Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka should surely be congratulated for their achievement with Zoopolis. The work accomplishes a significant shift in how we might think about animals, by resituating the problem of our violent relationships with animals away from questions of individual ethics, towards problematising how we think about political systems and the way in which they reproduce domination of animals. As Donaldson and Kymlicka have acknowledged, the main challenges to human violence towards animals have been from moral philosophers. Despite the efforts of these moral philosophers, our relationships with animals continue to be characterised by patterns of exploitation and violence. And it seems we have reached a ‘political impasse’ with respect to the matter. Donaldson and Kymlicka straightforwardly summarise the prevailing situation: “for the foreseeable future, we can expect more and more animals every year to be bred, confined, tortured, exploited, and killed to satisfy human desires” (2). The answer provided in Zoopolis, which crafts a set of proposals for a new political community rather than a new individual ethics, offers a powerfully effective avenue for thought on how we might practically approach the political problem of manifest human violence towards animals.
While some might object that Donaldson and Kymlicka have gone too far in transcribing hallowed concepts such as citizenship and sovereignty and applying them to non-human animals, in this paper I suggest that perhaps Donaldson and Kymlicka could go further in untangling these political concepts from their liberal political foundations. In particular, I will focus broadly on how Donaldson and Kymlicka conceptualise sovereignty, and offer some thoughts on how we might think more about what this sovereignty looks like. In order to advance this discussion, I would like to focus on two aspects of Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s analysis: firstly, the proposed regulation of the sexuality and reproduction of domesticated animals; and secondly, the category of “denizen,” applied to “liminal animals.”
Donaldson and Kymlicka offer a “tripartite” model of sovereignty in Zoopolis that comprises inside, outside, and the border. Animals within and reliant on human communities are conceptualised as being owed citizenship; animals that are outside of human spheres and belong to their own territorially bounded communities are imagined as possessing sovereign rights; while those animals on the borders of human communities are imagined as being owed denizenship status. Sovereignty might be said to mediate all three of these different modes of living with respect to human political communities—inside, outside, and the border—since the political status of any entity within this new global community will be determined by their relationship with a sovereignty (human or non-human). That is, entities either belong or participate in sovereignty through citizenship or they possess full sovereign rights as part of a community of others; or finally, they do not belong to a territorially bounded political community, but are owed basic rights protections by existing sovereign communities.
A significant innovation of Zoopolis is the extension of contemporary citizenship theory to thinking about how animals might be granted formal membership in political communities. This approach undoubtedly goes further than conventional animal rights approaches, insofar as there is a shift from extending human rights to non-humans (particularly negative rights, such as freedom from intervention) to a focus on promoting positive rights and obligations that might accrue to citizenship as a mode of belonging. Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest that domesticated animals who have a continuing relationship of dependence or co- dependence with humans should be included in human communities through citizenship recognition. The authors certainly do not think of citizenship as a passive state of membership; on the contrary, they identify the evolution of citizenship beyond mere national membership, or as a descriptor of a popular sovereignty that legitimates rule and authority, instead describing citizenship as an active space of political agency, where the citizen is understood as “taking on the right and responsibility to shape law” (56). But, as noted by the authors, the latter view of citizenship is usually the reason for the exclusion of animals from this membership category, since active citizenship often implies that citizens will possess particular attributes in order to participate in the polis. Indeed, Donaldson and Kymlicka point out that the failure to allow animals to be considered citizens “rests on a misunderstanding about the nature of citizenship”:
Citizenship has multiple functions, and all of them are, in principle, applicable to animals. Citizenship operates to allocate individuals to territories; to allocate membership in sovereign peoples; and to enable diverse forms of political agency (including assisted and dependent agency). Not only is it conceptually coherent to apply all three citizenship functions to animals, but we argue…it is the only coherent way to make sense of our moral obligations (61).
As such, citizenship has diverse roles within a community. However, territorial sovereignty remains the binding factor here: citizenship describes the bond to a bounded nation state. As such, as I have stated above, citizenship is framed by sovereignty, through a linking of a community of human (and potentially non-human) entities within a sovereign territory. Donaldson and Kymlicka do not essentially question this bond; on the contrary, their focus is upon radicalising the meaning of this bond in order to widen possible members of a citizenship community.
Citizenship is only reserved for domesticated animals within existing human communities. Donaldson and Kymlicka propose sovereignty rights for wild animals that live in their own communities outside of human sovereign territories (167). This proposal, I would contend, significantly extends existing theories of sovereignty, which are limited in their ability to recognise non-human animals, in part because there is an expectation of a normatively defined authority structure existing within a community in order to recognize a claim of sovereignty.Footnote 1 Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that there is a strong basis for amending our traditional understanding of sovereignty to reflect the moral purpose in guaranteeing sovereign rights to communities. They suggest a different capability to establish sovereign rights:
When evaluating whether and how to accord rights to sovereignty to particular communities, what matters is not the legal institutions they happen to posses, but rather whether they have interests in autonomy, which, in turn, depends on whether their flourishing is tied to their ability to maintain their modes of social organization and self-regulation on their territory (173).
Donaldson and Kymlicka continue:
What sort of competence is needed for sovereignty? We would argue that for wild animals—as indeed for humans—what matters for sovereignty is the ability to respond to the challenges the community faces, and to provide a social context in which its individual members can grow and flourish (175).
In this model, wild animals are granted sovereign rights due to a competence to manage their own affairs within a social context that is underpinned by territory.
The view of sovereignty presented by Donaldson and Kymlicka appears to be an advance on a conventional understanding of who might be capable of sovereignty. It is true, at least at the level of political representation, that Donaldson and Kymlicka appear to arrive at a similar position to Goodin, Pateman and Pateman in their 1997 essay “Simian Sovereignty”.Footnote 2 However, there are some important differences in their respective approaches. Goodin, Pateman and Pateman justify the capability of great apes for sovereignty upon their lack of differentiation from humans in key areas of functioning and “intelligence,” suggesting that great apes satisfy the criteria of a “people” as it currently is understood in international law.Footnote 3 Arguably, Goodin, Pateman and Pateman use a more conservative approach to understanding sovereignty, allowing access to sovereign rights to non-human animals who can demonstrate capability that directly resembles that of humans who comprise political communities. This differs from Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s argument in Zoopolis, which recognises the capability for sovereignty in a broader range of entities (beyond just great apes). The innovation here is in focusing on what constitutes a political community as a category, rather than the individual capacities of members of a community of “people.” Thus, Donaldson and Kymlicka create an alternative set of criteria, which does not strictly rely on any membership similarity to human communities, but rests on a capacity of a collectivity to “have interests in autonomy, which, in turn, depends on whether their flourishing is tied to their ability to maintain their modes of social organization and self-regulation on their territory” (173). Because Donaldson and Kymlicka approach sovereignty through a species non-specific level of political community functioning, rather than as a status that can only be attained by individuals satisfying a capability test, there is broader scope to include a wider range of animal sovereignties and side step the, perhaps inevitable, anthropocentricism of the model offered by Goodin, Pateman and Pateman. In this sense, as I have said, there is significant innovation in their approach.
However, despite the promise of Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s proposal, there remain some unsettling issues in relation to how human authority is framed within Zoopolis, and the limits that are applied to its conceptualisation. One question we may ask, for example, is who gets to decide on citizenship, denizenship (which I discuss below) and sovereignty, who regulates these political statuses, and who will make decisions for animals within future communities? Certainly, it appears that the model put forward by the authors relies upon humans determining these category differences, and standing at the borders to determine eligibilities and entitlements.Footnote 4 The human prerogative to decide remains in the background of the Donaldson and Kymlicka model: in this sense, we do not find a clear contestation of the idea put forward by John Webster that “Man has dominion over the animals whether we like it or not”Footnote 5. A human sovereignty over other animals, in other words, prevails.
This is certainly apparent in Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s discussion of the regulation of the sexuality and reproduction of domesticated animals (as I have discussed, they are granted citizenship in the proposed model). Donaldson and Kymlicka acknowledge that humans “exert enormous control over domesticated animals’ sex and reproductive lives” (114). However, the authors appear to suggest that regulation of sexuality and reproduction is something that must occur, either though socially imposed regulation or through “natural” processes. They argue that human societies regulate sexuality for a range of reasons, such as the protection of children, protecting individuals from non-consensual sex (114), and intervening into reproduction and choices, including for example “selective abortion to end pregnancies in the case of birth defects” (145). Donaldson and Kymlicka further suggest that regulation is managed on a personal level through the norms of behaviour of individuals in human societies, and that these norms are also bolstered by State intervention: “in general, we expect individuals to be self-regulating and responsible when it comes to engaging in sex and accepting its consequences” (145). These processes of social regulation are, it is argued, effectively mirrored “in nature” for wild animals. Donaldson and Kymlicka, citing the example of wolves, suggest that these wild animals “strictly regulate sexual and reproductive activity,” including in forms of self-regulation (145). They argue that natural forces combine in nature to limit population sizes for other animals, whose populations are “kept in check by predation, exposure, disease and starvation” (145).
Having established for human societies and wild animal societies the “inevitability” of the regulation of sexuality and reproduction—through self-regulatory norm, law or nature—Donaldson and Kymlicka go on to argue that the process of domestication strips domestic animals from a context in which sex and reproduction can be effectively self-regulated. The inability of domestic animals to control their population, either through self-regulation or through external predation, means that human intervention is required (146). Donaldson and Kymlicka further suggest that in this future scenario, population controls would need to put in place, meeting both sustainability goals and welfare interests:
Presumably we should head towards population sizes that are (a) ecologically sustainable, and (b) socially sustainable (i.e., reflect some sort of balance between the human duty to care for domesticated animals, and the ways in which animals contribute to joint human-animal society). It is in the interest of domesticated animals that humans regulate their numbers in a sustainable fashion rather than allowing the ravages of ecological or social collapse to do so instead (147).
In this scenario, forms of population control, tempered through non-invasive techniques, could be balanced against normative goals towards reproductive and family rights. Donaldson and Kymlicka state:
There are many relatively non-invasive ways in which we can control the reproductive rates of domesticated animals—birth control vaccines, temporary physical separation, non-fertilization of chicken eggs, etc. Moreover, insofar as possible, we can impose birth control measures after animals have had a chance to have a family, if they feel inclined to do so (147).
In other words, reproductive controls for previously domesticated animals would be justifiable for population sustainability and welfare reasons, and the potential violence of these controls could be mitigated through the use of particular techniques, and by affording animals limited reproductive rights.
Can reproductive controls be justified? Is it really “in the interest of domesticated animals that humans regulate their numbers” (147)? I would suggest here that it appears difficult to discriminate between human and animal interests when it comes to the question of reproductive controls. As Clare Palmer points out, paternalism might account for reproductive controls where they are genuinely in the “interests” of those being dominated, however this “is rarely the case with pet de-sexing, where domination combines with instrumentalism, not paternalism.”Footnote 6 I don’t pretend here that there isn’t complexity involved in attempting to determine in whose interest social controls should or could operate. Clearly, these are difficult questions for how we might imagine futures with animals beyond human utilization. However, it seems unclear why it should be up to humans to decide. The challenge surely must be how to unseat and question a human right to make the exceptional decision; that is, a human sovereign prerogative exercised over other animals. The reproductive control measures proposed by Donaldson and Kymlicka, despite their awareness of the need for care with the use of proposed techniques, still look uncomfortably like a reconfiguration of human domination of animals, where species difference justifies differential logics and uses of violence in the name of population control and welfare. Indeed, from an another perspective—and I point here to more recent scholarship which draws from Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben—these reproductive controls are expressly biopolitical, and tie human sovereignty explicitly with the management of populations, both human and non-human.Footnote 7
I am signalling here that we may need to go further in how we understand sovereignty. I have already suggested that Donaldson and Kymlicka propose a re-imagining of sovereignty that makes significant advances over the traditional Hobbesian conception, including through a commitment to “abandoning the idea that sovereignty must be univocal and absolute” (190). Instead of outlining a universal exclusory right for which only humans can demonstrate a capacity, Donaldson and Kymlicka put forward a view of sovereignty that dehumanises the relationship between population and territory, where territory is seen as what fosters and nourishes the life of a population, regardless of the species membership of its constituents. Donaldson and Kymlicka state:
Sovereignty is importantly tied to territory, since a community, especially most animal communities, cannot be ecologically viable, let alone autonomously self-regulating, without a landbase to sustain it. But sovereignty need not be defined in terms of exclusive access of control over a particular territory, but rather in terms of the extent or nature of access and control necessary for a community to be autonomous and self-regulating (190).
Citizenship here might be understood as actualising individual community member’s rights to flourish within the context of a territory, by enabling the rights of individual entities linked to territory to enjoy self-determination with respect to that territory. In this sense, Donaldson and Kymlicka “push” more recent tendencies within international discourses which suggest stronger accountability and responsibility of sovereignty in meeting key rights protections.Footnote 8 However, replacing a human rights model of animal rights with a citizenship model is not without its difficulties. While Donaldson and Kymlicka usefully move beyond a model of rights that simply extends human rights to non-human animals, their solution—which entails granting nation-state-based citizenship rights to animals—runs into the same dangers that accompany the current tension (at least in the human sphere) that exists between citizenship rights and human rights and arguably continues to be a source of strain in global geopolitics.
This danger is illustrated in Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s use of the concept “denizen” to describe “liminal animals”—divided between “opportunists,” “niche specialists,” “introduced exotics” and “feral animals”—who neither owe allegiance or seek dependency from existing human communities (nation states) nor possess sovereignty in their own right. In Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s model, denizen animals are owed more basic rights, in much the same way as stateless people are owed human rights in lieu of citizenship rights as a result of their inadequate attachment to a sovereign territory. Donaldson and Kymlicka justify this differential rights entitlement, arguing that while these animals rely on humans generally for survival, they do not require specific forms of care, inclusion or fostering of life within the context of an organised sovereign territory: “while liminal animals are dependent on human settlement and the resources it offers them, this dependency is more generalized ... Within that context they typically fend for themselves, living independently of individual humans…” (218).
Why are these liminal animals described as “denizens” and not offered citizenship rights, nor sovereign rights as a “people,” in their own right? The answer, I believe, has to do with their relationship to territory. These liminal animals—opportunists, specialists, exotics, and feral—are defined through a relationship to human constructed territory and the relationships that are articulated within these territories. Because these animals do not pay credence to the natural (or human constructed) borders of nation states; because they share human constructed space but do not express dependency to human communities; because these animals are migratory and do not have clearly demarcated sovereign territories, they are only granted provisional membership of these communities as seemingly perpetual visitors. The effect of ascribing denizenship to these animals is that a right to full membership (either to be members of a pre-existing human community or to possess sovereignty in their own right) is denied because they are not perceived to possess a territory of their own; they are conceptualised effectively as populations without a homeland. In this sense, Donaldson and Kymlicka, despite offering a glimpse of a sovereignty that goes beyond Westphalia, merely reinscribe this model. A system of bounded nation state communities might work where all can access rights within their respective communities, relative material inequality between communities is minimised, and rights of freedom of movement and nationality allow for flexibility and choice. However, we know from our own world that we are far from this cosmopolitan vision of global organisation. The Westphalian conceptualization of sovereignty is tested as soon as the non-national, the outsider to the territory, makes a claim to a right of non-distinction from those who are granted citizenship rights. As Hannah Arendt has observed, those who reside outside of the border always threaten the cohesiveness of the construct of the nation; the “arrival of the stateless people brought an end to this illusion.”Footnote 9 The worry I have here is that, by naturalising a concept of denizenship, we are already admitting that differential rights are appropriate where entities do not fit the neat boxes of either being citizens within an established community or being owed sovereign rights as a “people.”
Once again, we are in admittedly tricky territory here. It makes sense for Donaldson and Kymlicka to draw upon our existing liberal political frameworks and concepts to reframe how a Zoopolis may look. Indeed what I love about Zoopolis is that like other examples of radical liberal scholarship, the authors work within (rather than without) the logic and toolbox of liberalism to push the frameworks and conceptualisation of liberal political theory in order to re-imagine the political sphere in innovative ways. However, we must also be aware of the limits of the liberal project. If we rely upon our existing frameworks for understanding sovereignty, then we will probably produce a Zoopolis that is an expanded mirror of our existing human world, generating some of the same problems, including differential rights entitlements for those on the borders, and most likely, radical differences in rights entitlements between citizens residing in different “nation state” sovereignties—a system that arguably has contributed to the radical social and economic inequalities we see in our world today.
More demanding for me is how we might challenge the human right to decide who is in or out in any given community, who is owed rights and who may have their rights suspended. By asking the question about whether human domination of other animals is justified, and framing this domination as a form of sovereignty itself, perhaps we can get closer to responding to this challenge. This, of course, creates all sorts of pragmatic challenges for how we might imagine a Zoopolis where humans may not get to decide who is a citizen or sovereign, a world perhaps which would appear quite unimaginable. However, if we are to imagine a world without violence against animals, itself a far reaching and radical project that arguably ruptures the foundations of the liberal political state, then why not re-imagine sovereignty itself, including, our proclaimed sovereignty over other animals?
Acknowledgements: I thank Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka for their generous engagement with this response; I also thank Chlöe Taylor and Rob Nichols for organising the book panel that made this engagement possible.
