This book takes on the formidable task of extending Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum's ‘capabilities approach’ to human rights and social justice to the domain of human rights as they apply to health and health care. Although Sen has emphasised the centrality of health as a component of just social arrangements (Reference Sen2009), he has left the construction of a theoretically comprehensive and coherent bridge between the capabilities approach (CA) and entitlements to the capability to be healthy (and ergo health care) to others. As described by the book's author, the ideas advanced in this book are but the first instalment in this undertaking. The central aim of this ‘first instalment book’ is to ‘present the argument that every human being has a moral entitlement to a capability to be healthy (CH), and to a level that is commensurate with equal human dignity in the contemporary world’ (p. 6).
The book is organised in three parts, preceded by a lengthy introduction that provides an overview of theories of social justice as they apply to the problem of health and health disparities and in particular how the CA extends to the concept of ‘a capability to be healthy’ or CH. Part I of the book advances the conception of health as a capability (Chapter 1), and then presents a general theory of the causation of and distribution of health (Chapter 2). Part II of the book delves more deeply into the capabilities approach (CA) and presents the arguments that extend CA to the ‘capability to be healthy’ or CH. These tasks comprise Chapters 3 and 4 of the book. The final part of the book, Part III, reviews five alternative ethnical approaches to the problem of claims to health and then considers the implications of CH to the problem of the ethical bases of group claims and also global justice. These discussions comprise Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of the book.
Establishing the moral basis of a claim to ‘a capability to be healthy’ must necessarily begin with a definition of health. The book provides an in-depth review and critique of the prevailing definitions of health that have been advanced both by the natural sciences and international development politics, and argues for a definition of health that integrates Nordenfelt's theory of health (Nordenfelt, Reference Nordenfelt1987) that is defined by a person's ability, given standard circumstances, to realise their vitals goals with Nussbaum's ten central human capabilities (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum2000) − which provide the content for the ‘vital goals’ that Nordenfelt's theory of health left unspecified. Thus the core construct of the book, the capability to be healthy, is defined as a person's ability to achieve or exercise a cluster of basic capabilities and functioning, which in turn are understood as a ‘meta-capability’ to achieve and exercise Nussbaum's ten central human capabilities (p. 143). Nussbaum's ten central human capabilities, well known to students of social justice theory, encompass multiple dimensions of what is regarded as essential to ‘life worthy of the dignity of the human being’ and thus include the opportunities and activities that reflect the ‘neediness, sociability and ability to reason’ that are fundamental to human nature (p. 135). Most significantly, they are argued to be pre-political entitlements that provide the essential foundations for just institutions and societies.
Consistent with the capabilities theory generally, the book then argues that whatever the causal components to the capability to be healthy (CH) are established to be, there is a definitive entitlement claim to the social bases of that causal component. To cite the book directly on this crucial point, ‘protecting, promoting, or restoring the CH of individuals to adequate levels is realised through the possible and justifiable interventions into personal features/needs, conversion skills, external physical conditions and surrounding social conditions’ (p. 156). When coupled with theories and findings from the emergent discipline of social epidemiology that were integrated earlier in the book, it is evident that the claims that are derived from a societal obligation to promote even a minimal threshold realisation of CH entail a formidable array of social welfare entitlements and institutional reforms.
Whether or not a reader is convinced that the book establishes a sound moral argument for the capability to be healthy as a fundamental human right, the book's rejection of the treatment of ‘normal health’ as an assumed or baseline quality of participants in the social contract or as a ‘natural good’ that is an outcome of random luck is an essential advancement in liberal political philosophy. Although (as the book rightly points out), John Rawls’ later reformulations of his theory of justice and the amendments to Rawlsian liberal theory offered by Norman Daniels have acknowledged the importance of health-related entitlements to just social institutions, the ideas advanced in this book go much further in eradicating the prevailing false dichotomy between ‘naturally occurring’ health endowments and socially produced health conditions. To quote the book on this point, ‘unlike for fruit flies or zebras, longevity and physiological functioning are socially influenced and therefore cannot be morally neutral’ (p. 196).
My one significant criticism of the book, in light of its intended purpose as the first instalment of a large undertaking, pertains to its discussion of the social determinants of health. This crucial discussion neglected to make any mention of perhaps the most influential theory of the social determinants of health in American sociology − fundamental social cause theory (Link and Phelan, Reference Link and Phelan1995). While the book does a good job of constructing a generally coherent theory of the causation and distribution of health, the theory would have been enriched by reference to and incorporation of fundamental social cause theory's core propositions.
That said, in contrast to many books that garner praiseful quotations from prominent scholars, this one actually lives up to its laudatory appraisals − received by such luminaries as Amartrya Sen, Paul Farmer and Sir Michael Marmot. For those of us deeply interested in the interrogation of moral arguments for health and health care entitlements, the book is a must read.
