Teshale Tibebu's Hegel and the Third World is definitely not your standard account of this icon of Western philosophy. As I read it, I kept contrasting it with Herbert Marcuse's Reason and Revolution, C. L. R. James's Notes on Dialectics, and J. N. Findlay's Hegel: A Reexamination—three of the earliest commentaries on Hegel that I had read. As I turned the pages of Tibebu's book, the picture from these earlier readings began to fade. Emerging with great clarity and masterful documentation was the scale, depth, and other proportions of Hegel's Eurocentrism as I had never seen it before. As a result, for the first time I was forced to yield my image of Hegel as the master dialectician of the movement of universal Spirit and of the development of the “I” of self-consciousness. Tibebu's aim in this text is to show that “Hegel's philosophy fails to be a philosophy of genuine humanism or of concrete universalism” (331). In my view, he definitely succeeds in this undertaking.
Chapter 4, “Race, Class and Gender,” initiates the break that sets this book apart from others. In this chapter, the author makes two crucial moves: first, he shows that Hegel philosophizes from multiple standpoints. As a result, the dialectical codes of the discourses of Spirit and of the “I” of self-consciousness are not always dominant, and as Hegel moves between his different standpoints he contradicts the universalistic principles of the above two founding discourses. Second, Tibebu abandons without rejecting the dominance of the interpretive codes of these two discourses and makes the codes of Hegel's historical, biological, and environmental discourses the crucial interpretive keys to his philosophy. These new interpretive codes give Tibebu direct access not to Hegel's Absolute or his “I” of individual self-consciousness, but to the “We” of the national or collective self-consciousness of Europeans. It is precisely the gaps between Hegel's treatment of the “I” and the “We” that is the focus of Tibebu's book.
In his treatment of the “I” of individual self-consciousness, Tibebu shows that Hegel opens it up to the full transforming power of Absolute Spirit. In this state of unusual openness, the “I” transcends all of its empirical determinations and its tendencies to premature closure. It is on this spiritually guided and open-ended journey that the “I” moves from its original state of solipsistic self-centeredness and comes to know subjective universality as the embrace, rather than the rejection, of the many “moments” and particularities of humanity in formation that it had earlier categorized as its “other.”
The brilliance of Tibebu's analysis is the comprehensive and well-documented fashion in which he shows that in the case of Hegel's treatment of the “We” of European collective self-consciousness the relationships between Spirit and the growth of this form of self-consciousness are reversed. Unlike the “I” of individual self-consciousness, the “We” of collective self-consciousness does not transcend its empirical determinants or its internal tendencies toward premature closure around false, or what Tibebu calls “bad,” universals. On the contrary, in Hegel's treatment, the “We” remains inescapably embedded in these empirical determinants and bad universals. As a result, its codes of external empirical determination and of internal self-determination consistently overpower those of Spirit. In other words, they have the power to insulate the “We” from the all-transforming power that Spirit displays in the case of the “I.” As a result, the “We” remains much more a product of its geography, climate, ecology, and physiology, as Spirit is unable to force the transcending of these empirical determinants.
The Eurocentric consequences that resulted from this shift in the hierarchical order between Hegel's multiple interpretive codes are what Tibebu sums up so clearly and systematically in chapter 4, and then develops in much greater detail in chapters 5–8. Chapter 4 opens with the sharp contradiction that exists between “the trenchant critique of biological determinism” (74) in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the environmental determinism of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. This contradiction leads to problematic statements such as this one quoted by Tibebu: “No color has any superiority, it being simply a matter of being used to it, although one can speak of the objective superiority of the colour of the Caucasian race as against that of the Negro” (79). Trapping Spirit in his own providential reading of its natural manifestations, Hegel justifies this claim by suggesting that the “transparency” of white skin makes the inner life of spirit more visible. In short, Spirit is here a prisoner of what Fanon called “the epidermal schema.”
Developing further this thesis of the dominance of nature over Spirit in the analysis of the “We,” Tibebu shows that for Hegel, Africa was, geographically, a compact and mountainous unity that was inaccessible from the coast. Reading this geography providentially, Hegel saw in this physical inaccessibility a measure of the closure of the African “We” to Spirit. It was a measure of maximum resistance and solipsistic self-centeredness that Spirit could not break through, and thus had to abandon. This imprisoning of Absolute Spirit by the geography of Africa left the African “We” stuck at the earliest moment in the phenomenology of Spirit, the moment of sense-certainty.
This environmentally deterministic manner of describing Africans was also the basic framework for Hegel's broader racial discourses and thus for describing the “We” of other groups, including Europeans. According to Tibebu, Hegel's racial discourse recognized three basic groups: “the Negro,” “the Mongols,” and “the Caucasians.” The “We” of these groups are all characterized by the manner and degree to which their environmental conditioning blocked or facilitated the creative activities by which Spirit had been attempting to reach self-consciousness on earth by sharing the lives of the “I” and “We” of human groups. In Hegel's view, it was only in the “I” and “We” of Caucasians that Spirit was able to reach this absolute unity with itself, an achievement that was made possible by the geoclimatic conditions of their “We.”
I have two critical points to make in relation to this excellent book. First, Tibebu does not really attempt to explain this glaring contradiction in Hegel's treatment of the “I” and the “We” that he describes so well. Could it have been that Hegel never really overcame the early phase of solipsistic self-centeredness in his own development? Addressing this issue more directly would have rounded out this text and given its central argument a greater sense of completion.
My second critical point addresses the manner in which the author engages the growing literature in the field of Africana philosophy that has also examined the problem of Eurocentrism in Western philosophy. Charles Ephraim's The Pathology of Eurocentrism comes immediately to mind; also, the works of Lewis Gordon, Charles Mills, and Emmanuel Eze. Tibebu rightly acknowledges that he is not a philosopher. Remaining on his professional ground of an intellectual historian, he engages this literature primarily in his footnotes. However, integrating it into the text would have given his readers a more current view of the conversation between Hegel and Africana philosophers.
