IN THIS ISSUE
This issue's articles address three broad themes, each of which looms large in present-day political science: (a) revolution, civil war, and nationalism; (b) representation and deliberation; and (c) domestic and international sources of governments' economic policies.
Revolution, civil war, and nationalism. Are civil wars affected by international conflicts? Do lost wars displace domestic leaders? And do domestic leaders adopt different foreign policies as a result? Do structural factors or a revolutionary vanguard matter for the success of efforts to change regimes? And when is liberalism consistent with nationalist demands for a separate regime (i.e., secession)?
Civil wars undoubtedly increased over the last quarter century, but most believe that the end of the Cold War had little to do with that expansion. Our lead article, by Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, calls this view into question, arguing that the demise of the East-West conflict changed not the overall number of civil wars but, rather dramatically, how such wars were fought: the “technologies of rebellion.” Disaggregating civil wars into three distinct categories—irregular wars (insurgencies), conventional wars, and symmetric non-conventional wars—Kalyvas and Balcells show, in “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,” that the end of the Cold War brought a sharp decline in one particular form: insurgencies. Indeed, in a broader historical perspective, insurgency will likely be seen as an atypical form, furthered by the peculiar circumstances of the Cold War's bipolar conflict. Their findings and theoretical analysis suggest a new and different focus for research on civil wars.
A lost war, we also know, can cost leaders their offices or their lives, and most of us have believed that democratic leaders bear a higher risk of losing office than dictators. But that conclusion, assert Alexandre Debs and H. E. Goemans in “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War,” rests on erroneous statistical inference. Although freely elected leaders indeed are at greater risk of losing office in any given year, the odds that they will do so, conditional on a lost war, are lower than for authoritarian leaders; and the post-incumbency fate of democratic leaders is normally sanguine, that of dictators more often sanguinary. Moreover, among authoritarian leaders, civilian dictators are less likely than monarchs or military despots to lose office and life from a lost war. But, argue Debs and Goemans, the less risk international interactions carry for a given leader, the likelier she is to avoid war and strike a peaceful bargain. Hence the empirical regularity that they discover offers an explanation for the “democratic peace,” the greater propensity of dictators to go to war, and, previously little noted, why civilian dictators avoid conflict more than military rulers or monarchs.
Defeat in war, as Theda Skocpol first argued, is among the most powerful of “structural” factors that, along with things like waning repressive capacity and economic decline, can mobilize long-standing grievances into revolutionary action. However, subsequent critics have noted many cases in which the structural factors were obtained but no revolution ensued. Related, scholars have been uncertain about the role that revolutionary “vanguards” and demonstrative violence play in the outbreak of revolution. What we have overlooked, contends Ethan Bueno de Mesquita in “Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs,” is that revolutionary mobilization (or failure to mobilize) is inherently a situation with multiple equilibria, including one in which revolution is certain not to occur. In such a non-participatory equilibrium, neither structural factors nor actions of a revolutionary vanguard can affect outcomes. In participatory equilibria, where revolution is possible, both structural factors and actions of a vanguard, including violence, may facilitate mass mobilization. The model that Bueno de Mesquita develops, however, casts much recent empirical research into doubt. Structural factors may relate only weakly to revolutionary mobilization in general because so many equilibria are non-participatory. And, because the model also predicts that a revolutionary vanguard will arise only in a participatory equilibrium, the connection we observe between vanguards and revolutions may be largely due to selection effects.
Since the late eighteenth century, a major source of revolutionary grievance and mobilization has been nationalism, a phenomenon with which liberals have had a troubled and inconsistent relationship. Liberalism has historically justified peoples' and nations' right to choose their own political institutions, including political autonomy or independence. Yet the violence and displacement that often attend separation, the intolerance and ethnic cleansing that sometimes ensue, and even the absurd inefficiencies of governing Lilliputian states all offend liberal values.Footnote 1 On the other hand, within liberal constitutional orders the liberal values of individual autonomy, freedom, and choice have often proved solvents of group identities and loyalties, encouraging assimilation, endorsing pluralism, and—some would say—undermining community. In “A Liberal Defense of Black Nationalism,” Andrew Valls explores these tensions in relation to the historical and contemporary situation of African Americans in the United States. Drawing on recent liberal theories of secession and multiculturalism, he contends that two successive forms of black nationalism—Classical Black Nationalism and Community Black Nationalism, respectively—are each compatible with liberal values and principles. Although secessionist theories would support early black nationalists' quest for a separate African American republic, recent developments in multicultural theory can be modified to support the more limited forms of institutional autonomy sought by Black Power activists and community black nationalists since the Civil Rights era. Community black nationalist claims to some forms of autonomous institutions, Valls argues, are not only timely responses to persistent inequalities but are themselves defensible in terms of liberal justice.
Representation and deliberation. Five articles address these broad themes, in both democratic and non-democratic settings.
In “Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament,” Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler pit broader theories of authoritarian representation (i.e., why dictatorial regimes bother to have parliaments at all) against detailed textual evidence from the proceedings of the Vietnamese National Assembly. In particular, Malesky and Schuler analyze the stenographic records of that Assembly's question times, which permit delegates to interpellate ministers (including the Prime Minister) on locally or nationally important issues. Not only do the MPs sometimes question aggressively, but (a) the question times (televised nationally) draw a broad and enthusiastic audience and (b) successful questioning is sometimes followed by a change of policy or even of personnel (ministers who perform badly have sometimes resigned). While advancing evidence that the interpellations are not merely orchestrated “show trials,” in which an already decided change in policy or personnel is simply given an operatic fanfare, Malesky and Schuler examine particularly who does the questioning (two thirds of delegates only “nod,” rather than “needle”), which constituencies elected them, and whether in doing so they are directly expressing constituents' complaints or concerns. Perhaps not surprisingly, the most assertive delegates were not centrally nominated, are not part of the bureaucracy, and represent the better-off areas of the country. Although we have noticed for some time that the existence of a parliament affects authoritarian policy and performance, Malesky and Schuler are among the first to show exactly how it matters.
Even in more freely elected parliaments, incumbency conveys large advantages. Does that advantage extend, however, to the cabinet level? More precisely, in multi-party parliamentary systems, does a party that held office in the previous government have, all else equal, a better chance of retaining office in the next cabinet? Although much research suggests that such an “incumbency advantage” exists, no very convincing explanation has been offered. In fact, according to Lanny W. Martin and Randolph T. Stevenson (in “The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation”), the incumbency advantage—except where it rests on institutional rules—is conditional and can be intuitively explained. Incumbents have an advantage only in re-forming coalitions with previous partners with whom they have worked amicably and not suffered major election defeats. The alleged incumbency advantage disappears whenever the previous coalition was brought down by deep conflict, or where the previous coalition lost seats. The simple-minded theory, Californians might add, is that an amicable uncoupling is likelier to be followed by an amicable re-coupling.
A recurrent problem in democracies is the election of representatives who are more extreme than their constituents. Although writers ranging from F. A. Hermens to Anthony Downs have in the past argued that this was seldom a problem under plurality election (candidates would converge on the position of the median voter), others have offered evidence that policy on average is more moderate (closer to the median voter's bliss point) under proportional representation. Looking only at the U.S. case, and particularly at the 109th and 110th Congresses, Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron find, in “Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress,” that U.S. Representatives are consistently more extreme than the constituents of their home districts, and, when such an extremist fails of re-election, pace Downs, she or he is typically replaced not by a more moderate candidate but by an opposing extremist—the phenomenon that the authors label “leapfrog representation.” It is worth noting, as do Bafumi and Herron, that this result appears to be at odds with that of Stephen Jessee in “Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election,” previously in this Review,Footnote 2 where constituents were found usually to be more extreme than their representatives. Both the contradictory findings and an explanation for them (or whichever turns out to be correct) will doubtless be the object of much future inquiry in a field that has barely begun to open.
Whatever causes political polarization, and whatever its extent, it presumably has consequences, among other things for the size of government spending. But previous theory has advanced plausible reasons for both a negative and a positive effect: in a veto-player perspective, polarization might limit the size of government, while a “squeaky wheel” theory might expect that polarization could be bridged only by increased spending. Working directly from data on respondents' political positions and their preferences for increased or decreased spending, Erik Lindqvist and Robert Östling demonstrate, in “Political Polarization and the Size of Government,” that, controlling for other kinds of fractionalization and other plausible factors, higher polarization is correlated with lower government spending. That this result holds only in democratic countries suggests that polarization likely affects spending, and not the other way around; but more research would be required, as the authors note, to buttress any conjecture about causality.
One answer to polarization, it has been argued, is “deliberative democracy,” in which representative groups of citizens engage one another in rational and informed discourse about major issues of the day.Footnote 3 But can deliberation work in the real world? Won't most voters have little taste for deliberation, or actually find the process paternalistic and alienating? Among the minority who might actually want to deliberate, the argument goes, most would already be highly engaged politically. Testing both sets of assumptions in an elaborate real-world setting, Michael A. Neblo and his co-authorsFootnote 4 inquired about respondents' willingness to deliberate either with other citizens or with their representative in Congress (who had actually made himself or herself available for such discussion). In “Who Wants to Deliberate—And Why?” they find widespread willingness to deliberate in both settings, even at some cost. Surprisingly, respondents with little history of, or inclination toward, participation in usual partisan politics were among the most eager to deliberate.
Domestic and international sources of governments' economic policies. Even after we allow for such obvious factors as political risk, some countries attract much more foreign investment than others. Equally puzzling is that some countries with weak domestic competition, high labor costs, and high real-exchange rates are surprisingly successful exporters.
In “Familiarity Breeds Investment: Diaspora Networks and International Investment,” David Leblang calls attention to a underappreciated factor in attracting foreign investment, namely, diasporas from less-developed countries who reside in wealthier, outward-investing economies. Controlling for all other plausible factors, Leblang shows that the bigger the diasporic ties between two countries, the bigger the portfolio and the more foreign direct investment flows between them. The reason seems straightforward but is buttressed by Leblang with other evidence: The diaspora's networks and knowledge lower information and transaction costs to potential investors, making the potential site of investment less “foreign.” In an age of growing mass migration, Leblang's finding has evident future importance.
Some countries, visitors will readily notice, defy the “Law of One Price.” Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan (to name only a few) have high real-exchange rates and (think only of the “Big Mac Index”) high real prices—one result being that a dollar, euro, or pound sterling will buy far less there of almost any given commodity (hamburgers, hotel rooms, clothing) than at home, or even in a neighboring country that uses a less-appreciated currency. Despite their high real prices, note Torben Iversen and David Soskice in “Real Exchange Rates and Competitiveness: The Political Economy of Skill Formation, Wage Compression, and Electoral Systems,”Footnote 5 many such countries perform very well as exporters in world markets. The answer to the paradox, they argue with much evidence, lies in a dense interlocking network of political parties, institutions, and redistribution—the key to which is skill formation. Union centralization provides both wage restraint (in export industries) and wage compression (in non-trade sectors). However, the quid pro quo that permits necessary wage restraint is governmentally subsidized but union-run training, which can be sustained only by a long-run coalition that includes both labor and employers. While wage compression in non-traded sectors yields high real prices (i.e., a high real-exchange rate), wage restraint preserves the country's advantages in export markets. A remaining question for many readers will be whether such arrangements can be preserved in a world in which more and more previously sheltered sectors become open to trade.
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