perceived any centrifugal forces as a permanent threat, a logic that, as Fabian Baumann has argued, underlies the repressive features of Czechoslovak militant democracy.Footnote 79 Even had the Ministry of the Interior wished to reverse course, years of centralised oversight had atrophied the institutional reflexes that autonomous judgement requires. The development of communication technology enabled the Ministry to manage situations from a distance in near real time and further eliminated any case for local discretion.
Freiwaldau was situated in a predominantly German-speaking region, which raises the question of whether the communicative blockade operated across ethnic boundaries. The evidence shows that it did. The first shooting into a crowd during the economic crisis – in which two women and three children were hit – occurred in the purely Czech village of Radotín near Prague.Footnote 80 The breakdown that transformed protest into lethal confrontation was not, in its mechanics, an ethnically targeted act, but its reception was another matter. In parliament, deputies of the German National Socialist Workers’ Party (Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei) described the Freiwaldau events as a communist demonstration, yet joined the communists in viewing the shootings in the borderlands as the deliberate repression of ethnic minorities. The Depression had fallen hardest on the German-speaking regions, and the manner of these interventions prepared the ground for the later crisis in Czech–German relations. When Hans Krumpe of the German Christian Social People’s Party (Deutsche Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei; DCVP) told the chamber that rifles were used against Germans ‘with the lightest of hearts’, applause came from the German benches across party lines.Footnote 81
Lethal state violence began to subside only in 1933. The easing of the Depression weakened the organisation of hunger marches, and the overwhelmingly negative reaction of public opinion across the political spectrum testified to the continued vitality of the Czechoslovak public sphere. The Ministry of the Interior responded in the mid-1930s by tightening the regulations under which gendarmes could open fire.Footnote 82 The way the state communicated with its citizens, however, did not change. Administrative silence, built during the Depression, persisted as the grammar of governance.Footnote 83 For a state that had built its crisis communication on withholding explanation rather than providing it, this rigidity carried consequences beyond the cessation of violence. It undermined the state’s credibility precisely in the border areas that would, in the course of the 1930s, become vulnerable to Nazi mobilisation.
Conclusion
František Bidlo’s Great Depression caricature, The Censors’ Floor Exercise with a Pencil [Prostná cenzorů s tužkou], depicts the censors – clad in the suits of district governors – contorting around their tools like rubber-limbed gymnasts. Bidlo mocked what the public perceived as bureaucratic caprice: an authority that suppressed freedom of expression arbitrarily and without explanation. In a sense, the caricaturist was unfair to the district governors themselves. The contortions he captured were not mere individual whims, but symptoms of ‘administrative silence’: a communicative regime built on the abandonment of negotiation and the systematic withholding of public explanation.
From the perspective of crisis communication, the state’s blanket and unexplained bans proved self-defeating. Under the Habsburg monarchy, strikes and demonstrations typically targeted third parties: strike breakers, mine owners or capitalists. The imperial state remained, for the most part, a secondary target in social conflicts, acting as a guarantor of order and preserving space for negotiation. By pre-emptively criminalising hunger marches, the Czechoslovak state forfeited this mediatory distance, thereby transforming socioeconomic grievances into direct confrontations with its own power.
In Freiwaldau, fifteen gendarmes faced hundreds of protesters. This tactical imbalance was a symptom of the communicative failure, not its cause. Once the state had abandoned negotiations over the routes of the march, the gendarmerie lost the capacity to intercept converging streams of demonstrators across open rural terrain. The blanket bans, which were justified by nothing more than the preservation of public order, did not produce the shooting in a simple causal sense, but they eliminated the dialogic alternatives through which the violence could have been averted and produced an information environment that the state could no longer read or control. As Tiratelli has observed, collective violence is never a chaotic breakdown of order but a structured action following identifiable scripts.Footnote 84 In Freiwaldau, two rigid scripts collided, but the state’s own script of blanket prohibition had created the communicative vacuum in which the communist script of mobilisation and confrontation could operate virtually unopposed.
The Freiwaldau case exposes the limits of ‘militant democracy’ when applied through a rigid administrative state (Verwaltungsstaat), one in which the scope for decision-making lay with the administration rather than with the statute itself. Waddington’s distinction between legitimate protesters and disruptive actors presupposes a system capable of recognising this difference in practice.Footnote 85 By replacing local discretion with standardised directives, the Czechoslovak state processed citizens marching for bread through the same repressive machinery as those marching for revolution and punished defenders of the constitutional order no less than its enemies. Citizens could neither anticipate the grounds for prohibition nor challenge them.
The structural tension identified in this study – between democratic legitimacy demanding dialogue and existential fragility driving centralisation – invites comparison. Whether other Habsburg successor states developed comparable communicative regimes, and with what consequences for the management of social conflict, remains an open question. But the Freiwaldau case suggests a broader conclusion. When a state replaces dialogue with opaque prohibitions and administrative silence, it dismantles the communicative infrastructure on which its own legitimacy depends. In a democracy, the gravest threat to stability is not the presence of social conflict, but the erosion of the institutional capacity to mediate it.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Siobhán Hearne of Contemporary European History for her careful editorial guidance and generous engagement with the text, and to the three anonymous reviewers, whose perceptive comments did much to sharpen its argument. Thanks are also due to Hynek Zlatník and Simon O’Flynn for their copyediting assistance in the preparation of this manuscript. The author used Claude (Anthropic) for language editing and for checking conformity with the journal’s style guidelines. All content, analysis and interpretations are the author’s own, and the author takes full responsibility for the text.
Funding statement
This study was supported by project no. 25-17777S of the Czech Science Foundation (GA ČR), ‘Protest Culture in the Bohemian Lands Between 1890 and 1938’.
Pavel Horák is a Research Fellow at the Masaryk Institute and Archives of the Czech Academy of Sciences in Prague. His work explores the cultural history of the Bohemian Lands and Czechoslovakia during the first half of the twentieth century, situated at the intersection of historical analysis, media studies and political communication. His publications examine, among other topics, how states manage risk, information and public discourse in times of crisis.
