By the 2003 Duma election, the belief that Russia's electoral democracy would deepen into a liberal, consolidated democracy had waned, but the reasons why democracy failed to develop were unclear. During the 1990s in Russia, the absence of deeply rooted, democratic values, a middle class, and exogenous factors such as membership in the European Union made scholars look toward democratic institutions and most of all competitive elections as a source of democratic consolidation. But democratic development stalled, and soon Russia the “illiberal” or “juridical” democracy became Russia a “plebiscitarian autocracy” (Richard Rose). Regina Smyth in her book, Candidates Strategies and Electoral Competition in the Russian Federation, provides a sophisticated explanation of why elections failed democracy in Russia. In a closely argued and empirically convincing account, she shows how candidate behavior undermined, rather than promoted, the growth of a competitive party system and democratic infrastructure. Smyth's book makes a significant contribution to the theoretical literature on how political parties develop and their role in the process of political transition as well as to our understanding of the specific Russian case.
The answer to the conundrum of why elections failed to contribute to the development of an electoral infrastructure needed for democratic consolidation lies in the “micro foundations” of candidate behavior. Smyth employs a choice-theoretic institutional approach to the study of transition in which candidate choices are individually rational but taken together undermine the formation of a competitive, democratic party system. In short, candidates choose to maximize their own interests rather than those of political parties. The resultant, weak parties described by Smyth contrast with the growth of political parties during the 1990s in Russia found by scholars of Russian electoral behavior who base their findings on electoral results and surveys of individual voters. In part, this difference results from her focus on elite candidate behavior, rather than mass partisanship.
Smyth uses data from her own surveys of candidates in 1995 and 1999 supplemented by interviews to explain why “Too many candidates run in every election; too few candidates choose to tie themselves to political parties; most candidates do not establish strong electoral connections to their constituencies; and candidates do not invest in campaigns that generate reliable information to guide voters' choices, future government actions, or future campaigns” (10). These “strategic choices” by candidates put into question some of the fundamental findings offered by the classic literature on political parties and elections.
The anomalies of Russian electoral experience—the persistence of too many parties, too many candidates running for election, the absence of coordination and cooperation among candidates and parties—cast doubt on the applicability to transitional regimes of Duverger's Law, the role of parties as the “monopoly supplier of electoral resources” (59), and spatial voting models. Smyth contends that “explanatory factors such as: goals, resources, information and structural incentives,” result in different outcomes in Russia and transitional systems more generally, than in established democracies and suggests that “electoral rules are not deterministic but interact with the larger political context to shape outcomes” (206).
Smyth develops a micromodel to explain candidates' behavior in Russia. She examines “candidates' decisions at critical points in the electoral process: entry, partisan affiliation, district selection, and campaign strategy” (11). The nature of these political choices is due to the mixed member electoral system in Russia (SMD plurality and Party List with a 5 percent threshold), candidate goals, resources, and information (11). In the four chapters forming the heart of the analysis, Smyth meticulously examines why candidates continue to run in elections in which they are likely too lose (chapter 4), why candidates choose party affiliation (chapter 5) and their districts (chapter 6), and finally, candidate strategies (chapter 7).
Among the key answers explaining candidate choices emerging from the empirical analysis is the role of information. Uncertainty caused by the absence of information makes it difficult for candidates and parties to assess the likelihood of their winning. This contributes to their failure to coordinate and cooperate. The resulting multiplicity of candidates and parties makes strategic voting difficult. Smyth devotes a chapter to show how a spatial voting model fails to capture preferences accurately due to candidates' use of personal appeals in addition to ideological or policy issues in campaigns. She concludes that political parties fail to play the role of gatekeepers at least in part due to their lack of “brand names” to attract voters and, in this case, the presence of too many parties making for too much information for the voter. The other major factor contributing to weak parties is candidates' reliance on non-party resources within an electoral system with low entry costs.
Distinguishing types of candidates based on their goals (career, party builders, policy interests) and whether they have resources, Smyth finds that most candidates either choose to be independents or to associate themselves with non-ideological centrist parties due to the mixed electoral system in Russia. Candidates choose campaign strategies that focus on regional issues and choose districts based on their own interests, rather than those of a party. As a consequence of these choices, Russia has national parties with only weak connections to regions. Parties are dependent upon candidates, not vice versa. Under such conditions, party accountability is difficult.
Smyth's findings complement those of scholars such as Henry Hale and Anna Grzymała-Busse. Her study adds a unique perspective to a growing and sophisticated literature on elections. The empirical analysis tests whether the underlying assumptions found in the theoretical literature on elections are applicable to transitional polities. In the course of the analysis, important insights into the nature of transition are made. Transitions need not be gradual, but rather may have multiple equilibriums subject to exogenous shocks producing change.
Candidate Strategies and Electoral Competition in the Russian Federation is a masterful study that will be of interest to electoral scholars as well as comparativists. For those concerned about the implications for transitional regimes and Russia, in particular, the findings may be disturbing. The inability of Russian political parties to incorporate elites and to aggregate mass interests, according to Smyth, left the Russian polity “vulnerable to populist appeals … backed by effective leadership” (194). The absence of coordination and cooperation among political parties makes opposition to the efforts of the Putin Presidency difficult. The emergence of United Russia, the party associated with Putin, is not a victory for the growth of a strong political party, but the artifact of electoral regulations and a strong presidency consistent with the failure to develop democracy.
