Ruth Schwartz Cowan is an American historian of biology turned feminist historian of technology, Peter Harper a recently retired medical geneticist from Cardiff. From them I had anticipated two research monographs, but I was wrong. I had heard Cowan discuss her marvellous case study of thallasaemia in Cyprus, but that emerges as the only chapter of her book to be heavily based on primary research. I was keen to see how Harper reconstructed the social history of genetic services in Britain, and elsewhere, but that aspect earns scarcely a paragraph. What, then, are these books?
Cowan's Heredity and Hope is economically constructed and beautifully written, with a rose and a baby on the dust jacket. Its distillations from existing historical research will be very useful for students and their teachers, but it is not a text book. It is a sustained argument in favour of genetic screening. Harper's book is very different, a compendium rather than an analysis, collecting key advances across the whole field of medical genetics and often presenting them by topic. Characteristically, eugenics here features mainly towards the end – among the wider implications of genetics as a science.
Cowan began her historical career with a PhD on William Bateson and the Edwardian British conflict between the biometricians and the Mendelians. That same conflict, in the hands of the young Donald MacKenzie, provided a widely read case study for the Edinburgh strong programme in science studies, showing the mutual dependencies of Karl Pearson's progressivist social reform programme, eugenics and biostatistics. In the 1970s Bateson seemed the less exciting figure, a conservative geneticist attached to ‘individuality’ and averse to discipline-building. In Cowan's new book he appears with his clinician friend Archibald Garrod at the root of a non-eugenic concern with human heredity, a tradition that was to become clinical genetics. For Cowan, most eugenics was ideological and statist, and has rightly become a trigger for a history lesson on disastrous scientism; but genetic screening is radically different – it opened new possibilities to afflicted families wanting healthy children of their own.
Cowan presents this new genetic world as emergent in the 1960s and 1970s because of technical advances linked with deep social changes. Tests on amniotic fluid (or post-natal blood) proved able to reveal key chromosomal or biochemical anomalies. For most of the congenital disorders that could be detected before birth, the only ‘prevention’ available was abortion, but in 1960, across most of the world, abortion was illegal and family planning was a minority pursuit. By the 1980s, however, and largely for reasons independent of genetics, contraception was common and abortion was available on demand.
Once Western families were being planned (more or less), one could think of a future healthy child as ‘replacing’ the one which might be lost because of positive antenatal tests (or indeed because of the amniocentesis). Screening could therefore be seen as pro-natalist, especially in families which carried inherited disorders. For them, premarital and prenatal testing allowed reproduction with little risk of transmission.
Here, then, was a new kind of preventive medicine which Cowan skilfully analyses as a sociotechnical system. Most parents chose to take advantage of the services which most public authorities were keen to provide because they promised to reduce costs. Opposition came from anti-abortionists and some disability-rights activists, and from social radicals who disliked the clinical and calculative rationality. Though most of the new genetic testing was not centrally about inheritance, the practices had been colonized by emergent ‘medical geneticists’ and were historically connected with pre-war eugenicists (and their opponents), and so were stigmatized as eugenics. But might a closer historical analysis pick out the new genetic substance from the long eugenic shadow – perhaps by attaching the medical genetics to acceptable aspects of eugenics, or showing how the dark shadow could block the new utility?
In Scandinavia, Cowan claims, the old eugenics had made space for individual choices and for selective abortion on clinical grounds. Because that legislation was not repealed after the Second World War, it helped ease the path for selective abortion based on prenatal testing, perhaps aiding the legalization of abortion elsewhere. By contrast, among African Americans in the USA, the awful memory of eugenics (and of medical experimentation more generally) meant that screening programmes against sickle-cell anaemia were read in the 1970s as oppressive and imposed. For this disease, suspicion was reinforced by a problem common to many screening programmes, that potential ‘carriers’ feared discrimination through employment and insurance. For a different racial and cultural grouping, however, such suspicions were no longer appropriate: the American Jewish community – which over the century had become much richer and ‘professionalized’ – itself created screening against Tay-Sachs disease. Supposing, then, that the genetics of sickle-cell had been less ambiguous, or its screening programmes established before the Black Panthers and others objected, would the results have been different – more like the Jews and Tay-Sachs? That is the implication of Cowan's history, partly because the path to familial calculative rationality is taken as the norm; but further social and ideological analysis would be helpful here.
It is for thallasaemia in Cyprus that Cowan most closely explores the historical pathways. On a divided island, two effectively mandatory premarital screening programmes were created in spite of the power of Greek Orthodox and Turkish Islamic religious authorities. The British connections had helped ensure that thallasaemia became treatable – but with much suffering and potentially crippling expense. They also meant that Cypriots gained access in London not just to tests for carriers but to abortion and antenatal tests. Because civil authorities in both the states were keen to reduce the health-service burden, they advocated premarital testing, which grew slowly. But when abortion in London became popular, the religious authorities came to accept that screening and testing reduced the total numbers of abortions – it was pro-natalist!
The eugenic bogeyman of compulsory screening thus appears in this (doubly) unique Cypriot realization as a product of individual choices rather than of statist pressure. But was it not also the product of communal solidarity, state support for medicine (and cost reduction), increased autonomy for women and the loosening of religious ties? And, if we flick back to Pearson and early eugenics, were these not also the aims of the Edwardian socialists who sought to increase ‘positive freedoms’?
Peter Harper does not claim to be a historian. Though about half his large book covers topics where the secondary literature is already quite good (from before Mendel, through classical, populational, cytological, biochemical and molecular genetics to eugenics and Lysenkoism), he insists that his work is preparatory – making material available, showing how many themes await historical research. One might wish that he had written more from his own experience and worked more closely with historians (or their publications), rather than collecting across the whole field, whether previously tilled or untilled; but one cannot dispute the utility of his comprehensive compendium, especially where it focuses on the profession and practices of medical genetics, nor of his securing archival material, including interviews, on which he plans to publish more. Perhaps this will provide opportunities for the kinds of collaboration available in most universities which employ historians of science and medicine, where reflective clinicians work with historians interested in the technicalities to produce analytical studies (or perhaps even polemical accounts) using the mix of scientific papers, reviews, institutional histories, official documents, biographies, recollections and interviews which Harper has ably digested into his sections. Such collaborations might also profitably connect otherwise divergent understandings of what best counts as ‘history’.
