Husni Mubarak is gone. The regime he led for thirty years is gradually being dismantled, though its legacies continue to influence Egypt's transition. What will replace the regime remains uncertain, yet Lisa Blaydes’ impressive study of electoral politics under Mubarak offers valuable insights for those who find troubling elements of continuity in Egypt's “post-authoritarian” transition.
Despite its title, Blaydes’ book is less about Mubarak's Egypt than the vulnerability of competitive electoral frameworks to the manipulation of incumbents, whether under authoritarianism or democracy. It thus can (and should) be read in two directions: backward, as an account of how the Mubarak regime managed electoral politics to buttress its authority and durability; forward, as a warning about the potential for electoral abuse in a new, post-Mubarak, and perhaps postauthoritarian political order in which many of the most powerful political actors are products of the Mubarak era. To imagine that Mubarak's fall means an end to the electoral dynamics that characterized his regime would be a grave mistake. If forewarned is forearmed, Blaydes gives us ample reason to pay close attention to the emergent electoral dynamics of a post-Mubarak Egypt.
Over time, Blaydes argues, elections came to occupy an increasingly important role in the Mubarak regime's survival strategy. Why they did so, and how the regime used elections to enhance its power, however, are not self-evident. Nor is it immediately apparent why the political opposition participated in elections or why citizens voted, knowing that the process was rigged to the regime's advantage. Blaydes sets out to answer these questions by drawing on a wide range of theoretical literature relating to electoral politics and the political economy of corruption and clientelism, incorporating insights from cases that range from consolidated democracies to embedded authoritarian regimes, and relying heavily on previous qualitative research on Egyptian politics. Blaydes effectively unpacks the incentives and strategic logics that help to explain why elections matter for authoritarian leaders, why opposition parties participate, and why citizens vote. The result is a compelling account that brings to the fore the formal underpinnings of Egyptian politics during the last decade of Mubarak's rule and provides important analytic support for much of the qualitative work on the subject that has appeared during this period.
Blaydes anchors her account in an argument about the effects on Egyptian politics of shifts in the organization of corruption and clientelism that resulted from processes of market-oriented economic reform. Prior to the 1990s, the predatory, rent-seeking coalitions that ruled Egypt secured their privileged positions through access to the state bureaucracy, the ruling party, corporatized trade unions, and the public sector more broadly. Parliament mattered relatively little for authoritarian incumbents concerned with managing access to rent-seeking opportunities as a leading instrument of political control. As Egypt's economy underwent a selective process of economic liberalization, however, new arenas emerged as the foci of corrupt rent-seeking behavior. Crony capitalist networks that secured their privileged positions through access to liberalized sectors of the economy gained new influence—both political and economic—as agents of regime support. In this postsocialist context, Blaydes argues, allocating access to rent-seeking opportunities poses new challenges for an authoritarian regime. Elections become an important means for managing competition over access to the kinds of predatory opportunities to which privileged actors such as members of parliament have access. Parliamentary membership, in turn, becomes more significant because it confers immunity from prosecution on its members. Electoral competition is valued as a source of information about the relative strength of contenders for parliament and as a decentralized means for mobilizing regime loyalists. As Blaydes writes, “competitive parliamentary elections lead to a series of distributive outcomes that provide functional benefits for the authoritarian regime in Egypt . . . it is by delegating distributive decisions to the political marketplace in the form of competitive elections that the regime actually creates a more robust form of social control” (p. 238).
A similar strategic logic helps to explain why opposition parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), take part in elections that they know are unfair and why citizens turn out to vote. For the MB, participation serves a number of useful functions. It establishes legitimacy for its claim to leadership of the opposition, a chance to demonstrate its willingness to abide by democratic political rules, and, for MB candidates who win seats, “opportunities to propagandize . . . access to resources . . . [and] a chance to score publicity points against the regime” (Tarek Massoud, “Why Do Important Social Movements Run in Rigged Elections for Seats in Rubber-Stamp Legislatures?” Paper presented at the 2008 meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, cited by Blaydes, p. 152). For citizens, elections are seen in part in transactional terms, as an opportunity to sell their votes to the highest bidder, and in part as a means to sustain classic machine-style politics in which winning candidates reward their constituents by ensuring a flow of resources to their home districts.
In addressing each of these questions, Blaydes tests hypotheses about the functional benefits of elections for various actors against available data and is able to provide convincing support for her claims. The result is an account in which electoral dynamics in Egypt come to be seen not only as unexceptional—as a variation of the dynamics that shape electoral behavior more broadly—but also as important more for the functional benefits they provided than for their role as mechanisms of regime legitimacy. Nor, in her focus on electoral benefits, does Blaydes overstate the durability of this system or of the regime that managed it. As she notes in her conclusion, “there is compelling reason to believe that some of the very conditions endogenous to the equilibrium that I have described may actually undermine its stability over time” (p. 240). She was right. Yet as Egypt's post-Mubarak transition unfolds, it may well turn out that Blaydes’ account of electoral dynamics will remain more relevant than we might wish.
