Benjamin Popp-Madsen's Visions of Council Democracy is an important addition to a growing literature on the radical participatory vision of council democracy. It is perhaps an indication of the anxieties and hopes of our time that scholars and activists have been turning back to the vision of council democracy that emerged from the workers movements of the early twentieth century and had largely fallen into oblivion until the last two decades. The basic idea of the councils is simple: “local people meet in local councils to decide on local matters and afterwards delegate individuals to participate in higher councils,” up to the highest decision-making level (67). By making citizens participators in government, council democracy seeks to eliminate the relations of domination and hierarchy that emanate from the separation between rulers and ruled, which characterizes modern democracy despite its egalitarian aspirations.
As detailed in the first two chapters, workers’ councils first emerged in the 1905 Russian Revolution and then spread like wildfire throughout Europe between 1917 and 1921, spontaneously and contrary to the expectations of most socialist theoreticians, who anticipated a centralized revolutionary authority rather than decentralized councils. The councils appeared as local responses to specific needs of the workers such as organizing for protests, taking over factories, and coordinating revolutionary actions, and only gradually came to perceive themselves as alternative governmental institutions. They existed for only a short period of time before they were crushed, often by the revolutionary parties themselves, and then reappeared, most prominently, during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.
Socialist and anarchist thinkers who reflected on the councils drew on the authority of Marx, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, who saw in the 1871 Paris Commune, in Marx's famous words, “the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labor.” As a critique of both Bolshevism and parliamentary democracy, a tradition of “council communism” emerged in the interwar period. Figures like Anton Pannekoek, Otto Rühle, Karl Korsch, and Antonio Gramsci, among others, provided a theoretical articulation of council democracy as a highly democratic alternative of workers’ self-emancipation.
While Popp-Madsen's study provides a fine historical and theoretical overview of this council tradition, its major contribution lies in its examination of the way Cornelius Castoriadis, Claude Lefort, and Hannah Arendt reinterpreted council democracy out of its socialist framework, as a main arena of more general questions of freedom and democracy. The guiding thread in this discussion is the tension between constituent power and constituted power. Constituent power is the “generative power to constitute the constitutional rules and political form of a polity” (10). In the popular imagination, it is the rising people who overthrow unjust rulers and then send their delegates to deliberate and decide on a new constitution and a new polity. Yet once the new institutions are in place and a new power is constituted as a political form, the constituent power has to recede to the background, to exist only as the supposed sovereign and source of legitimacy, prohibited from threatening the political form it brought into existence by its potentially revolutionary outbursts (11–12). It must be represented, rather than participate.
The councils provide at least a partial way out of this conundrum. They acted as revolutionary organs—a constituent power if there ever was one. Yet they strove to be institutionalized as part of a new form of government, which allows “ordinary” citizens to take part in day-to-day decision-making. They could thereby have made the extraordinary ordinary while checking its more anarchistic tendencies, and thus serve as a political form that “combines constituent power and constituted form, thereby insisting on democratic politics’ dual commitment to the freedom to act anew and the concern for self-limitation” (8, 13).
For Castoriadis, the councils manifested his concept of autonomy: by participating in them citizens can recognize their society as their own creation and therefore as open to deliberate transformations. The formless nature of human creativity and novelty was given space, while at the same time stabilized through a council democracy (76). Yet Castoriadis failed to sufficiently appreciate the dangers of total politicization that a council democracy poses.
More attuned to this danger, Lefort stressed that the councils would coexist with institutions such as parties and unions rather than replace them, thus allowing for broad citizen participation with the necessary checks and balances which emanate from conflictual and competing powers (100–101, 128). He essentially treated the councils as instrumental institutions to prevent domination on the broader societal level (102, 112), and left little space for radical social transformation and popular action (123).
Arendt was acutely aware of the dangers in both pure constituent power and pure constituted power (133). For her, the councils provided a space for citizens to act and speak together on a regular basis, while at the same time channeling and limiting this very capacity for new beginnings and coordinated action. The key was dispersing power through the various councils so that each would have its own sphere of responsibility and action (161–62). The act of founding—the exemplary act of the constituent power—would thus be constantly augmented through citizens’ action in councils that are the core institutions of a federalized political form (132).
This analysis allows Popp-Madsen to put forward his own conception of council democracy, which seeks to remedy theories of radical democracy. Council democracy shares with radical democracy the concern for much broader citizen participation and the resistance to domination, bureaucratization, and elitism, as well as to any attempt to homogenize “the people” and to suppress the plurality of voices, opinions, and conflicts that exist in every political community (189). Yet it also seeks to institutionalize and stabilize these spaces of human creativity and self-transformation rather than to leave them to episodic outburst of “people's power,” as theories of radical democracy often do (191). Council democracy thus resists the zero-sum competition between constituent power and political form.
In analyzing council democracy in terms of the tension between constituent power and constituted power, Popp-Madsen offers a genuine contribution to the theory of council democracy and to democratic theory more broadly. Naturally, one may take issue with certain aspects of his narrative. For example, his interpretation of Arendt begins with her response to the appearance of the councils in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, and he deliberately ignores her advocacy of council-like institutions in the context of Palestine and Europe in the 1940s, as they seem to him too far removed from the council tradition (136, 200n4). He thereby overlooks the possibility that Arendt's thoughts about the councils were actually quite developed at an earlier point—and played a more important role in her political thought—than he assumes. It puts in question, for example, the common view in scholarship, which Popp-Madsen accepts, that Arendt shifted from an “individualist” conception of politics in her 1958 The Human Condition to an “associative” one in her 1963 On Revolution (140). This view is hard to sustain when one realizes that a council democracy was Arendt's vision from early on, and that it informed The Human Condition no less than On Revolution (see my Hannah Arendt and Participatory Democracy: A People's Utopia [Palgrave Macmillan, 2019]).
These comments are meant simply to suggest that there is still much to be explored about the history and theory of council democracy. Popp-Madsen's important study should be seen, then, as an invitation to bring the councils from the margins of democratic theory into its center, as arguably the only modern democratic alternative that has ever emerged to representative, parliamentarian democracy as we know it.
