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De la relativité des jugements moraux

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Pascal Ludwig*
Affiliation:
Université de Paris I — Panthéon Sorbonne
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: In the first part of this paper, I criticize the indexical interpretation of meta-ethical relativism. According to the indexical interpretation, the content of a moral statement varies with the context of its utterance. I argue that such an interpretation is not empirically plausible, and that it cannot explain the seriousness of radical moral disagreements. In the constructive part of the paper, I offer an alternative, minimalist interpretation of moral relativism, which is based upon an analogy with the case of the relativity of motion.

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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2012