Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a dearth of academic literature was available on 20th-century Iraqi political development preceding the rise of the Baʿthist regimes in 1963 and 1968. Majid Khadduri's two volumes on Iraq, Independent Iraq (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952) and Republican Iraq (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Hanna Batatu's seminal book, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Charles Tripp's A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 2002) are notable exceptions. Thus, expansion of the knowledge base on Iraq's political development, and especially research on its political parties and movements, prior to the rise of Baʿthism and Saddam Hussein would be a welcome addition to the literature. Unfortunately, Red Star over Iraq falls short in this regard.
Frazén's book recaps Hanna Batatu's monumental study, complemented by the sources published three decades later in Aziz Sbahi's groundbreaking three-volume official history of the Iraqi Communist Party (ʿUqud min Tarikh al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-ʿIraqi [Damascus: al-Thiqafa al-Jadida, 2003–5]) and Tareq Ismael's The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). In Frazén's treatment of this subject matter, a series of jarring factual errors emerge in the text.
First are matters of imprecision. For instance, on page 1, the author refers to “prior to the Husaynian era (1979–2003),” when in fact the label “Husaynian era” has no academic, historical, or conceptual precedence. On page 87, the author states that “in 1954, the Baʿth Party in Syria merged with Akram al-Hourani's Arab Socialist Party.” This assertion is meant to contest a claim of Batatu referred to in footnote number 5 that “Hourani merged with the Syrian Baʿth already in 1952.” Yet Hourani confirmed Batatu's claim in his memoirs (Mudhakkirat Akram al-Hourani, vol. 2 [Cairo: Madbuli, n.d.], 487–96). Indeed, this fact has been confirmed by all sources except the one that Frazén cites. On page 88, one reads that the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) “propagated the idea of a federal Arab union comprising Iraq, the UAR, and Yemen.” In fact, a federal Arab union was propagated between Iraq and the UAR in the party literature; Yemen was not included. The idea of “union” came out of the “war” of public demonstration slogans between the Arab nationalists and the Communists, which raged from August 1958 to May 1959. The Baʿthist slogan was “Arab unity, neither Eastern nor Western,” while the ICP demonstrators rallied behind “federal union with Soviet friendship.” Finally, on page 248, we read that “when Saddam Husayn ultimately ended the alliance after having usurped all the powers of the state in 1979, the Iraqi Communist Party . . . expended its role.” It is unclear whether the author is making a descriptive claim that the ICP no longer played a political role or an ideological claim that the ICP no longer had worthy contributions to offer.
In terms of factual errors, the author writes on page 86 that “Qasim . . . proclaimed himself president of the new republic.” Prime Minister Qasim neither made such a proclamation nor held the title of president. Frazén also refers to Qasim as “the new Iraqi president” on page 83. No such post existed under Qasim's regime. On pages 186–87, Frazén states that “the RCC was made up of six veteran Baʿthi generals: Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, Hardan al-Tikriti, Saleh Mahdi ʿAmmash, ʿAbd al-Ghaffar al-Tikriti, Saʿdun Ghaydan, and Hammad Shihab.” In fact, there were only five army officers, and they were neither all generals nor all Baʿth party members. ʿAbd al-Ghaffar al-Tikriti does not appear as an Iraqi general in any of the extant sources. The father of Hardan al-Tikriti, he was in fact known to have never been a participating member in either the Baʿth party or the Iraqi military. The author's not providing a citation for the source in which he found the opposite to be true represents a serious omission. On page 247, we read that the Free Officers were “modeled organizationally on the ICP. Copying communist practices, the Free Officers operated from the basis of small cells and were fiercely clandestine, something that undoubtedly provided the necessary element of surprise in its military operation on 14 July.” This statement is both incorrect and misrepresentative. The Free Officers were modeled in every respect on the Egyptian Free Officers movement of 1952. Consider, as a further example, the lack of attention to context in the statement on page 113: “the ICP created a popular hero out of Qasim through a continuous propagandistic effort employing epithets such as al-Zaʿim (‘The Leader’) when referring to him in public.” While “the leader” is a literal translation of the Arabic word al-zaʿīm, in Iraq at the time al-zaʿīm referred to an official military rank equivalent to brigadier general. In other words, because Qasim's military rank at the time (pre-1963 coup) was al-zaʿīm, he would have been known as al-zaʿim Qāsim.
Flawed logical inference riddles the text. For example, the chronology is confused on page 93, where the author states that a series of developments, including a law limiting individual land holdings (30 September 1958), an agreement of technical and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union (16 March 1959), Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact (24 March 1959), and the proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine (14 May 1959), formed the “backdrop” of an ICP Central Committee meeting held earlier in September 1958. This is, chronologically and logically, an impossible assertion.
Frazén depends heavily on Batatu throughout the work; however, he readily accuses him of being mistaken in his historical account of ICP political activity, as when he disputes, for example, on the basis of an assertion of a “veteran communist” (p. 168, 177fn), a meeting date referred to by Batatu (p. 1045, 57fn). Another example of this journalistic form of documentation is on page 104, footnote 70, where an interview with “a long-time ICP member” is cited for an opinion (not based on his involvement) of an event that occurred fifty years earlier. It is well known that an individual memoir written by a party member or leader represents only one view, reflecting varying degrees of self-serving revisionism. Upholding one personalized account as infallible while declaring others as “erroneous” is dangerous, especially when examining a historical record.
In his introduction, the author proposes to “answer the question of how the ICP came to play such a notable and instrumental role in Iraqi politics” and claims that the ICP was “arguably the largest and most important communist party in the Arab world at the time [1979–2003].” Later, following a summary of the ICP's role in Iraqi politics, the three-page conclusion opens with the statement that “the Iraqi Communist Party stands out as arguably the most important . . . organization in the Middle East never to have attained state power” (p. 245). Considering that no comparative analysis of other regional communist parties (i.e., the Syrian, Lebanese, or Sudanese communist parties) and their influence exists and that the book provides no compelling evidence to warrant such a conclusion, these statements seem grandiose.
The ICP has to be placed in the context of the Cold War, particularly the 1950s and 1960s, when Cold War competition in the Middle East was at its height. U.S. and British foreign office documents for these decades are available and reveal much about the ICP, especially with regard to U.S. involvement surrounding the 1963 coup. While these U.S. and British accounts are certainly shaped by the biases of the foreign-office staff members at the time, they nevertheless provide a contemporaneous account of developments. For example, Weldon Matthews’ excellent article, “The Kennedy Administration, Counterinsurgency, and Iraq's First Baʿthist Regime” (International Journal of Middle East Studies 43 [2011)]: 635–53), situates Iraqi political developments within the larger geostrategic context.
Finally, the book would have benefited from intensive editing because it is riddled with grammatical, structural, and syntactical errors.
