1. Introduction
The dynamic allocation problem, also known as the ‘multi-armed bandit’ problem, simulates a situation in which an agent is faced with a tradeoff between actions that yield an immediate reward and actions whose benefits can only be perceived in the future. In a classical example, an investigator is faced with d ‘projects’ that simultaneously compete for attention. At any given discrete moment in time, only one of these projects may be engaged in, while the others remain ‘frozen.’ On engaging on a project, the investigator receives a random reward, which becomes discounted over time. Such a scenario encapsulates what is known in machine learning as the conflict between ‘exploitation’ and ‘exploration.’ On the one hand, the investigator may choose to consistently engage a small subset of well-understood projects whose rewards are acceptably high; on the other hand, the investigator may find it worthwhile to spend time ‘learning’ about each of the projects, perhaps sacrificing some greater immediate rewards in doing so, to devise a stronger strategy for the future. A solution to the dynamic allocation problem consists of finding the sequence of projects that should be engaged with that maximizes the overall rewards reaped by the investigator, as well as the value of the rewards acquired through such an optimal strategy.
To be precise, for each moment in time
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
, let
$T_i(t)$
denote the total number of occasions we have engaged on the ith project by time t, where i ranges from
$1,\dots,d$
. We require that
$\sum_{i=1}^d T_i(t) = t$
, and that if
$T_i(t+1) = T_i(t)+1$
then
$T_j(t)=T_j(t+1)$
for each
$j\neq i$
, encapsulating the constraint that it is only possible to engage on a single project at a time, during which time the remaining projects are frozen. By engaging project i at time t, a reward
$h_i(T_i(t))$
is gained, geometrically discounted in time by a factor of
$\beta\in(0,1)$
. Finally, the entire endeavor may be abandoned in return for a ‘retirement reward’
$M\gt0$
, also discounted with time. The dynamic allocation problem is to determine an optimal ‘allocation strategy’
$\tilde T^*(t) = (T_1^*(t),\dots,T_d^*(t))$
,
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
, along with an optimal stopping time
$\eta^*$
, which attains the maximum total expected reward
\begin{align*}\Phi \;:\!=\; \sup\limits_{\tilde T,\eta}\,\mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{t=0}^{\eta-1} \beta^t h_i(T_i(t+1)) (T_i(t+1)-T_i(t) ) + M\beta^\eta\Bigg],\end{align*}
and to compute the value of
$\Phi$
. We assume that the rewards sequences
$H_i\;:\!=\;\{h_i(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
are positive, uniformly bounded, and adapted to filtrations
$\mathbf F_i\;:\!=\;\{\mathcal F_i(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
representing their histories; we do not require them necessarily to be Markov processes. We do, however, require that decisions about the allocation strategy and the retirement time be made only on the basis of information that has already been accumulated in the course of the investigation. In other words, we require that
$\tilde T$
and
$\eta$
be adapted to a so-called ‘multi-parameter filtration’
$\mathbf F\;:\!=\;\{\mathcal F(\tilde s)\}_{\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d}$
, related to the project filtrations
$\mathbf F_i$
, which represents the collective history of all d projects accumulated up to moments
$\tilde s$
in ‘multi-parameter time.’
The multi-armed bandit problem enjoys a long history of research, beginning as early as World War II, when ‘efforts to solve it so sapped the energies and minds of Allied analysts that the suggestion was made that the problem be dropped over Germany, as the ultimate instrument of intellectual sabotage,’ in the words of Peter Whittle [1]. Building on early work in experimental design from the 1920s, Herbert Robbins outlined the first modern formulation of the problem in 1952 [Reference Robbins26], yet the first major breakthrough did not take place until 1979 with Gittins’ brilliant development of the so-called ‘Gittins index’ and the index-type strategy [Reference Gittins14]. Gittins’ key insight was to introduce an additional parameter to the problem by allowing the investigator to abandon, at any point in time, the entire collection of projects in exchange for a fixed ‘retirement reward.’ The effect of this new parameter, which prima facie makes the problem even more difficult, is that it allows each of the d projects to be recognized as its own optimal stopping problem, which can be solved independently and ‘stitched together’ to form an optimal strategy for the dynamic allocation problem. Additional insights in both discrete and continuous time for Markov rewards processes followed in the 1980s, e.g. [Reference Karatzas16], [Reference Tsitsiklis30], and [Reference Whittle36].
Theory for the non-Markovian setting, in which the random rewards additionally depend on the history of the project being engaged in, was first developed in [Reference Varaiya, Walrand and Buyukkoc31] and afterward split largely into two camps: the ‘excursion-theoretic’ approach [Reference Kaspi and Mandelbaum18, Reference Kaspi and Mandelbaum19], and the ‘martingale-theoretic’ approach [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas9–Reference El Karoui and Karatzas11, Reference Mandelbaum20, Reference Mandelbaum21]. With the exception of [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas11], all formulations of dynamic allocation assumed that the projects evolved independently in time, i.e. that the choice to engage a given project has no effect on the rewards yielded by other projects. In 1997, El Karoui and Karatzas [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas11] showed in the continuous-time case that there exists an optimal index-type strategy even when the projects are not assumed to be independent. They instead assumed only the celebrated conditional independence condition, frequently referred to as the (F4) condition of [Reference Cairoli and Walsh5], which was originally developed for multi-parameter martingale theory. Heuristically, the (F4) condition relaxes the independence assumption by allowing the different projects to be dependent on a ‘shared history,’ whereas they become independent conditioned on knowledge of that shared history.
In this work, we formulate and extend the results of [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas11] to the discrete-time setting, and we discuss additional properties of index-type strategies and of representations of the dynamic allocation problem under the (F4) condition. One recurring finding is that the random rewards sequence can be replaced by a certain almost surely (a.s.) decreasing sequence of rewards, without affecting the expected maximum achievable rewards or the optimal strategy. This fact was previously known in the one-dimensional case (3.15) and in the case where the projects are independent [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas8, Reference El Karoui and Karatzas9]; the main result of this work, Theorem 4, shows that this remains true in the most general scenario, where the filtrations of the multiple projects satisfy only the (F4) condition and are not necessarily independent. The proof of Theorem 4 relies on a class of strategies satisfying the so-called ‘synchronization identity,’ which strictly include those of index type.
By working in the discrete-time setting, several new contributions are made to the theory of dynamic allocation.
-
(i) We establish the equivalence of three different representations of the value of the dynamic allocation problem (Theorems 4 and 5); these equivalences were previously confirmed only when assuming independence of filtrations, and unknown to hold in continuous time under the weaker (F4) condition.
-
(ii) Compared with [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas11], which constructs only one strategy that is optimal for the dynamic allocation problem in the (F4) setting, we show that that strategy is in fact of index type (Proposition 11), and that all index-type strategies are optimal.
-
(iii) We fully characterize, in discrete time, the relationship between the class of strategies satisfying the synchronization identity and the class of index-type strategies, by means of excursion theory (Proposition 9).
Additionally, the author has aimed to provide detailed and clear proofs throughout; with the exception of some results in the theory of optimal stopping and multi-parameter martingale theory, this paper is essentially self-contained. The author’s opinion is that the discrete-time setting permits a clarified presentation of the results of [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas9, Reference El Karoui and Karatzas11], on which this work is largely built. In particular, it is possible to give relatively elementary proofs of time-change results without relying on the machinery of stochastic calculus.
Finally, we note that the dynamic allocation problem in general is well known to have many important applications in a wide range of fields, such as experimental design for clinical trials [Reference Villar, Bowden and Wason32], path routeing in communication networks [Reference Awerbuch and Kleinberg2], and algorithms for machine learning [Reference Radlinski, Kleinberg and Joachims24]. For potential applications of the non-Markovian setup under a conditional independence assumption on the filtrations, [Reference Scully and Terenin27, Section 5.1] provides an example of a cost-per-sample Bayesian optimization problem with an index strategy that incorporates correlation data from prior samples. Other recent applications of non-Markovian dynamic allocation include reinforcement learning settings in which tasks must be performed in a specific sequence to reap rewards [Reference Gaon and Brafman13], as well as the optimal scheduling of healthcare interventions in a manner that incorporates empirically observed temporal dependencies in patients’ behavior [Reference Danassis6].
We begin in Section 2 with a brief overview of the one-dimensional setting, which is simply an optimal stopping problem, and Gittins index sequences are introduced in Section 3, following [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas9]. Section 4 introduces the dynamic allocation problem in full generality and determines its value and optimal strategy in the setting where the reward sequences are a.s. decreasing. Section 5 details the implications of the synchronization identity and delineates the relation between the synchronization identity and strategies of index type by means of excursion theory. Multi-parameter martingale theory is reviewed in Section 6. Finally, results from each of the previous sections are used in Section 7 to state and prove our main theorem, Theorem 4, and we conclude in Section 8 with Whittle’s representation of the value of the dynamic allocation problem.
2. The optimal stopping problem
We consider first the problem of optimal stopping in discrete time, equivalent to dynamic allocation with retirement reward when
$d=1$
. Proofs for results in this section can be found in [Reference Neveu23], unless otherwise stated.
Let us work on the complete probability space
$(\Omega,\mathcal F,\mathbb P)$
equipped with filtration
$\mathbf F = \{\mathcal F(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
. Let
$H = \{h(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N}$
be the positive ‘rewards sequence,’ which:
-
(i) is predictable with respect to
$\mathbf F$
, meaning that h(t) is
$\mathcal F(t-1)$
-measurable, for every
$t\in\mathbb N$
; and -
(ii) satisfies the integrability condition
$\mathbb E[\!\sum_{t=0}^\infty\beta^t h(t+1)]\lt\infty$
;
where
$\beta\in(0,1)$
is the ‘discount factor.’ Let
$\mathcal S(\theta)$
denote the collection of
$\mathbf F$
-stopping times taking value in
$\{\theta, \theta+1, \dots\}\cup\{+\infty\}$
for some
$\theta\in\mathbb N_0$
.
Definition 1. For ‘exit reward’
$m\in[0,\infty)$
and time
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
, the optimal stopping problem is to compute the value
\begin{align}V(t;\;m) \;:\!=\; \operatorname*{ess\,sup}_{\tau\in\mathcal S(t)}\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1} \beta^{u-t} h(u+1) + m\beta^{\tau-t} \,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\right]\!.\end{align}
Here,
$V(t;\;m)$
is the expected discounted reward indexed by the exit reward m, given that the agent begins at time t and possesses the information available at that time. If a stopping time
$\tau\in\mathcal S(t)$
attains this supremum, we call it an optimal stopping time. Notice that taking
$\tau\equiv t$
immediately yields
for all
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
,
$m\ge0$
.
Recall the following processes, standard in the theory of optimal stopping. We denote by
\begin{align}Y(t;\;m) \;:\!=\; \sum_{u=0}^{t-1} \beta^u h(u+1) + m\beta^t, \quad t\in\mathbb N\end{align}
the total reward received on stopping at time t given exit reward
$m\ge0$
. The ‘Snell envelope’ of
$Y(\!\cdot\!;\;m)$
is given by
and satisfies
\begin{align}Z(t;\;m) = \sum_{u=0}^{t-1} \beta^u h(u+1) + \beta^t V(t;\;m).\end{align}
The random sequence
$\{Z(t;\;m)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
is the smallest
$\mathbf F$
-supermartingale that dominates the rewards sequence
$\{Y(t;\;m)\}_{t\in\mathbb N}$
, hence the term ‘envelope.’ It happens that the relationship between Z and Y determines the optimal stopping time [Reference Snell29].
Theorem 1. For the processes Y and Z, as defined in (2.3) and (2.4), the stopping time
is contained in
$\mathcal S(t)$
and is optimal for (2.1). In other words,
\begin{align}V(t;\;m) = \mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{u=t}^{\sigma(t;\;m)-1} \beta^{u-t}h(u+1) + m\beta^{\sigma(t;\;m)-t} \,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\Bigg].\end{align}
From (2.5) and (2.6), we get the natural relationship
which says that it is optimal to stop as soon as the future expected discounted reward, conditioned on the currently available information, is exactly equal to the reward the agent would receive from exiting immediately.
From the theory of optimal stopping, we also have the following results.
Proposition 1. The stopped process
$\{Z(\theta\wedge\sigma(t;\;m);\;m), \mathcal F(\theta)\}_{\theta=t}^\infty$
is a martingale for every
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
and
$m\ge0$
.
Proposition 2. (Dynamic programming equation.) For every
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
and
$m\ge0$
,
holds a.s.
The dynamic programming equation states that the optimal future expected discounted reward can be achieved either by exiting immediately and collecting the exit reward m or by continuing for one additional unit of time and evaluating the optimal future conditional expected reward at that point in time.
Finally, we recall two lemmas from [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas9], which we require later, with self-contained proofs in the Appendix A.
Lemma 1. For any
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
, the map
$m\mapsto\sigma(t;\;m)$
is a.s. decreasing and right-continuous.
Lemma 2. For any
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
, the map
$m\mapsto V(t;\;m)$
is convex, increasing, and has right-derivative
3. Gittins index sequences
In the dynamic allocation problem with retirement reward, the investigator always has the option of disregarding all projects but one; by focusing on a single project and excluding all others, the investigator can treat each project as its own optimal stopping problem and construct an allocation strategy based on the project’s ‘Gittins index.’ We define the Gittins index for each such optimal stopping problem in isolation from the others; results in this section generally follow [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas9].
Definition 2. Let
$\mathcal M(t)$
be the family of positive
$\mathcal F(t)$
-measurable random variables for
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
. Define the Gittins index at time t by
which represents the minimum reward the investigator must be offered to exit immediately, at the current time t, i.e. ‘the equitable surrender value.’ We also define the minimum Gittins index to date, or the ‘lower envelope’ of the Gittins index to date, for given
$t,\theta\in\mathbb N_0$
with
$t\le\theta$
:
Remark 1. The definition (3.1) of the Gittins index is due to [Reference Whittle36], whereas Gittins’ original formulation is via the ‘forward induction’ characterization [Reference Gittins14, Eq. (4.1)]:
\begin{align}(1-\beta)M(t) = \operatorname*{ess\,sup}_{\tau\in\mathcal S(t+1)} \frac{\mathbb E\big[\!\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1}\beta^uh(u+1)\,\big\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\big]} {\mathbb E\big[\!\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1}\beta^u\,\big\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\big]}, \quad\text{a.s.}\end{align}
Proofs for the equivalence of the two formulations are given in [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas8] and [Reference Mandelbaum20]; a new method is presented in Appendix A.
Clearly, the mapping
$\theta\mapsto\underline M(t,\theta)$
is decreasing. The next result demonstrates that the mappings
$\theta\mapsto \underline M(t,\theta)$
and
$m\mapsto\sigma(t;\;m)$
are, in a sense, right-inverses of each other. As a consequence, understanding the behavior of the Gittins index over time will reveal the behavior of the optimal stopping rule as a function of the exit reward.
Lemma 3. For
$m\ge0$
and
$t,\theta\in\mathbb N_0$
with
$t\le\theta$
, we have a.s. that
Proof. The first equivalence follows directly from (2.2) to (2.8). Now we prove the second equivalence.
Assume that
$V(s;\;m)\gt m$
holds a.s. for
$s=t,\dots,\theta$
, and suppose, for some s, that
$M(s)=m$
holds on a set
$A\subset\mathcal F$
of positive measure. Recall from (2.1) that the map
$V(s;\cdot\!)$
is continuous; hence the set
$\{\tilde m\ge0\colon V(s;\;\tilde m)(\omega)\gt\tilde m\}$
is open, and thus does not contain its supremum, for almost every
$\omega\in\Omega$
. It follows from (3.1) that, for almost every
$\omega\in A$
, we have
Thus
$V(s;\;m)(\omega)\le m$
holds on a set of positive measure, contradicting our initial assumption, and so
$M(s)\gt m$
holds a.s., for every
$s=t,\dots,\theta$
. We now obtain
$\underline M(t,\theta)\gt m$
, as desired, from (3.2).
Conversely,
$\underline M(t,\theta) \gt m$
gives
$M(s)\gt m$
for every
$s=t,\dots,\theta$
. We know from (2.2) that
$V(s;\;M(s))\ge M(s)$
holds a.s. Now recall from (A.1) that the map
$\tilde m\mapsto V(s;\;\tilde m)-\tilde m$
, is strictly decreasing; hence
holds for each
$s=t,\dots,\theta$
.
Since
$\sigma(t;\;m)$
is an integer,
$\sigma(t;\;m)=\theta$
holds if and only if
$\sigma(t;\;m)\gt\theta-1$
and
$\sigma(t;\;m)\le\theta$
, which by Lemma 3 is equivalent to
$\underline M(t,\theta-1)\gt m $
and
$\underline M(t,\theta)\le m$
. Since
$\theta\mapsto\underline M(t,\theta)$
is decreasing, we obtain
Analogously, the right-continuity of
$m\mapsto\sigma(t;\;m)$
yields
Proposition 3. For
$t,\theta\in\mathbb N_0$
with
$t\le\theta$
, we have
Proof. The inequalities that follow hold a.s. By (3.6), there exists a sequence
$m_n\downarrow\underline M(t,\theta)$
such that
$\sigma(t;\;m_n)\le\theta$
holds for each
$n\in\mathbb N$
, so the right-continuity of
$m\mapsto\sigma(t;\;m)$
yields
$\sigma(t;\;\underline M(t,\theta))\le\theta$
.
Conversely, there exists a sequence
$m'_n\uparrow\underline M(t,\theta)$
, also by (3.6), such that
$\sigma(t;\;m'_n)\gt\theta$
holds for each
$n\in\mathbb N$
. Since
$\sigma(t,\!\cdot)$
takes integer values, we obtain
$\sigma(t;\;m'_n)\ge\theta+1$
, which implies
$\sigma(t;\;\underline M(t,\theta)-\!)\ge\theta+1\gt\theta$
.
Proposition 4. If
$\sigma(t;\cdot\!)$
has a jump at
$m\ge0$
for fixed
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
then the mapping
$\theta\mapsto\underline M(t,\theta)$
is a.s. constant on
$\{\sigma(t;\;m),\dots,\sigma(t;\;m-\!)-1\}$
, and
Proof. Fix an integer
$\sigma(m)\le\theta \lt \sigma(m-\!)$
. By (3.4),
$\sigma(t,m)\le\theta$
implies that
$m\ge\underline M(t,\theta)$
holds a.s. Conversely, the decrease of
$\sigma(t;\cdot\!)$
implies that
$\sigma(t;\;m-\delta)\ge\sigma(t;\;m-\!)\gt\theta$
holds a.s. for every
$0\lt\delta\le m$
. Thus,
$m-\delta\lt\underline M(t,\theta)$
holds a.s., again by (3.4), and taking
$\delta\downarrow0$
yields
$m\le\underline M(t,\theta)$
, a.s.
From the relation between
$\sigma(t;\cdot\!)$
and
$\underline M(t,\!\cdot)$
, we deduce several notable properties of the optimal stopping problem.
Lemma 4. For any
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
, the mapping
$m\mapsto {\partial^+}V(t;\;m)/{\partial m}$
is a.s. right-continuous and increasing. Moreover, it takes the value zero for
$m=0$
and the value one for
$m\ge M(t)$
, a.s.
Proof. Right-continuity and increase follow immediately from Lemma 1 and (2.10). By (3.1) and (3.4), we have
$M(\theta)\gt0$
; thus
$\sigma(t;\;0)\gt\theta$
for all
$\theta\ge t$
. Therefore,
which in conjunction with (2.10) implies
${\partial^+}V(t;\;0)/{\partial m}=0$
. Conversely, if
$M(t)\le m$
then (3.5) yields
$\sigma(t;\;m)=t$
, and so
${\partial^+}V(t;\;m)/{\partial m}=1$
.
We also obtain a representation of the value of the optimal stopping problem in terms of the Gittins indices. Note the significance of (3.15) in the following: when computing future expected discounted rewards, conditioned on current information, the rewards sequence
$\{h(\theta+1)\}_{\theta=t}^\infty$
can be replaced by the decreasing sequence
$\{(1-\beta)\underline M(t,\theta)\}_{\theta=t}^\infty$
, without consequence.
Proposition 5. For any
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
and
$m\ge0$
, we have the almost sure representation
\begin{align}V(t;\;m) &= (1-\beta)\,\mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{\theta=t}^\infty \beta^{\theta-t} (m\vee \underline M(t,\theta) ) \,\big\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\Bigg] \notag \\&= m + \mathbb E\left[\int_m^\infty \big(1-\beta^{\sigma(t;\;\lambda)-t}\big)\,\mathrm{d}\lambda\,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\right]\end{align}
of the value in the optimal stopping problem (2.1), in terms of the minimum Gittins index to date in (3.2).
Proof. First notice that (2.7) and (3.9) yield
\begin{align}V(t;\;m) - V(t;\;0) = \mathbb E\Bigg[m\beta^{\sigma(t;\;m)-t} - \sum_{\theta=\sigma(t;\;m)}^\infty\beta^{\theta-t}h(\theta+1) \,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\Bigg].\end{align}
Now, for every
$\tilde m\le m$
, observe that
$\sigma(t;\;\tilde m)\ge\sigma(t;\;m)$
a.s., by Lemma 1. Thus, by applying the equivalence (3.4), we may write
$\beta^{\sigma(t;\;\tilde m)-t}$
as
\[\beta^{\sigma(t;\;\tilde m)-t}= (1-\beta)\sum_{\theta=\sigma(t;\;\tilde m)}^\infty \beta^{\theta-t} = (1-\beta)\sum_{\theta=\sigma(t;\;m)}^\infty\beta^{\theta-t} \mathbf{1}\{\underline M(t,\theta)\le \tilde m\}.\]
Substituting this value into (2.10) and integrating yields
\begin{align*}V(t;\;m) - V(t;\;0)&= \int_0^m\frac{\partial^+}{\partial\tilde m}V(t;\;\tilde m)\,\mathrm{d}\tilde m \\&= (1-\beta)\int_0^m \mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{\theta=\sigma(t;\;m)}^\infty\beta^{\theta-t} \mathbf{1}\{\underline M(t,\theta)\le \tilde m\} \,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\Bigg] \mathrm{d}\tilde m, \quad\text{a.s.}\end{align*}
Note that the fundamental theorem of calculus can be used to establish the first of these equalities, despite the fact that the right-derivative of
$V(t;\cdot\!)$
is used; this is due to convexity, established in Lemma 2 (e.g. [Reference Karatzas and Shreve17, Problem 3.6.21]). Since the integrand on the right-hand side is non-negative, Tonelli’s theorem implies
\begin{align}V(t;\;m)-V(t;\;0) = (1-\beta)\,\mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{\theta=\sigma(t;\;m)}^\infty \beta^{\theta-t} (m-\underline M(t,\theta) ) \,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\Bigg], \quad \text{a.s.},\end{align}
where we use the fact that
$m-\underline M(t,\theta)\ge0$
when
$\theta\ge\sigma(t;\;m)$
, from (3.4).
Finally, we note
\begin{align}& (1-\beta) \,\mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{\theta=\sigma(t;\;m)}^\infty \beta^{\theta-t} (m-\underline M(t,\theta) ) \,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\Bigg] \nonumber \\&\quad = m\,\mathbb E[\beta^{\sigma(t;\;m)-t} \mid \mathcal F(t)] - (1-\beta)\,\mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{\theta=\sigma(t;\;m)}^\infty \beta^{\theta-t}\underline M(t,\theta) \,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\Bigg].\end{align}
Recalling (3.12), we deduce that the right-hand sides of (3.11) and (3.13) are a.s. equal; hence
\begin{align}\begin{split}\mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{\theta=\sigma(t;\;m)}^\infty\beta^{\theta-t}h(\theta+1) \,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\Bigg] = (1-\beta)\, \mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{\theta=\sigma(t;\;m)}^\infty \beta^{\theta-t}\underline M(t,\theta) \,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\Bigg],\quad\text{a.s.}\end{split}\end{align}
Once more, (3.4) implies that
$\sigma(t;\;m)\to t$
as
$m\to\infty$
, so it follows from (2.7) and (3.9) to (3.14) that
\begin{align}V(t;\;0) = \mathbb E\left[\sum_{\theta=t}^\infty\beta^{\theta-t}h(\theta+1) \,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\right] = (1-\beta)\, \mathbb E\left[\sum_{\theta=t}^\infty \beta^{\theta-t}\underline M(t,\theta) \,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\right]\!,\quad \text{a.s.}\end{align}
By substituting the expression on the right-hand side into (3.12), we obtain the desired representation of
$V(t;\;m)$
.
The second equality follows from (3.4), namely
\begin{align*}&(1-\beta)\mathbb E \Bigg[\sum_{\theta=t}^\infty \beta^{\theta-t}(m\vee\underline M(t,\theta))\,\Bigg\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\Bigg] \\&\quad= (1-\beta)\mathbb E\left[\sum_{\theta=t}^\infty \beta^{\theta-t}\left(m + \int_m^\infty\mathbf{1}\{\sigma(t;\;\lambda)\gt\theta\}\,\mathrm{d}\lambda\right)\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\right] \\&\quad= m + \mathbb E\left[\int_m^\infty\big(1-\beta^{\sigma(t;\;\lambda)-t}\big)\,\mathrm{d}\lambda\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\right]\end{align*}
as desired.
The final result in this section now compares the expected rewards, evolving in time, when receiving the actual rewards
$h(\!\cdot\!)$
versus the decreasing rewards
$(1-\beta)\underline M(t,\!\cdot)$
.
Proposition 6. For every
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
and
$m\ge0$
, the sequence
is an
$\{\mathcal F(\theta)\}_{\theta=t}^\infty$
-martingale.
Proof. The following equalities hold a.s.
Fix
$\theta\ge t$
. We recall that
$(1-\beta)^{-1}=\sum_{u=0}^\infty\beta^u$
; hence (3.10) implies
\begin{align}\beta^\theta [V(\theta;\;m)-m ] = (1-\beta)\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=\theta}^\infty \beta^u (\underline M(\theta,u)-m )^+\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(\theta)\right]\!.\end{align}
This holds for every
$m\ge0$
, so replacing m with
$\underline M(t,\theta)$
, an
$\mathcal F(\theta)$
-measurable random variable, yields
\begin{align}\beta^\theta [V(\theta;\;\underline M(t,\theta))-\underline M(t,\theta) ] = (1-\beta)\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=\theta}^\infty \beta^u (\underline M(\theta,u)-\underline M(t,\theta) )^+\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(\theta)\right]\!. \end{align}
Now fix
$m\ge0$
. In the event
$\{\theta\lt\sigma(t;\;m)\}=\{m\lt\underline M(t,\theta)\}$
, we easily check that
for every
$u\ge\theta$
. Thus, by subtracting (3.17) from (3.16), we obtain
\begin{align}\beta^\theta D(\theta) = (1-\beta)\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=\theta}^\infty \beta^u (\underline M(t,u)-m )^+\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(\theta)\right]\end{align}
on
$\{\theta\lt\sigma(t;\;m)\}$
, where
For ease of notation, let
$\theta_\sigma(m) \;:\!=\; \theta\wedge\sigma(t;\;m)$
. We claim that the sequence
\begin{align}\Bigg\{\beta^{\theta_\sigma(m)} D(\theta_\sigma(m)) + (1-\beta)\sum_{u=t}^{\theta_\sigma(m)-1}\beta^u(\underline M(t,u)-m), \Bigg\}_{\theta=t}^\infty\end{align}
is an
$\{\mathcal F(\theta)\}_{\theta=t}^\infty$
-martingale. Indeed, fix
$\theta,\theta'\in\mathbb N_0$
such that
$t\le\theta\le\theta'$
. Then
\begin{align*}&\mathbb E\Bigg[ \vphantom{\sum_{u=t}^{\theta'_\sigma(m)-1}} \beta^{\theta'_\sigma(m)} D(\theta'_\sigma(m)) + (1-\beta)\sum_{u=t}^{\theta'_\sigma(m)-1} \beta^u (\underline M(t,u)-m )\,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(\theta)\Bigg] \\[3pt]&\quad = (1-\beta)\, \mathbb E\Bigg[\mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{u=t}^\infty\beta^u (\underline M(t,u)-m )^+ \,\Bigg\vert\,\mathcal F(\theta'_\sigma(m))\Bigg]\,\Bigg\vert\,\mathcal F(\theta)\Bigg] \\[3pt]&\quad = (1-\beta)\, \mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{u=\theta_\sigma(m)}^\infty \beta^u (\underline M(t,u)-m )^+ + \sum_{u=t}^{\theta_\sigma(m)-1}\beta^u (\underline M(t,u)-m )\,\Bigg\vert\,\mathcal F(\theta_\sigma(m))\Bigg] \\[3pt]&\quad = \beta^{\theta_\sigma(m)}D(\theta_\sigma(m)) + (1-\beta)\sum_{u=t}^{\theta_\sigma(m)-1}\beta^u (\underline M(t,u)-m ),\end{align*}
making use of (3.18), the
$\mathcal F(u)$
-measurability of
$\underline M(t,u)$
, and the fact that
$\underline M(t,u)\gt m$
for every
$u\lt\sigma(t;\;m)$
.
Conversely, observe that the left-hand side of the identity
\begin{align*}m\beta^t = m\beta^{\theta_\sigma(m)}+\sum_{u=t}^{\theta_\sigma(m)-1}\beta^u(1-\beta)m\end{align*}
does not depend on
$\theta$
, so the sequence
\begin{align}\Bigg\{\beta^{\theta_\sigma(m)} [V(\theta_\sigma(m);\;m)-m ] + \sum_{u=t}^{\theta_\sigma(m)-1} \beta^u (h(u+1) - (1-\beta)m )\Bigg\}_{\theta=t}^\infty\end{align}
is an
$\{\mathcal F(\theta)\}_{\theta=t}^\infty$
-martingale, by (2.5) and Proposition 1. It follows that the difference between (3.20) and (3.21), namely,
\begin{align}\Bigg\{\beta^{\theta_\sigma(m)} [V(\theta_\sigma(m);\; \vphantom{\sum_{u=t}^{\theta_\sigma(m)-1}} \underline M(t;\;\theta_\sigma(m))) - \underline M(t;\;\theta_\sigma(m)) ] + \sum_{u=t}^{\theta_\sigma(m)-1} \beta^u (h(u+1)-(1-\beta)\underline M(t,u) )\Bigg\}_{\theta=t}^\infty,\nonumber \\&\end{align}
is an
$\{\mathcal F(\theta)\}_{\theta=t}^\infty$
-martingale, for every
$m\ge0$
. By (3.9),
$\theta_\sigma(m)\equiv\theta$
when
$m=0$
; taking
$m=0$
in (3.22) completes the proof.
4. The dynamic allocation problem
We now formulate the dynamic allocation problem with general filtrations, with no assumptions about independence or conditional independence whatsoever, and present a solution in the simple case where the rewards sequences are a.s. decreasing. In particular, using the forward induction characterization of the Gittins index (3.3) for each project, we derive a representation of the maximum total expected rewards and show that it is attained by allocation strategies which satisfy the so-called ‘synchronization identity.’ Later, in Section 5, we explore the implications of the synchronization identity and how it relates to Gittins indices.
Let
$(\Omega,\mathcal F,\mathbb P)$
be a complete probability space with a complete multi-parameter filtration
$\mathbf F\;:\!=\;\{\mathcal F(\tilde s)\}_{\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d}$
, in the sense that
$\mathbf F$
satisfies
-
(F1)
$\mathcal F(\tilde s)\subseteq\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
for every
$\tilde s,\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
,
$\tilde s\le\tilde r$
, -
(F2)
$\mathcal F(\tilde 0)$
contains all the null sets in
$\mathcal F$
,
where we put the canonical partial ordering on
$\mathbb N_0^d$
,
Multi-parameter filtrations in this formulation were first introduced in [Reference Cairoli and Walsh5].
Example 1. A simple example of a multi-parameter filtration is the one constructed as the join of d complete filtrations
$\{\mathcal F_i(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
,
$i=1,\dots,d$
, namely
\begin{align*} \mathcal F(\tilde s) \;:\!=\; \bigvee_{i=1}^d \mathcal F_i(s_i) = \sigma\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^d \mathcal F_i(s_i)\right)\!, \quad \tilde s = (s_1,\dots,s_d)\in\mathbb N_0^d. \end{align*}
We also define two varieties of one-parameter filtration in which information is only accumulated with respect to a single project, while information regarding the other projects is either complete or frozen. In the former case, we set
\begin{align} \mathcal F^i(t)\;:\!=\;\mathcal F(\infty,\dots,t,\dots,\infty) = \sigma\left(\bigcup_{\substack{\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d\\r_i\le t}}\mathcal F(\tilde r)\right)\!, \quad t\in\mathbb N_0, \end{align}
where the t appears in the ith coordinate; note that
$\mathcal F(\tilde s)=\bigcap_{i=1}^d\mathcal F^i(s_i)$
. Similarly, in the latter case, we set
with the convention
$\mathcal F_i(t)\;:\!=\;\mathcal F_i(t;\;\tilde 0)$
. In other words,
$\mathcal F^i(t)$
represents the history of the ith project up to time t, with the future evolution of all other projects known in advance at time 0, and we set
$\mathbf F^i\;:\!=\;\{\mathcal F^i(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
. Analogously,
$\mathcal F_i(t)$
represents the history of the ith project up to time t, with this project considered in isolation from all the rest frozen at position
$\tilde s$
, and we set
$\mathbf F_i\;:\!=\;\{\mathcal F_i(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
.
Definition 3. Given any
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
, an allocation strategy for
$\tilde s$
is an
$\mathbb N_0^d$
-valued sequence
$\tilde T\;:\!=\;\{\tilde T(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
such that
-
(i)
$\tilde T(0) = \tilde s$
; -
(ii)
$\tilde T(t+1) = \tilde T(t)+\tilde e_j$
for some
$j\in\{1,\dots,d\}$
, where
$\tilde e_j$
is the unit vector in
$\mathbb N_0^d$
in the jth coordinate; and -
(iii)
$\{\tilde T(t+1) = \tilde T(t)+\tilde e_j,\ \tilde T(t)=\tilde r\}\in\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
for every
$j=1,\dots,d$
.
Let
$\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
denote the collection of allocation strategies for
$\tilde s$
.
The first condition requires that
$\tilde T$
begin at
$\tilde s$
, while the second condition implies that
$\tilde T$
is a random path in
$\mathbb N_0^d$
that only takes steps in a positive direction along the integer lattice; the
$T_i(t)$
count the number of times the ith project has been engaged up to time t. The third condition, also known as the ‘non-anticipativity’ requirement, says that the decision about which project to engage at each time t is made on the basis of the information accumulated from engaging various projects up to time t. Notice that condition (ii) is equivalent to the requirement that each component
$T_i(\!\cdot\!)$
be increasing with the constraint
$\sum_{i=1}^d(T_i(t)-T_i(0))=t$
for every time
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
.
Definition 4. We call a measurable function
$\tilde\nu\;:\;\Omega\to\mathbb N_0^d$
a stopping point of the multi-parameter filtration
$\mathbf F$
if
$\{\tilde\nu=\tilde r\}\in\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
for every
$\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
. We also define the
$\sigma$
-algebra generated by a stopping point
$\tilde\nu$
to be
It can be shown that
$\tilde\nu$
is
$\mathcal F(\tilde\nu)$
-measurable. This definition generalizes the notion of stopping time from one-parameter filtrations to the multi-parameter setting.
Proposition 7. Let
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
be an allocation strategy. For every
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
,
$\tilde T(t)$
is an
$\mathbf F$
-stopping point, and
$T_i(t)$
is an
$\mathbf F^i$
-stopping time for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
. Moreover,
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)\;:\!=\;\{\mathcal F(\tilde T(t))\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
is a one-parameter filtration, and
$\tilde T(\nu)$
is an
$\mathbf F$
-stopping point for every
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-stopping time
$\nu$
.
Proof. By conditions (ii) and (iii) in Definition 3, we obtain
\begin{align} \{\tilde T(t)=\tilde r\} = \bigcup_{j=1}^d\{\tilde T(t+1)=\tilde T(t)+\tilde e_j,\ \tilde T(t)=\tilde r\} \in \mathcal F(\tilde r) \end{align}
for every
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
and
$\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
such that
$\tilde r\ge\tilde s$
. If
$\tilde r\not \ge\tilde s$
then it follows from condition (ii) of Definition 3 that
$\{\tilde T(t)=\tilde r\}=\varnothing\in\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
. Thus
$\tilde T(t)$
is a stopping point. Next, fix
$r\in\mathbb N_0$
. For every
$\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
such that
$r_i=r$
, we have
$\mathcal F(\tilde r)\subseteq\mathcal F^i(r)$
; hence
\begin{align*}\{T_i(t)=r\} = \bigcup_{\substack{\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d\\r_i=r}}\{\tilde T(t)=\tilde r\} \in \mathcal F^i(r).\end{align*}
Thus
$T_i(t)$
is an
$\mathbf F^i$
-stopping time.
Condition (ii) also implies that
$\tilde T(t+1)\ge\tilde T(t)$
in the partial ordering of
$\mathbb N_0^d$
for every
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
. Then
$\mathcal F(\tilde T(t))\subset\mathcal F(\tilde T(t+1))$
; thus
$\{\mathcal F(\tilde T(t))\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
is a one-parameter filtration.
Finally, let
$\nu$
be an
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-stopping time. For every
$\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
, we have
Since
$\{\nu=t\}\in\mathcal F(\tilde T(t))$
then (4.3) implies
$\{\nu=t\}\cap\{\tilde T(t)=\tilde r\}\in\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
. We conclude that
$\{\tilde T(\nu)=\tilde r\}\in\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
, which proves that
$\tilde T(\nu)$
is an
$\mathbf F$
-stopping point.
Definition 5. A policy available at
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
is a pair
$(\tilde T,\eta)$
, where
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
is an allocation strategy for
$\tilde s$
and
$\eta:\;\Omega\to\mathbb N_0\cup\{+\infty\}$
is an
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-stopping time. We denote by
$\mathcal P(\tilde s)$
the collection of policies available at
$\tilde s$
. In other words, a policy is an allocation strategy with an additional option of abandoning all projects at a random time
$\eta$
, based on the flow of information generated by the strategy.
We are now ready to formulate the dynamic allocation problem. Fix the discount factor
$\beta\in(0,1)$
and consider d positive
$\mathbf F_i$
-predictable rewards sequences
$H_i\;:\!=\;\{h_i(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N}$
,
$i=1,\dots,d$
, one for each project. We assume that each
$h_i(t)$
is uniformly bounded from above by
$K(1-\beta)$
for some fixed
$K\gt0$
, so that the maximum discounted reward that can accumulate over time for any given project is
$\sum_{t=0}^\infty\beta^tK(1-\beta) = K$
.
Definition 6. For retirement reward
$M\in[0,\infty)$
and
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
, the dynamic allocation problem is to compute the value
where
\begin{align} \mathcal R(\tilde T,\eta;\;M) \;:\!=\; \sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{t=0}^{\eta-1} \beta^t h_i(T_i(t+1)) (T_i(t+1)-T_i(t) ) + M\beta^\eta \end{align}
is the total discounted reward accumulated by following the allocation strategy
$\tilde T$
with a retirement reward M collected at the
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-stopping time
$\eta$
. As a consequence of bounding
$h_i(t)$
within the interval
$[0,K(1-\beta)]$
, the conditional expectation
$\mathbb E[\mathcal R(\tilde T,\eta;\;M)\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s)]$
is well-defined and bounded.
In solving the dynamic allocation problem, we consider the family of optimal stopping problems
\begin{align*} V_i(t;\;m) \;:\!=\; \operatorname*{ess\,sup}_{\tau\in\mathcal S_i(t)}\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1}\beta^{u-t} h_i(u+1) + m\beta^{\tau-t} \,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F_i(t) \right]\!,\quad i=1,\dots,d, \end{align*}
indexed by
$m\ge0$
, associated with the previously established filtrations
$\mathbf F_i$
and reward sequences
$H_i$
. Here,
$\mathcal S_i(t)$
is the collection of
$\mathbf F_i$
-stopping times taking values in
$\{t,t+1,\dots\}\cup\{+\infty\}$
. Each such optimal stopping problem has an associated Gittins index sequence
$\{M_i(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
and its lower envelope
$\underline M_i(t,\theta)$
for
$t,\theta\in\mathbb N_0$
,
$t\le\theta$
. Notice that bounding each
$h_i(t)$
within
$[0,K(1-\beta)]$
implies, via (2.1), that
$V_i(t;\;m)\le K$
for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
; hence
as a consequence of (3.1), for every
$i=1,\dots,d$
and
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
. All the results from Sections 2 and 3 hold for these new objects.
To capture the combined effects of all d projects, we further introduce, for every
$m\ge0$
and
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
, the ‘total operational time’
\begin{align} \tau(m;\;\tilde s) \;:\!=\; \sum_{i=1}^d(\sigma_i(s_i;\;m)-s_i),\quad\tau(m) \;:\!=\; \tau(m;\;\tilde 0), \end{align}
and its right-inverse
Here,
$\tau(m;\;\tilde s)$
represents the earliest calendar time at which it will be optimal to abandon all projects and collect the retirement reward m, when starting with position
$\tilde s=(s_1,\dots,s_d)$
at calendar time
$t=\sum_{i=1}^d s_i$
. Analogously,
$N(t;\;\tilde s)$
represents the minimum reward that must be offered to abandon all projects immediately, at the current position
$\tilde s$
and current calendar time
$t=\sum_{i=1}^d s_i$
. In other words,
$N(t;\;\tilde s)$
is the current ‘equitable surrender value for the entire collection of projects.’
The analogs of (3.4) and (3.5), namely
and
now hold for every
$m\ge0$
,
$\tilde s=(s_1,\dots,s_d)\in\mathbb N_0^d$
, and
$t=\sum_{i=1}^d s_i$
. We have also the analog of (3.7),
as well as the following analog of Proposition 4.
Proposition 8. If
$\tau(\!\cdot\!;\;\tilde s)$
has a jump at
$m\ge0$
for fixed
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
, then the mapping
$\theta\mapsto N(\theta;\;\tilde s)$
is a.s. constant on
$\{\tau(m;\;\tilde s),\dots,\tau(m-;\tilde s)-1\}$
, and
It will be useful to utilize the following representation of
$N(t;\;\tilde s)$
, as a more explicit version of Proposition 8. For ease of notation, we assume
$\tilde s=\tilde 0$
.
Notice that
$\tau(\!\cdot\!)$
is a decreasing, integer-valued step function, as a consequence of Lemma 1, with
$\tau(0) = \infty$
and
$\tau(m)\to0$
as
$m\to\infty$
. Then there exist pathwise finitely many times
$0 = t_0 \lt t_1 \lt \dots \lt t_\ell = \infty$
with corresponding values
$m_1 \gt \dots \gt m_\ell \ge 0$
such that
$\tau(\!\cdot\!)$
has jumps precisely at
$m_1,\dots,m_\ell$
, with
$\tau(m_j) = t_{j-1}$
for
$j=1,\dots,\ell$
. It follows from (4.10) that
$N(\!\cdot\!)$
is a bounded, decreasing, discrete-time process satisfying
\begin{align} N(t) = \sum_{j=1}^\ell m_j\mathbf{1}\{t_{j-1}\le t\lt t_j\},\quad t\in\mathbb N_0, \end{align}
as well as
We remark that the times
$t_1,\dots,t_\ell$
and the values
$m_1,\dots,m_\ell$
are, of course, random—determined pathwise for the function
$\tau(\!\cdot\!)$
—as is
$\ell$
itself.
4.1. Dynamic allocation with decreasing rewards
We consider the simple yet indispensable case where the rewards sequences
$\widehat H_i \;:\!=\; \{\widehat h_i(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N}$
are a.s. decreasing, while remaining positive and
$\mathbf F_i$
-predictable. We wish to compute the value of the dynamic allocation problem
where
\begin{align} \widehat{\mathcal R}(\tilde T,\eta;\;M) \;:\!=\; \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{t=0}^{\eta-1} \beta^t \widehat h_i(T_i(t+1)) (T_i(t+1)-T_i(t) ) + M\beta^\eta. \end{align}
We emphasize that what follows requires absolutely no assumptions on the dependency structure of the multi-parameter filtration
$\mathbf F$
.
As before, we have for each project a corresponding optimal stopping problem, for which the objects and results found in Sections 2 and 3 stand. It turns out that the lower envelopes of the Gittins indices of each project relate directly to the values of their associated reward sequences, via the forward induction characterization of the Gittins index.
Lemma 5. For each
$i=1,\dots,d$
and
$t\ge s_i$
, we have the representation
Proof. For every
$t\ge s_i$
and stopping time
$\nu\in\mathcal S(t+1)$
, we have by the decrease and predictability of
$\widehat h_i(\!\cdot\!)$
that
\begin{align*}\mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=t}^{\nu-1}\beta^u\widehat h_i(u+1)\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F_i(t)\right] \le \widehat h_i(t+1)\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=t}^{\nu-1}\beta^u\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F_i(t)\right]\!,\quad\text{a.s.}\end{align*}
It follows from (3.3) that
$(1-\beta)M_i(t)\le \widehat h_i(t+1)$
a.s. But taking
$\nu\equiv t+1$
in the essential supremum of (3.3) also yields
$(1-\beta)M_i(t)\ge \widehat h_i(t+1)$
a.s. Now
$M_i(\!\cdot\!)$
is decreasing, and since
$\underline M_i(s_i,\!\cdot)$
is the lower envelope of
$M_i(\!\cdot\!)$
then, in fact,
$M_i(t)=\underline M_i(s_i,t)$
, for every
$t\ge s_i$
.
We are now ready to obtain a solution to the dynamic allocation problem (4.16), conditioned on the existence of an allocation strategy
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
that satisfies the ‘synchronization identity,’ i.e.
\begin{align} \sum_{i=1}^d [(T_i(t)-s_i)\wedge(\sigma_i(s_i;\;m)-s_i) ] = t\wedge\tau(m;\;\tilde s), \quad \text{for all}\ t\in\mathbb N_0,\,m\gt0. \end{align}
We will construct an explicit strategy satisfying (4.19) in Section 5.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the multi-parameter filtration
$\mathbf F$
satisfies conditions (F1) and (F2). Then the value of the dynamic allocation problem (4.16) is given by
\begin{align} \widehat\Phi(\tilde s;\;M) & = M + \mathbb E\left[\int_M^\infty \big(1-\beta^{\tau(m;\;\tilde s)}\big) \mathrm{d} m \,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F(\tilde s)\right] \notag \\ & = (1-\beta)\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t (M\vee N(t;\;\tilde s)) \,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F(\tilde s)\right]\!, \quad\text{a.s.} \end{align}
Moreover, the supremum in (4.16) is attained by
$(\tilde T,\eta)\in\mathcal P(\tilde s)$
if and only if
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
satisfies the synchronization identity (4.19) for every
$m\ge M$
and either
$\eta=\tau(M;\;\tilde s)$
or
$\eta=\tau(M;\;\tilde s)+1$
.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that
$\tilde s=\tilde 0$
. For every
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
,
$m\ge M$
, and
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde 0)$
, we define
\begin{align*} A_i(t;\;m,\tilde T)\;:\!=\;T_i(t)\wedge\sigma_i(m), \quad A(t;\;m,\tilde T)\;:\!=\;\sum_{i=1}^dA_i(t;\;m,\tilde T)\le t\wedge\tau(m). \end{align*}
Notice that
$A(t;\;m,\tilde T)=t\wedge\tau(m)$
holds if and only if
$\tilde T$
satisfies the synchronization identity (4.19) for m. Also notice that
$A_i(0;\;m,\tilde T)=0$
and that
We compute the following, using (3.4), (4.18), and (4.21):
\begin{align*} \widehat{\mathcal R}&(\tilde T,\eta;\;M) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{t=0}^{\eta-1} \beta^t(1-\beta) (T_i(t+1)-T_i(t) ) \cdot \!\bigg(M\wedge\underline M_i(T_i(t))+\int_M^\infty \mathbf{1}\{m \lt \underline M_i(T_i(t))\}\,\mathrm{d} m\!\bigg) + M\beta^\eta \\ &\le \sum_{i=1}^d \int_M^\infty \sum_{t=0}^{\eta-1} \beta^t(1-\beta) (A_i(t+1;\;m,\tilde T) - A_i(t;\;m,\tilde T) )\,\mathrm{d} m + M \\ &= \int_M^\infty \sum_{t=0}^{\eta-1} \beta^t(1-\beta) (A(t+1;\;m,\tilde T) - A(t;\;m,\tilde T) )\,\mathrm{d} m + M \\ &\le \int_M^\infty\Bigg[(1-\beta)\beta^{\eta-1}(\eta\wedge\tau(m)) + (1-\beta)^2\sum_{t=0}^{\eta-2} \beta^t ((t+1)\wedge\tau(m) )\Bigg]\,\mathrm{d} m + M.\end{align*}
The first inequality becomes equality if and only if
$M\le\underline M_i(T_i(t))$
for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
and
$0\le t\lt\eta$
. This is equivalent to
$t\le\tau(M)$
for
$t\lt\eta$
by (3.4); hence we require
$\eta\le\tau(M)+1$
. The second inequality follows from expanding the telescoping sum and becomes equality if and only if
$\tilde T$
satisfies the synchronization identity. By splitting the sum into
$t\lt\tau(m)$
and
$t\ge\tau(m)$
, observing that the integrand is increasing in
$\eta$
, it is observed that the integrand is bounded from above by
$1-\beta^{\tau(m)}$
. But it is easy to check that this upper bound is attained when
$\eta\ge\tau(m)$
for all
$m\ge M$
. Since
$m\mapsto\tau(m)$
is decreasing by Lemma 1, it suffices that
$\eta\ge\tau(M)$
. This proves the first equality in (4.20). The second equality of (4.20) follows from (4.10), since
\begin{align*} (1-\beta) \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t (M\vee N(t)) &= (1-\beta) \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t\bigg(M + \int_M^\infty\mathbf{1}\{t\lt\tau(m)\}\,\mathrm{d} m\bigg) \\ &= M + \int_M^\infty \big(1-\beta^{\tau(m)}\big) \mathrm{d} m.\end{align*}
Finally, to show that
$\tau(M)$
is an
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-stopping time, observe that (4.19) implies
\begin{align*}\{\tau(M)\le t\} = \bigcap_{i=1}^d \{\sigma_i(M)\le T_i(t)\} = \{\tilde\sigma(m) \;:\!=\; (\sigma_1(m),\dots,\sigma_d(m))\le\tilde T(t)\}.\end{align*}
Recall that
$\tilde T(t)$
is an
$\mathbf F$
-stopping point, from Proposition 7, and note that
\begin{align*}\{\tilde\sigma(m)\le\tilde r\} = \bigcap_{i=1}^d\{\underline M_i(r_i)\le m\} \in \bigcap_{i=1}^d \mathcal F^i(r_i) = \mathcal F(\tilde r), \quad\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d\end{align*}
and so
$\{\tau(M)\le t\}\in\mathcal F(\tilde T(t))$
by definition, for each
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
.
In words, Theorem 2 states that satisfying the synchronization identity is a necessary and sufficient condition for an allocation strategy to be optimal, and that the investigator should retire as soon as every rewards sequence, or, in light of (4.18), the Gittins index of every project, falls below the retirement reward M.
5. Synchronization and index-type strategies
Before continuing further, we elucidate additional characterizations of the synchronization identity (4.19), which will simplify later proofs and reveal new representations of the value of the dynamic allocation problem. We also introduce allocation strategies of ‘index type’—namely, strategies that compel the investigator to engage, at each moment in time, a project with the maximum current Gittins index—and show via the ‘excursion theory’ of [Reference Kaspi and Mandelbaum19] that index-type strategies are a subset of those satisfying the synchronization identity. Finally, we construct an explicit strategy of index type that therefore satisfies the synchronization identity and completes the proof of Theorem 2.
First, let us introduce the random fields
and
for every
$\tilde s,\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
such that
$\tilde s\le\tilde r$
, recalling the notation of (3.1) and (3.2).
Theorem 3 (Synchronization and dual optimality.) Let
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
be an allocation strategy. The following are equivalent.
-
(a)
$\tilde T$
satisfies the synchronization identity (4.19). -
(b) For each
$m\ge0$
, (5.3)
\begin{align} T_i(\tau(m;\;\tilde s)) = \sigma_i(s_i;\;m),\quad i=1,\dots,d. \end{align}
-
(c) For each
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
, (5.4)
\begin{align} \sigma_i(s_i;\;N(t;\;\tilde s)) \le T_i(t) \le \sigma_i(s_i;\;N(t;\;\tilde s)-\!), \quad i=1,\dots,d. \end{align}
-
(d)
$\tilde T$
satisfies the ‘dual optimality property,’ i.e. (5.5)
\begin{align} \max_{1\le i\le d}\underline M_i(s_i,T_i(t)) = \underline{\mathcal M}(\tilde s,\tilde T(t)) = N(t;\;\tilde s),\quad \textit{for all}\ t\in\mathbb N_0. \end{align}
-
(e)
$\tilde T$
is of the ‘lower envelope index type,’ i.e. (5.6)for each
\begin{align} \underline M_i(s_i,T_i(t)) = \underline{\mathcal M}(\tilde s,\tilde T(t)) \quad\textit{on}\quad \{\tilde T(t+1) = \tilde T(t) + \tilde e_i\} \end{align}
$i=1,\dots,d$
and
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
.
Of particular importance here is the synchronization identity (4.19), which will feature heavily in Section 7. In words, a strategy that satisfies the synchronization identity will not engage any given project beyond the optimal stopping time associated with that project, no matter how large or small the exit reward, until every project has been engaged up to its optimal stopping time. Compare this with (5.3), which posits that the strategy
$\tilde T$
partitions the total operational time
$\tau(m;\;\tilde s)$
optimally across all projects, for any choice of retirement reward and starting position.
Conversely, we shall see next in the proof of Theorem 3 that
holds for every allocation strategy
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
; the dual optimality property (5.5) is then saying that strategies satisfying the synchronization identity are not only optimal for the maximization problem in dynamic allocation, as in Section 4, but that they also solve a related minimization problem, expressed by (5.5) and (5.5ʹ).
Notice also that (4.19) is equivalent to the similar statement
\begin{align} \sum_{i=1}^d [T_i(t)-s_i)\wedge(\sigma_i(s_i;\;m-\!)-s_i) ] = t\wedge\tau(m\!-\!;\tilde s),\quad \text{for all}\ t\in\mathbb N_0,\,m\gt0. \end{align}
by the right-continuity of
$\sigma_i(s_i;\cdot\!)$
and
$\tau(\!\cdot\!;\;\tilde s)$
.
Proof of Theorem
3. We will proceed by proving (a)
$\implies$
(b)
$\implies$
(c)
$\implies$
(a), then show (a)
$\implies$
(d)
$\implies$
(b), and finally (a)
$\iff$
(e). Throughout the proof, we assume for ease of notation that
$\tilde s=\tilde 0$
, as the general case follows by translation.
-
(a)
$\implies$
(b). Taking
$t=\tau(m)$
in (4.19) yields
$\sum_{i=1}^d(T_i(\tau(m)) \wedge\sigma_i(m))=\tau(m)$
; hence
$T_i(\tau(m))=\sigma_i(m)$
for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
and every
$m\ge0$
, by condition (ii) of Definition 3. -
(b)
$\implies$
(c). It follows from (4.12), (5.3), and the increase of
$T_i(\!\cdot\!)$
that, for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
,
\begin{align*}\sigma_i(N(t))=(T_i\circ\tau)(N(t))\le T_i(t)\le(T_i\circ\tau)(N(t)-\!)=\sigma_i(N(t)-\!).\end{align*}
-
(c)
$\implies$
(a). Fix
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
and
$m\ge0$
. If
$m\gt N(t)$
then (5.4) and the decrease of
$\sigma_i(\!\cdot\!)$
yield
\begin{align*}T_i(t)\ge\sigma_i(N(t))\ge\sigma_i(m)\end{align*}
Now (4.12) and the decrease of
$\tau(\!\cdot\!)$
imply
yielding (4.19).
Conversely, if
$m\le N(t)$
, we have analogously that
yielding (5.7). But (5.7) is equivalent to (4.19).
(a)
$\implies$
(d). Let
$\tilde T$
be an arbitrary allocation strategy and let
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
and
$m\ge0$
be given. It holds that
$\underline{\mathcal M}(\tilde T(t))\le m$
if and only if
$\underline M_i(T_i(t))\le m$
for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
, which in turn holds if and only if
$\sigma_i(m)\le T_i(t)$
for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
, by (3.4). Summing over each i yields
$\tau(m)\le t$
, which is equivalent to the inequality
$N(t)\le m$
by (4.10). Thus
from which (5.5ʹ) follows. Now the reverse inequality holds if and only if the converse of (5.8) also holds, which requires the implication
But this holds immediately for every
$\tilde T$
that satisfies (4.19).
(d)
$\implies$
(b). If (5.5) holds then (5.9) must also hold. By taking
$t=\tau(m)$
, we obtain
$\sigma_i(m)\le T_i(\tau(m))$
for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
and every
$m\ge0$
. But summing over i yields
\begin{align*} \tau(m)=\sum_{i=1}^d\sigma_i(m)\le\sum_{i=1}^dT_i(\tau(m))=\tau(m); \end{align*}
hence
$\sigma_i(m)=T_i(\tau(m))$
for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
.
(a)
$\implies$
(e). It suffices to show that, for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
and
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
, we have
We have by property (d) that
$\underline{\mathcal M}(\tilde T(t))=N(t)$
, so we assume
$\underline M_i(T_i(t)) \lt N(t)$
for given
$i=1,\dots,d$
and
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
.
Suppose
$\sigma_i(\!\cdot\!)$
has a jump at N(t). Then
$T_i(t)\in\{\sigma_i(N(t)),\dots, \sigma_i(N(t)-\!)\}$
, by (5.4). If
$T_i(t)\neq\sigma_i(N(t)-\!)$
then (3.8) implies that
$\underline M_i(T_i(t)) = N(t)$
, contradicting our initial assumption. Thus,
$T_i(t)=\sigma_i(N(t)-\!)$
holds. In particular, we have by (5.3) that
$T_i(t) = T_i(\tau(N(t)-\!))$
, where
$t\lt\tau(N(t)-\!)$
by (4.12). The increase of
$T_i(\!\cdot\!)$
thus implies that
$T_i(t)=T_i(t+1)$
, as desired.
Conversely, suppose
$\sigma_i(\!\cdot\!)$
is continuous at N(t). Then (5.4) implies that
$T_i(t)=\sigma_i(N(t))=\sigma_i(N(t)-\!)$
. Notice that, by (5.3), we have
whereas
$\tau(N(t)-\!)\gt t$
by (4.12). The increase of
$T_i(\!\cdot\!)$
again implies that
$T_i(t)=T_i(t+1)$
.
(e)
$\implies$
(a). Fix
$m\gt0$
and proceed by induction on
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
. For
$t=0$
, we have
$T_i(0)=0$
for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
, and synchronization is trivially satisfied. Now suppose synchronization is satisfied for some
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
. We consider two cases.
Case 1.
$\sum_{i=1}^d(T_i(t)\wedge\sigma_i(m))=\tau(m)\le t$
. This holds if and only if
$\sigma_i(m)\le T_i(t)$
holds for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
. The increase of
$T_i(\!\cdot\!)$
then implies
$\sum_{i=1}^d(T_i(t+1)\wedge\sigma_i(m))=\tau(m)\le t+1$
, as desired.
Case 2.
$\sum_{i=1}^d(T_i(t)\wedge\sigma_i(m))=t\le\tau(m)$
. This holds if and only if
$\sigma_i(m)\ge T_i(t)$
holds for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
. If equality holds for each i then we fall into Case 1. Therefore, suppose there exists a non-empty set
$J\subseteq\{1,\dots,d\}$
such that
$\sigma_j(m)\gt T_j(t)$
holds if
$j\in J$
and
$\sigma_j(m)=T_j(t)$
holds if
$j\notin J$
. By (3.4),
$\underline M_j(T_j(t))\gt m$
holds if
$j\in J$
, whereas
$\underline M_j(T_j(t))\le m$
holds if
$j\notin J$
. It follows from the lower envelope index-type property (5.6) that
$\tilde T(t+1) = \tilde T(t)+e_{j^*}$
for some
$j^*\in J$
. Then
$\sigma_i(m)\ge T_i(t)=T_i(t+1)$
for each
$i\neq j^*$
while
$\sigma_{j^*}(m)\gt T_{j^*}(t)$
implies
$\sigma_{j^*}(m)\ge T_{j^*}(t)+1=T_{j^*}(t+1)$
. As a result,
$\sigma_i(m)\ge T_i(t+1)$
holds for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
, and synchronization is satisfied for
$t+1$
.
Remark 2. The synchronization identity (4.19) can also be understood as allowing the ‘minimum’ and ‘summation’ operations to commute, when it comes to the pairs of random times
$T_i(t)$
and
$\sigma_i(s_i;\;m)$
. One interesting connection here is with the max-plus algebra (also known as the tropical semi-ring) of [Reference Baccelli, Cohen, Olsder and Quadrat3]; see also [Reference El Karoui and Meziou12]. Alternatively, the explicit relationship between synchronization and index-type strategies, as shown later in Proposition 9, may help elucidate the role of the Gittins index in certain scheduling problems of queueing theory; see, for example, [Reference Ramakrishna, Harlev and Scully25], [Reference Scully and Terenin27], and [Reference Scully, Harchol-Balter and Scheller-Wolf28].
Remark 3. In light of Theorem 3, particularly (5.5), we immediately observe from (4.20) that the value of the dynamic allocation problem (4.16) with decreasing rewards sequences has the additional representation
\begin{align} \widehat\Phi(\tilde s;\;M) = (1-\beta)\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t (\underline{\mathcal M}(\tilde s,\tilde T^*(t))\vee M) \,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F(\tilde s)\right]\!, \end{align}
for any
$\tilde T^*\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
satisfying the synchronization identity (4.19). The equivalence of the synchronization identity and the lower envelope index property (5.6), in conjunction with (4.18), shows that optimal strategies for the decreasing rewards case are exactly those which engage, at each moment in time, in the project that offers the maximum immediate reward. Such strategies are sometimes referred to as ‘myopic’ in the sense that it is not necessary to consider the future at all when deciding which project to engage in. A similar proof that myopic strategies are optimal in this special setting also appears in [Reference Bank and Küchler4].
5.1. Index-type strategies and excursions
We now introduce allocation strategies of index type and connect them to the synchronization identity by means of the ‘excursion-theoretic’ approach to dynamic allocation first developed in [Reference Kaspi and Mandelbaum18] and [Reference Kaspi and Mandelbaum19].
Definition 7. An allocation strategy
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
is of index type if
recalling the notation of (5.1). In other words, an index-type strategy requires the investigator to engage in a project only if it has maximal current Gittins index.
Compare (5.11) against the weaker (5.6), which requires the investigator to only engage in projects whose current minimum Gittins index to date is maximal among all projects. This observation is the basis for the following connection between index-type strategies and strategies that satisfy the synchronization identity. The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 9. An allocation strategy
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
is of index type (5.11) if and only if it satisfies the synchronization identity (4.19) and the ‘excursion property’
We term (5.12) the ‘excursion property,’ in the tradition of [Reference Kaspi and Mandelbaum18]. Morally speaking, when a project is engaged in, its Gittins index may either go above its lower envelope or fall to a new ‘all-time low.’ Periods of time in which the Gittins index exceeds its lower envelope are referred to as ‘excursions’ away from the lower envelope; excursions come to an end when the Gittins index drops to a new all-time low and again coincides with its lower envelope. As such, the excursion property (5.12) is satisfied by an allocation strategy if the investigator exclusively engages in the project that is in the middle of an excursion period. When all projects’ Gittins indices coincide with their lower envelopes, such as at time
$t=0$
, the investigator has the option, prima facie, to engage in any one of them; the synchronization identity and its equivalent (5.6) then oblige the investigator to choose a project with maximal current Gittins index and to pursue that project until the end of its excursion.
For later use in the proof of Theorem 4, let us expand briefly on the idea of excursions. Let
$\mathbf F$
be a complete multi-parameter filtration. Recall for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
that
$\mathcal S_i(t)$
denotes the collection of
$\mathbf F_i$
-stopping times taking values in
$\{t,t+1,\dots\}\cup\{+\infty\}$
. For some fixed
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
, we introduce the stopping times
$\varepsilon_i(k;\;t)\in\mathcal S_i(t)$
,
$k\in\mathbb N_0$
, defined by
$\varepsilon_i(0;\;t)\equiv t$
and
Clearly,
so, in particular, we have
In other words, the stopping time
$\varepsilon_i(k;\;t)$
denotes the beginning of the kth excursion of the Gittins index, from time t onwards, for the ith project.
Additionally, for each
$\tilde s,\tilde k\in\mathbb N_0^d$
, let
For any allocation strategy
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
, define
$\rho(k;\;\tilde T)$
,
$k\in\mathbb N_0$
, by
$\rho(0;\;\tilde T)\equiv0$
and
which denote the calendar times at which, in the course of pursuing the allocation strategy
$\tilde T$
, every project is about to begin its next excursion. The next result, whose proof is in Appendix A, states that the random times
$\rho(k;\;\tilde T)$
are accessible to an investigator pursuing strategy
$\tilde T$
.
Proposition 10. For every
$\tilde k,\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
,
$\tilde\varepsilon(\tilde k;\;\tilde s)$
is an
$\mathbf F$
-stopping point, and for every
$k\in\mathbb N_0$
,
$\rho(k;\;\tilde T)$
is an
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-stopping time.
In light of Proposition 10, we define the random, possibly infinite, ‘excursion intervals’ of an allocation strategy
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
by
Our terminology is motivated by the following crucial lemma.
Lemma 6. If an allocation strategy
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
satisfies the excursion property (5.12) then, for every
$k\in\mathbb N_0$
, there exists pathwise a unique
$j\equiv j(k)\in\{1,\dots,d\}$
such that
$\tilde T(t+1)=\tilde T(t)+\tilde e_j$
for every
$t\in E(k;\;\tilde T)$
.
Proof. Let us work pathwise, i.e. for fixed
$\omega\in\Omega$
. Fix
$k\in\mathbb N_0$
. At time
$t=\rho(k;\;\tilde T)$
, we have
$M_i(T_i(\rho(k;\;\tilde T)))=\underline M_i(T_i(\rho(k;\;\tilde T)))$
for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
, by (5.14) and (5.16). Set j(k) to be the project engaged at time
$\rho(k;\;\tilde T)$
, i.e. the unique j for which
$\tilde T(\rho(k;\;\tilde T)+1) = \tilde T(\rho(k;\;\tilde T)) + \tilde e_j$
.
For our inductive hypothesis, let
$t\in E(k;\;\tilde T)$
with
$t\lt\rho(k+1;\;\tilde T)-1$
, and suppose that
$\tilde T(t+1)=\tilde T(t)+\tilde e_j$
and that
$M_i(t)=\underline M_i(t)$
for each
$i\neq j$
. Since
$\rho(k;\;\tilde T) \lt t \lt \rho(k+1;\;\tilde T)$
, there exists at least one project for which the Gittins index does not coincide with its lower envelope. This must be the jth project by assumption, i.e.
$M_j(t) \gt \underline M_j(t)$
. The excursion property (5.12) implies that the inductive hypothesis also holds for
$t+1$
. It follows that, under the strategy, the jth project is exclusively engaged in during the excursion interval
$E(k;\;\tilde T)$
.
Remark 4. Proposition 9 suggests that allocation strategies of index type (5.11) are a strict subclass of those satisfying the synchronization identity (4.19). This is true if and only if it is possible, with positive probability, to enter into a scenario in which, at some time t, the minimum Gittins index to date is maximized by two projects simultaneously, but the Gittins index of one project is strictly larger than the Gittins index of the other. In light of Theorem 3, a strategy may choose to engage either one of those projects and still satisfy the synchronization identity, whereas an index-type strategy is compelled to select the project with larger Gittins index. Under certain conditions on the rewards processes, this scenario might never occur. For instance, when the rewards processes are decreasing, each project’s Gittins index coincides with its lower envelope (Lemma 5), so if two projects have equal minimum Gittins indices to date, then their Gittins indices are also equal. Therefore, the class of strategies satisfying the synchronization identity coincides with the index-type strategies. Conversely, it is quite straightforward to construct a simple dynamic allocation problem in which these two classes of strategies do not coincide. An example is provided in Appendix A.
5.2. An explicit index-type strategy
In the remainder of this section, we construct a strategy
$\tilde T^*\in\mathcal A(\tilde 0)$
satisfying the synchronization identity (4.19). It turns out that the strategy is also of index type, but the motivation behind its construction is given by the synchronization principle encoded in (5.4). Similar constructions appear in [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas10], [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas11], and [Reference Mandelbaum21].
Let
$y_0(t)\;:\!=\;\tau(N(t))$
, recalling the notation of (4.8) and (4.9); for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
, define
\begin{align}y_i(t) \;:\!=\; \tau(N(t)) + \sum_{j=1}^{i}\Delta\sigma_j(N(t)) = \sum_{j=1}^{i}\sigma_j(N(t)-\!) + \sum_{j=i+1}^d\sigma_j(N(t)), \quad t\in\mathbb N,\end{align}
where
$\Delta\sigma_i(m)\;:\!=\;\sigma_i(m\!-\!)-\sigma_i(m)$
. Recall that
$\tau(N(t))\le t\lt\tau(N(t)-\!)$
from (5.7ʹ) to (5.7ʹʹ), and we have
Thus, there exists a unique
$k\equiv k(t)\in\{1,\dots,d\}$
for which
$t\in[y_{k-1}(t),y_k(t))$
. Now, for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
, we simply set
$T^*_i(0)=0$
and
\begin{align}T^*_i(t) = \left. \begin{cases} \sigma_i(N(t)-\!), &\text{if }\, i=1,\dots,k-1 \\ \sigma_i(N(t)) + t - y_{i-1}(t), &\text{if }\, i=k \\ \sigma_i(N(t)), &\text{if }\, i=k+1,\dots,d\end{cases}\right\},\quad t\in\mathbb N.\end{align}
Proposition 11. The process
$\tilde T^*(t)=(T^*_1(t),\dots,T^*_d(t))$
, as defined in (5.20), is an allocation strategy of index type (5.11).
Proof. Conditions (i) and (iii) of Definition 3 are trivially satisfied. It is clear, furthermore, that
$\sum_{i=1}^dT^*_i(t)=t$
for every
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
. To show that each
$T^*_i(\!\cdot\!)$
is increasing, fix
$i=1,\dots,d$
and recall the notation of (4.14). Suppose for some
$j'=1,\dots,\ell$
that
$t\in\{t_{j'-1},\dots,t_{j'}-1\}$
. We wish to show that
$T^*_i(t)\le T^*_i(t+1)$
.
Suppose
$t+1\lt t_{j'}$
. Then
$N(t)=N(t+1)$
and so
$y_j(t)=y_j(t+1)$
for each
$j=0,\dots,d$
. Additionally, it holds that
$k(t)\le k(t+1)$
, so it suffices to show that
The first inequality follows from the definition of k(t). Similarly, we have
which is equivalent to the second inequality.
Suppose, however, that
$t+1=t_{j'}$
. But (5.21) and the decrease of both
$\sigma_i(\!\cdot\!)$
and
$N(\!\cdot\!)$
imply
hence
$\tilde T$
is an allocation strategy.
Finally, suppose
$T_i^*(t)=\sigma_i(N(t))$
. Since
$\sigma_i(\!\cdot\!)$
is integer-valued, it is a right-continuous step function. Thus,
$\sigma_i(\!\cdot\!)$
has a jump at the point
$r = \inf\{m\ge0\colon \sigma_i(m)=\sigma_i(N(t))\}$
, which implies that
$\underline M_i(\sigma_i(r))=r$
, by (3.6). But (3.6) implies
$M(\sigma_i(r))=r$
as well, yielding
$M_i(T_i^*(t)) = \underline M_i(T_i^*(t))$
. If instead
$T_i^*(t)=\sigma_i(N(t)-\!)$
then we may repeat the same argument by instead setting
$r = \inf\{m\ge0 \colon \sigma_i(m) = \sigma_i(N(t)-\!)\}$
. It follows that, in the notation of (5.20), if
$i\neq k$
, then the excursion property (5.12) holds vacuously. Since (5.20) guarantees that the kth project is engaged on, in fact (5.12) holds in general. Additionally,
$\tilde T^*$
satisfies (4.19) as a consequence of (5.21) and Theorem 3. Thus
$\tilde T^*$
is of index type, by Proposition 9.
Roughly speaking, the allocation strategy (5.20) is a time change via
$\sigma_i(N(\!\cdot\!))$
. The ‘flat’ parts of
$N(\!\cdot\!)$
correspond to the jumps of
$\tau(\!\cdot\!)$
, which in turn comprise the jumps of each
$\sigma_i(\!\cdot\!)$
. Immediately after every jump of
$\tau(\!\cdot\!)$
, our strategy has the form
$T^*_i(t)=\sigma_i(N(t))$
. To ensure that
$T^*_i(t)$
lies between
$\sigma_i(N(t))$
and
$\sigma_i(N(t)-\!)$
, the investigator should engage in each project, one at a time in ‘lexicographic order,’ until the distance between
$\sigma_i(N(t))$
and
$\sigma_i(N(t)-\!)$
has been ‘traversed.’ That this traversal occurs one project at a time ensures that
$\tilde T^*$
satisfies the excursion property. We note that in the language of excursion theory, this strategy may be described as an ‘index-priority strategy,’ which adheres to a ‘static priority scheme’
$(1,\dots,d)$
[Reference Kaspi and Mandelbaum19].
Remark 5. While the construction (5.20) seems quite complex at first glance, in practice it is quite straightforward to implement since it is of index type. At time
$t=0$
, we compute the Gittins indices of each project and select a project with maximal index to engage. We continue to engage this same project until its Gittins index is no longer maximal among all projects, at which point we switch once more to a project whose Gittins index is maximal. In case of ties, (5.20) is designed to select the project lowest in lexicographic order, although of course any manner of tie-breaking can be used. In general, the benefit of index policies from a computational perspective is that at each moment in time, only d indices need to be computed to make optimal decisions, rather than searching the entire space of paths through
$\mathbb N_0^d$
, thus resolving the so-called ‘curse of dimensionality.’ Conversely, computing the Gittins index can be a non-trivial task, although algorithms have been analyzed in the finite-state Markov setting [Reference Varaiya, Walrand and Buyukkoc31]. It would be interesting to see if the connection between the Gittins index and synchronization lends itself to faster algorithms, since control problems involving synchronization have linear representations in the max-plus algebra and may thus be able to leverage fast matrix algorithms [Reference Baccelli, Cohen, Olsder and Quadrat3]. For an excellent overview of practical implementations of index policies, see [Reference Scully and Terenin27].
6. General multi-parameter martingales
We now set out to solve the dynamic allocation problem (4.5) in the general setting, without additional assumptions on the rewards sequences as in (4.16). In contrast to previous works, the filtrations
$\mathbf F_1,\dots,\mathbf F_d$
associated with each project are not necessarily independent. As before, we work on a complete probability space
$(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)$
with a multi-parameter filtration
$\mathbf F\;:\!=\;\{\mathcal F(\tilde s)\}_{\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d}$
. This filtration is assumed to have the properties (F1) and (F2), as introduced in Section 4, as well as the following additional property of [Reference Cairoli and Walsh5].
-
(F4)
$\mathcal F(\tilde s),\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
are conditionally independent given
$\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)$
, meaning that (6.1)holds for every
\begin{align} \mathbb P(A\cap B\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)) = \mathbb P(A\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r))\,\mathbb P(B\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)) \end{align}
$A\in\mathcal F(\tilde s)$
and
$B\in\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
.
Notice that the (F3) right-continuity condition in [Reference Cairoli and Walsh5] is omitted here because we are in a discrete-time setting. The celebrated (F4) condition is standard in multi-parameter theory, and constitutes a relaxation of the projects’ independence by allowing them to depend mutually on a ‘shared history.’ We use the unnatural enumeration, in passing over (F3), to remain consistent with the well-established appellation ‘(F4)’ used for the condition spelled out in (6.1).
Proposition 12 ([Reference Walsh34, p. 349].) Let
$\mathbf F$
be a multi-parameter filtration. The following are equivalent.
-
(a)
$\mathbf F$
satisfies condition (F4). -
(b) For every
$\tilde s,\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
and bounded
$\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
-measurable function
$\xi$
, (6.2)
\begin{align}\mathbb E[\xi\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s)]=\mathbb E[\xi\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)].\end{align}
-
(c) For every
$\tilde s,\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
and bounded
$\mathcal F$
-measurable function
$\xi$
, (6.3)
\begin{align}\mathbb E[\mathbb E[\xi\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s)]\mid\mathcal F(\tilde r)] = \mathbb E[\mathbb E[\xi\mid\mathcal F(\tilde r)]\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s)].\end{align}
If any of these hold then
holds for every
$\tilde s,\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
.
Proofs for these claims can be found in [Reference Cairoli and Walsh5] and [Reference Kallenberg15], while proofs for the claims made in Examples 2 and 3 can be found in Appendix A.
Example 2. The multi-parameter filtration constructed as the join of d one-parameter filtrations as in Example 1, where the one-parameter filtrations are mutually independent, satisfies condition (F4).
Example 3. This is an example, given by [Reference Cairoli and Walsh5], of a multi-parameter filtration that satisfies (F4) but cannot be expressed as a join of independent one-parameter filtrations. Let
$\mathcal B$
denote the power set
$\sigma$
-algebra on
$\mathbb N_0^d$
and let
$\{\eta(\tilde s)\}_{\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d}$
be a family of independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) standard Gaussian random variables. Then the so-called ‘white noise process’ on
$\mathbb N_0^d$
is the family of random variables
$\{W(S)\}_{S\in\mathcal B,\,|S|\lt\infty}$
, indexed by finite sets in
$\mathcal B$
, defined by
$W(S)\;:\!=\;\sum_{\tilde s\in S}\eta(\tilde s)$
. This family satisfies
-
(i)
$\mathbb E[W(S)]=0$
,
$\mathbb E[W(S)^2]=|S|$
, and -
(ii) if
$S\cap R = \varnothing$
then W(S) and W(R) are independent with
$W(S)+W(R)=W(S\cup R)$
a.s.,
and has the covariance matrix given by
\begin{align}\mathbb E[W(S)W(R)] = \sum_{\substack{\tilde s\in S,\,\tilde r\in R\\\tilde s\neq\tilde r}} \mathbb E[\eta(\tilde s)]\mathbb E[\eta(\tilde r)] + \sum_{\tilde s\in S\cap R}\mathbb E[\eta(\tilde s)]^2 = |S\cap R|.\end{align}
The process
$\{B(\tilde s)\}_{\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d}$
, defined as
$B(\tilde s) \;:\!=\; W(\{1,\dots,s_1\}\times\dots\times\{1,\dots,s_d\})$
, is the ‘Brownian sheet’ on
$\mathbb N_0^d$
, and the filtration it generates,
satisfies (F4) but cannot be written as the join of independent one-parameter filtrations as a consequence of (6.5).
Example 4. In light of the previous example, consider the dynamic allocation problem defined on the filtration generated by the two-dimensional Brownian sheet
$\{B(\tilde s)\}_{\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^2}$
, in which the rewards processes are given by
$h_1(t+1)=B(t,0)^2\wedge K$
and
$h_2(t+1)=B(0,t)^2 \wedge K$
for
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
and some fixed
$K\gt0$
. These are respectively
$\mathbf F_1$
- and
$\mathbf F_2$
-predictable, bounded, and not independent, since they both depend on
$\eta(0,0)$
. Of course, one can construct, in this vein, more involved dependencies between the two rewards sequences.
Recall the one-parameter filtrations
$\mathbf F_i$
and
$\mathbf F^i$
defined in (4.1) and (4.2). The condition (F4) provides a link between the ‘small’ filtration
$\mathbf F_i$
and the ‘large’ filtration
$\mathbf F^i$
, via the following ‘enlargement of filtrations’ property.
Proposition 13. Every
$\mathbf F_i$
-supermartingale is also an
$\mathbf F^i$
-supermartingale.
Proof. It suffices to show, for every
$s,t\in\mathbb N_0$
,
$s\le t$
, and every bounded
$\mathcal F_i(t)$
-measurable random variable
$\xi$
, that
$\mathbb E[\xi\mid\mathcal F_i(s)] = \mathbb E[\xi\mid\mathcal F^i(s)]$
. Notice by (6.4) that
$\mathcal F_i(t)\cap\mathcal F^i(s)=\mathcal F_i(s)$
, so (6.2) yields
as desired.
Remark 6. As a consequence of the previous proposition, we observe that the results of Sections 2 and 3 hold with respect to either filtration,
$\mathbf F_i$
or
$\mathbf F^i$
.
We now introduce several new objects in our multi-parameter setting. For the remainder of this section, we assume that
$\mathbf F$
satisfies conditions (F1), (F2), and (F4).
Definition 8. Let
$\mathbf X\;:\;\mathbb N_0^d\times\Omega\to\mathbb R$
be a random field, with
$X(\!\cdot\!)$
denoting a sample field. We say that
$\mathbf X$
is an
$\mathbf F$
-submartingale if
-
(i)
$\mathbb E|X(\tilde s)|\lt\infty$
for every
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
; -
(ii)
$\mathbf X$
is
$\mathbf F$
-adapted, i.e.
$X(\tilde s)$
is
$\mathcal F(\tilde s)$
-measurable for every
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
; and -
(iii)
$\mathbb E[X(\tilde r)\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s)]\ge X(\tilde s)$
a.s. for every
$\tilde s\le \tilde r$
.
We say that
$\mathbf X$
is an
$\mathbf F$
-supermartingale if
$-\mathbf X$
is an
$\mathbf F$
-submartingale, and we say that
$\mathbf X$
is an
$\mathbf F$
-martingale if it is both an
$\mathbf F$
-submartingale and an
$\mathbf F$
-supermartingale.
Proposition 14. ([Reference Walsh34, Proposition 2.1, p. 349].) For a random field
$\mathbf X\;:\;\mathbb N_0^d\times\Omega\to\mathbb R$
, the following are equivalent:
-
(a)
$\mathbf X$
is an
$\mathbf F$
-supermartingale; -
(b)
$\mathbf X$
is
$\mathbf F$
-adapted, integrable, and
$\mathbb E[X(\tilde r)\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s)]\le X(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)$
a.s., for every
$\tilde s,\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
; -
(c) the process
$\{X(\tilde s+t\tilde e_i)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
is a
$\{\mathcal F^i(s_i+t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
-supermartingale for every
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
and for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
.
The following result, whose proof can be found in Appendix A, says that following an
$\mathbf F$
-supermartingale along the path of an allocation strategy is itself a one-parameter supermartingale. We note that this fact is subtler than it might seem at first glance, as the optional sampling theorem used in the usual proof in a single dimension fails to hold for multi-parameter filtrations of dimension
$d\ge2$
[Reference Mandelbaum and Vanderbei22]. In fact, it is precisely sequences of stopping points generated by allocation strategies, in the sense of Proposition 7, that enjoy an optional sampling-type property. For details on the issues that arise in the multi-dimensional setting, see [Reference Mandelbaum and Vanderbei22] and [Reference Walsh33], as well as [Reference Mandelbaum20, Theorem 3].
Proposition 15. ([Reference Mandelbaum and Vanderbei22, p. 255].) Let
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
be an allocation strategy and let
$\mathbf X$
be an
$\mathbf F$
-supermartingale. Then
$\mathbf X(\tilde T) \;:\!=\; \{X(\tilde T(t))\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
is an
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-supermartingale.
Proof. Fix arbitrary
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
,
$\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
, and
$\Lambda\in\mathcal F(\tilde T(t))$
. Since
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
is a filtration by Proposition 7, it suffices to show
$\mathbb E[X(\tilde T(t+1))\mathbf{1}_{\Lambda\cap\{\tilde T(t)=\tilde r\}}]\le\mathbb E[X(\tilde T(t))\mathbf{1}_{\Lambda\cap\{\tilde T(t)=\tilde r\}}]$
by definition of conditional expectation. We have
\begin{align*}\mathbb E\big[X(\tilde T(t+1))\mathbf{1}_{\Lambda\cap\{\tilde T(t)=\tilde r\}}\big]&= \sum_{i=1}^d \mathbb E\big[X(\tilde r+\tilde e_i)\mathbf{1}_{\Lambda\cap\{\tilde T(t)=\tilde r,\,\tilde T(t+1)=\tilde T(t)+\tilde e_i\}}\big] \\&\le \sum_{i=1}^d \mathbb E\big[X(\tilde r)\mathbf{1}_{\Lambda\cap\{\tilde T(t)=\tilde r,\,\tilde T(t+1)=\tilde T(t)+\tilde e_i\}}\big]\le \mathbb E\big[X(\tilde T(t))\mathbf{1}_{\Lambda\cap\{\tilde T(t)=\tilde r\}}\big],\end{align*}
where the inequality follows from the supermartingality of
$\mathbf X$
with the fact that
$\Lambda\cap\{\tilde T(t)=\tilde r,\,\tilde T(t+1)=\tilde T(t)+\tilde e_i\}\in\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
by definition of allocation strategies.
To conclude this section, we prove a result that will be needed in Section 7.
Lemma 7. Let
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
be an allocation strategy. For each
$i=1,\dots,d$
, suppose that
$Q_i=\{Q_i(u)\}_{u=s_i}^\infty$
is an
$\{\mathcal F_i(u)\}_{u=s_i}^\infty$
-(super)martingale. Then the process
\begin{align*} \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{u=0}^{t-1} \beta^{u-T_i(u)} (Q_i(T_i(u+1))-Q_i(T_i(u)) ), \quad t\in\mathbb N_0 \end{align*}
is an
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-(super)martingale.
Proof. We prove the lemma for supermartingales; the same arguments hold for the martingale case. We may assume
$\tilde s=\tilde 0$
. For each
$i=1,\dots,d$
, the process
\begin{align*} U_i(t) \;:\!=\; \sum_{u=0}^{t-1}\beta^{-u} (Q_i(u+1)-Q_i(u) ),\quad t\in\mathbb N_0 \end{align*}
is an
$\mathbf F_i$
-supermartingale because it is an integrable martingale transform of
$Q_i$
by the deterministic process
$\{\beta^{-u}\}_{u\in\mathbb N_0}$
. In particular, it is an
$\mathbf F^i$
-supermartingale by the enlargement of filtrations property, Proposition 13. We obtain then from Proposition 14 (the (c)
$\implies$
(a) implication) that the random field
\begin{align*}U(\tilde r)\;:\!=\;\sum_{i=1}^dU_i(r_i),\quad \tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d,\end{align*}
is an
$\mathbf F$
-supermartingale. Now Proposition 15 implies that
\begin{align*} U(\tilde T(t)) &= \sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{u=0}^{t-1}\beta^{-T_i(u)} (Q_i(T_i(u+1))-Q_i(T_i(u)) ), \quad t\in\mathbb N_0 \end{align*}
is an
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-supermartingale. Taking the martingale transform of
$U(\tilde T)$
by
$\{\beta^u\}_{u\in\mathbb N_0}$
yields the desired
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-supermartingale.
7. Optimality in the (F4) setting
We now solve the general dynamic allocation problem (4.5), with respect to a multi-parameter filtration
$\mathbf F$
satisfying only the conditions (F1), (F2), and (F4). As before, each project, viewed in isolation, corresponds to an optimal stopping problem, for which the objects and results of Sections 2 and 3 stand.
The main result of this work, Theorem 4, says that the general dynamic allocation problem (4.5) has the same value as the dynamic allocation problem (4.16), in which the rewards sequences are a.s. decreasing, and that all index-type strategies, which are optimal in the decreasing rewards setting, are also optimal in the general case. This result will require almost all of the machinery developed in Sections 5 and 6 and, in particular, relies crucially on the excursion property (5.12) described in Proposition 9. The analysis of the synchronization identity via Theorem 3 also plays a major role, both in the reduction of the general problem to that of decreasing rewards, and in proving the alternate representation (7.4).
Versions of Theorem 4 in which the filtrations
$\mathbf F_1,\dots,\mathbf F_d$
are assumed to be independent have appeared in [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas9], [Reference Kaspi and Mandelbaum19], and [Reference Mandelbaum20]; in each of these works, independence of filtrations is crucial. One should also notice that Proposition 5 is a special case of Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. Assume that the multi-parameter filtration
$\mathbf F$
satisfies the conditions (F1), (F2), and (F4). Let
$\underline M_i(\cdot,\!\cdot)$
,
$i=1,\dots,d$
, denote the lower envelopes of the corresponding Gittins index sequences
$M_i(\!\cdot\!)$
defined with respect to the projects of the general dynamic allocation problem (4.5).
Then, for every
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
, the value of the dynamic allocation problem (4.5) is a.s. equal to the value of the dynamic allocation problem (4.16) with decreasing rewards given by
$\widehat h_i(t+1) \;:\!=\; (1-\beta)\underline M_i(s_i,t)$
, i.e.
\begin{align} \qquad = (1-\beta)\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t(M\vee N(t;\;\tilde s)) \,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F(\tilde s)\right]\!, \quad\textit{a.s.} \end{align}
Moreover, any policy that follows an allocation strategy
$\tilde T^*\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
of index type (5.11), and stops at
$\tau(M;\;\tilde s)$
, is optimal for the dynamic allocation problem (4.5), i.e.
and yields the representation
\begin{align} \Phi(\tilde s;\;M) = (1-\beta)\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \big(M\vee\underline{\mathcal M}(\tilde s,\tilde T^*(t))\big) \,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F(\tilde s)\right]\!, \quad\textit{a.s.} \end{align}
Remark 7. We must be careful when considering the objects
$\tau(\!\cdot\!;\;\tilde s)$
and
$N(\!\cdot\!;\;\tilde s)$
in (7.1), since they depend on the underlying filtration and rewards sequences—recall their definitions (4.8) and (4.9). In (7.1), they refer to the optimal time to abandon all projects and to the equitable surrender value for all projects, respectively, for the dynamic allocation problem (4.5) with filtration
$\mathbf F$
satisfying conditions (F1), (F2), and (F4) and general rewards sequences.
We prove the special case where no retirement reward is given, i.e.
$M=0$
, from which the general case can be obtained immediately by incorporating the computations from the proof of Theorem 2. We rely on three key facts, namely, that if
$\tilde T^*\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
is an index-type allocation strategy, the following hold.
-
(T1) In the notation of Proposition 6, the process
(7.5)is a uniformly integrable
\begin{align} K(t) \;:\!=\; \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{u=0}^{t-1} \beta^{u-T^*_i(u)} \big(U_i\big(T_i^*(u+1)\big)-U_i\big(T^*_i(u)\big) \big), \quad t\in\mathbb N_0 \end{align}
$\mathbf F(\tilde T^*)$
-martingale.
-
(T2)
$K(\infty) \;:\!=\; \lim_{t\to\infty}K(t)$
and
$\Lambda(\infty) \;:\!=\; \lim_{t\to\infty}\Lambda(t)$
exist and are a.s. equal, where (7.6)and the series
\begin{align} \Lambda(t) \;:\!=\; \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{u=0}^{t-1} \beta^u \big[h_i\big(T_i^*(u+1)\big) - (1-\beta)\underline M_i\big(s_i,T_i^*(u)\big)\big] \big(T_i^*(u+1)-T_i^*(u) \big), \nonumber\\ \quad t\in\mathbb N_0, \end{align}
$\Lambda(\infty)$
is absolutely convergent a.s.
-
(T3) For any allocation strategy
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
, the process is a non-negative bounded
\begin{align*}Q(t;\;\tilde T) \;:\!=\; \beta^t\widehat\Phi(\tilde T(t)) + \sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{u=0}^{t-1}\beta^u h_i(T_i(u+1)) (T_i(u+1)-T_i(u) ), \quad t\in\mathbb N_0\end{align*}
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-supermartingale.
Indeed, (T1) and (T2) imply a.s. that
Owing to the absolute convergence of
$\Lambda(\infty)$
, we may write, in the notation of (4.6) and (4.17),
$\Lambda(\infty) = \mathcal R(\tilde T^*) - \widehat{\mathcal R}(\tilde T^*)$
. Thus, we have
since
$\tilde T^*$
is optimal for the problem (4.16) by Proposition 9 and Theorem 2.
Now, for any allocation strategy
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
, let
$\{Q(t;\;\tilde T)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
be the supermartingale of (T3). Note that
$Q(\infty;\;\tilde T) \;:\!=\; \lim_{t\to\infty}Q(t;\;\tilde T)$
exists and equals
$\mathcal R(\tilde T)$
, since
$\widehat\Phi(\!\cdot\!)$
is bounded. Therefore, we obtain
which in conjunction with (7.7) yields
By definition,
$\tilde T^*$
attains the supremum in (4.5), and
$\Phi(\tilde s)= \mathbb E[\mathcal R(\tilde T^*)\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s)]=\widehat\Phi(\tilde s)$
. The representation (7.4) follows from (5.5) of Theorem 3, and the theorem is proved.
It now remains to prove (T1), (T2), and (T3).
Proof of (T2). For each
$i=1,\dots,d$
, let
In the notation of Proposition 6, we may write
\begin{align*} K(t) &= \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{u=0}^{t-1} \beta^{u-T_i^*(u)} \big[\beta^{T_i^*(u+1)}Y_i(u+1) - \beta^{T_i^*(u)}Y_i(u) \\ &\quad + \beta^{T_i^*(u)}\big(h_i\big(T_i^*(u+1)\big) - (1-\beta)\underline M_i\big(s_i,T_i^*(u)\big)\big)\big] \big(T_i^*(u+1)-T_i^*(u)\big), \end{align*}
yielding
\begin{align} W(t) \;:\!=\; K(t)-\Lambda(t) = \sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{u=0}^{t-1}\beta^{u-T_i^*(u)} \big(\beta^{T_i^*(u+1)}Y_i(u+1)-\beta^{T_i^*(u)}Y_i(u)\big). \end{align}
Observe that
$Y_i(t)=0$
whenever
$M_i(T_i^*(t)) = \underline M_i(T_i^*(t))$
, by virtue of (3.1). Then by (5.14), (5.16), and Lemma 6, the summand in (7.9) is non-zero for exactly a single project at each time u, and consequently, the almost sure limit
$W(\infty) \;:\!=\; \lim_{t\to\infty}W(t)$
exists and equals the sum
\begin{align} W(\infty) = \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{k=0}^\infty \sum_{u=\rho(k;\;\tilde T^*)}^{\rho(k+1;\;\tilde T^*)-1} \beta^{u-T_i^*(u)}\big(\beta^{T_i^*(u+1)}Y_i(u+1) - \beta^{T_i^*(u)}Y_i(u)\big), \end{align}
in the notation of (4.14) and (5.16). Note that the sum converges absolutely since
$|\beta^{-T_i^*(u)}(\beta^{T_i^*(u+1)}Y_i(u+1) - \beta^{T_i^*(u)}Y_i(u))|$
is bounded by 2K.
In light of Lemma 6, let
$j\equiv j(k)$
be the exclusive project engaged between times
$\rho(k;\;\tilde T^*)$
and
$\rho(k+1;\;\tilde T^*)$
. The summand in (7.10) is zero for every
$i\neq j$
, and
\begin{align} & \sum_{u=\rho(k;\;\tilde T^*)}^{\rho(k+1;\;\tilde T^*)-1} \beta^{u-T_j^*(u)} \big(\beta^{T_j^*(u+1)}Y_j(u+1)-\beta^{T_j^*(u)}Y_j(u)\big)\nonumber \\ &\quad = \beta^{\rho(k+1;\;\tilde T^*)}Y_j(\rho(k+1;\;\tilde T^*)) - \beta^{\rho(k;\;\tilde T^*)}Y_j(\rho(k;\;\tilde T^*)). \end{align}
Both terms on the right-hand side are zero since
$\rho(k;\;\tilde T^*)$
and
$\rho(k+1;\;\tilde T^*)$
are by definition times where the Gittins indices of every project coincides with their lower envelopes, so we obtain from (7.10) that
$W(\infty)=0$
. Assuming that (T1) holds, we have the existence of
$K(\infty)$
, since uniformly integrable martingales converge a.s. It follows that
$\Lambda(\infty)$
exists and
$K(\infty)=\Lambda(\infty)$
. Moreover, it is clear from the definition that
$\Lambda(\!\cdot\!)$
is uniformly bounded from above by the random variable
\begin{align*}\sum_{i=1}^d\left[\sum_{u=0}^\infty\beta^uh_i(u) + \sum_{u=0}^\infty\beta^u(1-\beta)\underline M_i(u)\right]\!,\end{align*}
which is integrable thanks to the boundedness of the sequences
$h_i(\!\cdot\!)$
and
$\underline M_i(\!\cdot\!)$
. Therefore,
$\Lambda(\infty)$
is a.s. absolutely convergent, and the process
$\{\Lambda(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
is uniformly integrable.
Proof of
(
T1
). Each process
$U_i(\!\cdot\!)$
of Proposition 6 is an
$\mathbf F_i$
-martingale, so the process
$K(\!\cdot\!)$
of (7.5) is an
$\mathbf F(\tilde T^*)$
-martingale, by Lemma 7. In the notation of (7.9), we may write
$K(\!\cdot\!)=$
$\Lambda(\!\cdot\!)+W(\!\cdot\!)$
, so it suffices to show that the families
$\{\Lambda(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
and
$\{W(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
are each uniformly integrable; we have already shown that
$\{\Lambda(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
is uniformly integrable in the proof of (T2).
Fix
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
and observe, by an argument analogous to that of (7.10) and (7.11), that
\begin{align*}W(t) = \sum_{u=\rho(k;\;\tilde T^*)}^{t-1}\beta^{u-T_j^*(u)} \big(\beta^{T_j^*(u+1)}Y_j(u+1) - \beta^{T_j^*(u)}Y_j(u)\big) = \beta^tY_j(t),\end{align*}
where k is the largest integer for which
$t\gt\rho(k;\;\tilde T^*)$
, and
$j\equiv j(t)$
is the unique project engaged at time t.
Thus, we wish to show the uniform integrability of
$\{\beta^tY_{j(t)}(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
. For every
$s\in\mathbb N_0$
and
$m\ge0$
, we have by (3.15), (3.16), and Remark 6 that
\begin{align*} \beta^t[V_i(s;\;m)-m] &\le (1-\beta)\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{\theta=s}^\infty\beta^\theta \underline M_i(s,\theta)\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F^i(s)\right] \le \mathbb E\left[\sum_{\theta=0}^\infty\beta^\theta h_i(\theta+1)\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F^i(s)\right]\!, \quad\text{a.s.} \end{align*}
for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
. Since
$Y_{j(t)}(t)$
is
$\mathcal F(\tilde T^*(t))$
-measurable, the tower rule yields
\begin{align*} \beta^tY_{j(t)}(t) \le \mathbb E\left[\sum_{\theta=0}^\infty \beta^\theta h_{j(t)}(\theta+1)\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(\tilde T^*(t))\right]\!, \quad\text{a.s.} \end{align*}
As a consequence of the uniform boundedness of
$\{h_i(\theta)\}_{\theta\in\mathbb N_0}$
over every
$i=1,\dots,d$
, the family
\begin{align*}\left\{\mathbb E\left[\sum_{\theta=0}^\infty\beta^\theta h_{j(t)}(\theta+1) \,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F(\tilde T^*(t))\right]\right\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}\end{align*}
is uniformly integrable [Reference Durrett7, Theorem 4.6.1]; hence the same holds for
$\{W(t)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
.
Before proving (T3), we require one more technical lemma, characterizing time changes with respect to an allocation strategy.
Lemma 8. Let
$\tilde T\in\mathcal A(\tilde s)$
be an allocation strategy. Suppose
$f_i\;:\;\mathbb N_0\to[0,\infty)$
,
$i=1,\dots,d$
, are non-decreasing, and set
$F(t)\;:\!=\;\sum_{i=1}^df_i(T_i(t))$
. Then, for any
$\theta\lt t$
and
$\beta\in(0,1)$
, we have
\begin{align} \sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{u=\theta}^{t-1} \beta^{F(u)-f_i(T_i(u))} \big (\beta^{f_i(T_i(u))} - \beta^{f_i(T_i(u+1))}\big) = \beta^{F(\theta)} - \beta^{F(t)} \ge 0. \end{align}
Proof. For ease of notation, set
$F_i(t)=f_i(T_i(t))$
, and define the finite difference operator
$\Delta f(t) \;:\!=\; f(t+1)-f(t)$
. The inner sum, via summation by parts, equals
\begin{align*} \beta^{F(t-1)+\Delta F_i(t-1)} - \beta^{F(\theta)} + \sum_{u=\theta}^{t-2} \beta^{F(u)}\big(\beta^{\Delta F_i(u)} - \beta^{\Delta F(u)}\big). \end{align*}
Since allocation strategies can engage in only one project at a time, then for each
$u=\theta,\dots,t-1$
, either we must have
$\Delta F(u)=\Delta F_i(u)=0$
for all
$i=1,\dots,d$
, or there exists a unique
$j\equiv j(u)$
for which
$\Delta F(u) = \Delta F_j(u)\gt0$
while
$\Delta F_i(u)=0$
for
$i\neq j$
. Thus, letting
$\theta\le u_0\lt\dots\lt u_n\lt t-1$
be the points at which
$\Delta F(u)\gt0$
, we obtain
\begin{align*} \sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{u=\theta}^{t-2} \beta^{F(u)}\big(\beta^{\Delta F_i(u)} - \beta^{\Delta F(u)}\big) &= \sum_{u=\theta}^{t-2} \sum_{\substack{i=1\\i\neq j(u)}}^d \beta^{F(u)}\big(1-\beta^{\Delta F(u)}\big) \\ &= (d-1)\sum_{k=0}^n \beta^{F(u_k)}\big(1-\beta^{\Delta F(u_k)}\big). \end{align*}
Similarly, we find
$\sum_{i=1}^d \beta^{F(t-1)+\Delta F_i(t-1)} = (d-1)\beta^{F(t-1)} + \beta^{F(t)}$
. Consequently, the left-hand side of (7.12) is given by
\begin{align*} \beta^{F(t)}-\beta^{F(\theta)} + (d-1)\Bigg[\beta^{F(t-1)} - \beta^{F(\theta)} + \sum_{k=0}^n\big(\beta^{F(u_k)}-\beta^{F(u_{k+1})}\big)\Bigg], \end{align*}
using the fact that
$F(u_k)+\Delta F(u_k) = F(u_k+1) = F(u_{k+1}) $
, with the convention that
$F(u_{n+1}) = F(t-1)$
. Now the summation telescopes and equals
$\beta^{F(u_0)}-\beta^{F(u_{n+1})}$
but, by definition,
$F(u_0)=F(\theta)$
and
$F(u_{n+1})=F(t-1)$
. Thus the term inside the square brackets is zero, completing the proof.
Proof of
(
T3
). For each project
$i=1,\dots,d$
, let
$\{V_i(t)\}_{t=s_i}^\infty$
and
$\{Z_i(t)\}_{t=s_i}^\infty$
be the corresponding value processes and Snell envelopes, respectively, in the notation of (2.1) and (2.4) with
$m=0$
. Set
\begin{align} X_1(t;\;\tilde T) \;:\!=\; \sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{u=0}^{t-1} \beta^{u-T_i(u)} (Z_i(T_i(u+1)) - Z_i(T_i(u)) ), \end{align}
as well as
\begin{align} X_2(t;\;\tilde T) \;:\!=\; \beta^t\widehat\Phi(\tilde T(t)) - \sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{u=0}^{t-1} \beta^{u-T_i(u)}\big(\beta^{T_i(u+1)}V_i(T_i(u+1)) - \beta^{T_i(u)}V_i(T_i(u))\big). \end{align}
It follows from (2.5) that
$Q(t;\;\tilde T) = X_1(t;\;\tilde T)+X_2(t;\;\tilde T)$
, so it suffices to show that
$\{X_1(t;\;\tilde T)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
and
$\{X_2(t;\;\tilde T)\}_{t\in\mathbb N_0}$
are non-negative, bounded
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-supermartingales. Since Snell envelopes are non-negative
$\mathbf F_i$
-supermartingales, the former follows from Lemma 7. For the latter, observe that (4.20) and (4.8) imply
while (3.10), in conjunction with Proposition 13 yields, for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
,
We aim to show, for every
$\theta\lt t$
, that
$\mathbb E[X_2(t;\;\tilde T)\mid\mathcal F(\tilde T(\theta))] \le X_2(\theta;\;\tilde T)$
. This is equivalent, on rearranging terms in (7.14), to showing
\begin{multline} \mathbb E\left[\int_0^\infty \left(\beta^{\sum_{i=1}^d\sigma_i(T_i(t);\;m)} - \beta^{\sum_{i=1}^d\sigma_i(T_i(\theta);\;m)} \phantom{\sum_{i=1}^d} \right.\right. \\[3pt] \left.\left. + \sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{u=\theta}^{t-1} \beta^{u-T_i(u)} \big(\beta^{\sigma_i(T_i(u);\;m)} - \beta^{\sigma_i(T_i(u+1);\;m)}\big)\right)\mathrm{d} m\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(\tilde T(\theta))\right] \\[3pt] \ge \mathbb E\left[\int_0^\infty\left(\beta^t - \beta^\theta + \sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{u=\theta}^{t-1} \beta^{u-T_i(u)}\big(\beta^{T_i(u)} - \beta^{T_i(u+1)}\big)\right)\mathrm{d} m\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(\tilde T(\theta))\right]\!. \end{multline}
The integrand on the right-hand side is identical to zero by Lemma 8, setting each
$f_i$
to be the identity. Conversely, observe that
$u-T_i(u) = \sum_{j\neq i} T_j(u) \le \sum_{j\neq i}\sigma_j(T_j(u);\;m)$
a.s., so the integrand on the left-hand side dominates:
\begin{align*} \beta^{\sum_{i=1}^d\sigma_i(T_i(t);\;m)} - \beta^{\sum_{i=1}^d\sigma_i(T_i(\theta);\;m)} + \sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{u=\theta}^{t-1} \beta^{\sum_{j\neq i}\sigma_j(T_j(u);\;m)} \big(\beta^{\sigma_i(T_i(u);\;m)} - \beta^{\sigma_i(T_i(u+1);\;m)}\big). \end{align*}
This is non-negative, again by Lemma 8 with
$f_i(t) \;:\!=\; \sigma_i(t;\;m)$
. This completes the proof of (T3) and thus that of Theorem 4 as well.
8. The Whittle reduction
In this section, it is shown that the value of the dynamic allocation problem (4.5) has yet another representation, in addition to the two in (7.1), known as the ‘Whittle reduction’ after [Reference Whittle36]. This representation was derived in the non-Markovian setting in [Reference El Karoui and Karatzas9], which our proof essentially follows, except that we demonstrate that one can dispense with the independence condition assumed in that work. The key point is that the equivalence of the representation (8.2) presented later and the representations in (7.1) was previously established in a rather straightforward way, but relying on the independence of filtrations, whereas Theorem 4 constitutes a large detour required to prove (7.1). Finally, we observe that Theorem 5 provides an alternative proof of the optimality of index-type strategies.
We appeal to the following characterization of the random field
$\Phi(\!\cdot\!;\;M)$
of (4.5).
Lemma 9 For every given
$M\ge0$
, the random field
$\Phi(\!\cdot\!;\;M)$
of (4.5) is the unique bounded solution of the Bellman dynamic programming equation
Analogously to the dynamic programming equation (2.9) for the problem of optimal stopping, the Bellman equation states that the maximum future expected discounted reward in the dynamic allocation problem can be attained in one of two ways: either by retiring immediately and collecting the retirement reward M or by continuing for one additional unit of time, engaging a particular project, and evaluating the maximum future conditional expected reward at that point in time. The proof, which can be found in Appendix A, is from [Reference Mandelbaum20] and [Reference Mandelbaum and Vanderbei22], and does not rely on the assumptions that the filtrations
$\mathbf F_1,\dots,\mathbf F_d$
are independent.
Following [Reference Whittle36], we now derive an explicit expression for the random field
$\Phi(\tilde s;\;M)$
of (4.5). Recall that K is a fixed upper bound on the maximum discounted reward that can possibly be accumulated from any single project, and that
$M_i(t)$
denotes the Gittins index of the ith project at time t.
Theorem 5. Assume that the multi-parameter filtration
$\mathbf F$
satisfies the conditions (F1), (F2), and (F4). The random field
\begin{align} F(\tilde s;\;M) \;:\!=\; \left.\begin{cases} K-\int_M^K\big(\prod_{i=1}^d\frac{\partial^+}{\partial m}V_i(s_i;\;m)\big) \mathrm{d} m &\textit{if }\, 0\le M\lt K \\ M & \textit{if }\, M\ge K \end{cases}\right\},\quad \tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d \end{align}
satisfies the Bellman dynamic programming equation (8.1).
In particular, for every
$M\ge0$
,
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
, and
$i=1,\dots,d$
, we have
and
Moreover, recalling the notation of (5.1), we have
and
Proof. By Lemma 4,
$0\le {\partial^+}V_i(s_i;\;m)/{\partial m} \le1$
holds for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
; hence
$F(\tilde s;\;M)\ge M$
when
$M\lt K$
, which proves (8.3). Also, by Lemma 4,
${\partial^+}V_i(s_i;\;m)/{\partial m}=1$
holds if
$m\ge M_i(s_i)$
; hence
$\prod_{i=1}^d({\partial^+}V_i(s_i;\;m)/{\partial m})=1$
if
$m\ge\mathcal M(\tilde s)$
. Then the integrand in (8.2) is identical to one when
$M\ge\mathcal M(\tilde s)$
, which proves (8.5).
To prove (8.4), first consider the case where
$M\ge K$
. From the bound
$0\le h_i\le K(1-\beta)$
, we easily obtain
Now suppose that
$0\le M\lt K$
. Fix
$i\in\{1,\dots,d\}$
and denote the vector given by removing the ith coordinate of
$\tilde s$
by
$\tilde s^{(i)}\;:\!=\;(s_1,\dots,s_{i-1},s_{i+1},\dots,s_d) \in\mathbb N_0^{d-1}$
. Consider the mapping
\begin{align*}m\mapsto P_i\big(\tilde s^{(i)};\;m\big) \;:\!=\; \prod_{\substack{j=1\\j\neq i}}^d \frac{\partial^+}{\partial m} V_j(s_j;\;m), \quad m\ge0.\end{align*}
Observe that, by Lemma 4 and (4.7), we have
$P_i(\tilde s^{(i)};\;K)=1$
. Additionally, (2.9), (3.4), and (4.7) imply that
$V_i(s_i;\;K)=K$
. Integrating by parts then yields
\begin{align} F(\tilde s;\;M) &= K - \int_M^K P_i \big(\tilde s^{(i)};\;m \big) \cdot \frac{\partial^+}{\partial m}V_i(s_i;\;m)\,\mathrm{d} m \nonumber \\ &= V_i(s_i;\;M)P_i \big(\tilde s^{(i)};\;M \big) + \int_M^K V_i(s_i;\;m)\,\mathrm{d}_mP_i \big(\tilde s^{(i)};\;m \big). \end{align}
Therefore,
Since
$V_i(s_i+1;,\!)\in\mathcal F_i(s_i+1)$
, the (F4) condition in the form (6.2) yields
$\mathbb E[V_i(s_i+1;\;m)\mid \mathcal F(\tilde s)] = \mathbb E[V_i(s_i+1;\;m)\mid\mathcal F_i(s_i)]$
for all
$m\ge0$
. Since
$P_i(\tilde s^{(i)};\;M)$
is
$\mathcal F(\tilde s)$
-measurable, taking conditional expectations and applying Fubini’s theorem yields
\begin{align} &\mathbb E[F(\tilde s+\tilde e_i;\;M)\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s)] \notag \\ & \quad = P_i\big(\tilde s^{(i)};\;M\big)\mathbb E[V_i(s_i+1;\;M)\mid\mathcal F_i(s_i)] + \int_M^K \mathbb E[V_i(s_i+1;\;m)\mid\mathcal F_i(s_i)]\,\mathrm{d}_m P_i \big (\tilde s^{(i)};\;m \big ). \end{align}
Now define
By (8.7), (8.8), and the fact that
$P_i(\tilde s^{(i)};\;K)=1$
, we obtain the identity
\begin{align} & \phi_i(s_i;\;M)P_i \big(\tilde s^{(i)};\; M\big) + \int_M^K \phi_i(s_i;\;m)\,\mathrm{d}_mP_i\big(\tilde s^{(i)};\;m\big) \notag \\ &\quad = F(\tilde s;\;M)-h_i(s_i+1)-\beta\,\mathbb E[F(\tilde s+\tilde e_i;\;M)\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s)]. \end{align}
The left-hand side of (8.9) is non-negative by (2.9), so the right-hand side is non-negative as well, proving (8.4).
It remains to show (8.6). On
$\{M\lt M_i(s_i)\;:\!=\;\mathcal M(\tilde s)\}$
, we have
$M\lt K$
by (4.7), so it suffices to show that the left-hand side of (8.9) is zero in this event.
Let
$m\in[M,K]$
be given. On
$\{m\lt M_i(s_i)\}$
, we have by (3.4) that
$V_i(s_i;\;m)\gt m$
; hence (2.9) implies
$\phi_i(s_i;\;m)=0$
. In particular,
$\phi_i(s_i;\;M)=0$
. Conversely, we have by definition that
$m\ge M_j(s_j)$
holds for each
$j=1,\dots,d$
on
$\{m\ge M_i(s_i)\}$
. Lemma 4 then implies
$P_i(\tilde s^{(i)};\;m)=1$
; hence
which proves (8.6).
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proofs of results in Section 2
Proof of Lemma
1. Let
$\phi(t;\;m) \;:\!=\; \beta^t(V(t;\;m) - m)$
. Each of the following claims holds a.s. We have from (2.2) that
$\phi\ge0$
; by (2.1), we can express
$\phi$
via a telescoping sum as
\begin{align} \phi(t;\;m) &= \operatorname*{ess\,sup}_{\tau\in\mathcal S(t)}\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1} \beta^u (h(u+1) - m(1-\beta)) \,\middle\vert\, \mathcal F(t) \right]\!. \end{align}
It is then clear that
$m\mapsto\phi(t;\;m)$
is strictly decreasing. Let
$m_1\gt m_2$
be given and note that
$V(\sigma(t;\;m_2);\;m_2) = m_2$
by (2.8); hence
$\phi(\sigma(t;\;m_2);\;m_2) = 0$
. By monotonicity we have
which implies
$V(\sigma(t;\;m_2);\;m_1) = m_1$
. By definition
$\sigma(t;\;m_1)$
is the smallest integer
$\theta$
for which
$V(\theta;\;m_1) = m_1$
, so
$\sigma(t;\;m_1) \le \sigma(t;\;m_2)$
. Thus
$m\mapsto\sigma(t;\;m)$
is decreasing.
In showing right-continuity, we have from the just-established decrease that, for fixed
$m\ge0$
,
where the limit exists because
$\sigma$
is bounded from below by t. Fix
$\delta\gt0$
and observe that for integer
$k\gt1/\delta$
, we have
$\phi(\sigma(t;\;m+1/k);\;m+\delta) = 0$
by analogy with (A.2). Since
$\sigma(t;\cdot\!)$
takes integer values,
$\sigma(t;\;m+1/k) = \sigma_*$
holds for all large enough k; hence
$\phi(\sigma_*;\; m+\delta)=0$
for all
$\delta\gt0$
. Now we see from (2.1) that
$m\mapsto V(t;\;m)$
is continuous, so
$m\mapsto\phi(t;\;m)$
is also continuous. Taking
$\delta\downarrow0$
, we get
$\phi(\sigma_*;\;m)=0$
. We conclude by the minimality of
$\sigma(t;\;m)$
that
$\sigma(t;\;m)\le\sigma_*$
, and this completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Increase and convexity follow immediately from the definition (2.1). Again the following claims hold a.s.
For (2.10), fix
$m\ge0$
. From the definition and Lemma 1, we have, for any
$\delta\gt0$
, the inequalities
From Proposition 1 and (2.5), we know that the stopped process
$Z(\!\cdot\wedge\sigma(t;\;m);\;m)$
is a non-negative martingale; hence we may apply the optional sampling theorem [Reference Durrett7, Theorem 4.8.4] to obtain
Substituting, and using (2.5), this equality becomes
\begin{align*} \sum_{u=0}^{t-1} \beta^uh(u+1) + \beta^tV(t;\;m) = \mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{u=0}^{\sigma(t;\;m+\delta)-1}\beta^uh(u+1) + \beta^{\sigma(t;\;m+\delta)} V(\sigma(t;\;m+\delta);\;m) \,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\!\Bigg]. \end{align*}
Isolating
$V(t;\;m)$
and using the inequality (2.2), we obtain
\begin{align} V(t;\;m) &\ge \mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{u=t}^{\sigma(t;\;m+\delta)-1}\beta^{u-t}h(u+1) + m\beta^{\sigma(t;\;m+\delta)-t} \,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\Bigg]. \end{align}
We recall at this stage (2.7), which, on replacing m with
$m+\delta$
, yields
\begin{align*} V(t;\;m+\delta) = \mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{u=t}^{\sigma(t;\;m+\delta)-1}\beta^{u-t}h(u+1) + (m+\delta)\beta^{\sigma(t;\;m+\delta)-t}\mid\mathcal F(t)\Bigg]. \end{align*}
From this in conjunction with (A.3), we have
where the second inequality holds on the strength of Fatou’s lemma and Lemma 1.
Conversely, we have
by applying the optional sampling theorem once again on the supermartingale
$Z(\!\cdot\!;\;m+\delta)$
. By analogy with (A.3), we obtain
\begin{align*} V(t;\;m+\delta) &\ge \mathbb E\Bigg[\sum_{u=t}^{\sigma(t;\;m)-1}\beta^{u-t}h(u+1) + (m+\delta)\beta^{\sigma(t;\;m)-t} \,\Bigg\vert\, \mathcal F(t)\Bigg], \end{align*}
From this, in conjunction with (2.7), it follows that
A.2. Proofs of results in Section 3
Proof of
(3.3). Since
$\sum_{u=0}^\infty\beta^u=(1-\beta)^{-1}$
, we can write the left-hand side of (3.3) in terms of (2.1), i.e.
\begin{align} (1-\beta)M(t) = \operatorname*{ess\,sup}\left\{X\in\mathcal M(t)\colon \operatorname*{ess\,sup}_{\tau\in\mathcal S(t)}\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1}\beta^{u-t} (h(u+1)-X)\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\right]\ge0\right\}. \end{align}
For every
$\tau\in\mathcal S(t+1)$
, let
\begin{align} \lambda(\tau) \;:\!=\; \frac{\mathbb E\big[\!\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1}\beta^uh(u+1)\,\big\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\big]} {\mathbb E\big[\!\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1}\beta^u\,\big\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\big]}, \end{align}
noting that
$\lambda(\tau)\in\mathcal M(t)$
since h is positive. Additionally, let
so there exists a sequence of stopping times
$\tau_n\in\mathcal S(t+1)$
,
$n\in\mathbb N$
, such that
$\lambda(\tau_n)\to\lambda^*$
a.s. Notice from (A.6ʹ) that
\begin{align} \mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1} \beta^{u-t} (h(u+1)-\lambda(\tau))\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\right] = 0, \quad\tau\in\mathcal S(t+1),\quad \text{a.s.}, \end{align}
which yields
\begin{align} \mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1}\beta^{u-t}(h(u+1)-\lambda^*)\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\right] \le 0, \quad\tau\in\mathcal S(t+1),\quad \text{a.s.}, \end{align}
and, by the bounded convergence theorem,
\begin{align} \lim_{n\to\infty} \mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=t}^{\tau_n-1}\beta^{u-t}(h(u+1)-\lambda^*)\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\right] = 0, \quad\text{a.s.} \end{align}
Conversely, (A.7) implies
\begin{align} \operatorname*{ess\,sup}_{\tau\in\mathcal S(t)}\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1}\beta^{u-t}(h(u+1)-\lambda^*) \,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\right] \le 0, \quad\text{a.s.}; \end{align}
hence
$\lambda^*$
is a.s. an upper bound of the set
\begin{align*}\left\{X\in\mathcal M(t)\colon \operatorname*{ess\,sup}_{\tau\in\mathcal S(t)}\,\mathbb E\left[\sum_{u=t}^{\tau-1}\beta^{u-t} (h(u+1)-X)\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(t)\right]\ge0\right\}.\end{align*}
But
$\lambda^*$
is an element of this set, modulo events of null measure, as follows from (A.8) and (A.9). It follows from (A.6) that
$\lambda^*=(1-\beta)M(t)$
a.s., as desired.
A.3. Proofs of results in Section 5
Proof of Proposition
9. Without loss of generality, assume
$\tilde s = \tilde 0$
. Recall that (4.19) is equivalent to the lower envelope index-type property (5.6).
(
$\Longrightarrow$
) We proceed by induction on t. At
$t=0$
, we have
$M_j(T_j(0)) = \underline M_j(T_j(0))$
for every
$j=1,\dots,d$
; hence (5.6) implies (5.11) at
$t=0$
.
Assume then that (5.11) is satisfied for some
$t\ge0$
, and that
$M_j(T_j(t))=\underline M_j(T_j(t))$
for all
$j\neq i$
in the event
$\{\tilde T(t+1)=\tilde T(t)+\tilde e_i\}$
. Now suppose
$\tilde T(t+1)=\tilde T(t)+\tilde e_i$
and
$\tilde T(t+2)=\tilde T(t+1)+\tilde e_k$
for some i,k.
Case 1.
$M_i(T_i(t+1)) = \underline M_i(T_i(t+1))$
. Then the same equality holds for every
$j=1,\dots,d$
by the inductive hypothesis, so (5.6) implies
$M_k(T_k(t))=\mathcal M(\tilde s)$
, in the notation of (5.1), as desired.
Case 2.
$M_i(T_i(t+1)) \gt \underline M_i(T_i(t+1)) = \underline M_i(T_i(t))$
. Then (5.12) implies
$i=k$
, and (5.6) in conjunction with the inductive hypothesis yields
for every
$j\neq i$
. This completes the induction.
(
$\Longleftarrow$
) We follow a similar strategy. Assume that (4.19) and (5.12) hold for some
$t\ge0$
, and that
$M_j(T_j(t)) = \underline M_j(T_j(t))$
for all
$j\neq i$
in the event
$\{\tilde T(t+1)=\tilde T(t)+\tilde e_i\}$
.
Case 1.
$M_i(T_i(t+1)) = \underline M_i(T_i(t+1))$
. Clearly (5.12) holds trivially for
$t+1$
. By the inductive hypothesis,
$M_j(T_j(t+1))=\underline M_j(T_j(t+1))$
for every
$j=1,\dots,d$
. If
$\tilde T(t+2)=\tilde T(t+1)+\tilde e_k$
for some k, then (5.11) implies
as desired.
Case 2.
$M_i(T_i(t+1)) \gt \underline M_i(T_i(t+1)) = \underline M_i(T_i(t))$
. If
$\tilde T(t+2)=\tilde T(t+1)+\tilde e_k$
for some
$k\neq i$
, then the inductive hypothesis yields
contradicting (5.11). Thus
$k=i$
, which shows (5.12) for
$t+1$
. In particular, we have
which is (5.6) for
$t+1$
.
Proof of Proposition
10. We consider the latter claim and prove the former claim on the way. We proceed by induction on k; the base case is trivial. Suppose that
$\rho(k;\;\tilde T)$
is an
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-stopping time for some
$k\in\mathbb N_0$
. It suffices to stay within the event
$\{t\gt\rho(k;\;\tilde T)\}$
. In this case, we have
\begin{align} \{\rho(k+1;\;\tilde T) = t\} = \bigcup_{\tilde k\in\mathbb N_0^d} \Bigg[\{\tilde T(t) = \tilde\varepsilon(\tilde k;\;\tilde s)\} \cap \bigcup_{u=0}^{t-1} \{\rho(k;\;\tilde T)=u,\,\tilde T(u)\neq\tilde\varepsilon(\tilde k;\;\tilde s)\} \Bigg]. \end{align}
Fixing
$\tilde k\in\mathbb N_0^d$
, we deal with each event in this expression separately.
Fix
$\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
. Since
$\{\varepsilon_i(k_i;\;s_i)=r_i\}\in\mathcal F_i(r_i)\subset\mathcal F^i(r_i)$
, then
\begin{align*}\{\tilde\varepsilon(\tilde k;\;\tilde s) = \tilde r\} = \bigcap_{i=1}^d \{\varepsilon_i(k_i;\;s_i)=r_i\} \in \bigcap_{i=1}^d \mathcal F^i(r_i) = \mathcal F(\tilde r),\end{align*}
where the last equality follows by (4.1). Thus
$\tilde\varepsilon(\tilde k;\;\tilde s)$
is an
$\mathbf F$
-stopping point. Consequently,
hence
$\{\tilde T(t)=\tilde\varepsilon(\tilde k;\;\tilde s)\}\in\mathcal F(\tilde T(t))$
by definition.
The other two events that remain are
$\{\rho(k;\;\tilde T)=u\}$
and
$\{\tilde T(u)\neq\varepsilon(\tilde k;\;\tilde s)\}$
, for
$u=0,\dots,$
$t-1$
. The latter event is
$\mathcal F(\tilde T(t))$
-measurable by closure under complements, while the former is
$\mathcal F(\tilde T(u))$
-measurable by the inductive hypothesis. But
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
is a filtration by Proposition 7, so
$u\lt t$
implies that our event is also
$\mathcal F(\tilde T(t))$
-measurable.
We conclude that (A.10) is a countable union of
$\mathcal F(\tilde T(t))$
-measurable events; hence
$\{\rho(k+1;$
$\tilde T)=t\}\in\mathcal F(\tilde T(t))$
. Since this holds for every
$t\in\mathbb N_0$
,
$\rho(k+1;\;\tilde T)$
is an
$\mathbf F(\tilde T)$
-stopping time.
Example 5 (Example for Remark 4.) This is an example of a dynamic allocation problem where the class of index-type (5.11) strategies is strictly contained in the class of strategies satisfying the synchronization identity (4.19). Our example is inspired by the Pandora’s box model [Reference Scully and Terenin27, Reference Weitzman35].
Set the discount factor as
$\beta=\tfrac12$
and let
$B_1\sim\mathrm{Bernoulli}(\tfrac12)$
,
$B_2\sim\mathrm{Bernoulli}(\tfrac15)$
be independent Bernoulli random variables. We define two projects as follows. The rewards process for project 1 is given by
$h_1(2)=6B_1+9$
and
$h_1(t)=0$
for
$t\neq2$
; whereas the rewards process for project 2 is given by
$h_2(2)=15B_2+9$
and
$h_2(t)=0$
for
$t\neq2$
. We set the filtrations to be
$\mathcal F_1(0)=\mathcal F_2(0)=\{\varnothing,\Omega\}$
, and
$\mathcal F_1(t)=\sigma(B_1)$
and
$\mathcal F_2(t)=\sigma(B_2)$
for all
$t\gt0$
. Note that
$\mathbb E[h_1(2)]=\mathbb E[h_2(2)]=12$
.
We compute the Gittins indices via the forward induction formula (3.3). At
$t=0$
, we always choose
$\tau\equiv2$
in (3.3); hence
so strategies of either synchronization type or index type may make an arbitrary choice of project in which to engage. Suppose we engage in project 1 and find ourselves in the event that
$h_1(2)=15$
. Project 2 remains frozen, but the new Gittins index for project 1 is given by
$M_1(1) = 30$
, by taking
$\tau\equiv2$
again in (3.3). An index-type allocation strategy is compelled to engage in project 1 again since it has the greater Gittins index. However, a strategy that only satisfies the synchronization identity is allowed to engage in project 2 at time
$t=1$
, since both projects have the same minimum Gittins index to date.
A.4. Proofs of results in Section 6
Proof of Example
2. We fix
$\tilde s,\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
and prove that
holds for every
$A\in\mathcal F(\tilde s)$
and
$B\in\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
.
Recall that
$\mathcal F(\tilde s)=\bigvee_i\mathcal F_i(s_i)$
and
$\mathcal F(\tilde r)=\bigvee_i\mathcal F_i(r_i)$
. It suffices to show, by the monotone class theorem, that (A.11) holds for
$A=\bigcap_iA_i$
and
$B=\bigcap_iB_i$
, for some
$A_i\in\mathcal F_i(s_i)$
and
$B_i\in \mathcal F_i(r_i)$
. Since the
$\sigma$
-algebras
$\mathcal F_i(s_i\vee r_i)$
,
$i=1,\dots,d$
, are independent, and
$A_i\cap B_i\in\mathcal F_i(s_i\vee r_i)$
, then
\begin{align*}\mathbb P(A\cap B\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)) = \mathbb P\left(\bigcap_{i=1}^d(A_i\cap B_i)\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)\right) = \prod_{i=1}^d \mathbb E\big[\mathbf{1}_{A_i}\mathbf{1}_{B_i}\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)\big].\end{align*}
Notice that at least one of
$\mathbf{1}_{A_i}$
or
$\mathbf{1}_{B_i}$
is
$\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)$
-measurable for each
$i=1,\dots,d$
, yielding
and we obtain, again by independence,
\begin{align*} \prod_{i=1}^d\mathbb E\big[\mathbf{1}_{A_i}\mathbf{1}_{B_i}\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)\big] &= \mathbb E\left[\prod_{i=1}^d\mathbf{1}_{A_i}\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)\right] \mathbb E\left[\prod_{i=1}^d\mathbf{1}_{B_i}\,\middle\vert\,\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)\right] \\ &= \mathbb P(A\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r))\,\mathbb P(B\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)) \end{align*}
as desired.
Proof of Example
3. We show that the filtration (6.6) satisfies (6.2). Let
$R(\tilde s)$
denote the rectangle
$\{1,\dots,s_1\}\times\dots\times\{1,\dots,s_d\}$
for
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
. Fix
$\tilde s,\tilde r\in\mathbb N_0^d$
. We may write
$R(\tilde s) = $
$R(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)\cup U$
and
$R(\tilde r)=R(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)\cup V$
for some
$U,V\subset\mathbb N_0^d$
such that U, V, and
$R(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)$
are pairwise disjoint. Then
and
where
$\mathcal G(U)\;:\!=\;\sigma(W(A)\colon A\subseteq U))$
. By the construction of the white noise process,
$\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)$
,
$\mathcal G(U)$
, and
$\mathcal G(V)$
are independent.
Let
$\xi$
be a bounded
$\mathcal F(\tilde r)$
-measurable function. Since
$\mathbb E[\xi\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)]$
is
$\mathcal F(\tilde s)$
-measurable, it suffices to show, again by the monotone class theorem, that
holds for every
$A=F\cap G$
, for some
$F\in\mathcal F(\tilde s\wedge\tilde r)$
and
$G\in\mathcal G(U)$
. In this case,
$\xi$
and
$\mathbf{1}_G$
are independent, and we obtain
as desired.
A.5. Proofs of results in Section 8
Proof of Lemma
9. We first show that
$\Phi(\cdot;\;M)$
, as defined in (4.5), solves (8.1). Fix
$\tilde s\in\mathbb N_0^d$
,
$M\ge0$
, and
$j=1,\dots,d$
. By considering a policy where the stopping time is identical to zero, we have
$\Phi(\tilde s;\;M)\ge M$
.
Conversely, there exists a sequence of policies
$\Pi_n\in\mathcal P(\tilde s+\tilde e_j)$
such that
Since
$h_i(\!\cdot\!)$
is bounded in
$[0,K(1-\beta)]$
then
Since
$h_j(\!\cdot\!)$
is
$\mathbf F_j$
-predictable then we have a.s. that
Here, we use the fact that the
$\Pi_n$
are policies for
$\tilde s+\tilde e_j$
; hence the integrands
$h_j(s_j+1)+\beta\mathcal R(\Pi_n;\;M)$
are, in fact, the total discounted rewards of policies in
$\mathcal P(\tilde s)$
. The inequality then follows from the maximality of
$\Phi(\!\cdot\!)$
. Because this holds for arbitrary
$j=1,\dots,d$
, we obtain the inequality
To obtain the reverse inequality, we write the total discounted reward for any given policy
$\Pi=(\tilde T,\tau)\in\mathcal P(\tilde s)$
as
As before, we have
$\mathcal R(\tilde T,0;\;M)=M$
. Also notice that on
$\{\tilde T(1)=\tilde s+ \tilde e_j,\,\tau\ge1\}$
, we have
\begin{align*} \mathcal R(\tilde T,\tau\vee1;\; M) & = h_j(s_j+1) \\&\quad + \beta\Bigg(\sum_{i=1}^d\sum_{t=0}^{(\tau\vee1)-2} \beta^t h_i(T_i(t+2) (T_i(t+2)-T_i(t+1) ) + M\beta^{(\tau\vee1)-1}\Bigg). \end{align*}
Let
$\tilde T^j$
denote any allocation strategy in
$\mathcal A(\tilde s+\tilde e_j)$
such that
$\tilde T^j(t) = \tilde T(t+1)$
holds in the event
$\{\tilde T(1)=\tilde s+\tilde e_j\}$
. Then
\begin{align*} \mathcal R(\tilde T,\tau\vee1;\;M)\mathbf{1}\{\tilde T(1)&=\tilde s+\tilde e_j,\,\tau\ge1\} \\ &= \left(h_j(s_j+1)+\beta\mathcal R(\tilde T^j,(\tau\vee1)-1;\;M)\right) \mathbf{1}\{\tilde T(1)=\tilde s+\tilde e_j,\,\tau\ge1\}. \end{align*}
We may thus write (A.15) as
\begin{align*} \mathcal R(\Pi;\;M) = M\mathbf{1}\{\tau=0\} + \sum_{j=1}^d\left(h_j(s_j+1)+\beta\mathcal R(\tilde T^j,(\tau\vee1)-1;\;M)\right) \mathbf{1}\{\tilde T(1)=\tilde s+\tilde e_j,\,\tau\ge1\}. \end{align*}
It is clear that
$(\tilde T^j,(\tau\vee1)-1)$
is a policy for
$\tilde s+\tilde e_j$
. By the maximality of
$\Phi$
, we obtain
This holds for an arbitrary policy
$\Pi\in\mathcal P(\tilde s)$
; hence
as desired.
It remains to show uniqueness. Suppose that
$\Psi(\tilde s;\;M)$
is another bounded solution to (8.1). Let
$X(\tilde s;\;M)=|\Phi(\tilde s;\;M)-\Psi(\tilde s;\;M)|$
.
Suppose
$\Phi(\tilde s;\;M)\gt M$
. Then there exists some
$k=1,\dots,d$
such that
By (8.1) applied to
$\Psi$
, we have
\begin{align*} \Phi(\tilde s;\;M)-\Psi(\tilde s;\;M) &\le \beta\,\mathbb E[\Phi(\tilde s+\tilde e_k;\;M)-\Psi(\tilde s+\tilde e_k;\;M)\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s)] \\ &\le \max_{1\le j\le d}\beta\,\mathbb E[X(\tilde s+\tilde e_j;\;M)\mid\mathcal F(\tilde s)]. \end{align*}
If instead
$\Phi(\tilde s;\;M)=M$
then (8.1) again yields
The same inequality holds on interchanging
$\Phi$
and
$\Psi$
; hence
By iterating this inequality and applying the tower rule, we obtain
for every
$n\in\mathbb N$
. Since X is bounded due to the boundedness of
$\Phi$
and
$\Psi$
, then
$X(\tilde s;\;M)\equiv0$
follows from taking
$n\to\infty$
.
Acknowledgements
The author expresses immense thanks to Dr. Ioannis Karatzas for proposing this topic, in addition to his suggestions, insight, and continued support; as well as the anonymous referees whose comments have greatly improved the contents and structure of this paper.
Funding information
This research was supported in part by NSF GRFP grant number DGE–2139899.
Competing interests
There were no competing interests to declare which arose during the preparation or publication process for this article.