The 1950s live on in the folklore of the Jordanian left as a period of democratic promise, an all too brief interlude when the power of monarchy was challenged and the forces of the Jordanian National Movement (JNM) were able to contest the decisions of King Hussein and his Western backers. In charting the rise and fall of this loose coalition of Communists, Baʿthists, Free Officers, and left leaning notables, Betty Anderson mines a rich seam of historical sources encompassing archival material, contemporary newspapers and magazines, autobiographies, and the oral testimony of some of the JNM's most influential figures. The result is an impressive work that throws new light on the first decade of King Hussein's rule, shifting historical attention from the palace to the people and from the high politics of the “king's men” to such societal factors as party political association and the tumultuous politics of the Jordanian “street.”
Anderson's work departs from traditional accounts of the 1950s in giving due attention to the colonial backdrop against which the events of this formative decade unfolded. In her account, Jordanian politics in Mandatory times were framed by competing histories of nationhood: official narratives attempted to imbue the nascent monarchy in Amman with a degree of legitimacy by depicting Transjordan as a Hashemite creation and a legatee of the Arab Revolt. These accounts competed with a rival account that gained considerable popular resonance thanks to the poetry of ʿArar (Mustafa Wahba al-Tall). This “nativist” (the term is Joseph Massad's) discourse idealized the landscapes of the East Bank and attempted to reclaim “Trans-Jordan for the Trans-Jordanians”—the latter for the most part being equated with the peasants and pastoralists who had inhabited southeastern Syria in Ottoman times.
In the first decades of Abdullah's rule, a localistic Transjordanian waṭaniyya dominated Jordanian politics and molded the resolutions of the five Tranjordanian national congresses that convened between 1928 and 1933. By the early 1940s, however, the East Bank's still minuscule intelligentsia had been wedded to a more expansive nationalism that took its cue from politicians and polemicists in Damascus and Beirut and sought to end dependence on Britain through unity with Jordan's Arab neighbors. This Pan-Arab and anticolonial outlook mirrored that of political activists in other parts the Arab east, not least in Palestine, where Arab politics had been radicalized by Britain's apparent complicity in Zionist colonization. Anderson argues that the Pan-Arab orientation of Jordan's political field eased the integration of Palestinian activists into Jordanian politics after the annexation of the West Bank in the wake of the 1948 war over Palestine.
The 1948 war itself and the upheavals that followed had a galvanizing effect on Jordanian society. Towns on both sides of the Jordan were filled with embittered Palestinian migrants and refugees, even as their politics were radicalized by the rise of Nasser and the atrocities that accompanied Israel's “border wars.” Anderson cogently demonstrates how the resulting social and political dislocation combined with the liberalizing bent of the constitution granted during King Talal's brief reign to create the conditions for a broader political mobilization than had been possible before. By the mid-1950s both the Communist and Baʿth parties had acquired a mass following; the Arab Legion was rife with networks of Free Officers chafing at British control and a large section of Jordan's mercantile and land-owning elite had gathered together in the National Social Party under the leadership of Sulayman al-Nabulsi. By combining their efforts under the banner of the JNM, these forces were able to foment what was virtually a mass uprising against Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact, cajole Hussein into the “Arabization” of the Legion, and ensure that Jordan's fifth parliamentary elections were both free and fair.
The October 1956 elections gave the JNM a working parliamentary majority; but once in power, it proved unable to deliver on the heady promises of independence and unity that had propelled it to office. Nabulsi held the premiership until April 1957 and moved quickly to end Jordan's colonial dependence by annulling the 1946 Anglo–Jordanian treaty. However, he was unable to find an alternative to Western aid that sustained the Jordanian state. With a fiscal crisis looming and the Nabulsi cabinet paralyzed by rivalries between its extremist and moderate wings, the JNM soon fell victim to a Palace countercoup that imprisoned or exiled its activists and changed party political life for a generation. Although the JNM maintained a shadowy existence in the political underground, its ideas, in Anderson's estimation, remained influential in the governments of Hazzaʿ al-Majali and Wasfi al-Tall, whose policies explicitly sought to ameliorate the economic hardship of the masses and co-opt Jordan's dissident intelligentsia into the political mainstream.
Given the scope of the book, disagreements are bound to arise, and it is possible to take issue with two aspects of Anderson's account in particular. For example, when reviewing the Mandatory years, she underestimates the ambivalence felt by both the Hashemites and their opponents towards nation-building schemes confined to Trans-Jordan's borders. Even ʿArar named two of his sons (Ahmad Muraywid and Saʿid ʿAmmun) after members of the Syrian Istiqlal. Indeed, it can be argued that the Pan-Arab orientation of Jordan's political field in the 1940s owed at least as much to the salience of Abdullah's schemes for Greater Syrian and Jordanian–Iraqi unity as to the socializing effects of university educations in Damascus and Beirut. When she turns to the 1950s, Anderson accepts too readily the precepts of modernization theory when stressing the correlation between urbanization and political mobilization or when attributing the appeal of the JNM to the professional status of its leaders and the attractions of its ideology to the educated. This neglects the fact that the vast majority of Jordan's urbanites were displaced rural dwellers either driven to the towns by Israeli violence or drawn there by the promise of casual or governmental employment. Once in the cities, they still gave their primary loyalty to members of the same locality or kinship grouping. As a result, even during the elections of 1956, it was the possession of a secure tribal or regional base—as opposed to the factors stressed by Anderson—that most often held the key to political success.
These points should not, however, detract from the overall merits of Anderson's work or from her achievement in so effectively bringing to life politics beyond the palace gates. Her book makes a significant contribution to a small but growing literature that views modern Jordan through the lens of social history as opposed to diplomacy and the high politics of the Hashemite elite. It is to be hoped that a similar perspective is applied to the three years after the June war, when the JNM briefly returned to the political limelight—albeit as a client of the “state within a state” erected by Yasir Arafat and the PLO.
